Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

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canambridge
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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#31

Post by canambridge » 24 Jul 2012, 15:49

carl wrote: You have a source for the details of the original Brimstone plan?
But, but but, I thought I got the five division for a March/April Brimstone from one of your posts :? I'm so confused.
Actually, I have nothing on Op Brimstone, but I would be very interested if you have more details. All I found was this:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/36037300/WWII ... History-II

and this:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... ily-1.html in particular see pages 7 & 8.
carl wrote: Looking at the map ...

Now you have shamed me into actually looking at a map instead of relying on my all too feeble memory. And low and behold Sardinia is farther west and south than I thought. Assuming the major Allied objective on Sardinia would be Cagliari, Sardinia may have been better situated with respect to the Tunis airfields than Sicily. Advantage Allies for Husky, Axis for Brimstone. The trump for Husky is Malta, good airfields a very short distance from the landing beaches. The Sicilian airfields would have been in range against Brimstone, as would Rome. I think LOC to Sardinia is not as good as Sicily, but maybe not fatally so.
Carl wrote: I am unsure the Proximity fuzes were issued to the Allied navy in the Med in early 43.
IIRC, always a dubious prospect, the first use was in the Pacific in October 1944 and in Europe in December 1944. Maybe earlier in Britain against the V1, but still no earlier than mid 1944.
Carl wrote: ... The changes look 'complex'
I think you are right. The advantages of a Sardinian operation over Sicily don't seem clear enough for the additional risk. There was no gain in destabilizing Italy. The Med shipping lanes are still exposed to the LW. The air advantage seems a bit tenuous. The threat to the Germans, was about the same. It seems that there was a logistic (shipping) disadvantage (see the second link above). After Sardinia, it seems the Allies would have had to invade Sicily anyway.

Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#32

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 24 Jul 2012, 21:40

canambridge wrote:
Carl wrote: I am unsure the Proximity fuzes were issued to the Allied navy in the Med in early 43.
IIRC, always a dubious prospect, the first use was in the Pacific in October 1944 and in Europe in December 1944. Maybe earlier in Britain against the V1, but still no earlier than mid 1944.
Naval use in the western Hemisphere came much earlier. The Dec 1944 was when they were released for field artillery. AAA artillery on land may have been a bit earlier in the ETO. 'The Deadly Fuze' by Baldwin has the dates for each release for use, but I dont have a copy at hand. Its not really a consideration here. My mind keeps wandering off to the attrition the German air force suffered in the Med in 1942 & the various factors that influenced it.


canambridge
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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#33

Post by canambridge » 25 Jul 2012, 01:46

Thanks for that Carl, I had no idea the prox fuze was used in the west so early. I thought (that even at sea) there was a fear of the Germans getting hold of a prox fuze and doing some reverse engineering. Although how the Germans would get hold of one at sea is kind of hard to imagine.
I have a book at home (6,000 miles away) titled "Combat Scientists" that deals with the development of the prox fuze. I have never actually read it, but you have really piqued my interest now. A 1942 or early 1943 use would definitely help explain why the Med was as deadly to the LW as the whole Eastern Front.

Back to Sardinia vs Sicily: I think that Allies may have missed an opportunity to kill off the 16th SS and 90th PG on Sardinia and Corsica, but of course missed a much bigger opportunity to kill off more in Sicily. Having finally looked at the map, it seems the Calabria could have been seized and held very easily at it's most narrow point. Perhaps a good target for the Paratroops, Commandos or Rangers? This would have cut off the short route to Italy for the retreating Germans and just left the more exposed Naples route.
It seems to me that the potential for writing down German forces was greater in Sicily than Sardinia and it provided an easier, if more predictable springboard to Italy.

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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#34

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 25 Jul 2012, 12:33

canambridge wrote:Thanks for that Carl, I had no idea the prox fuze was used in the west so early. I thought (that even at sea) there was a fear of the Germans getting hold of a prox fuze and doing some reverse engineering. Although how the Germans would get hold of one at sea is kind of hard to imagine.
According to Baldwin here were restrictions on using the fuze when firing towards land. No one wanted the Japanese of Germans to pick up a dud & send it back to the ordnance laboratory.
canambridge wrote: A 1942 or early 1943 use would definitely help explain why the Med was as deadly to the LW as the whole Eastern Front.
More likely late 1943 for naval use, or 1944. I just cant remember.
canambridge wrote:Back to Sardinia vs Sicily: I think that Allies may have missed an opportunity to kill off the 16th SS and 90th PG on Sardinia and Corsica, but of course missed a much bigger opportunity to kill off more in Sicily. Having finally looked at the map, it seems the Calabria could have been seized and held very easily at it's most narrow point. Perhaps a good target for the Paratroops, Commandos or Rangers? This would have cut off the short route to Italy for the retreating Germans and just left the more exposed Naples route.
Definitly a failure to communicate. There were losses during the Sardinian/Corsica evacuation, tho you would think they could have been higher. The failure to effective interdict the Sicillian withdrawl was a fiasco. I think Eisenhower learned a lesson there.

canambridge
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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#35

Post by canambridge » 27 Jul 2012, 14:53

Do you know what losses the 90th PG and 16th SS suffered escaping from Sardinia and Corsica.
On paper it looks like it should have been another massacre.

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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#36

Post by rcocean » 28 Jul 2012, 00:18

HansvonLuck wrote:I was just watching the movie "Patton" the other day (very good movie may I say) and there's
a part where they talk about Sardinia.

It got me thinking.. Why didn't the Allies land on Sardinia? Why was Sicily chosen over Sardinia?
The movie says that Patton will try at all cost to convince his superiors to land on Sicily because the Athenians did it. Is that true? Did Patton want to land on Sicily based on history?
Surely there was more explanations as to why Sicily was taken right?

So why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?
Was it simply because it's nearer? Or are there other explanations?
Quite simple. The only advantage Sardinia had over Sicily is that its further north. That is if you're also going to then take Corsica -establish air fields - and invade then Italy near Rome or the top of the boot instead of at the bottom. In Hindsight it might have been better to do this, but then no one was planning on marching from one end of Italy to the other.

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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#37

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 28 Jul 2012, 17:22

canambridge wrote:Do you know what losses the 90th PG and 16th SS suffered escaping from Sardinia and Corsica.
On paper it looks like it should have been another massacre.
I had a detailed description of that somewhere here & cant find it. From memory some vehicle convoys were ambushed by the partisans with moderate losses. I recall one cargo ship sunk or grounded with all equipment aboard lost, and some ferrys sunk, but that needs to be checked. the author claimed the same sort of higher level miscommunication, and lack of attention at the upper levels as with the Sicillian evacuation.

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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#38

Post by Ropey » 28 Jul 2012, 18:17

[quote="canambridge"]Do you know what losses the 90th PG and 16th SS suffered escaping from Sardinia and Corsica.
On paper it looks like it should have been another massacre.[/quote]

I believe that aircraft were used to evacuate many from Corsica and that losses were heavy amongst these (though I found little in Molony to support this).

Mil-tech Bard
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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#39

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 21 Nov 2012, 04:01

The 1st VT fuse was USN in the Pacific in Jan 1943.

http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq96-1.htm
This test firing of proximity fuzed 5"/38 projectiles against drones was carried out in August 1942 aboard the cruiser [USS] Cleveland [CL-55]. Results of this test were entirely satisfactory and accordingly, full-scale production of proximity fuzes was initiated at the Crosley Corporation in September 1942. Early production was plagued with numerous difficulties but satisfactory material was finally produced. This fuze, which was designated the Mk 32, was delivered to the Fleet during November and December 1942, and the first Japanese plane was shot down with proximity fuzed projectiles by the cruiser [USS] Helena [CL-50] in January 1943.
and the second fuse that went into service was British Royal Navy in Sept 1943, place unspecified --
In general, all work on the British fuze paralleled the work on the Navy's Mk 32 fuze. About the fall of 1942 a contract was placed with the Radio Corporation of America for production of these fuzes, and shortly after the first of the year 1943, Eastman Kodak Company was also brought into the program on this fuze. Early work on the Mk 33 was rather unsatisfactory and although production was carried along at a small rate, acceptable material was not available for sometime. In about May 1943 an emergency program was set up to iron out the remaining difficulties in the Mk 33 fuze with the hope of obtaining satisfactory material before the end of the summer of 1943. By September of that year the fuze was in fairly satisfactory production and deliveries were commenced to the British. This fuze was designed specifically for the British 4".5 gun which was carried aboard aircraft carriers. In addition, it was contemplated that the fuze would also work in the British 5".25 Navy gun, but because of more severe treatment of the fuze in this gun, the fuze was not at that time satisfactory for use in the 5".25 British gun.

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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#40

Post by canambridge » 10 Feb 2013, 11:06

Good stuff, thanks Mil-tech Bard.

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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#41

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 10 Feb 2013, 20:34

Carl Schwamberger said --

My mind keeps wandering off to the attrition the German air force suffered in the Med in 1942 & the various factors that influenced it.

and

canambridge said --

Thanks for that Carl, I had no idea the prox fuze was used in the west so early. I thought (that even at sea) there was a fear of the Germans getting hold of a prox fuze and doing some reverse engineering. Although how the Germans would get hold of one at sea is kind of hard to imagine.

I have a book at home (6,000 miles away) titled "Combat Scientists" that deals with the development of the prox fuze. I have never actually read it, but you have really piqued my interest now. A 1942 or early 1943 use would definitely help explain why the Med was as deadly to the LW as the whole Eastern Front.
If one were to give the reasons and rank order them as to why the Luftwaffe lost more planes in the Mediterranean in 1942 thru 1943 than the Eastern Front, they would go as follows --

1) Allied Ultra Signals intelligence.
2) Axis Numerical inferiority. (Axis Fighters were outnumbered 15-to-1 when you include the Hurricane, P-39 and P-40 and something like 8-to-1 when limited to the American P-38 and British Spitfire V and later marks)
3) Allied Radar fighter direction.
4) American radar directed AA 90mm gunfire.

Ultra told the Allies where the Luftwaffe was and what it intended to do such that Allied air patrols and ground/sea based radar were alerted to the coming attacks ahead of time. This let the Allies vector fighters onto incoming raids and Allied bombers onto Axis air facilities following the raids to catch the returning planes on the ground.

This happened primarily with the Mediterranean Coastal Command, until Sicily, and later with the XII Fighter Command. This was where General Elwood Richard "Pete" Quesada learned to use radar directed tactical air power.

The issue with the Allied failed interdiction of Sicily and Sardinia/Corsica was the lack of range -- due to a lack of drop tanks -- of Allied fighters. Only the P-38 and the A-36 Apache (AKA Mustang) by Salerno had the legs to cover interdicting Allied Medium bombers in the face of Luftwaffe radar directed interceptors.

The command issues with the Mediterranean Allied Air Force precluded the concentration of those fighter resources for those missions at that time. The USAAF and RAF bomber cliques just did not believe in the anti-transportation mission and the RAF Coastal Command and Fighter Command generals there didn't have the pull to make it happen.

The issue for German bombers in the Mediterranean was that American radar directed gunfire was far better that the British was because the American SCR-268 Searchlight/Gunlaying Radar was better than equivalent British sets, and more importantly, US Army data from the radars was transmitted automatically to their gunfire directors rather than through a manual plotting room, which was the British method.

This made American night/bad weather high altitude 90mm gunfire far more accurate than anything the Luftwaffe had faced up to that time and their losses reflected it. The Japanese had the same experience with the SCR-268/90mm combo in USMC hands at nearly the same time at Bougainville (Solomon Islands).

When the Luftwaffe tried low level tactics to get at North African ports, the Allies deployed 10cm surface search radars in the air defense role and the Luftwaffe got bloodied some more.

The Luftwaffe didn't get a handle on the SCR-268 until Anzio via jamming and Duple (Chaff in modern terms) drops at high altitude. By then the SCR-584 and SCR-545 10 cm gunlaying radars with the new M9 electronic gun director were available to replace the SCR-268. Their surprise deployment at Anzio did in the Luftwaffe for offensive bombing in the Mediterranean.

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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#42

Post by Dili » 10 Feb 2013, 22:55

The Germans lost many planes bombed on the ground , plus they were loosing land so every time they retired from some airfield a plane that was repairable might get lost because couldn't fly off. And do not forget the dreadful loss of transports trying to supply Tunisia.

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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#43

Post by Mil-tech Bard » 12 Feb 2013, 04:02

There is a very good piece of the development of the British Desert Air Force at this link --

http://thoughtsonmilitaryhistory.wordpr ... main-body/

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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#44

Post by Hoopdriver » 07 Nov 2013, 19:49

canambridge wrote:Do you know what losses the 90th PG and 16th SS suffered escaping from Sardinia and Corsica.
On paper it looks like it should have been another massacre.
Am new to the forum and no military expert by any means.

Its my understanding that German losses in the move from Sardinia were minimal.

And that the Italian forces on September 8 significantly outnumbered the Germans.

I was in Cagliari earlier this year and a major several-months-long exhibition staged by the Town Council in the Town Hall commemorating the 1943 bombings of Cagliari stated that on September 8 Italy declared war on Germany.

Not true of course unless I'm very much mistaken.

Alberto Bechi Luserna was an Italian Folgore officer killed near Macomer in Sardinia while apparently trying to persuade a group of Folgore from leaving the island with the Germans.

There's a memorial at the spot where this happened by the roadside though I haven't seen it.

It is my understanding that his body was then thrown into the sea here:

http://www.flickr.com/photos/marcolino_ ... 340900903/

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Re: Why did the Allies choose Sicily over Sardinia?

#45

Post by milasicj » 28 Oct 2014, 02:22

I agree (with the question), that the Allies should have invaded Sardinia and Corsica first, before Sicily. Eisenhower was correct, as evidenced by so many Allied casualities in Sicily, that Sicilian Axis airfields and Sicilian Axis naval power could have been destroyed (by Allied air and sea power) without invading Sicily first. Isolation of Axis ground forces (in Sicily) was the correct approach. Within months, and after successfully invading Sardinia and Corsica (setting up Allied air and sea bases), the Axis would have withdrawn from Sicily to defend Italy further north and the Allies could have taken the Sicily more easily. This would have saved many Allied casualties. By invading Sardina and Corisa first, the Allies could have quickly crushed Axis defenses on these two islands (b/c these islands were more lightly defended and flat) and would have had enough "forward air and sea power" to heavily disrupt all of the Italian coast and coastal Southern France. The invasion of Sicily first satisfied the need of politics, i.e. to "drive harder at the Axis" instead of simply recognizing that the same outcome could be achieved by simplier, and less costly means. After Axis air and naval power (around Sicily) was destroyed communication lines in the Med would have been opened throughout and the Axis could be deprived of all offensive capability in the Med, and hence, Axis troops in Sicily would rot on the vine and then withdraw. Alternatively, if the Axis would not withdraw from Sicily after taking of Sardinia and Corsica, then invade Sicily having learned better tactics invading two previous islands.

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