British Errors in Reporting Tank States and Losses

[Richard Anderson]

Yes, Richards was G.W. "Ricky" Richards CBE DSO MC of RTR. He seems to have survived much contact with Montgomery, so clearly he can't have been a duffer!

Regards

Tom

Thanks for the confirmation Tom; I was going mostly by memory since I don't have access to most of those file copies now. I do remember how scant and lacking in detail many of the early reports were. By Gazala the reports were scheduled and more detailed, so I suppose experience played a part. In any case, I was trying to answer the question of whether or not he was a donkey-walloper or a tankie.

Cheers!

[Richard Anderson]

Trawling forward through the GHQ AFV file, I was surprised to see that even by 10 June 1941 British tank regiments were only "equipped with wireless on minimum scale of 30 sets per Armd Regt CRME/10443/AFV of 25 February refers."

I had always thought that by this point all British tanks were fitted with wireless sets, now I understand why earlier in the year Richards should have been concerning himself about the lack of a tank flag that signalled specifically that the tank had run onto a minefield.

Regards

Tom

Not really surprised. Most of the tank "radios" I suspect in most countries were actually preset receivers tied into the command net. The US Army Armored Force progressed through distinct stages of thinking as to whether or not the non-officer tank commanders needed to talk back to their betters or not; usually only the platoon commander's and his platoon sergeant's tanks had transmitter-receivers. In that respect and were not fully wireless until c. February 1944...and even that was probably in theory only.

[MarkN]

Richard and Tom,

Regarding Richards: most definitely a tankie. Google is your friend: http://www.iwm.org.uk/collections/item/ ... 1030008481

Regarding radios: reading around the document you mention Tom, I think you'll find a few notes on the shortage of radios in the ME. Notes on how one set was having to be installed instead of another etc etc. Remember not long before they had installed about 60 into Italian tanks only to lose the lot in a matter of days. In otherwords, the standard was indeed for each tank to have 2-way communication radios, but there simply wasn't enough to go around.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi all,

I picked up the 600+ pages of WO169/926 - GHQ ME, GSD1a the other day at Kew in search of more evidence of staff work in this area in 1941 and find that on 10 Feb 41 GSD2 (dammit have to look at them next time!) produced CRME/3816/3/GSD.2 which covered a "Statement of Deficiencies in Middle East excluding East Africa" which contains appendices covering W.E. Reserve Holdings and deficiencies in main items of equipment including:

Small Arms and S.A.A; Field Arty and amn; AA Arty and amn; "A" and "B" Vehicles; R.E. Equipment; Signal Equipment; Captured Italian rifles and A.Tk guns.

If anyone wants to know how many power saws or F.B.E. Mk. III there were in theatre or on way or in reserve just shout.

Regards

Tom

[David W]

S,A,A Field Arty & AA Arty deficiencies are of interest to me Tom.

T.I.A
David.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Source: WO169/926 - GHQ ME, GSD1a CRME/3816/3/GSD.2 dated 10 Feb 41.

Item: 25pdr
W.E.: 744
90 days Reserve: 68
Total Reqts: 812
Holdings & Transit: 435
Deficiencies: 377

Item: 18-pdr
W.E.: 48
90 days Reserve: 4
Total Reqts: 52
Holdings & Transit: 96
Deficiencies: + 44

There is also a rather confused note under remarks which says "76 18/25-pdr are (25-pdr included in holdings of (Details concerning return of guns to INDIA have been set out in WOLO Note CRME/3754/R.A. of 20 Jan 41.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

I had a look at the 7th Armd Div Workshops RAOC file for 1941 today and find that they only arrived in Egypt in Jan/Feb 41 and didn't move up to the Western Desert until June 1941, which obviously begs the question of who was meant to be looking after 7 Armd Div's tanks during Operation Compass?

I also had a look in some Official History correspondence letters and found a very interesting collection of documents that talk about the decision to withdraw 7 Armd Div all the way back to Egypt in Feb 1941, what happened to their tanks, guns, vehicles, etc. As soon as I get a spare few minutes I'll post some of it up.

Unfortunately for those of us suggesting that MarkN is being too harsh on the British, it looks on a very cursory reading that, in fact, he might not be being harsh enough.

Regards

Tom

[Urmel]

[MarkN]

Hello Tom,

Sounds like you found some treasure....

Here's to hoping you find lots of time to post up lots of interesting excerpts.

Regarding your question, "who was ... looking after 7 Armd Div's tanks during Operation Compass", the answer is fairly simple: 7th Armd Div Workshops, the three Brigade level LRS and all the various unit fitters and mechanics. Additionally, an AOW (Advanced Ordnance Workshop) was set up in Tobruk.

An armoured division was established with both a 'divisional workshop' and an attached 'RAOC workshop'. It seems 7th Armd Div only got the latter of those two mid-41. The names are easily confused to the unwary. For example, the 1st Armd Div in France 1940 had its own 1st Armoured Division Workshops alongside the attached 1st Division Section, Armoured Corps Workshops, RAOC.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Hi,

The source is CAB103/329 which is mainly full of correspondence reference the publication of the official history The Mediterranean and the Middle East Volume 1 but at the beginning of the file are some tables of questions and answers although it is not immediately clear where the questions have come from, but they seem familiar to some we have been asking here.

1. What was Wavell’s real part in the offensive in Cyrenaica begun in the winter of 1940?
2. Why did he recommend the Greek expedition without making sure of his position in the Western Desert.
3.
(a) Why did he send the 7th Armoured Division back from Benghazi to refit its tanks and thus destroy his power to resist Rommel?
(b) Is it true that the Tanks in going back under their own power to their base in Egypt wore out a remaining life quite sufficient to deal with Rommel or deter him.
4. Why did he not send to Crete enough the 400 Tanks (1) sent him from home to repair his losses.
5. Why was he so ineffectual in bringing the rest into action against Rommel as to destroy all fruits of the risks run in sending them to him.

I thought that Appendix "A" which refers to question 3(b) might be of interest:

Appendix “A”
Some comments on the withdrawal of the 7th Armd Division from the forward area in February 1941

1. The “Atmosphere” in Cairo in February was that the war in the Western Desert was as good as over.

2. Intelligence. This “end of term” feeling tended to nullify all the reports received of enemy reinforcements arriving through Tripoli. Wavell realised by the 24th March that he had made a wrong assessment as to the date when the enemy might attack, but Neame in Cyrenaica in spite of all the air and ground reports to the contrary still disbelieved that any attack was likely.

On the 27th March at a conference at HQ 2nd Armd Division he “stressed the point that he was confident that no threat of serious enemy attack was imminent” and two days later at the HQ of 2nd Support Group he denied the presence of any German troops in Tripolitania except for a few technical experts.

3. The order for the withdrawal of the 7th Armd Division to Cairo seems to have been very hastily issued.

The tanks were dealt with as already described but the order entailed that all the artillery, all the infantry and all the dismounted tank crews moved to Cairo with their own unit transport.

The distance was about 900 miles and the journey took about 8 days. With them they took about 1500 trucks and lorries and the departure of this mass of transport made the administrative difficulties in the forward area acute and in the end may have contributed to the final defeat.

G.H.Q. – M.E.F. seems to have woken up too late to what was happening but they managed to stop the 1st Regiment R.H.A. at El Adem and 104th Regiment R.H.A. at Daaba but the other guns and all the infantry streamed on to Cairo, where they handed in all their vehicles for overhaul.

The Division as a fighting formation had ceased to exist by the end of the month and in an emergency the artillery and infantry could not have got back to the front in under two weeks and the Armoured units would have taken much longer.

I have never been able to understand why they went beyond Tobruk where they were suitably placed to move in any direction quickly.

4. Repair Facilities. The reason may lie in what repair facilities were then available and where these were sited. In peace-time there were very few repair shops in the M.E.F. and by the end of 1940 this situation had not been greatly improved and we know that the Armoured Divisional Workshop for the 7th Armd Division only arrived in Egypt in February 1941.

There were then no Tank Recovery Sections nor were there any Tank Delivery units and it would appear as though there was no heavy repair shop in Tobruk capable of handling tanks.

On the other hand the workshops then existing in the forward area should have been capable of handling the overhaul of all the trucks and lorries. It does seem ill-advised therefore to have sent all this transport beyond Tobruk, from where it would have been easy to have sent the personnel in batches by sea and rail to Cairo for their well earned rest.

5. Armour. We know that after the battle of Beda Fomm there remained in the forward area approximately 36 Cruisers and 80 Light Tanks. The latter had reached the end of their useful life, but it is hard to understand why on the 30th March not even one Armoured Brigade could be assembled to meet Rommel.

The 3rd Armoured Brigade could then only muster 33 light tanks with the 3 Hussars; 23 Cruisers with 5 R.T.R. and some Italian M.13 tanks manned by the 6 R.T.R.

It would appear to have been unsound to leave this formation so ill equipped if it was the only armoured force available and one cannot help feeling that if more thought had been given to the matter in February a comparatively well found Armoured Brigade could have been made up.

6. The Mersa Brega Position. I would stress the point here that this position did not fall to Rommel’s assault as the result of a tank attack. It fell because there were insufficient infantry and artillery to hold it.

In fact it was almost tank proof owing to marshes and heavy sand. It stretched for about 8 miles inland and there were only 4 companies of infantry to hold it. The result was that there was a space of about 1½ miles between the village and the sea that was only defended by machine gun fire and it was here that Rommel’s infantry made their successful attack late in the evening after his infantry guns had knocked out the M.G. defence and the German supporting weapons had halted and destroyed the very gallant counter attack led by our carriers in an effort to restore the position.

I maintain that if we had had another Battalion supporting by a field Regiment R.A. we would have held the position and it is for this reason that I have explored the availability of infantry and artillery units in addition to the tanks.

If Rommel had tried to turn the position he would first have had to have enlarged the poor water facilities at Agheila and then after marching across our front would have plunged into hummicky going which his wheeled vehicles could only have negotiated very slowly.

Neither side then had the huge water convoys which came later and the only really good water points were at Sirte, Mersa Brega and Agedabia.

The artillery of the 2nd Armd Division had gone to Greece and 1 and 104 Regiments R.H.A. which had been stopped on their way back to Cairo had returned to support the front line by the 30th March but the leading battalion of the 7th Armd Division (1/K.R.R.C.) did not leave Cairo till the 29th March and did not become involved in the fighting till we had been driven back to Maraua.

4 R.H.A. and the Medium Regiments never got back till Tobruk was surrounded.

And I thought this snippet would make MarkN smile:

(N.B. Owing to the destruction of Records at G.H.Q. Cairo in 1942 no relevant reports of tank states now exist.)

I'll try to post up some of the detailed answers to those questions as well.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

More from CAB103/329:

3. (a)
Why did he [Wavell] send the 7th Armoured Division back from Benghazi to refit its tanks and thus destroy his power to resist Rommel?

General Playfair’s assessment: Vol.II 2nd Draft p.2.
7 Armoured Division had been continually in action for 8 months and was mechanically exhausted and needed a complete overhaul.

Historical Section Narratives – Records and Personal Comments:
True but it could still muster at least 36 Cruiser and 80 Light Tanks. After the breaking up of the 2nd Armoured Division it was the only fully trained Armoured formation left in the M.E.F. See Appx “A”
Surely it was ill-advised to withdraw it all the way to Cairo. It needed a rest admittedly but could have carried this out whilst refitting (say) at Tobruk.

Answer:
No explanation exists.
The only valid excuse for this move lies in the fact that when ordered on 17th February no operations were expected to take place in Cyrenaica till May.

3. (b)
Is it true that the Tanks in going back under their own power to their base in Egypt wore out a remaining life quite sufficient to deal with Rommel or deter him.

General Playfair’s assessment: Vol.II 2nd Draft
I can find no reference to this subject nor in fact are alternative roles for the 7th Armoured Division discussed.
The assessment is that it was “finished” as a fighting formation for the time being.

Historical Section Narratives – Records and Personal Comments:
War Diaries Feb.1941: 7 Armd Div, 4 Armd Bde, 7 Armd Bde, 3 Hussars, 7 Hussars, 1 RTR, 2 RTR, 7 RTR.
The 7 Armoured Division was relieved on 18th Feb. and concentrated in the Antelat area with orders to move back to Cairo.
No tanks were to accompany it.
It is not easy to establish in detail what happened to the Tanks but it would appear that all that remained were “on their last legs”.
3 Hussars being originally a unit of 2 Armoured Division were to stay behind and all the Light Tanks that had any fight left in them were handed over to them. On 21st Feb. they had over 63 Light Tanks which they weeded down to 46. The remaining Light tanks were handed over to Divisional Workshops (just south of Benghazi).

2 R.T.R. took over all the Cruisers which could travel and marched with them to Tobruk where they were handed in to Army Ordnance Workshops for sea voyage to Alexandria. The remaining Cruisers were handed in to Divisional Workshops.

7 R.T.R. had only 31 ‘I’ Tanks in the forward area. These were concentrated in Tobruk and handed over to Army Ordnance Workshops for sea passage to Alexandria.

No tank of any type thus marched beyond Tobruk, i.e. a distance of 240 miles.

(N.B. Owing to the destruction of Records at G.H.Q. Cairo in 1942 no relevant reports of tank states now exist.)

Answer:
No! not entirely.

All the good Light tanks remained with 3 Hussars.

All the good Cruisers and I Tanks marched to Tobruk.

The remaining “not to[o] good” Light Tanks and Cruisers went to Benghazi.

The distance from Antelat to the front line at Mersa Brega is about 100 miles.

See Appendix ‘A’.

Having read through these comments and those in Appendix "A", I'm thinking that these questions and answers were put together by Brigadier Latham who was, I think, involved in the War Office Historical Section and had been in command of 2nd Armd Div Support Group in March 1941. Is that right?

Regards

Tom

[MarkN]

Tom,

Some very interesting words and thoughts in there. Thank you for finding the time.

Yes, the Brigadier Latham commanding the 2nd Support Group in Cyrenaica March 1941 is the same Brigadier Latham who was head of the Cabinet Official War History Section into the early 1950s.

If he is the author of "Appendix A", it is a rather interesting comment that he feels he could have held up Rommel if he had another infantry battalion to play with and an RA Regt instead of an RHA Regt - unless he meant both.

I maintain that if we had had another Battalion supporting by a field Regiment R.A. we would have held the position and it is for this reason that I have explored the availability of infantry and artillery units in addition to the tanks.

Neame had a further 8 Australian infantry battalions at his disposal and 1 British MG battalion. Gambier-Parry had divvied up his forces and given 1RHA to 3 Armd Bde. CYRCOM had the forces to hold at Mersa el Brega if the author is to be believed.

If Playfair was unable to find any documentary record of how decisions were being made etc etc, I doubt we are going to fare any better 60-70 years later. But we can speculate of course.

[MarkN]

Hello Tom,

I'll have another look at the tank stats that I have as some interesting calculations can be made. But that will be in a day or two.

However, this popped out and I thought deserved a bit more attention. Its part of Annex A you posted a couple of days back (my bold)...

Appendix “A”
Some comments on the withdrawal of the 7th Armd Division from the forward area in February 1941

1. The “Atmosphere” in Cairo in February was that the war in the Western Desert was as good as over.

2. Intelligence. This “end of term” feeling tended to nullify all the reports received of enemy reinforcements arriving through Tripoli. Wavell realised by the 24th March that he had made a wrong assessment as to the date when the enemy might attack, but Neame in Cyrenaica in spite of all the air and ground reports to the contrary still disbelieved that any attack was likely.

On the 27th March at a conference at HQ 2nd Armd Division he “stressed the point that he was confident that no threat of serious enemy attack was imminent” and two days later at the HQ of 2nd Support Group he denied the presence of any German troops in Tripolitania except for a few technical experts.

CYRCOM WD makes no mention of either conference.
2nd Armd Div WD was lost.
2nd Spt Gp WD makes no mention of either conference.
The report on the loss of 2nd Armd Div makes no mention of either conference.
Neame's report of the episode written in captivity in late April and early May 1941 makes no mention of either conference.

So where did the author of Annex A get this information from?

The 2nd Spt Gp issued Op Inst No.1 on 22 March 1941 and the first paragraph reads: "Probably one German Armd Div of about 200 AFVs and one Inf Motorised Bde with supporting arms now facing 2 AD WEST of AGHEILA."

If the author of Annex A is indeed Brig Latham, then he could be writing from his own personal recollection of the meetings.

Nevertheless, whoever the author is, if the conferences did occur as claimed, and the words are a true reflection of his comments and thoughts at the time, they are shocking indictment of his understanding of the situation and the threats to his command.

[MarkN]

Having done a few calculations, I've decided there's nothing worth writing up about the tank states of the time.

All the numbers do is confirm what we already know: broken tanks were littered all across the desert; nobody was keeping tabs on them; Ordnance Census data was being used well beyond its sell by date; the staff officers using that Ordnance data did not have the intellectual capacity to question the data and were more than happy to regurgitate it even further past the sell by date - to the point of allocating non-existant tanks to units for the defence of Egypt!

It seems to have been London that finally saw the numbers simply didn't add up and queried it. This prompted Wavell into having to explain in more detail the tank state at the beginning of May.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Nark,

A little more from CAB103/329:

4. Why did he [Wavell] not send to Crete enough of the 400 Tanks (1) sent him from home to repair his losses.
(1) I may be wrong over this but have assumed that the 400 Tanks referred to comprised:
(a) The 156 which arrived in September 1940 with the three Armoured Regiments.
(b) The 238 delivered by “Tiger” Convoy in May 1941.

General Playfair’s assessment:
I cannot find any reference to this in Playfair’s Vol. II 2nd Draft.
The only reference to Tanks in Crete occur on:
P.208 – Two ‘I’ Tanks in Maleme Sector.
P.220 – Two Light Tanks at Galatas.

Historical Section Narratives – Records and Personal Comments:
The best detailed account of the operations in Crete is contained in:- The Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War 1939-45 “Crete” by D.M. Davin.
The story as given there agrees with and expands that given by the Prime Minister in “The Second World War” Vol. III pages 218-223.
Pages 49-50 of the New Zealand account read:-
Wavell had first mentioned these (Tanks) to Freyberg in his message of 7th May, suggesting that if carefully concealed they might intervene effectively. Freyberg had welcomed the proposal… (but) had pointed out that the shore installations could not lift heavy tanks. In the event 16 Light Tanks of C Squadron 3 Hussars and 6 ‘I’ Tanks of B Squadron 7 Royal Tank Regiment were with difficulty got ashore by 15th May.

Our records show that by the 1st May approx 20,000 troops had been evacuated to Crete from Greece. Before any defence of the island could take place these had to be re-organised and completely re-equipped. The Germans were expected to assault the island on the 17th May and in the short time allowed and though many reinforcements were included, the bulk of the space in the convoys was allotted to Infantry weapons, artillery equipments, signalling and defence stores and transport as well as to the very large administrative requirements.

Wavell had very few Tanks that he could spare. The ‘Tiger’ Convoy docked on 12th May and so none of the Tanks it carried could be made available in time for shipment to Crete. Besides all these Tanks were required for the reformation of the 7 Armd Division which was a first priority.
All the Tanks of the 1st and 3rd Armoured Brigades (2 Armd Division) had been lost and it would seem that after equipping the “Armoured Force” [1] for the Tobruk garrison there was little left except those in the base workshops i.e. some very worn Lt. Tanks, a few cruisers and the balance of the ‘I’ Tanks of 7 RTR. Of these he sent 16 Lt. Tanks and 6 ‘I’ Tanks to Crete.

[1] 1 RTR – 23 Cruisers.
7 RTR – 12 ‘I’ Tanks.

Answer:
In my opinion Wavell sent nearly all the Tanks he could make available by 17th May.
At Freyberg’s request other equipment and vital stores were shipped first.
In Wavell’s appreciation Armoured reinforcements for Tobruk and the re-equipping of the 7 Armoured Division had first priority

Regards
Tom