Kelvin wrote:I don't know why Yugoslav and Greek forces were routed so quickly as they had an advantage in terrain. The terrain of the Balkan is unsuitable for tank operations , so their defensive position was much more superior to those of the Polish forces in 1939.
The Balkans have
plenty of room for armoured units to move. Look at the map were Belgrade is located.
Moreover, speaking for the Greek army at least, there was such a lack of anti tank weapons that even an armoured car company was too much to handle. In reality, the Balkan terrain from a military point of view is characterised by alternating plains and mountains. For the Germans, as soon as they opened a pass, an armoured column would exploit through it and roll into the following plain.
The German used their Panzers a bit too much though. When faced by an adequately equipped opponent such as the Commonwealth forces on Olympus, the Panzers took heavy and unnecessary losses.
The Yugoslav army was half mobilised and mostly not deployed. I don't have a detailed description of the Yugoslav side, but it is clear from the German side's description that they encountered resistance only at the border by the border battalions, and after eliminating it they advanced deep before meeting new resistance, in uncoordinated fashion. The Yugoslavs seem to have attempted to from a cohesive line but to no avail. It is worth noting that the German advance in Yuogslavia and in Greece was based on motorized detachments advancing rapidly in depth along highways, and not actually eliminating the forces they met. The Germans were aware that they were bypassing large masses of Yugoslav forces, which if made an aggressive return they would potentially cause great trouble to the Germans.
The Greek army was mobilised and deployed but its bulk was in Albania, and arguably the deployment in two lines (Metaxas' line and the Mt. Vermio line) did not help. Still, like in the case of Yugoslavia, the Germans bypasssed rather than destroyed the Greek forces.
In any case, the quick German success in Yugoslav "Macedonia" killed the morale of all Allied forces. The separation of the Yugoslav army from the Greco-British, achieved practically already since 8 (or 9? irrelevant) April, meant the end for the Yugoslav effort as the principal mission had been lost. I I recall correctly, the German attack against central and northern Yugoslavia opened on 8 April, rather than 6, thus when the fate of the Yugoslav army had been sealed. The British were never serious about fighting and they were always ready to bail out, while the Greek command found out it had to make a deep retreat over the mountains very quickly which potentially would, and eventually did, cause the disintergration of the Greek forces.
Kelvin wrote:And in Oct 1940, repluse of Italian attack proved that the Greek army was experienced military forces, somewhat like Finnish resistance against Russia. Although the Greek army was no match for the battle-hardened German veteran forces, she at least might hold the German for a while. Also she had the support of 6th Australian infantry division and 2nd New Zealander infantry division and RAF. The latter could provide adequate air cover for the Greek troops.
The Greek army scored a few victories against the Germans. As far as I am concerned it was definitely "a match" for the Germans, although admittedly the Germans were an excellent army. Given better air coverage and organic anti tank weapons, the Greek forces would have stopped the Germans in meeting engagements line those of 13-15 Arpil. The Greek forces actually stopped if not defeated in some cases the Germans attacking on Metaxas line. In the sector of the 72nd German division the Greeks destroyed a German battlegroup, took several hundred prisoners and forced the division to the defensive. German sources admit that if the Greek reserves were more readily available the position of the 72nd division would be difficult. The German 125th regiment was mauled, although a battalion that ahd infiltrated (I think the II/125) held its ground with remarkabe tenacity and with invaluable assistance from the Stukas.
The Commonwealth forces performed poorly despite being well equipped. Also, cooperation between the Greek and British forces was poor and frustrating.
It is my personal belief from having examined the campaign from all sides, that while there were the necessary forces available to hold the Germans, the problems of poor morale on the Greek side, poor combat performance in the mountanous terrain from the British forces, and overall lack of coordination, precluded a stabilisation.
