Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
[quote="Richard Anderson"]
So the loss of 27% of the Italian merchant marine overnight did not result in a lack of shipping? How about the loss of 56% of their tanker fleet? As of 10 June 1940 the Italian merchant marine had just 36 tankers to transport fuel to North Africa in bulk and built just 7 more.
Wrong question : correct question is : was the lack of ships caused by war losses resulting in a lack of shipping for the transports to NA ?
The same for the oil tankers : more available oil tankers does not mean that more oil would be available to be transported to NA : if more oil must be transported to NA, the first thing needed is more oil, not more tankers . Empty tankers will not be useful.
Besides, was more oil needed in NA ? And if so , why and how much ?
So the loss of 27% of the Italian merchant marine overnight did not result in a lack of shipping? How about the loss of 56% of their tanker fleet? As of 10 June 1940 the Italian merchant marine had just 36 tankers to transport fuel to North Africa in bulk and built just 7 more.
Wrong question : correct question is : was the lack of ships caused by war losses resulting in a lack of shipping for the transports to NA ?
The same for the oil tankers : more available oil tankers does not mean that more oil would be available to be transported to NA : if more oil must be transported to NA, the first thing needed is more oil, not more tankers . Empty tankers will not be useful.
Besides, was more oil needed in NA ? And if so , why and how much ?
Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
These figures do not change the problem ,unless there are proofs that the PzAA received what the KM claimed what was needed :Richard Anderson wrote:More idiocy. Panzerarmee Afrika as of 8 October 1942 consisted of?ljadw wrote:As one can see , the Germans (LW included) received monthly less than 25000 ton . Thus I have my doubts, big ones , about the figures of 40000 and 60000 .
Deutsches Afrika Korps
90. leichte Afrika-Division
X. italienisches Armee Korps
XXI. italienisches Armee Korps
XX. italienisches Armee Korps (mot)
Would you please stop and think before you post knee-jerk drivel.
If the PzAA received what was needed, this debunks the claims about the importance of the Malta losses. If the PzAA received its 40000/60000, the Malta attacks had failed .
If the PzAA failed to receive what was needed, how to explain the successes of the PzAA ?
This only fortifies my objection against the use of raw figures : the importance of the Malta attacks can not be proved by % of losses or by raw figures, but only by proving what the effects of these attacks were for the Axis .
One should not forget that it has been claimed at the beginning of this discussion that without the Malta attacks the whole ME would have been lost ,translation : the Axis failed because of Malta .
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
That this has to be explained to you perfectly defines your problem. I leave others to contemplate the idiocy of your answer.ljadw wrote:These figures do not change the problem ,unless there are proofs that the PzAA received what the KM claimed what was needed :
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
This does not prove a numerical Italian superiority,which did not exist :Richard Anderson wrote:More idiocy. Panzerarmee Afrika as of 8 October 1942 consisted of?ljadw wrote:As one can see , the Germans (LW included) received monthly less than 25000 ton . Thus I have my doubts, big ones , about the figures of 40000 and 60000 .
Deutsches Afrika Korps
90. leichte Afrika-Division
X. italienisches Armee Korps
XXI. italienisches Armee Korps
XX. italienisches Armee Korps (mot)
.
10 AK :16000
21 AK : 13600
20 AK : 18500
The 3 Italian AC (8 divisions ) had a strength of 3 divisions (several units were located far away from the frontline ),while the strength of the German divisions was 48000 men .Besides this does also not indicate how much the Germans/Italians needed .
Numerically they had the same strength,and if the Germans needed the half of 60000,this (30000) was still higher than what all German army units (not only those in Egypt) received every month in 1942 .
Other point is that "operations " is that vague that it can not be used .
Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
So, to summarise the findings of this thread so far.ljadw wrote: Other point is that "operations " is that vague that it can not be used .
1) Unless it is data and concepts that ljadw agrees with and approves, nothing can be concluded or used.
2) Forces based on Malta, or working from Malta inflicted significant damage on Axis forces (shipping et al) but this is completely irrelevant unless one can prove the same damage could not have been inflicted by non-Malta based assets.
3) The impact on the war of the diversion of forces from the Russian Front are not to be considered - presumably because such a consideration may not help a certain narrative.
4) The availability of shipping only played a "minor" role in the delivery quantities of supplies across the Med - allegedly.
5) Although there is no evidence, the British cabinet chose to defend Malta at the expense of the (allegedly) more strategically important Singapore and Burma.
6) If you suggest that somebody may have formed an opinion in advance of a question asked, you are insulting and making accusations of perfidy.
It's going pretty well so far!
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
Mark, you missed that a supply estimate for a combined Italo-German army only applied to the Germans...unless the preferred narrative needs it to apply to something completely irrelevant.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
The delivery of quantities of supplies across the Med did in first instance NOT depend on the availability of shipping , but on the availability of supplies : if the amount of available supplies decreased (because of several reasons ) by 10 % and the available shipping was increading by 10 %, the result would be that the number of supplies that was sent to NA also would decrease by 10 % : if 10 tankers more were available (60000 GRT of oil) ,but 10000 GRT of oil less was available, the result would be that less oil would be transported, and that a lot of tankers would remain idle in the harbours : this should not be difficult to understand . Empty tankers are useless .MarkN wrote:So, to summarise the findings of this thread so far.ljadw wrote: Other point is that "operations " is that vague that it can not be used .
4) The availability of shipping only played a "minor" role in the delivery quantities of supplies across the Med - :
That's why the production of supplies, the transportation of supplies, the stockage of supplies, the loading of supplies were as important as the availability of shipping for the transports of supplies to NA .And even more important, because the influence of the Allies in 1941/1942 on these factors was minimal .The could only influence the shipping aspect . They had no influence on the amount of supplies that was available to be transprted, they could only attack the transportation means .
It was the same for the U Boats during the Battle of the Atlantic .
Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
This does not prove that Malta was more important than Singapore : the cabinet consisted of politicians,and politcians are (also ) using political arguments .MarkN wrote:
5) Although there is no evidence, the British cabinet chose to defend Malta at the expense of the (allegedly) more strategically important Singapore and Burma.
YOU are saying that Malta was defended at the expense of Singapore : I like to see the proofs , and may I observe that in 1940/1941 Britain was at war in the mediterranean and not east of Suez, and that there was no reason to spend a part of the resources for Malta to the defense of Singapore .
Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
Empty tankers are not useless. But tankers at the bottom of the ocean certainly are.ljadw wrote:The delivery of quantities of supplies across the Med did in first instance NOT depend on the availability of shipping , but on the availability of supplies : if the amount of available supplies decreased (because of several reasons ) by 10 % and the available shipping was increading by 10 %, the result would be that the number of supplies that was sent to NA also would decrease by 10 % : if 10 tankers more were available (60000 GRT of oil) ,but 10000 GRT of oil less was available, the result would be that less oil would be transported, and that a lot of tankers would remain idle in the harbours : this should not be difficult to understand . Empty tankers are useless .MarkN wrote:So, to summarise the findings of this thread so far.ljadw wrote: Other point is that "operations " is that vague that it can not be used .
4) The availability of shipping only played a "minor" role in the delivery quantities of supplies across the Med - :
That's why the production of supplies, the transportation of supplies, the stockage of supplies, the loading of supplies were as important as the availability of shipping for the transports of supplies to NA .And even more important, because the influence of the Allies in 1941/1942 on these factors was minimal .The could only influence the shipping aspect . They had no influence on the amount of supplies that was available to be transprted, they could only attack the transportation means .
It was the same for the U Boats during the Battle of the Atlantic .
Richard Anderson thinks you are just trolling. He may be right.
I had thought you were being serious. But now you are just embarrassing yourself.
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
There is no evidence whatsoever that the supplies required by the Axis forces in Africa were not available in the required quantities or that they could not be transported to the ports of embarkation. The point you are trying to make might be relevant in other scenarios but it is entirely moot here.ljadw wrote:The delivery of quantities of supplies across the Med did in first instance NOT depend on the availability of shipping , but on the availability of supplies : if the amount of available supplies decreased (because of several reasons ) by 10 % and the available shipping was increading by 10 %, the result would be that the number of supplies that was sent to NA also would decrease by 10 % : if 10 tankers more were available (60000 GRT of oil) ,but 10000 GRT of oil less was available, the result would be that less oil would be transported, and that a lot of tankers would remain idle in the harbours : this should not be difficult to understand . Empty tankers are useless .MarkN wrote:So, to summarise the findings of this thread so far.ljadw wrote: Other point is that "operations " is that vague that it can not be used .
4) The availability of shipping only played a "minor" role in the delivery quantities of supplies across the Med - :
That's why the production of supplies, the transportation of supplies, the stockage of supplies, the loading of supplies were as important as the availability of shipping for the transports of supplies to NA .And even more important, because the influence of the Allies in 1941/1942 on these factors was minimal .The could only influence the shipping aspect . They had no influence on the amount of supplies that was available to be transprted, they could only attack the transportation means.
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
You've entirely missed my point. Yes, if Malta were lost the surviving ships and subs, and the aircraft which had the range to do so, could be withdrawn to a base such as Alexandria. BUT FROM THERE THEY WOULD BE FAR LESS ABLE TO INTERDICT THE AXIS SUPPLY ROUTES TO AFRICA. Malta was astride the key routes to Libya. That is why the British kept offensive forces there, despite the fact that they were more susceptible to damage from air attack and despite the fact that it was harder to keep them supplied there.ljadw wrote:Your point is not logical : if Malta was lost, the surface ships, submarines and aircraft based at Malta at the moment of the capture and the surface ships, submarines and aircraft that later were sent to Malta in the OTL,would not be lost : they could move to the eastern part of the Mediterranean and continue from there their attacks . they were not tied to Malta .Rob Stuart wrote:Here is a logical point for you: If the Malta-based cruisers, destroyers, subs and aircraft used for offensive operations could have inflicted the same level of loss on Axis shipping if they had been based elsewhere, than why in hell would the British keep them in Malta? Any alternative base would have been less vulnerable than Malta and it would have been easier to get fuel, ammo and so on for these offensive forces to just about any other base, so clearly they were kept in Malta because it was from there that they could inflict the most damage on the enemy.ljadw wrote:The fact that 2/3 of the losses were caused by aircraft/submarines operating from Malta does not prove that Malta was important/more important than an other base and for Britain and for the Axis, because of 2 logical points
When Crete was captured and no longer available as base for the RAF/RN, the RAF/RN units based at Crete were not lost : they left Crete and continued the war from elsewhere .
If Gibraltar was lost , would the RN forces stationed at Gibraltar (force K ) be lost ?
If Hawaii had been lost, would that mean that the USN forces stationed at Hawaii would have been unable to continue the war ?
THE big British base in the Mediterranean was Alexandria and if Malta was lost ,why wold the "Malta" naval and air forces not be able to emigrate to Alexandria ?
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
At this point I hesitate to participate further in what is very evidently yet another circle jerk. However, I will point out there is all kinds of evidence showing supplies in Italy was not a problem, such as it took months to just get the units loaded and to Africa. I now I'll wait to be told that they really didn't "need" the units so that is irrelevant.Rob Stuart wrote: There is no evidence whatsoever that the supplies required by the Axis forces in Africa were not available in the required quantities or that they could not be transported to the ports of embarkation. The point you are trying to make might be relevant in other scenarios but it is entirely moot here.
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American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
I guess just because I'm feeling ornery I'll deal with this fatuousness.ljadw wrote:This does not prove a numerical Italian superiority,which did not exist :
10 AK :16000
21 AK : 13600
20 AK : 18500
The 3 Italian AC (8 divisions ) had a strength of 3 divisions (several units were located far away from the frontline ),while the strength of the German divisions was 48000 men .Besides this does also not indicate how much the Germans/Italians needed .
As of 20 October 1942, Panzerarmee Afrika had a strength of c. 105,000 “at the front”. The German component consisted of:
15. Pz.D. 9,178
21. Pz.D. 9,312
90. le. Afrika-D. 5,568
164. le. Afrika-D. 8,814
19. LW Flak-D. 6,302
1. LW Jg.-Bde. 4,610
HARKO Afrika - 3,069
Pz.Armee Afrika u. D.A.K. Stab u. Heerestruppen - 4,370
Total - 51,223
Italian strength is more difficult to determine. Italian combat strength "at the front" was 46,000 in the eight divisions of X., XX., and XXI. CA., but another 8,000-odd were corps and army troops, while altogether 99,000 were in Egypt, including Giovani Facisti at Siwa with 2,200-3,000, Pistoia guarding the coast from Halfaya to Bardia with 8,600, and about 34,000 other logistics troops. While the strength of the Italian forces "on the front lines" was c. 54,000, another 45,000 were present. We can also see the strength of the "German divisions" was 32,872 (the 19. Flak Division is not included since it was not a maneuver division).
Yes, numerically they had similar strengths – on the front lines. However, the Italians provided the bulk of the logistical support for the Panzerarmee, some 34,000 men.Numerically they had the same strength,and if the Germans needed the half of 60000,this (30000) was still higher than what all German army units (not only those in Egypt) received every month in 1942 .
What idiocy.Other point is that "operations " is that vague that it can not be used .
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
No. What matters is how much needs to be transported to Africa vs shipping available. Shipping losses only started to be felt at time of Tunisia, But they were somewhat offset by Franch ships taken over in Southern France.So the loss of 27% of the Italian merchant marine overnight did not result in a lack of shipping? How about the loss of 56% of their tanker fleet? As of 10 June 1940 the Italian merchant marine had just 36 tankers to transport fuel to North Africa in bulk and built just 7 more.
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Re: Strategic Decision to Defend Malta
Of course, but the argument made was that there was always sufficient shipping because the amount to be shipped was always less than the shipping available, which is circular reasoning. By that logic, if there was only one ship per month capable of hauling 10,000 tons, then the requirement would be the same if there were 1,000 ships each hauling 10,000 tons per month.Dili wrote:No. What matters is how much needs to be transported to Africa vs shipping available. Shipping losses only started to be felt at time of Tunisia, But they were somewhat offset by Franch ships taken over in Southern France.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell