British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

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ClintHardware
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British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#1

Post by ClintHardware » 07 Sep 2016, 13:54

Michael Kenny wrote:
I am not familiar with the NA numbers but what I did (for NWE) is get a start number and then total up all losses over an extended period. Once you struggle through the 'non combat loss/abandoned' get-outs you find that admitted losses were always well below the actual shrinkage. Also concentrate of the 'fit' tank total rather than all tanks still with the unit. The norm was a Panzer unit entered combat and in the first few days had a huge drop in fit tanks. This gave a pool of damaged tanks that were repairable and their return to service over the next week or so tended to mask the daily losses. The chaos of the eventual German flight meant this discrepancy could be attributed to all manner of reasons other than the mythical 'fair fight'. For example damaged tanks in overrun workshops could be classed as abandoned whilst the original action that rendered them beyond repair can be forgotten.

MarkN wrote: The very same story can be said of the British in the ME.

ClintHardware asks: Do we have areas of concern ?
Imperialism and Re-Armament NOW !

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#2

Post by MarkN » 22 Sep 2016, 18:27

ClintHardware wrote:Michael Kenny wrote:
I am not familiar with the NA numbers but what I did (for NWE) is get a start number and then total up all losses over an extended period. Once you struggle through the 'non combat loss/abandoned' get-outs you find that admitted losses were always well below the actual shrinkage. Also concentrate of the 'fit' tank total rather than all tanks still with the unit. The norm was a Panzer unit entered combat and in the first few days had a huge drop in fit tanks. This gave a pool of damaged tanks that were repairable and their return to service over the next week or so tended to mask the daily losses. The chaos of the eventual German flight meant this discrepancy could be attributed to all manner of reasons other than the mythical 'fair fight'. For example damaged tanks in overrun workshops could be classed as abandoned whilst the original action that rendered them beyond repair can be forgotten.

MarkN wrote: The very same story can be said of the British in the ME.

ClintHardware asks: Do we have areas of concern ?
We?

I have no idea whether Michael Kenny has an area, or areas of concern.

I have no idea whether you have an area, or areas of concern.

I have no areas of concern.

British staff officers and commanders at the time certainly did have areas of concern, however, they seem to have failed to recognise it/them. Another 'lesson' that they failed to spot, let alone learn.


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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#3

Post by ClintHardware » 23 Sep 2016, 13:07

That looks like a dodge but never mind.

Mark you were probably right to some extent in your original comment and if anyone has anything on this subject it would be interesting to see.
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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#4

Post by MarkN » 23 Sep 2016, 16:23

ClintHardware wrote:That looks like a dodge but never mind.
You ought to lose the habit of assuming that if I don't post the answer you were expecting I must be dodging.
ClintHardware wrote:Mark you were probably right to some extent in your original comment and if anyone has anything on this subject it would be interesting to see.
Context:
It's mid-April 1941. Rommel has just chased 2nd Armoured Division out of Cyrenaica, Stumm is doing the same to W Force in Greece. ME Command is starting to twitch about how they can prevent the Germans taking Cairo and the Suez. What have the got left in Egypt to stop the pantsers gobbling them up? DCGS sends out notes requesting urgent feedback from his staff departments.

Maj-General O'Moore-Creagh who is both GOC 7th Armoured Division and Director of AFVs responds with the ME tank state. The letter is dated 17 April 1941. Here is an extract from Appendix A to that letter.
Image

For the purposes of this discussion, please now concentrate your attention on the A9 column. You will notice that his report is that there are 28 serviceable A9 gun tanks with units. As GOC 7th Armoured Division and Director of AFV, you can assume he knows the state of 'his' tanks. But does he?

1RTR had just been sent into Tobruk with 10 A9 gun tanks. That's 10 accounted for. What about the other 18? Where are they?

Here's one of them....

Here are two images of the same tank, in the same location, from the same timeframe.
Image
Caption: Lorry column with supply goods on the mountain road to Derna - passing a wrecked british tank. May 1941
http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news- ... d542362081

Image
Caption: On the outskirts of the Libyan town of Derna, the crew of a British tank surrender to Italian soldiers. Libya, April 1941
http://www.gettyimages.com/detail/news- ... d141557308

With your knowledge of the theme and years of research, you will no doubt instantly grasp that that tank has probably been sitting there, in that state, since the latter half of February. Nevertheless, the quality of British staff officer, their record keeping and their intellectual capacity have lead them to believe that that tank is serviceable and with a unit that, presumably, can be sent to border to keep the pantsers out of Cairo. Some would call that delusion.

Where are the other 17?

The actual number of missing A9 gun tanks is higher than 17, but I'm keeping to the numbers as printed so no accusations of number inflation can be thrown at me. And don't forget, there are missing A10s and A13s as well. Where are they all?

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#5

Post by nmao » 23 Sep 2016, 18:35

Hi.

It's not a primary source, but it can be useful to compare that tank state to the one presented by Jentz for 1 March 1941.
jentz-tank-state-1-march-1941.JPG
jentz-tank-state-1-march-1941.JPG (19.53 KiB) Viewed 2118 times
jentz-tank-state-1-march-1941_pt2.JPG
jentz-tank-state-1-march-1941_pt2.JPG (21.6 KiB) Viewed 2118 times
regards.

-Nuno

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#6

Post by Mori » 23 Sep 2016, 19:03

MarkN wrote: Maj-General O'Moore-Creagh who is both GOC 7th Armoured Division and Director of AFVs responds with the ME tank state. The letter is dated 17 April 1941. Here is an extract from Appendix A to that letter.
Image
Could you specify the source of this document, just for our education?

I have long been looking for British daily status on armored vehicles and on personel. These data must be somewhere, as I can't see how you can manage to command a unit without permanent information on strength. I have looked in various sources but still haven't found these.

Oh, I did find daily losses of armored vehicles in war diaries of armored divisions (and not other divisions) during NW Europe campaign. An exception, so far.

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#7

Post by ClintHardware » 24 Sep 2016, 09:22

Interesting stuff - thank you Mark, Nmao and Mori.

References would be useful for everyone.
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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#8

Post by MarkN » 25 Sep 2016, 18:35

File reference on the document is BM/AFV/60.

I suspect it came from the appropriate AFV Branch ME Command TNA file.

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#9

Post by MarkN » 25 Sep 2016, 19:19

From that document, we can extrapolate that AFV ME Command had managed to lose 44 cruiser tanks in their paperwork and/or delusion: 24 A9/A9cs, 16 A10 and 4 A13.

In otherwords, of the 122 cruiser tanks they believed were "Serviceable with units", one third were effectively non-existant or 'lost' in the system/delusion. The majority of the other 78 had already been lost in Greece or Cyrenaica, or were shortly to be.

The consequence of this was that, as of 12 April (the date of this data), not a single cruiser tank was in the Western Desert with a unit ready to confront a possible German attack. Not a single cruiser tank was held by an operational unit in Egypt to be sent immediatly to the Western Desert. I do not have the full diary for 7RTR, so I cannot be entirely sure whether they had a sub-unit in the Western Desert with infantry tanks. If not, this means the only gun tanks in the Western Desert were the Vickers Mediums manned by A/1RTR of the Matruh Fortress!

So, back to the original post.
ClintHardware wrote: ClintHardware asks: Do we have areas of concern ?
I suggest that the British staff officers at the time certainly did have an area of concern. Not that they would ever recognise it though....

When you place this problem alongside the over-inflated claims of casualties to the enemy, it does not take much effort to grasp how easy it was for the British to get a few good slaps each time they went into battle. Rommel was not the genius that so may believe.

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#10

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 26 Sep 2016, 21:29

Hi,

Mark's letter is also present in WO169/952 - GHQ ME AFV diary for 1941 which is a must for anyone interested in this subject and depressing reading for the most part!

In terms of cruiser tanks in the covering letter, it is stated that "present assets are approximately:

1 Sqn 1 R.T.R. )
1 Sqn Composite Regt ) TOBRUK
1 Sqn 2 RTR - 7 Armd. Bde. Matruh

As the letter is dated 17 April, it might be too early to expect Creagh to know that all the cruisers sent there were in the process of breaking down or running off the road, and he does concede that "as much as one third of the potential may be in workshops for overhaul, and repair at any one time".

In Creagh's defence it should be pointed out that he was with 2nd Armoured Division (or at least the elements of that division in Cyrenaica) and "stayed a couple of days" but "it takes four long days to get back by car and I couldn't spare any more time"!

Incidentally again, Creagh states on 8 April that while 1 RTR was shipped to Tobruk with 11 cruisers there were also "ten cruisers in Tobruk which will be ready in ten days time".

Another interesting statement is that 2nd Armoured Division sent "most of its ordnance to Greece" which couldn't have helped!

Regards

Tom

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#11

Post by MarkN » 27 Sep 2016, 11:28

Tom from Cornwall wrote:Hi,

Mark's letter is also present in WO169/952 - GHQ ME AFV diary for 1941 which is a must for anyone interested in this subject and depressing reading for the most part!

In terms of cruiser tanks in the covering letter, it is stated that "present assets are approximately:

1 Sqn 1 R.T.R. )
1 Sqn Composite Regt ) TOBRUK
1 Sqn 2 RTR - 7 Armd. Bde. Matruh

As the letter is dated 17 April, it might be too early to expect Creagh to know that all the cruisers sent there were in the process of breaking down or running off the road, and he does concede that "as much as one third of the potential may be in workshops for overhaul, and repair at any one time".

In Creagh's defence it should be pointed out that he was with 2nd Armoured Division (or at least the elements of that division in Cyrenaica) and "stayed a couple of days" but "it takes four long days to get back by car and I couldn't spare any more time"!

Incidentally again, Creagh states on 8 April that while 1 RTR was shipped to Tobruk with 11 cruisers there were also "ten cruisers in Tobruk which will be ready in ten days time".
Hi Tom,

Thanks for confirming the TNA file reference. I'm sure it is much appreciated by those seeking it.

It is not my intention to nitpick, however, your post highlights how the 'delusion' was even worse than the 'missing' 44 I mentionned.

The "present assets are approximately" are as follows:-
- 1 Sqn 1RTR in Tobruk in reality is just 10 A9 and 1 A10. These are not included in the 'missing' 44 as they are not 'missing'. They are included in the other 78 which are "serviceable with units". Moreover those 11 were the only cruiser tanks found in Egypt able to be sent forward. DAFV has calculated there were 55, not 11.
- 1 Sqn Comp Regt in Tobruk is undoubtably the 10 tanks mentonned by Richardson(*) in his letter of 8th April and were the 10 A13 left behind by 5RTR or recovered from their march forward. The first became available on the 8th; they had 9 operational by the 15th. They are not included in the 'missing' 44 as they are not 'missing'. They are included in the other 78 which are "serviceable with units" - despite their serviceability on the 12th being in question.
- 1 Sqn 2RTR on Matruh is not correct. C/2RTR was on its way to Matruh. It only departed Egypt on the morning of 17th by road and rail. Moreover, it only received its 16 cruiser tanks in the preceeding 2 days (3 from RAOC Abassia on 15th, 13 from RAOC El Wardian on 16th). These tanks were not fully completed, but the best available. Moreover, these were drawn from the numbers noted as held by RAOC on the 12th - thus they too are not included in the 'missing' 44 as they are not 'missing'.

(*) Tom, the letter of 8th April was penned by Richardson not O'Moore Creagh. Creagh did not spend a couple of days with 2 Div, it was Richardson. O'Moore Creagh was still in Turkey on the 8th.

As regards O'Moore Creagh knowing how many of 2nd Armoured Division's tanks were in the process of breaking down, to avoid that conundrum I totally eleminated 2nd Armoured Division's tanks from the calculation. To clarify, the 'missing' 44 are ALL tanks used by (allocated to) 7th Armoured Division - O'Moore Creagh's division. All 44 'missing' tanks are supposed to be in Egypt not on the frontline in either Cyrenaica or Greece.

Of the 44 'missing' cruiser tanks, I can place/locate with reasonable certainty about 15. One reference suggests the location of another 6 or 7, but if correct, those 6-7 NEVER made it back to operations. So, hardly serviceable. The implication being that either: (a) there were in the region of 30 tanks stranded somewhere, probably for the previous 6-8 weeks, (as per the A9 pictured above) but still being recorded as "serviceable with units"; or, (b) RAOC has written off that number as being beyond repair subsequent to the census of 1 March - and nobody else has been updated to this rather important administrative event; or (c) a combination of the two; or (d) some other administrative record keeping failure (of which 1 I can easily identify).

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#12

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 27 Sep 2016, 21:23

Hi Mark,

Thanks for the reply and pointing out that 8 April 1941 letter was in fact produced by Lt Col Richards rather than Creagh as I mistakenly had it. Very poor staff work on my part... :oops: My bad. Thanks for the details against the estimates made by AFV Branch - they do seem to have been in a bit of a pickle. 8O

It does appear that both General Creagh and Col Richards were away at a rather inopportune moment at end of March - beginning of April. I hadn't realised Creagh had gone to Turkey though, thanks for pointing that out.

One thing that I think is clear from reading through the early '41 appendices to the GHQ ME AFV Branch diary is, however, that the appalling state of armoured formations in Cyrenaica was known to GHQ ME, if not in exact detail, certainly in enough detail that it should have been raising concerns that any action could result in complete collapse of those elements of 3 Armoured Brigade in the forward area. For example, it is clear that the utter mechanical uselessness of the captured Italian tanks equipping 6 RTR was being reported and that the extremely fragile state of 5 RTR's cruisers was also known; equally it was realised that the light tanks of 3 Hussars were of no use whatsoever against German armoured formations. As Richards says in the 8 April letter "This [the collapse in Cyrenaica] is a very gloomy picture, but is only what could be expected if the enemy launched anything big against us and this he has been able to do".

As for 7 Armd Division, I noted that according to Gairdner's letter when Brigadier AFV on 23 May 41:

"In 7 Armoured Division a careful record was always kept of tank mileage and by means of graphs it was easy to see at once what "life" was left in tanks at any given time. I am inaugurating this system, the only difficulty being that [sic] the time between when the return is rendered and when it arrives here."

I know that O'Connor's Corps HQ was dispersed when replaced by CYRCOM, do you happen to know what happened to HQ 7 Armoured Division when they were relieved by 2 Armd Div? Did they all disappear to the fleshpots of Cairo?

Given that even by 25 May Gairdner was reporting that there were only 7 transporters capable of carrying I tanks and 5 capable of carrying cruiser tanks how were they even attempting to get broken down tanks back to the workshops in the Delta?

Regards

Tom

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#13

Post by MarkN » 28 Sep 2016, 19:47

Hello Tom,
Tom from Cornwall wrote:Thanks for the reply and pointing out that 8 April 1941 letter was in fact produced by Lt Col Richards rather than Creagh as I mistakenly had it. Very poor staff work on my part... :oops:
My bad staff work too. Richards was on, on, on to Richardson. :lol:
Tom from Cornwall wrote: It does appear that both General Creagh and Col Richards were away at a rather inopportune moment at end of March - beginning of April. I hadn't realised Creagh had gone to Turkey though, thanks for pointing that out.
I do not believe their absence from the office made a blind bit of difference. The information failure (or delusion) was a long term issue derived from admin doctrine. The system was at fault, and the personnel in the system had neither the intellect nor the desire to find a way around the system to benefit the troops on the front line. Anyway, who wants to do more work than necessary when there's an ice cold beer waiting at the club?
Tom from Cornwall wrote: One thing that I think is clear from reading through the early '41 appendices to the GHQ ME AFV Branch diary is, however, that the appalling state of armoured formations in Cyrenaica was known to GHQ ME, if not in exact detail, certainly in enough detail that it should have been raising concerns that any action could result in complete collapse of those elements of 3 Armoured Brigade in the forward area. For example, it is clear that the utter mechanical uselessness of the captured Italian tanks equipping 6 RTR was being reported and that the extremely fragile state of 5 RTR's cruisers was also known; equally it was realised that the light tanks of 3 Hussars were of no use whatsoever against German armoured formations. As Richards says in the 8 April letter "This [the collapse in Cyrenaica] is a very gloomy picture, but is only what could be expected if the enemy launched anything big against us and this he has been able to do".

As for 7 Armd Division, I noted that according to Gairdner's letter when Brigadier AFV on 23 May 41:

"In 7 Armoured Division a careful record was always kept of tank mileage and by means of graphs it was easy to see at once what "life" was left in tanks at any given time. I am inaugurating this system, the only difficulty being that [sic] the time between when the return is rendered and when it arrives here."
The problems were complex and deeply rooted into the very fabric and working culture of the British Army and the mentality and attitude around the British officer 'class'.

I have no time now to put my thoughts into words, and even if I did, a PhD thesis wouldn't do the subject justice. However, a good start point to understanding the specific issues going on here is to first take on board the de facto reality that the British Army is, and always was, a colonial policing force that enjoyed the occasional heated engagement with vastly inferior (technologically) opposition. And they even managed to delude themselves over how good they were at doing that too. To beat the Boers with equally effective rifles, they had to swamp them with masses of troops and introduce the concentration camp system to the world! More recently, they've failed in both Iraq and Afghanistan! If only they had the numbers and could reintroduce the camps, they'd have sorted out them flip-floppers no problem...
Tom from Cornwall wrote: I know that O'Connor's Corps HQ was dispersed when replaced by CYRCOM, do you happen to know what happened to HQ 7 Armoured Division when they were relieved by 2 Armd Div? Did they all disappear to the fleshpots of Cairo?
CYRCOM was O'Connor's WDF Rear HQ rebadged. The only part that was disbanded was the very small Advanced HQ. There were, of course, normal personnel rotations which changed faces. HQ 7 Armoured Division also remained intact, but personnel dispersed and it was effectively completely non-operational until O'Moore Creagh took it back to the Western Desert in May.
Tom from Cornwall wrote: Given that even by 25 May Gairdner was reporting that there were only 7 transporters capable of carrying I tanks and 5 capable of carrying cruiser tanks how were they even attempting to get broken down tanks back to the workshops in the Delta?
Very good question. Another one would be, why were they evacuating them all back to the Delta. The Germans didn't evacuate anything back to Tripoli. It's back to the old Colonial Policing mentality usurping large-scale industrial warfare requirements.

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#14

Post by Michael Kenny » 28 Sep 2016, 21:04

MarkN wrote:Another one would be, why were they evacuating them all back to the Delta. The Germans didn't evacuate anything back to Tripoli. It's back to the old Colonial Policing mentality usurping large-scale industrial warfare requirements.
If you read the 'Repairing The panzers' books you can read how German units were hanging on to their wrecks and sending very little back for homeland repair. The situation was considered serious enough for orders to be issued forbidding the practice-which were ignored-they never did solve the problem, The result being panzers being kept 'in repair' that never ever got repaired. Every army has its foibles

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Re: British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

#15

Post by MarkN » 28 Sep 2016, 21:56

Michael Kenny wrote: Every army has its foibles
Some more than others.

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