ARVN

[David C. Clarke]

Excellent post Peter! Indeed, anything that recognizes the ARVN is a breathe of fresh air after so many decades of seeing their sacrifices ignored. Oddly enough, some of the Ranger Battalions and the somewhat dodgy 18th Infantry Division, put up the best fights in 1975 when the war was lost. As you noted, the 18th fought it out at Xuan Loc, a totally hopeless fight.

Not to veer off-topic, but the records of the Ranger Battalions during the abortive invasion of Laos are records of superb heroism against superior odds.

Best,
David

[Peter H]

Thanks David.

Independent(Separate)units in 1973 were as follows:

7 Armored Cavalry Squadrons
8 Artillery Battalions(105mm)
4 Artillery Battalions(155mm)
5 Artillery Battalions(175mm)
4 Artillery Air Defense Battalions
12 Military Police Battalions


Also the Vietnamese Navy SEALS(Lien Doc Nguoi Nhia) should be mentioned.Badly mauled in the fight with China over the Spratly Is in 1974.

[The_Enigma]

Ive never really stuided the Vietnam war but why did the south collaspe following the American withdrawal? The lists posted have stated that some of these divisions put up a hell of a fight, and had they not been funded for years with modern equipment and money etc?

[David C. Clarke]

A very complicated question. At the very least, ARVN forces were over-stretched in 1975. The decision to abandon the Central Highlands by Thieu completely demoralized the Army (Google: "Trail of Tears"). And, without American air-support (or enough ARVN air support, due to a lack of resources) the very well-motivated NVA took the initiative.

South Vietnam never quite had the single-purposefulness or motivation of the NVA and its leadership in Hanoi. History in Asia proves over and over that a Communist State can beat a weak capitalist state, due to its greater ability to focus their Armies and population on Nationalism.

Best,
~D

[Carl Schwamberger]

ARVN senior leadership and command & control was often overcomplicated & sometimes broke down due to internal political fighting amoung the Vietnamese in & out of the military. One example were the ARVN Corps commanders. The ARVN Corps were regional entitys and the comander had cnsiderable political and government admisistration power. Those guys seemed to regard their 'corps' as their own little kingdom. For example: Reinforcing one corps with units from another was vastly more involved than ordinary a staff action and a command decsion. It was something that was negotiated according to Vietnames custom, politics, and largely behind the backs of the US advisors and commanders.

[The_Enigma]

Thanks for the inpuy guys

[David C. Clarke]

A few books for you Enigma:

"Victory in Vietnam"--the official History of the People's Army of Vietnam, translated by Merle L. Pribbenow. (Pure propaganda, but read between the lines...)

"Our Great Spring Victory", by General Van Tien Dung. (Probably the best account from the NVA side.)

"The Fall of South Vietnam; Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders", by Stephen T. Hosmer.

"55 Days", by Alan Dawson. (A decent American account.)

"The Final Collapse", by General Cao Van Vien. (General Cao Van Vien was the last chairman of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff.)

There are others worthy of comment. If you need more, write and I'll dig deeper.

Best,
David

[Peter H]

In 1973 its said that South Vietnam had the four largest air force in the world.This was after Nixon pumped in equipment.supplies before the final ceasefire in March.

But as noted here ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VNAF ) this was more quantity than quality:

Later, the US released more powerful light attack A-1 Skyraiders and jet light attack A-37 Dragonfly, and the lightweight F-5 Freedom Fighter which was developed by Northrop as an affordable export fighter for foreign air forces. By the end of 1972, the VNAF operated 18 squadrons with 500 new helicopters, one of the largest helicopter fleets in the world. In 1972, President Thieu asked for, but did not receive the F-4 Phantom with its massive bombload and speed that was widely used for all roles by US air services.

When the NVA started to install anti-aircraft missiles near Khe Sanh, the VNAF lacked the radar jamming gear, and the navigational aids required to attack the missile sites.The VNAF primarily flew close support as communist forces did not fly aircraft over US-held territory, so they never had the opportunity to fight MiGs or "go downtown" in heavy fighter bombers.

The lack of aircraft spare parts in 1974 and 1975 is nearly always mentioned but as one source claims " the main problem in the depots was not inadequate spare parts,but accounting procedures to determine where the parts were".

The Oil Crisis of 1973/74 also pushed back flying hours by 49%.Training,bombloads,and sorties were cut back.This factor hit all the World's Air Forces at that time,but most weren't fighting a war.

[The_Enigma]

the VNAF operated 18 squadrons with 500 new helicopters, one of the largest helicopter fleets in the world

Some of these are the Hueys we see getting pushed off USN CV's are they not?

Hey thanks David, i will have to take a look at some of those books!

[Peter H]

"Vietnamization: Success or Failure?"

http://www.vva.org/veteran/1207/vietnamization.html

The Airborne and Marines were elites, in part because they could fight anywhere in South Vietnam. With the exception of some ARVN Ranger units, the other forces were all territorial. Families lived with, or close to, the soldiers and their bases. The infantry divisions were not formations that could move to where the enemy threatened unless it was their own regions.

Saigon lacked freely deployable forces. In 1971, when President Thieu rejected pulling the ARVN’s 2nd Infantry Division out of its sector to reinforce the Laotian invasion, he was recognizing this fact. The next year, during the Easter Offensive, the ARVN managed to send the 21st Division from the Mekong Delta to help the defenders of An Loc in a different military region, and the difficulty of that maneuver confirmed the basic problem. After the war, Gen. Vien theorized that creating large-scale units (regiments) from the Regional Forces would have freed ARVN divisions from territorial defense responsibilities, but that would not have made them mobile without solving these social issues.

[Peter H]

A good read:

Vietnam's Forgotten Army: Heroism and Betrayal in the ARVN chronicles the lives of Pham Van Dinh and Tran Ngoc Hue, two of the brightest young stars in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Both men fought with valor in a war that seemed to have no end, exemplifying ARVN bravery and determination that is largely forgotten or ignored in the West. However, while Hue fought until he was captured by the North Vietnamese Army and then endured thirteen years of captivity, Dinh surrendered and defected to the enemy, for whom he served as a teacher in the reeducation of his former ARVN comrades.

An understanding of how two lives that were so similar diverged so dramatically provides a lens through which to understand the ARVN and South Vietnam's complex relationship with America's government and military. The lives of Dinh and Hue reflect the ARVN's battlefield successes, from the recapture of the Citadel in Hue City in the Tet Offensive of 1968, to Dinh's unheralded role in the seizure of Hamburger Hill a year later. However, their careers expose an ARVN that was over-politicized, tactically flawed, and dependent on American logistical and firepower support. Marginalized within an American war, ARVN faced a grim fate as U.S. forces began to exit the conflict. As the structure of the ARVN/U.S. alliance unraveled, Dinh and Hue were left alone to make the most difficult decisions of their lives.

Andrew Wiest weaves historical analysis with a compelling narrative, culled from extensive interviews with Dinh, Hue, and other key figures. Once both military superstars, Dinh is viewed by a traitor by many within the South Vietnamese community, while Hue, an expatriate living in northern Virginia, is seen as a hero who never let go of his ideals. Their experiences and legacies mirror that of the ARVN's rise and fall as well as the tragic history of South Vietnam.

Pham Van Dinh surrendered,defected his 56th Regiment in 1972("the only mass surrender in the Vietnam War"),while Tran Ngoc Hue,captured in Laos in 1971,remained in captivity for 13 years.


"Harry" Tran Ngoc Hue with Australian WO2 Barry Long
http://www.aattv.iinet.net.au/longb.JPG

[Peter H]

Some good generals

Ngo Quang Truong

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ngo_Quang_Truong

General Norman Schwarzkopf stated in his autobiography It Doesn't Take A Hero, that "His face was pinched and intense, not at all handsome, and there was always a cigarette hanging from his lips. Yet he was revered by his officers and troops -- and feared by those North Vietnamese commanders who knew of his ability...General Truong was the most brilliant tactical commander I'd ever known."

http://www.vietnamwar.com/soldiersmedals.jpg




Do Cao Tri

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Do_Cao_Tri

Tri was considered by both his contemporaries and by historians as one of the most aggressive and able combat commanders produced by the Republic of South Vietnam. As a lieutenant general, he performed brilliantly as commander of the III Corps Tactical Zone during the Cambodian Campaign of 1970, earning an unusual lauditory sobriquet from the U.S. news media as "the Patton of the Parrot's Beak". Tri had been ordered north to take command of beleaguered I Corps Tactical Zone forces during the darkest days of the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive of 1972, when he was killed in a helicopter accident while still in Cambodia.

http://www.nhaydu.com/index_83hg_files/ ... CaoTri.jpg



Vu Van Giai,ill fated to command the 3rd Division in 1972 was also termed "professional,strict and tough".

http://www.generalhieu.com/giai.jpg

[Peter H]

Da Lat National Military Academy

http://vietnamlibrary.informe.com/the-l ... dt778.html

[Peter H]

Nguyen Viet Thanh

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nguyen_Viet_Thanh

[David C. Clarke]

A most intriguing figure to me has been that of Nguyen Trong Luat, commander of the 1st Armored Brigade during Lam Song 719. I've rarely seen, in any war, such mixed reviews of an armor leader as he's gathered.

Any thoughts on this controversial armored commander guys?

Very Best,
~D