Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

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BDV
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Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#1

Post by BDV » 15 Nov 2016, 16:14

Malta sat astride Italian shipping lanes to the North Africa front. Also, it provided a golden propaganda opportunity (Eternal Glory to the Heroic Defenders of Malta! :milsmile: ; and lets laugh at the puny Mussolinisti :lol: ), its defenders dished out punishment as good as they took. OTOH the defense came at a great cost; throughout 1941, especially, Britain was on a tight squeeze.

When all is said and done, was the decision to defend Malta a net gain or net loss for Great Britain?
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#2

Post by steverodgers801 » 15 Nov 2016, 21:21

well the destruction it caused to the Italian merchant fleet alone made it a good decision. plus it is always easier to held a place then take it back later


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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#3

Post by MarkN » 16 Nov 2016, 23:20

BDV wrote:Malta sat astride Italian shipping lanes to the North Africa front. Also, it provided a golden propaganda opportunity (Eternal Glory to the Heroic Defenders of Malta! :milsmile: ; and lets laugh at the puny Mussolinisti :lol: ), its defenders dished out punishment as good as they took. OTOH the defense came at a great cost; throughout 1941, especially, Britain was on a tight squeeze.

When all is said and done, was the decision to defend Malta a net gain or net loss for Great Britain?
Thee is an alternate way to look at this. If Malta was so unimportant, why did the Axis put so much effort into trying to neutralise it. And, furthermore, why didn't they try to take it?

When all is said and done, was the Axis decision to attack Malta, and their failure, a net gain or net loss for the Axis?

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#4

Post by stg 44 » 19 Nov 2016, 15:41

BDV wrote:Malta sat astride Italian shipping lanes to the North Africa front. Also, it provided a golden propaganda opportunity (Eternal Glory to the Heroic Defenders of Malta! :milsmile: ; and lets laugh at the puny Mussolinisti :lol: ), its defenders dished out punishment as good as they took. OTOH the defense came at a great cost; throughout 1941, especially, Britain was on a tight squeeze.

When all is said and done, was the decision to defend Malta a net gain or net loss for Great Britain?
How is this remotely arguable? It was a huge net gain. It saved Tobruk and immobilized Rommel in 1941 and then was vital at interdicting Rommel's supplies during the Tunisian campaign. It forced the Axis to expend huge resources suppressing it and cost them quite a bit of scarce ones. Yes the Brits took it on the chin trying to supply it, but they had the resources to spare to maintain it, the Axis did not have nearly as much to spare to suppress it. While less of a factor in 1942 Malta still remained a major threat and required Axis forces to suppress it; 2nd Air Fleet had to be withdrawn from Russia in 1941 right before the Soviets launched their December counteroffensive to bomb Malta. That certainly cost the Germans dearly in the East.

If we play the counterfactual game and assume it was abandoned in early 1941 then Rommel can build up the necessary supplies to take Tobruk and invade Egypt successfully before the Operation Crusader forces can be built up. Italian merchant shipping would remain relatively unblooded, while the Middle East may well fall to Arab uprisings and Axis invasion if Egypt falls.

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#5

Post by OHara » 21 Nov 2016, 05:08

I think BVD asks a good question. When you look at war as a whole the cost of defending Malta to the United Kingdom was high. Maybe it was worth it, maybe it wasn’t but it was hardly a “huge net gain” as stg 44 says.

The first thing to look at is what did the British War Cabinet consider its strategic priorities. What did points in the British Empire did they absolutely have to retain possession of to prevent defeat, particularly in the period before the U.S. came in? Well, first the Home Island. After that they identified Hamadan (Mid East oil) Singapore (the Far East). Ceylon (the Indian Ocean), and the capitals of all the Dominions, of course. Malta, Suez, and the Mediterranean were not on their list. Malta and Suez were in the nice to have, but not the absolutely necessary to have category. This is because as long as the Axis held Sicily, the British could not use the Mediterranean for traffic. The decision made in September 1940 to retain Malta was more of a political than a military decision. This is not to say it was wrong or bad but it is to say that many important elements in the British military, like the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, felt it would have been better to abandon Malta from the onset.

So, what happened is that the British made the retention of a secondary objective one of their main military goals during the war’s second and third year. This cost them, possibly, Singapore and Burma because a lot of the aircraft, troops, and fleet units originally intended for the Far East ended up in the Middle East. That’s just one line of argument that can be made. It’s also easy to argue that Italy had no real reason to fight in North Africa. The conquest of Tripoli was not going to force Italy out of the war. Germany had little strategic reason to be engaged in the Mediterranean, other than to support their ally. I think it’s clear that there was only one way to defeat Germany and that was the way Germany was defeated: by occupying Berlin. I think it’s relevant to note that when Soviet troops entered Berlin the Germans still held parts of Italy and still had a presence on the Mediterranean coast. So much for the Mediterranean being a decisive theater of war.

Counterarguments: What would the British (and Italians) do, especially in 1941, if they didn’t fight in the Mediterranean? What impact did the deployment of 400+ German aircraft in the Mediterranean have on the Russian campaign? What would France (and Spain) have done if the British didn’t hold out in the Mediterranean?

Yes, it’s an interesting question.

Vince

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#6

Post by MarkN » 21 Nov 2016, 14:49

Lot's of random opinion. Not a single shred of evidence to support the opinion. Let's see some numbers....
BDV wrote: OTOH the defense came at a great cost; throughout 1941, especially, Britain was on a tight squeeze.
What was the cost?
What was lost exactly?
How did that compare to Axis losses trying to neutralise Malta?
What percentage was that loss compared to British total effort? I mean, if the answer is 1%, hardly making the tight squeeze that much tighter is it.
BDV wrote: When all is said and done, was the decision to defend Malta a net gain or net loss for Great Britain?
Depends largely on the numbers coming from the questions above.
OHara wrote:I think BVD asks a good question. When you look at war as a whole the cost of defending Malta to the United Kingdom was high.
You say it was high. How high? What are the numbers?
OHara wrote: The first thing to look at is what did the British War Cabinet consider its strategic priorities. What did points in the British Empire did they absolutely have to retain possession of to prevent defeat, particularly in the period before the U.S. came in? Well, first the Home Island. After that they identified Hamadan (Mid East oil) Singapore (the Far East). Ceylon (the Indian Ocean), and the capitals of all the Dominions, of course. Malta, Suez, and the Mediterranean were not on their list. Malta and Suez were in the nice to have, but not the absolutely necessary to have category. This is because as long as the Axis held Sicily, the British could not use the Mediterranean for traffic. The decision made in September 1940 to retain Malta was more of a political than a military decision.
Are these political meetings and decisions actual historical events or your assumptions to fit your opinion?
OHara wrote: So, what happened is that the British made the retention of a secondary objective one of their main military goals during the war’s second and third year. This cost them, possibly, Singapore and Burma because a lot of the aircraft, troops, and fleet units originally intended for the Far East ended up in the Middle East.
You have evidence that the Suez and Malta were secondary objectives?
You have evidence that it was a political decision to uograde them to a "main military goal"?
How much did it cost them?
What exactly was diverted from Singapore and Burma to Malta?
What exactly was diverted from Singapore and Burma to the ME generally? Note these need to be separate issues not lumped together as you have done.
Would what was sent to Malta have made a difference to the result in Singapore or Burma? If not, the "cost" was not the loss of the two.
OHara wrote: That’s just one line of argument that can be made.
Please make it. But to make an argument, rather than just offer an opinion, you have to present the evidence to support that argument. So, numbers please and perhaps some document references for the Cabinet Meetings and their decisions.
OHara wrote: It’s also easy to argue that Italy had no real reason to fight in North Africa. The conquest of Tripoli was not going to force Italy out of the war. Germany had little strategic reason to be engaged in the Mediterranean, other than to support their ally. I think it’s clear that there was only one way to defeat Germany and that was the way Germany was defeated: by occupying Berlin. I think it’s relevant to note that when Soviet troops entered Berlin the Germans still held parts of Italy and still had a presence on the Mediterranean coast. So much for the Mediterranean being a decisive theater of war.
Is you argument based on the notion that since the Med was not "a decisive theatre of war", it should not have been defended and effort concentrated soley on Berlin?
OHara wrote: Yes, it’s an interesting question.
Not really. It is, at best, the precurser to an anti-factual discussion of what ifs.... Especially in the absence of not a single bit of data to support the line of thought.

PS. Having one's own opinion is most welcome. Arguing a point requires a bit of evidence. Opinion is meaningless if unfounded.

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#7

Post by ljadw » 21 Nov 2016, 15:34

steverodgers801 wrote:well the destruction it caused to the Italian merchant fleet alone made it a good decision. plus it is always easier to held a place then take it back later
There is no proof about the amount of destruction caused by Malta.

The Italian merchant ship losses were only 10/15 % of what was sent to NA, and the losses by Malta were only a part of them .

The Malta convoys (mostly starting in Egypt ) claimed a lot of supplies of the RN and of the merchant fleet .

Malta costed

707 aircraft

31 MS

1 battleship

2 aircraft carriers

4 cruisers

1 minelayer

20 destroyers

40 submarines

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#8

Post by stg 44 » 21 Nov 2016, 15:54

ljadw wrote:
steverodgers801 wrote:well the destruction it caused to the Italian merchant fleet alone made it a good decision. plus it is always easier to held a place then take it back later
There is no proof about the amount of destruction caused by Malta.

The Italian merchant ship losses were only 10/15 % of what was sent to NA, and the losses by Malta were only a part of them .
Source? Losses in 1941 were substantial and it forced the Italians to stop sending supplies in some months or take very costly detours to stay out of range. In the 1942 period it got less because the Luftwaffe put so much effort into bombing it, then supply convoys stayed out of range as the fight moved into Egypt. Malta then proved fatal to Axis shipping in 1943

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#9

Post by ljadw » 21 Nov 2016, 18:10

Sources:

Germany conquers ME oil (WWII)

The Crusader project : supply statistics for NA

Christos military and intelligence corner: Ultra intelligence and Rommel's convoys .

The 1941 losses were NOT substantial : From Source number one : 1941 : sent 1016000 ton,delivered 852000, lost 164000 (it is uncertain if the transports starting from Crete are included )

It is also dubious that if 1016000 ton was delivered ,this would have benefited to Rommel, as the big problem was NOT to send supplies to the harbours of NA, but to transport them from the harbours to the front .One can even argue that,if more was sent, less would arrive at the front .

other point :the deliveries (=what was sent ) changed from month to mont,principal cause being NOT the losses underway, but transport problems of the German and Italian railways, the limited storage and loading and unloading capacities of the Italian and NA harbours (The same problem existed in 1944 for the port of Antwerp and other ports ) .

Example :march 1942 : delivered 58000,lost 10000;april : 152000, lost 2000 may :93000 ,lost 7000 ,thus the losses of march did not influence the sendings of april and those from april not the sendings from may.

last point : a big part of the losses of the Axis MS in the Mediterranean was not caused by submarines but by aircraft operating from outside Malta.

PS : most of what was sent had as destination NOT the AK but the Italian military and civilians and the Axis was also hurt (but it is difficult to evaluate how much ) by air attacks on the harbours : if the unloading capacity of a harbour was down 10 % by air attacks, this had also a negative effect on the amount of supplies that was sent .

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#10

Post by MarkN » 21 Nov 2016, 19:06

Hmmmm!

If the losses to Axis shipping from Malta based assets were so minimal, why were they putting so much effort into neutralising the island?

If it wasn't shipping losses that concerned them, why was it the Axis made such an effort? Or did they just do it all for kicks?

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#11

Post by ljadw » 21 Nov 2016, 22:37

Reason was mostly political : Rommel (as usual) blamed the Italians and the supply chiefs, the Italians (not born yesterday ) said that it was Malta ,and that they could do nothing about Malta,the result was that the OKW/OKH/OKM/OKL (the whole gang ) advised Hitler to start air attacks again Malta.

I doubt also that the LW made such an effort against Malta . I know that at the end of 1941 a Luftflotte was withdrawn from the east and sent to the Mediterranean but that does not mean that this Luftflotte was concentrated against Malta .

Besides if one looks at the results, the transfer of the Luftflotte did not help the transports to NA

october 1941: sent 93000 ton ,delivered 74000

november 1941: 79000 /30000

december 1941 :48000/39000

1942

january:66000/66000 (still less than in october)

february :60000/59000

march :58000/48000

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#12

Post by Richard Anderson » 22 Nov 2016, 00:05

None is so blind as he who refuses to see...or actually evaluate data in a meaningful way.
ljadw wrote:The 1941 losses were NOT substantial : From Source number one : 1941 : sent 1016000 ton,delivered 852000, lost 164000 (it is uncertain if the transports starting from Crete are included )
A yearly loss of 16.14 percent is "NOT exactly how "NOT"? Because you capitalized it?
It is also dubious that if 1016000 ton was delivered ,this would have benefited to Rommel, as the big problem was NOT to send supplies to the harbours of NA, but to transport them from the harbours to the front .One can even argue that,if more was sent, less would arrive at the front .
Which is a different issue irrelevant to what is under discussion.
other point :the deliveries (=what was sent ) changed from month to mont,principal cause being NOT the losses underway, but transport problems of the German and Italian railways, the limited storage and loading and unloading capacities of the Italian and NA harbours (The same problem existed in 1944 for the port of Antwerp and other ports ) .

Example :march 1942 : delivered 58000,lost 10000;april : 152000, lost 2000 may :93000 ,lost 7000 ,thus the losses of march did not influence the sendings of april and those from april not the sendings from may.
Gee, could you possibly suppose the losses incurred on Malta by the arrival of Fliegerkorps II in January 1942 might have been a factor on the decrease in Axis losses?
last point : a big part of the losses of the Axis MS in the Mediterranean was not caused by submarines but by aircraft operating from outside Malta.
Really? So where were all those aircraft operating from?
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#13

Post by Richard Anderson » 22 Nov 2016, 00:17

MarkN wrote:Hmmmm!

If the losses to Axis shipping from Malta based assets were so minimal, why were they putting so much effort into neutralising the island?

If it wasn't shipping losses that concerned them, why was it the Axis made such an effort? Or did they just do it all for kicks?
Figures are percent of supplies lost/total shipping tonnage lost/total shipping tonnage lost to Malta forces/percent lost to Malta forces

Oct. 1940 - Jan. 1941 3.9/61,159/28,527/ 47
Feb. - Jun. 1941 6.6/168,845/101,230/60
Jul. - Dec. 1941 26.8/319,281/273,026/86
Jan. - Jun. 1942 6.2/161,121/83,707/52
Jul. - Dec. 1942 32.3/290,387/166,533/57
Jan. - Apr. 1943 31.1/371,236/185,600/50

The Axis could decrease their losses by 47 to 86 percent by eliminating Malta, depending on when.
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#14

Post by ljadw » 22 Nov 2016, 08:31

Richard Anderson wrote:
The Axis could decrease their losses by 47 to 86 percent by eliminating Malta, depending on when.

That is unprovable and questionable .That's the usual changing of a part of a HTL in a ATL and ignoring that this would influence the rest of the war in NA :if in may 1941 Malta had been captured, this does not mean that in january 1942 the Italian MV losses would decrease by 52 % . Saying that these losses would decrease by 52 % is ignoring the possibility of a British reaction .There is no automatism in history .

In january 1942 there were no losses : everything arrived : 66000 ton was sent, and 66000 ton arrived,thus the elimination of Malta would have no influence in january 1942 .

What was arriving at the ports of NA was essentially depending on what was sent to NA, and this was not depending on Malta .Even the losses were depending on what was sent:the less was sent, the less could be lost ; in december 1941 48000 ton was sent and 9000 was lost, while a year later 13000 was sent and only 7000 was lost .

Besides the % of the losses are irrelevant and without importance : injanuary 1942 0% was lost , but in may 1942 8% was lost , but the result was better in may than in january ,because in january 66000 was sent and 66000 arrived ,while in may 93000 was sent and 86000 arrived.
Looking at loss % gives a wrong picture .

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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

#15

Post by ljadw » 22 Nov 2016, 08:49

Richard Anderson wrote:


Gee, could you possibly suppose the losses incurred on Malta by the arrival of Fliegerkorps II in January 1942 might have been a factor on the decrease in Axis losses?
Decrease compared to what period ?

January 1941:sent 51000,arrived 49000

January 1942 :sent 66000,arrived : 66000

At a maxilum, the result was 2000 ton .At a maximum, because no one can prove that without the arrival of Fliegerkorps II, the losses would be also 2000 ton in january 1942 .

And even if one compares the monthly losses, the conclusion is that there is no conclusion

Before the arrival of the Fliegerkorps

losses in october :21000,november 49000, december 9000 : 9000 only If one blames the losses of october to the absence of the Fliegerkorps, how to explain that in december the losses were less than the helf of those from october ?

After the arrival of the Fliegerkorps

losses in january : 0, in february 1000, in march ; 10000.If one explains the absence of losses in january by the presence of the Fliegerkorps, how to explain the 10000 losses of march ?

Can one not argue that the absence /presence of the Fliegerkorps was neutral concerning the MV losses, because these were mainly caused by other factors,such as :weather, escort strengths, number of available aircraft/submarines, intelligence, number of sailing convoys, luck ,....

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