Strategic Decision to Defend Malta

[ljadw]

Other point,from what I have read the MV losses between june 1940 and may 1943 caused by Malta were 851861 GRT and 58 % of the losses of the convoys to NA (including /or not the convoys starting from Brindisi/Crete ) but only a minority of the total MV losses in the Mediterranean .

This is a fact .

But all the rest is conjecturing .
Example : one can not conclude from this that if on the day of the Italian DOW Malta had been captured, in may 1943 the Axis MV losses would have decreased by 851861 GRT .

Example : one can not say that if Hercules had been successfully executed, this would have resulted in less MV losses during and after Hercules, for the 2 following obvious reasons :

1 ) The FACT that the RM and the Italian merchant fleet could not at the same time prepare/be involved /execute Hercules and transport supplies to NA and protect these supplies

2 ) the POSSIBILITY /PROBABILITY that after a successful Hercules the RM would be to weak to protect the convoys to NA and that the Italian merchant fleet would be to weak to transport the same amount of supplies .
This is also without considering the possibility that the loss of Malta would result in more air and naval attacks from Britain .

I like also to go farther about the importance of the arrival of Kesselring and his LF:most of the LW sorties above Malta happened in 1942 (31391 on 37432) , but this did not have as result that in 1942 the supply situation was better than before Kesselring .

The importance of the arrival of LF 2 has been very inflated because it is founded on the old myth of the bungling italians and the efficient Germans ,proving that Goebbels was right when he said that the bigger the lie the more chance she had to be believed . There were 35724 Italian air sorties against Malta and 37432 German sorties, in the pré Kesselring period with very few German sorties, the supply situation was not worse than after Kesselring arrived : in the winter of 1940/1941 the Italians were able to send the needed reinforcements to stop the British and in the spring of 1941 they were able to transport the AK, all this without the help of the LW.

[Richard Anderson]

the conclusion is that there is no conclusion

The root of every argument you make is that you conclude there is no conclusion.

[Richard Anderson]

last point : a big part of the losses of the Axis MS in the Mediterranean was not caused by submarines but by aircraft operating from outside Malta.

Really? So where were all those aircraft operating from?

Answer my question.

[OHara]

Mark N asked: "re these political meetings and decisions actual historical events or your assumptions to fit your opinion?"

Mark, they’re actual historical events. You can verify by looking at the Appreciation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee presented to the War Cabinet on 4 September 1940. (CAB 66/11/42). This says “While it is obviously desirable to secure every part of the British Empire against enemy aggression, it is clear that, with the forces at our disposal, the allocation of defence resources to different areas must be directly related to the extent that each will contribute to the defeat of Germany." (pg 37). After that the security of the United Kingdom is listed as priority #1, followed by the security of sea communications. Singapore is "vital to our security in the Far East." (40). Freetown (in West Africa) is "most important to the maintenance of our sea communications round the Cape." "The security of our position in the Middle East is of the utmost importance to our strategy. . ." The document acknowledges that “is important that Malta be held” but the island is far down on the list of priorities.

This document also assesses the threat each strategic point faced and in September 1940 the threat Malta faced was greater than, say, Freeport or Singapore. The squeaky wheels gets the grease so Malta got resources than it would not otherwise have received because of it face a more immediate threat and because with very limited options for offensive action, the COSC decided that “it will be an objective of our offensive policy to increase the pressure on Germany through the elimination of Italy.” (pg 45)

The relative impact of Malta on the Allied and Axis war efforts, that is, of how much damage forces based in Malta caused to Axis shipping, or how many resources the Axis had to divert to attack Malta, or how much it cost the British in shipping to defend Malta seems like it can only be addressed by answering the question of whether Malta should have been defended in the first place. It seems that many people think this question has an obvious answer . . . of course it should have been defended, end of discussion. I’m not so sure this is the case, however. I don’t have a bunch of easy answers or lists to support this feeling, but I’d start by looking at how the buildup of Force H and the Mediterranean Fleet affected the war against traffic in the North Atlantic. I’d look at the impact of building up an army in Egypt for offensive operations had on reinforcements to the Far East. I think the fact it took three years and an American army to defeat Italy needs to be thrown into the mix of considerations. I think the politics of the Mediterranean also play a part. France and Spain could have come in on the Axis side in the autumn of 1940 but they didn’t. Did Malta (or the British policy that included defending Malta) factor into this reluctance to share in an apparent Axis victory? These are some of the things in the late 1940 early to mid 1941 time frame that I believe are more relevant to the question actually asked in this discussion than sinking or tonnage statistics (not to say that they’re not interesting or relevant as well)

Vince

[OHara]

Oct. 1940 - Jan. 1941 3.9/61,159/28,527/ 47
Feb. - Jun. 1941 6.6/168,845/101,230/60
Jul. - Dec. 1941 26.8/319,281/273,026/86
Jan. - Jun. 1942 6.2/161,121/83,707/52
Jul. - Dec. 1942 32.3/290,387/166,533/57
Jan. - Apr. 1943 31.1/371,236/185,600/50

Richard Anderson: what is your source for the total tonnage and the tonnage losses inflicted by forces based in Malta?

Thanks,

Vince

[ljadw]

last point : a big part of the losses of the Axis MS in the Mediterranean was not caused by submarines but by aircraft operating from outside Malta.

Really? So where were all those aircraft operating from?

Answer my question.

From elsewhere : Egypt, Libya., Cyprus ..

[Richard Anderson]

Monthly Axis Ships(tonnage lost)/Percent Ships Lost Due to Malta/Monthly Axis Supplies Arrived (tonnage)/Percent Axis Supplies Lost

January 1941 - 6 (19,381)/84%/49,084/3%
February 1941 - 3 (15,574)/47%/79,183/2%
March 1941 - 7 (16,669)/50%/92,753/9%
April 1941 - 11 (32,416)/84%/81,472/8%
May 1941 - 16 (75,123)/54%/69,331/8%
June 1941 - 10 (29,063)/60%/125,076/6%
July 1941 - 10 (36,464)/89%/62,276/19%
August 1941 - 10 (52,410)/95%/83,956/13%
September 1941 - 13 (80,631)/89%/67,513/28%
October 1941 - 12 (44,757)/76%/73,614/20%
November 1941 - 14 (57,819)/100%/29,843/62%
December 1941 - 11 (47,200)/58%/39,092/18%
January 1942 - 5 (32,520)/28%/66,179/0%
February 1942 - 6 (29,451)/88%/58,965/1%
March 1942 - 10 (45,396)/55%/47,588/17%
April 1942 - 6 (19,722)/49%/150,389/1%
May 1942 - 4 (13,966)/49%/86,439/7%
June 1942 - 6 (20,016)/39%/32,327/22%
July 1942 - 4 (10,486)/60%/91,491/6%
August 1942 - 12 (65,276)/39%/51,655/33%
September 1942 - 11 (36,272)/44%/77,526/20%
October 1942 - 13 (44,965)/74%/46,698/44%
November 1942 - 17 (54,584)/50%/97,715/81%
December 1942 - 31 (87,271)/73%/66,770/68%
January 1943 - 26 (87,098)/44%/70,193/21%
February 1943 - 20 (77,641)/82%/60,038/23%
March 1943 - 34 (102,247)/52%/49,361/49%
April 1943 - 29 (104,250)/30%/28,623/41%

[ljadw]

the conclusion is that there is no conclusion

The root of every argument you make is that you conclude there is no conclusion.

This is better than jumping from facts to unproved conclusions, to unprovable conclusions : such conclusions are not more than assumptions, guesses .

A good example is the presence of German U Boats in the Mediterranean : they did sink 95 MV with some 450000 GRT .

What would happen if they were absent in the Mediterranean ? There is only one simple answer : that these U Boats would not sink 95 MV with 450000 GRT.

There is also a wrong answer : that Britain would have lost 95 MV and 450000 GRT less ,because the result could be an increase of more than 450000 GRT.

It is the same for the arrival of Kesselring :no one can prove that if Kesselring remained in the east, the Axis convoys would have lost more MV.

It is the same for a fall of Malta : no one can prove that the fall of Malta (whatever the period ) would result in less losses for the Axis convoys .

It is the same for most WIs : what would be the result of no Overlord ? The only thing we know is that the Germans would not have lost in the West the men and material they lost in the OTL. But we don't know if the result of this would be less losses for the WM in 1944 . The opposite could be possible .

It is the same for Stalingrad,for Torch,etc:we can not say what would happen in the ATL if something that happened in the OTL did not happen .

The conclusion for Malta is that it was defended because the British were there and it would be PC not wise to give it up .

It was the same for Hongkong, and other places;the Channel Islands were an exception.

[Richard Anderson]

From elsewhere : Egypt, Libya., Cyprus ..

Dear God protect me from the stupid...

Distance from Malta to interdict Axis convoy routes? Less than 200 miles.

Distance from "Egypt" to interdict Axis convoy routes? Greater than 950 miles.

Distance from "Libya"? What British-controlled "Libya" bases were utilized to attack Axis convoys? Tripoli? Misrata? Sirte? Benghazi? Tripoli? Bardia?

Distance from "Cyprus" to interdict Axis convoy routes? Greater than 1,000 miles.

[Richard Anderson]

This is better than jumping from facts to unproved conclusions, to unprovable conclusions : such conclusions are not more than assumptions, guesses .

You mean like your assumption that the British had bases in "Libya" that could replace Malta?

[Richard Anderson]

Mark, they’re actual historical events.

Isn't it amazing what you can learn from examining real historical events instead of descending into flights of illogical sophistry such as supposing the British could replace the effect of bases in Malta with bases in "Libya", "Egypt", and "Cyprus"? :roll:

For example, we could look at the Italian estimates for supplying their forces in North Africa. Such as the Regiamarina DG 10/A2 study of 1938, which concluded the Italian armed forces and civilian population in Libya required monthly supplies of 113,000 tons. That supplies a nice baseline estimate for what was required to maintain what was there in June 1940, while any increases in military force there of course increased that baseline requirement.

We could also look at what the later Axis estimate of the situation was, say for 1 December 1941. https://rommelsriposte.com/2014/02/10/a ... ssessment/

Following a detailed examination it became clear that it is not possible, with the current naval situation, to bring reinforcements other than the most urgently required supply into Cyrenaica.

And so on...

[MarkN]

OHara,

Yesterday, you wrote...

The first thing to look at is what did the British War Cabinet consider its strategic priorities. What did points in the British Empire did they absolutely have to retain possession of to prevent defeat, particularly in the period before the U.S. came in? Well, first the Home Island. After that they identified Hamadan (Mid East oil) Singapore (the Far East). Ceylon (the Indian Ocean), and the capitals of all the Dominions, of course. Malta, Suez, and the Mediterranean were not on their list.

Today, you wrote...

... they’re actual historical events. You can verify by looking at the Appreciation of the Chiefs of Staff Committee presented to the War Cabinet on 4 September 1940. (CAB 66/11/42). This says “While it is obviously desirable to secure every part of the British Empire against enemy aggression, it is clear that, with the forces at our disposal, the allocation of defence resources to different areas must be directly related to the extent that each will contribute to the defeat of Germany." (pg 37). After that the security of the United Kingdom is listed as priority #1, followed by the security of sea communications. Singapore is "vital to our security in the Far East." (40). Freetown (in West Africa) is "most important to the maintenance of our sea communications round the Cape." "The security of our position in the Middle East is of the utmost importance to our strategy. . ." The document acknowledges that “is important that Malta be held” but the island is far down on the list of priorities.

I have that document too. Regretably, your ducks are not in a row.

Here are the 4 pages that you refer to (p.37-40)



Everyone but you will probably spot that Malta does indeed appear on the list and comes well BEFORE Singapore. Malta is on page 38, Singapore 40.

Or, to use your system, Malta "is listed as priority #5", whilst Singapore comes in at a lowly "priority #9".

This document also assesses the threat each strategic point faced and in September 1940 the threat Malta faced was greater than, say, Freeport or Singapore. The squeaky wheels gets the grease so Malta got resources than it would not otherwise have received because of it face a more immediate threat and because with very limited options for offensive action, the COSC decided that “it will be an objective of our offensive policy to increase the pressure on Germany through the elimination of Italy.” (pg 45)

In September 1940, Italy was officially at war with Britain. Indeed, Italy had already bombed the island. Feel free to make an argument that Malta was under the same or lower threat level than Freeport or Singapore.

As regards your theory that we first have to establish that Malta needed to be defended (rather than just assume so), before we discuss whether the defence was worth it, then the assumption that many have - myself included - is that you don't just walk away from your responsibilities. It does happen, but it shouldn't. Feel free to present an argument that Britain should have just walked away from Malta and left it at the mercy of the Axis Powers.

[BDV]

As regards your theory that we first have to establish that Malta needed to be defended (rather than just assume so), before we discuss whether the defence was worth it, then the assumption that many have - myself included - is that you don't just walk away from your responsibilities. It does happen, but it shouldn't. Feel free to present an argument that Britain should have just walked away from Malta and left it at the mercy of the Axis Powers.

I am confused what the argument is. The British government "walked away" from its responsibilities numerous times in 1940; most dramatically in the Channel Islands evacuation.

[OHara]

Everyone but you will probably spot that Malta does indeed appear on the list and comes well BEFORE Singapore. Malta is on page 38, Singapore 40.

Areas are discussed by geography radiating outward from the UK. That's why Australia is last

feel free to make an argument that Malta was under the same or lower threat level than Freeport or Singapore

??? I said that Malta was under a higher threat level than Freetown and Singapore not a lower threat level.

[ljadw]

From elsewhere : Egypt, Libya., Cyprus ..

Dear God protect me from the stupid...

Distance from Malta to interdict Axis convoy routes? Less than 200 miles.

Distance from "Egypt" to interdict Axis convoy routes? Greater than 950 miles.

Distance from "Libya"? What British-controlled "Libya" bases were utilized to attack Axis convoys? Tripoli? Misrata? Sirte? Benghazi? Tripoli? Bardia?

Distance from "Cyprus" to interdict Axis convoy routes? Greater than 1,000 miles.

I said : a big part of the losses in the MEDITERRANEAN . There were Axis convoys from Crete to NA , from Brindisi to NA

Some Axis convoy routes in the Mediterranean with distance in miles (source is Richard Hammond)

Brindisi -Benghazi :532

Brindisi-Athens :473

Naples-Tripoli : 502

Taranto-Tobruk :608

Messina -Tripoli :339

As Benghazi and Tobruk are closer to Egypt than to Malta, it is obvious that these outes could and were attacked by aircraft/submarines operating from Egypt .And as Benghazi was occupied by the British during several months, it is obvious that they used Benghazi to attack Axis convoys in the Mediterranean ;

The Coastal shipping : very important, but always ignored:

Tripoli -Benghazi : 352

Benghazi-Tobruk : 255

Greece:

Athens-Tobruk :389 .This route was used between june and november 1942 and I doubt that it was attacked by aircraft/submarines operating from Malta .

Athens-Benghazi : 400.This route was used between may-december 1941 and januari-november 1942 and was shorted than the Naples-Tripoli route (502 miles ) .