Medieval cavalry charges?

[Galahad]

--ChristopherPerrien writes: "Yes, yes, but the trouble with this whole deal, is that Alexander was the greatest Calvary commander that has ever been."

--I have to disagree with that. If any man can claim the title of greatest cavalry commander that has ever been, it's Temujin. And if not him, then it's his commander, Subotai.

--When you look at the accomplishments they achieved, the scale of those accomplishments and the scope of their campaigns, no other cavalry commanders in history come close to matching them.

[ChristopherPerrien]

--ChristopherPerrien writes: "Yes, yes, but the trouble with this whole deal, is that Alexander was the greatest Calvary commander that has ever been."

--I have to disagree with that. If any man can claim the title of greatest cavalry commander that has ever been, it's Temujin. And if not him, then it's his commander, Subotai.

--When you look at the accomplishments they achieved, the scale of those accomplishments and the scope of their campaigns, no other cavalry commanders in history come close to matching them.

Hard to say,

I do not know much of Tamerlame, except that he was a great leader.

However I do know that Alexander lead the companion cavalry as far back as when his dad was alive, IIRC, and those guys never lost a battle. He continued to lead this part of the best army that has ever been even when he was leader of an empire. If I was cav, I'd rather have Alex leading "The CHARGE", than anybody else. No matter how well the rest of his army did. I think the excellence of the combined arms element was more of the work of his dad, Phillip, and of several of his subordinates(Coneus,Craterus, Parmenio), rather than what Alex did. Alex had the attitude , to really "led" cav, at the time. I think his father Phillip, realized that and perhaps raised Alex to do exactly that. Leader of his Hammer.

[Galahad]

--I didn't say Tamerlane.

--I said Temujin, also known as Genghis Khan, the man whose cavalry armies of several hundred thousand men created the Mongol Empire, the largest land empire the world has ever seen, at least till the Soviet Union came around. Take a look at the campaign where he conquered a nice part of it, by destroying the Empire of Khwarizim.

--Subotai the Valiant was one of his most senior commanders in that campaign, and many others. Among other deeds, he led a mounted advance with 200000 men that started in Persia and only stopped in Hungary. Along the way he destroyed the armies of several kingdoms, including Poland, the Rus, Kiev, the Cuman and Hungary. Then he and his hordes of Mongol cavalry went home for the election of a new Great Khan, and never returned. At one point he fought and won two battles on the same day against two different armies more than fifty miles apart. Since the Mongols didn't occupy most of what they had conquered, this wasn't a campaign of conquest on a vast scale. What it was was the largest and longest cavalry raid in history.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

and those guys never lost a battle.

Not when Alexander was in charge, but when someone else was the commander then I guess they did.

[Hanny]

But it was Persian heavy cavalry which did it - not Alexander's.

Rode between the gaps in formations, created by mounted manouver elemnets was exactly what Alexander cav did in many of its engagements. Starting under his father at Charanea http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=6z6f ... us&f=false

You abused the primary text that only states persian cav moved between the fragemented Macedonian Lines to reach the rear element, as every modern text has that no Phalanx was broken or pierced by Persian Cav, See Hammond a History of Greec down to 331 page 618, or any book on the subject.

In the battle of Gaugamela, Persian and Indian cavalry armed with long spears managed to break through the line of Macedonian phalangites (pezhetairoi) at the point of contact of taxis (one taxis = "paper strength" of 2048 phalangites) under command of Simmias and taxis under command of Polysperchon:

Not what Arrian was explaining to have happened.Page 169 you quoted, 2nd Para starts with: But the formation under Simmias was unable to link up with Alexander to join the pursuit, was fourced to stand its ground and continue the struggle on the spot, a report comming in that the Macedonian left was in trouble.At this point the Macedonian line was broken, and some of the Indian and Persian cavalry burst through the gap and penetrated right through to the rear where the pack animals were.

No Phalanx was broken through, not least beacase they were two deep here, but pinned in place and gap appeared between them and the Macedonian right through which Persian and Indian cav pentrated, and D head Armies of the Macedonian and Punic wars tells us that both Persiand and indian used light throwing spears, not long thrsting spears.


Falsfing history to augemnt your flawed posistion is not the way to go.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Rode between the gaps in formations, created by mounted manouver elemnets was exactly what Alexander cav did in many of its engagements

The primary source - Arrian - writes that the gap in formation was first chopped / cut by Persians.

Let me quote it again:

"(...) the left wing of the Macedonians was reported to be hard pressed. In this part of the field, their line being broken, some of the Indians and of the Persian cavalry burst through the gap towards the baggage of the Macedonians; and there the action became desperate. For the Persians fell boldly on the men, who were most of them unarmed, and never expected that any men would cut through the double phalanx and break through upon them. (...)"

So Arrian clearly writes that:

1) The Persians broke the Macedonian line of phalangites in a ferocious attack ("hard pressed")
2) They also broke the line of Greek hoplites deployed in reserve behind those phalangites (see below)
2) Then the Persians burst through the gap that they themselves chopped / cut before
3) Then they attacked the Macedonian baggage train which was left behind their lines
4) Those who guarded the baggage were surprised as they never expected that the Persians would cut through the double phalanx (Macedonian phalanx and phalanx of Greek mercenary hoplites deployed behind)

This is the only valid interpretation - suggesting that the gap in Macedonian lines "emerged by itself" instead of being cut by attacking Persian soldiers is simply ignoring what Arrian wrote in his account of the battle.

Instead, Arrian at least twice confirms that the gap was created by Persian soldiers cutting through Macedonian lines, rather than "appeared" when Macedonian units "became detached" - 1st time when he writes that Macedonian line was broken under hard pressure of the enemy (I presume the same enemy who, as the result of breaking it, burst through it and attacked the Macedonian baggage behind it) and 2nd time when he explicitly writes that those who guarded the baggage did not expect that the Persians would cut through the double phalanx.

You abused the primary text that only states persian cav moved between the fragemented Macedonian Lines

I abused it? It is you who abused it - and those historians who claim that Arrian doesn't write about Macedonian line being broken by Persian attack, and instead try to claim that the gap emerged there "by itself".

Arrian doesn't say this. He clearly writes that the formation was broken by Persian soldiers (whether it was cavalry alone or cavalry + infantry is the only controversy here - as those "Indians" mentioned by Arrian could be infantry soldiers, since sources apart from Indian cavalry mention also Indian hillmen in this battle).

Falsfing history to augemnt your flawed posistion is not the way to go.

Who is falsyfing history here? Certainly not me.

You should read Arrian's text again and try the proper art of interpretation of what you read.

Not what Arrian was explaining to have happened.Page 169 you quoted, 2nd Para starts with: But the formation under Simmias was unable to link up with Alexander to join the pursuit, was fourced to stand its ground and continue the struggle on the spot, a report comming in that the Macedonian left was in trouble.At this point the Macedonian line was broken, and some of the Indian and Persian cavalry burst through the gap and penetrated right through to the rear where the pack animals were.

This is not what Arrian wrote. Arrian is a primary source. Your book is not.

What you quote now - "page 169" of some website - is from a book - from a secondary source.

Apparently a book written by somehow who decided not to believe in primary Ancient sources and decided to invent his own version of what happened. But this is pure "fantasy" of the author of this book. While Arrian clearly writes that Persians attacked and broke the Macedonian line - not that "formations were unable to link".

Show me a primary source which supports the "formation was unable to link" theory, please.

not least beacase they were two deep here

You don't think they were two deep there, do you? No phalanx was ever being deployed in such a thin line by their commanders. What Arrian writes is "double" phalanx - not "two deep" phalanx.

I.e. there was Macedonian phalanx and that of Greek mercenary hoplites behind.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

and D head Armies of the Macedonian and Punic wars tells us that both Persiand and indian used light throwing spears, not long thrsting spears.

You confuse early Achaemenid army (times of Marathon) with late Achaemenid army (times of Gaugamela).

At Gaugamela Darius had a lot of good heavy shock cavalry units - not just light skirmish cavalry.

[Galahad]

--Peter H writes: ""(...) the left wing of the Macedonians was reported to be hard pressed. In this part of the field, their line being broken, some of the Indians and of the Persian cavalry burst through the gap towards the baggage of the Macedonians; and there the action became desperate. For the Persians fell boldly on the men, who were most of them unarmed, and never expected that any men would cut through the double phalanx and break through upon them. (...)"

So Arrian clearly writes that:

1) The Persians broke the Macedonian line of phalangites in a ferocious attack ("hard pressed")"

--You're jumping to a conclusion here. Most commentators on Arrian--such as J.F.C. Fuller and Theodore Dodge--read Arrian as meaning a gap had opened between units of the Phalanx--"their line being broken"--rather than that a gap had been made by the Persian cavalry, as you imply.

--This is backed up by Arrian's comment about Simmias having to halt his unit of the Phalanx, thus losing contact with Polyperchon's unit to his right.

--Had the Phalanx truly been whammed so hard it effectively fell apart--as would have happened if it had actually been broken through in a fight--then what followed after the breakthrough couldn't have taken place. Namely that when the leaders of the second line of the infantry saw what was happening with the cavalry attack on the baggage, they turned around and hit the Persian cavalry in the rear, breaking them and killing many in the process.

--The clear implication is that the breakthrough was an isolated incident that took advantage of a hole that opened and that what was happening went unnoticed at first by most of the Phalanx. Its units continued what they were doing without any serious new trouble from the Persian cavalry, however much trouble it caused for the baggage guards. And having cavalry in your rear tends to be serious trouble for a linear iron age army; ask the Romans who were at Cannae.

--This was possibly so because, unlike the later Macedonian Phalanx, Alexander's could effectively form a defensive flank and could also face to the rear. It was flexible and practiced. If the flank or rear hadn't been covered, then the Persian cavalry was militarily stupid for not attacking. Of course, cavalry getting hit by surprise from the rear by heavy infantry isn't exactly showing military brilliance.

--When what had happened was noticed by the leaders of the second line, action was taken.....by infantry units CAPABLE of taking it. So however hard-pressed the Phalanx was on the Macedonian left, the reserve line was nonetheless free to turn around and had the cohesion to attack in a different direction as soon as the need for such an attack was seen.

--That isn't the action of units that have just been overrun by cavalry, which you have proposed is happened.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

--Had the Phalanx truly been whammed so hard it effectively fell apart--as would have happened if it had actually been broken through in a fight--then what followed after the breakthrough couldn't have taken place. Namely that when the leaders of the second line of the infantry saw what was happening with the cavalry attack on the baggage, they turned around and hit the Persian cavalry in the rear, breaking them and killing many in the process.

I'm not sure why is your conclusion such as it is here. The Phalanx line was very long - that very long line being broken through in one place, means that there is a gap in just one place - it doesn't, however, mean that the entire line along the entire battlefield fell apart from an attack against just a short section of that line.

To break through an enemy lines means simply to pierce it.

So breaking the Phalanx in one place and cavalry "pouring" into enemy rears through that gap, doesn't mean that neighbouring regiments (taxeis) of Phalanx, could not trun around and hit the Persian cavalry in the rear. If anything, only two regiments* (that of Simmias and that of Polyperchon) would be unable to do so.

And, anyway - the Persian cavalry in the rear was broken and killed mainly by Alexander's Companions, not by "infantry which turned around and hit it". It was mainly the job of Alexander's Companions.

*And maybe some mercenary hoplites behind these regiments, whose line was also broken - but also in one place, so the bulk of those mercenary hoplites were still intact and ready to carry out a counterattack.

--You're jumping to a conclusion here. Most commentators on Arrian--such as J.F.C. Fuller and Theodore Dodge--read Arrian as meaning a gap had opened between units of the Phalanx--"their line being broken"--rather than that a gap had been made by the Persian cavalry, as you imply.

--This is backed up by Arrian's comment about Simmias having to halt his unit of the Phalanx, thus losing contact with Polyperchon's unit to his right.

How exactly would halting his unit's advance behind cavalry, cause losing contact with Polyperchon?

And Arrian does not write about "losing contact". On the other hand, he clearly writes about "cutting through double phalanx" and "breaking enemy line". Since we could have some doubts regarding "breaking enemy line", we can't have any about "cutting through double phalanx". "Cutting through" can only be done in combat. It is not possible to "cut through" something, which already is not there - through nothing (empty space / gap). "Cutting through" indicates, that there was something to cut through, blocking their way (i.e. Macedonian line).

--The clear implication is that the breakthrough was an isolated incident that took advantage of a hole that opened and that what was happening went unnoticed at first by most of the Phalanx.

I agree that it was an isolated incident because it happened only in that one place on the battlefield. However I do not agree that a hole was opened by Macedonians losing contact with each other and creating empty space between them - because Arrian clearly writes about Persians "cutting through" Macedonian line, and to charge through a gap does not require "cutting through" anything - while to charge through enemy line clearly requires it.

I also do not agree that that incident went unnoticed at first by anyone from the Phalanx.

First of all when someone is killing your comrades to the left and right of you - it cannot go unnoticed by you. Secondly, Alexander reacted almost immediately with his Companions (at least Arrian's description indicates that it was a relatively short time between the Persian breakthrough and Alexander's relief), and of course he didn't see that personally, so logical conclusion is that someone reported to him about that incident. That could not be any of the baggage train guards, because from the breaking of Macedonian lines to the attack on defenceless baggage train it took some time (there was some distance for the Persians to cover - which takes time) and secondly, reporting anything to anyone would probably be the last thing about which those massacred, poor baggage guards would think. So it must have been some messenger sent by commanders of the Phalanx that informed Alex.

Its units continued what they were doing without any serious new trouble from the Persian cavalry, however much trouble it caused for the baggage guards.

That's because Persian cavalry decided to attack the baggage train, rather than to continue its struggle against other regiments of the Phalanx, attacking them either from the rear or from the flank. That was decision of the commander of that Persian cavalry, or maybe a spontaneous action of those cavalrymen. They simply chose a more defenceless target and a safer & easier task. Either it was because they hoped for some loot (maybe already knowing that the battle is lost), or because they hoped that it would cause panic in Macedonian rears, which could later spread over their whole army - is up to debate. The motives of their decision are up to debate.

And having cavalry in your rear tends to be serious trouble for a linear iron age army; ask the Romans who were at Cannae.

Only if that cavalry is willing to cause serious trouble and is allowed to act undisturbed (as we know the Persian cavalry was not allowed to act undisturbed, because Alexander quickly returned with his Companion cavalry and attacked them). And also Carthaginian cavalry which attacked Roman rears was more numerous (it was majority of Hannibal's entire cavalry force) than that one detachment of Persian cavalry which broke through Macedonian lines and then decided to attack their baggage train instead of the rest of their Phalanx (which, by the way, could also cause serious trouble if only panic would emerge among the baggage train guards / servants).

--When what had happened was noticed by the leaders of the second line, action was taken.....by infantry units CAPABLE of taking it. So however hard-pressed the Phalanx was on the Macedonian left, the reserve line was nonetheless free to turn around and had the cohesion to attack in a different direction as soon as the need for such an attack was seen.

No surprise - the reserve line of phalanx was also very long and very numerous. Alexander had almost (or even exactly) as many mercenary Greek hoplites at Gaugamela, as his pezhetairoi and hypaspists together.

So the second (reserve) line of Phalanx was as strong as the first one.

But still the bulk of the action was taken by Alexander who returned with his Companions. How did you come to a conclusion that it was mostly infantry which destroyed the Persians attacking the baggage train?

I think that the main job in the battle for baggage train was done by Companions. At least the Persian cavalry - encircled from all sides after attacking the baggage (but encircled doesn't mean that units forming the ring of encirclement were already in direct hand-to-hand contact with them - they could still be relatively far away from the Persians, just approaching towards them from all sides) - was trying to escape the encirclement by attacking Alexander's Companions - not Macedonian Phalanx. And Macedonian Companions prevented them from escaping from that pocket, apart from large number, who actually did manage to escape (but suffering heavy losses in the process - and also killing 60 of the Companions in their determine attempt to break the encirclement).

Infantry is much slower than cavalry - so I think Alexander with his Companions was the first to provide relief for the baggage train and the first to attack the Persians there, while infantry was still approaching.

Persian cavalry would be able to escape from Phalanx - not necessarily from Companions. Especially if they were busy with looting and saw the rapidly advancing Companions when it was too late to escape their charge.

--That isn't the action of units that have just been overrun by cavalry, which you have proposed is happened.

No - I have never proposed that entire Macedonian Phalanx had been overrun.

In fact I didn't even claim that entire 2 taxeis had been overrun.

What had been overrun was part of taxis under Simmias and part of taxis under Polyperchon - so that between those two taxeis a gap in their line was "cut through" by Persian swords, axes, spears and maces.

So at best Macedonians had 2 partially and temporarily shaken taxeis (regiments).** I have never claimed that any taxis was completely destroyed. Just that 2 suffered probably significant losses, and lost some ground to the Perians during that combat (they lost exactly enough ground for a gap to be "cut through" in their line).

The remaining of the taxeis (regiments) were intact and ready to action.

**As well as some part (but also a rather small one) of Greek mercenaries behind them.

If the flank or rear hadn't been covered, then the Persian cavalry was militarily stupid for not attacking. Of course, cavalry getting hit by surprise from the rear by heavy infantry isn't exactly showing military brilliance.

Ah, yeah - so (1) it must have been stupid to do so and (2) it actually was stupid.

So what else can I say if you already explained / answered your own point?

But, well:

It was not the best decision of the Persian cavalry to not continue their attack, but instead attack the baggage behind Macedonian line. But I already explained above what could be the possible motives of such decision. Maybe they already considered the battle as lost, and just wanted to capture some loot and then go away from the battlefield. Enemy baggage was an ideal place to this. Or maybe they didn't consider the battle as lost, but decided that attacking an enemy baggage train can cause panic there, which can then spread into other parts of enemy army.

And maybe simply they were too few / to exhausted to face the rest of the Macedonian line - even from behind / from the flank - and that's why they decided to attack the easier target - baggage train.

cavalry getting hit by surprise from the rear by heavy infantry isn't exactly showing military brilliance.

That's why I think that they were hit by Companion cavalry rather than by infantry. At least the Companion cavalry was the unit which hit them first and engaged them in combat until the arrival of the rest of the relief force (i.e. - of the heavy infantry units). And that's why they did not manage to escape. Heavy infantry was too slow to get there first, before the Companions. And too slow to hit the Persians by surprise (surprise requires speed - unless the enemy is completely blind). The Persians would have enough time to escape in such case.

Most commentators on Arrian--such as J.F.C. Fuller and Theodore Dodge--read Arrian as meaning a gap had opened between units of the Phalanx

IMHO that's because they are biased towards such interpretation - and they are biased in favor of it (not the opposite one - which I support), because - IMO - they think of Phalanx as something invincible - especially for cavalry.

But when you implement only "pure" interpretation techniques of a written source - without being biased towards one of possible interpretation results - then IMO "my" interpretation result emerges victorious, because it is more in agreement with what Arrian in fact had in his mind when he wrote his description of that incident.

I'm convinced that Arrian meant the Macedonian line being "cuth through" in combat. Of course Arrian based his description on earlier sources (like historians do) - but Apparently he didn't consider the episode of Phalanx being broken in combat as improbable or unlikely - because he sticks to & presents this version in his text.

It is also not so unlikely to me - but the Persians must have suffered heavy losses while doing this.

[DarthMaur]

What a interesting thread! I enjoyed the videos posted earlier quite much.

And to chime in:

I think that a very disciplined and cohesive unit of properly equipped pike infantry will without doubt withstand frontal shock cavalry (of practically any kind) charge.


The problem is that this scenario is pure fantasy. You could as well argue that the phalanx was superior to the legion, and that phalanx would defeat legion head on (that's quite a common topic on the web, isn't it?). And while it's true, there is the same problem that it's a scenario that doesn't have much to do with how things happen in reality, same as with the above one.


One can point to rough hill terrain, elephants, lack of morale, surprise, flank attack and so on to explain particular defeat, but if this happens consistently, it becomes clear that it is modus operandi and not an exceptional event. That's why these isolated and imagined scenarios don't give much if any insight.



I'd like to point two things somewhat related to what appeared in this thread.

First, who won the battle was more important than anything in ancient times in Greek and Roman world when it came to casaualties. Defeated side consistently suffered casaulaties of significant and often major part of the force, while victorioous side was often left unscathed, with casaualties under 1%. This highlights the importance of morale.

Second, i think people, when talking about England vs. French wars (including William the Conqueror) think about relative strenght of modern counterpart countries. In reality, England was sparsely populated - it had only about 20% of its population well after middle ages, and moreover was even less wealthy.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

First, who won the battle was more important than anything in ancient times in Greek and Roman world when it came to casaualties. Defeated side consistently suffered casaulaties of significant and often major part of the force, while victorioous side was often left unscathed, with casaualties under 1%.

This is what Ancient accounts say / Ancient writers write.

But I don't think this resembles the truth.

In later times (especially after Medieval) you rather don't see so huge disproportions in casualties of the victors & of the losers - which suggests that something is wrong with Ancient - not all other - sources.

I can believe in very high disproportion between losses in a cavalry battle, especially in a battle in which cavalry wins against infantry - and there is a long chase of the routing infantry, in such battles most of casualties of those who were defeated, are being suffered during the chase of the routing enemy (since infantry is slower - infantry is not able to run away without suffering heavy losses from the cavalry who are chasing them). Example of such a battle is the battle of Kircholm in 1605 - the battle itself lasted for less than 1 hour, but the chase of Polish-Lithuanian cavalry behind the routing Swedish army lasted for the rest of the day, if not also on the following day.

But this is improbable in battles in which most of the fighting & of the chase was done by infantry. Unless, of course, there was complete encirclement of the defeated army. But in such case also casualties of the victors are rather high, because encircled men - even if panicked - fight desperately to save their lives, or surrender (but if the victors don't take prisoners - like many armies in Antiquity - then the only way to survive is to fight).

And also note that when sources written by those who were defeated described casualties of the victors - for example Roman sources describing casualties of Carthaginians at Cannae - they were not as minimal, as when the victors described their own casualties. Hannibal at Cannae lost 8,000 killed according to Livy, 6,000 killed according to Polybius. That is much more than Alexander's casualties claimed by Hellenistic or Greco-Roman accounts.

So Ancient sources put emphasis on huge losses of those defeated and minimal losses of those victorious, only if these sources were written by those who won. On the other hand, in cases when sources come from those who were defeated - like Roman descriptions of the battle of Cannae - then disproportions are much smaller.

And so Roman sources describing Cannae (which, as we know - unlike Gaugamela - was a complete encirclement and slaughter of the Roman army, while at Gaugamela vast majority of Persians must have escaped from the battlefield, because Macedonians did not encircle the whole Persian army) say about 6,000 - 8,000 dead Carthaginians (and surely large number was wounded) vs 48,000 - 70,000 dead (and 4,500 - 10,000 captured) Romans:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_ ... Casualties

While at Gaugamela, we have 100 - 500 dead Macedonians, vs 40,000 - 300,000 dead Persians. In addition to dead Persians, Arrian claims also 300,000 more captured. Others also write about captured.

While casualty proportions claimed for Cannae are realistic, those for Gaugamela are improbable.

Defeated side consistently suffered casaulaties of significant and often major part of the force, while victorioous side was often left unscathed, with casaualties under 1%. This highlights the importance of morale

But when it comes to morale, the Persians were "not a whit inferior" to the Greeks:

"(...) The Persians many times seized hold of the Greek spears and broke them; for in boldness and warlike spirit the Persians were not a whit inferior to the Greeks (...)"

Source - Herodotus, "The Histories", 9.62

So this rather highlights the importance of manipulating numbers for propaganda purposes.

[DarthMaur]

In later times (especially after Medieval) you rather don't see so huge disproportions in casualties of the victors & of the losers - which suggests that something is wrong with Ancient - not all other - sources.

This is the crux of the issue. After medieval, warfare changed a lot. And greek/roman was peculiar anyway because of the prelevance of heavy infantry that was comparatively well-armoured.

I know there is an issue with numbers by ancient authors, but that happens even when reporting inter-polis warfare, that is relatively free of the ridiculous number inflation that plagued Greeks reports of warfare with Persia.

But you're right it's the pursuit that matters (with some exceptions, like Cannae, or that battle where Isocrates heavily bloodied two Spartan mora). Somehow it even happenned with infantry-heavy armies of Greece. Perhaps because even in Greece there was cavalry component useful in pursuit or perhaps because rout meant difference that have led to casaualties? I think it's possible that transformation of hoplite formation into mass of disorderly men that don't defend themselves and each other and instead run away, and the high casaualties happenned in the phase immediately following the break of the losing side.

Of course, we don't even know for sure how did the buggers fight, so it's a speculation, but one that makes sense (if anything, prologned pursuit not on horseback should mean more casaualties for victors).

Or maybe they just trampled each other in the chaos of the rout


As an interesting trivia, for example, Plato with his explanation why his state would be unbeatable with warfare - part of it is that, however silly it might sound for us, that physically fit warriors would be able to run away from enemy if needed.

Anyway, i'm not saying that Greeks were braver than Persians! In fact i meant more the intra-Greek warfare, so... what i was trying to point is that the organization and formation - and keeping them, which is partly morale and partly training, is very important. Why i did it? That's partly because of the original topic, ie: cavalry charge, and how that "pike wall vs. charge" scenario glances over (by assuming it) the most important thing - thing that apparently was also the most important in infantry vs. infantry warfare. Morale/organization.

(not as an individual virtue, but as a unit behaviour)

Looking at it now, I think i overgeneralized way too much, though. My bad.

PS. Cannae is indeed special case since the encirclement precluded retreat... i'm more surprised by Trasimene or Trebbia Carthaginian casaualties... but that's Livy...

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

After medieval, warfare changed a lot.

In Early Modern Era warfare was not that much different than in Late Middle Ages.

The evolution of warfare was rather gradual, not rapid.

But you're right it's the pursuit that matters

Not necessarily / not always.

Failed pursuit does not kill many enemies - successful destruction of enemies fighting to the last, does. On other other hand, successful pursuit will produce many enemy casualties. But you need lots of cavalry to do this.

Often to run away is really much better than to stay - and you will suffer less casualties when running.

Somehow it even happenned with infantry-heavy armies of Greece.

If someone writes that heavily armoured hoplites can efficiently pursue light infantry, don't believe them.

Perhaps because even in Greece there was cavalry component

Well, we don't really see Greek cavalry in battles such as Marathon or Plataea. But later - yes.

Or maybe they just trampled each other in the chaos of the rout

To trample someone to death isn't easy. Also when you have wide open space men who route tend to disperse rather than fall on each other - which means they won't trample each other often. Trampling each other is the case during combat in terrible crush - like that created by Germanic cavalry at Adrianople in Roman ranks.

[Hanny]

The primary source - Arrian - writes that the gap in formation was first chopped / cut by Persians.

Let me quote it again:

Does not do as you suggest. Please stop abusing history for your own amusment.

There is no way except by being dishonest to arrive at your view.

http://sitemaker.umich.edu/ryanvlcko/fi ... reat_3.pdf

This is the only valid interpretation -

Only if one is a ignoring the text.

I abused it? It is you who abused it - and those historians who claim that Arrian doesn't write about Macedonian line being broken by Persian attack, and instead try to claim that the gap emerged there "by itself".

Yes as there is no author who describes the primary textys as you have done, none, ever, all ( every book on the subject matter) ascibe the events to be moving between fragmented units.

Who is falsyfing history here? Certainly not me.

yes you.

You should read Arrian's text again and try the proper art of interpretation of what you read.


This is not what Arrian wrote. Arrian is a primary source. Your book is not.

Thats is Arrian page 169.
[quopte]

What you quote now - "page 169" of some website - is from a book - from a secondary source.

Apparently a book written by somehow who decided not to believe in primary Ancient sources and decided to invent his own version of what happened. But this is pure "fantasy" of the author of this book. While Arrian clearly writes that Persians attacked and broke the Macedonian line - not that "formations were unable to link".[/quote]

nope that you ingoring the Text of Arrain.

You don't think they were two deep there, do you? No phalanx was ever being deployed in such a thin line by their commanders. What Arrian writes is "double" phalanx - not "two deep" phalanx.

See map by Hammond in a History of greece to 331bc as well as his description of events that have zero reseblnce to yours, but he only had to teach the subject and write academic books for living.

You confuse early Achaemenid army (times of Marathon) with late Achaemenid army (times of Gaugamela).

Nope the book is expcite and contradicts you.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

--He wasn't quite correct. Horses are not stupid, generally, and they won't charge into a bunch of sharp points. Which is why pikes remained in use to protect the musketeers

This is another myth (like that "horses will not run into something solid" myth). You can surely force a horse to charge into a bunch of sharp points, as numerous historical examples of cavalry charges clearly prove.

They did charge pikemen (and formation called Winged Hussars did it successfully on numerous occasions).

Some accounts about Winged Hussars vs pikemen combats:

Battle of Kircholm (600 cavalry charging & defeating 3840 pike-musket infantry):

"Hussars attacked against pikemen, as it could not be differently, they broke the enemy formation, not without own damages."

Battle of Klushino (pike-musket infantry deployed behind a solid wooden fence):

"(...) our horsemen, after ramming fences, with which the enemies treacherously strengthened their defences, plunging into pikes with chests of horses, suffered a lot of damage."

Another account of the same events:

"German musketeers (...) deployed near field fortifications like behind a swamp, behind a fence, in dense formation, harmed us, protected by pikemen."

But in the end German mercenary infantry was defeated by again and again repeated charges of Hussars. But the final blow could be inflicted to them by Hussars only after Polish infantry forced them with musket fire to retreat from their position behind the fence, to a new, less protected defensive position.

About Polish-Swedish combats in Livonia:

"(...) our lancers wipe out not only enemy cavalry, but also pikemen, as fresh examples from Livonia prove."

In the battle of Mitawa in 1622 (the battle as a whole was inconclusive) 2 banners of Hussars (ca. 600 horsemen) charged against 2000 Swedish pike-musket infantry, broke through their lines and descended on the rear of the Swedish lines. However, mercenary Reiters of the Polish army refused to charge the Swedes to support the Hussars. Hussars thus had to withdraw - but their casualties during the charge which broke through Swedish lines were just mere 2 soldiers killed (and probably several soldiers wounded and over a dozen horses killed / wounded).

Even more examples of Hussars defeating pikemen in frontal charges are from Polish-Russian wars (Russian armies also made extensive use of pikemen). All of this was possible thanks to long lances they used (which were longer than pikes), combined with tactics they used.

Painting by Pieter Snayers (exact year unknown, but before 1630) - Hussars vs pike-musket square:



And here painting showing the mentioned above charge vs pikemen behind fences at Klushino:



Also French Gendarmes heavy cavalry were reported to successfully charge pikemen on some occassions.

If they were able to do that, they were basically invulnerable to cavalry charges alone, so long as they maintained the integrity of their ranks.

Maybe if cavalry was untrained / badly trained and horses not accustomed / trained to do such things.

You can train a horse to do a lot of things which an untrained horse would normally hardly do. For example a horse will generally run away from gunpowder fire (due to noise it produces), but not if a horse is accustomed to such sound. Polish armies in 16th - 17th centuries made extensive use of firearms against Crimean Tatars, because most of their horses were not accustomed to sound of gunpowder (otherwise firearms wouldn't really be efficient against swiftly moving & fighting in loose formations Tatars, considering how inaccurate firearms were back then).

--For example, look at the French cavalry at Waterloo. If Ney's lads had a few guns along with them (or some dragoons) and some grapeshot or cannister rounds, the British squares could have been opened up like tin cans, allowing the cavalry to charge in. But all the poor French had were mounted horse, and the horses wouldn't impale themselves on all those British (pardon the pun) frog-stickers. Which same were mounted on muskets that kept firing into the faces of the French.

I've read that the failure of the French charge against British squares at Waterloo was to large extent caused by difficult terrain across which they charged - i.e. their formation got shattered and disorganized already during charge, due to roughness of terrain and terrain obstacles which slowed them down and reduced their cohesion.

And regarding that famous movie scene - it was more the problem with men, than with horses:

"Extras playing British infantry panicked repeatedly and scattered during the filming of some of the cavalry charges. Attempts to reassure them by marking the closest approach of the horses with white tape similarly failed, and the scene was cut."

Source: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0066549/trivia

In reality during that charge French cavalry clearly did charge into those British "frog-stickers", because British infantry also suffered heavy casualties in that combat, inflicted by French cavalry (if we assume that horses couldn't even be forced to get close to those British squares, then what would be the cause of British losses?).

And actually some of 26 British squares were nearly broken by French cavalry - Lord Uxbridge sent remnants of his cavalry to save them, and only that's why the situation was brought again under British control.

Horses are not stupid, generally

Soviet "cannon fodder" soldiers were also not stupid, generally (I guess), yet they held their lines - which was totally suicidal for most of them - at the gates of Moscow in 1941, when NKVD squads with MPIs were deployed behind their lines, to implement "special measures" and ensure that everyone would fulfil the "not a step back" order of Stalin. The same refers to horses - you can force a horse to do what you want by inflicting pain on it & teaching it who is its master. You have spurs & other things to do it. And defenders of animal rights didn't exist back then.

This Mod for game Medieval 2 Total War realistically depicts the "charge mechanics" of lance-wielding shock cavalry. This particular video is an attempt of depicting the battle of Klushino in 1610 (over 2700 Polish soldiers including 200 musket-infantry & over 2500 cavalry vs 3350 Swedish mercenary soldiers, 15000 Russian soldiers and about 20 000 Russo-Swedish armed camp servants - Polish armed camp servants did not take part in the battle):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mR8G3fEEnx4