Napoleon's system of operations

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tigre
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Napoleon's system of operations

#1

Post by tigre » 12 Aug 2016, 23:04

Hello to all :D; something interesting..........................................

NAPOLEON'S SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS.

From his first campaign in 1796 to his last in 1815, Napoleon employed but two systems or types of operations:

a. The maneuver against flank and rear of the enemy.
b. Operations on interior lines.

In the first system, he threw the mass of his army into the hostile zone of retreat to cut the enemy's line of communication, in order to force a decisive battle, i.e., a turning movement.

In the second system, he moved his army in a compact mass to a central position between enemy units not yet united in order to defeat them in detail, i.e., an operation on interior lines.

It is quite apparent that while Napoleon employed the maneuver on interior lines on comparatively few occasions, he operated against the flank and rear of his opponent almost habitually.

Without considering the Peninsular War, Napoleon's Campaigns contain at least twenty-seven characteristic maneuvers against the hostile rear, but he attempted many others and planned still more, viz.:

1796—Lodi, Bassano, Arcole, Dolce
1800—Marengo
1805—Ulm, Hollabrunn
1806—Jena
1807—Pultusk, Allenstein, Friedland
1808—Landshut, Eckmuehl
1812—Vilna, Witebsk, Smolensk
1813—Leipzig, Bautzen, Dresden, Dueben
1814—Saint-Dizier, Brienne, Montmirail, Soissons, Mery-sur-Seine.

The strategic and tactical results of some of these operations were absolutely crushing or decisive, notably: Bassano, Arcole, Marengo, Ulm, Jena, Friedland, Landshut, Montmirail. There were others in which faulty execution or the result of unforeseen incidents did not produce the full effect. Nevertheless, all succeeded in driving the enemy far to the rear and gaining large amounts of territory: Lodi, Castelnuovo, Dolce, Hollabrunn. There was only one failure: St. Dizier.

Source: Maneuver in War. FMFRP 12-13. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#2

Post by tigre » 17 Aug 2016, 01:10

Hello to all :D; something more..........................................

NAPOLEON'S SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS.

THE MANEUVER AGAINST FLANK AND REAR.

There is a justifiable reluctance to reduce military operations to a formula, nevertheless one knows that in the arts as well as in science, genius is the result of system and method. As to the term "system" its dictionary definition: Orderly combination of parts or elements, into a whole, according to some rational principle." The general idea underlying Napoleon's favorite and most effective system—the maneuver against the rear of the enemy—can be expressed as follows:

(1) Frontal pressure will rarely lead to a decision; the enemy can always withdraw, fight delaying actions in successive positions and finally escape.
(2) Through demonstrations by detached forces, the enemy is drawn away from his bases or capitol.
(3) In rapid, secret concentrations, the mass of the army is moved into the hostile zone of retreat by a march around the enemy's flank; if possible, this movement is under cover of a natural screen: mountain range, forest, etc.
(4) The objective is a position astride the enemy's line of communications in order to secure a strategic barrier, usually a river line, cutting off his avenues of retreat.
(5) This threat in rear is expected to produce a certain degree of demoralization and a reversal of enemy movements.
(6) Then turn against the enemy in a battle of your own choice, in time and location.

This conception can be reduced to a schematic diagram; it is like a stage setting; note the scenery, the "props":

(1) Initial movements of the enemy against the French frontier; demonstration to keep him occupied.
(2) Secret concentration of the French mass; movement around the enemy's flank into the hostile rear areas.
(3) Specifically—where? To a position astride the enemy's line of retreat, preferably resting on a natural barrier: a river line, for instance. It is this barrier which became the initial, strategic objective of Napoleon; he waged battle ordinarily only after he had secured it.
(4) The enemy, aware of the threat to his rear, must make an about-face. In this connection, it is well to visualize the complex organization of an army rear-area, its administrative and supply establishments, lines of communications, depots, dumps, distributing points and various echelons of supply; the movement and location of reserves, trains, service units, supply and evacuation facilities are all generally oriented in a forward direction: suddenly this flow of men and materiel must be reversed!

The presumptive demoralization of the enemy, however, was not the only advantage accruing from this maneuver. Special conditions at that time favored it: the French had developed a superior strategic mobility as compared with their opponents. The French carried several days of fire within units at the expense of Class-I supplies, which they obtained through foraging and requisitions or the capture of hostile depots. The Austrians and Prussians depended almost entirely on convoys and rear-establishments; consequently, they were extremely sensitive to threats against their communications.

Finally, Napoleon did not employ this maneuver until he had sufficient strength to secure a local superiority of numbers.

Source: Maneuver in War. FMFRP 12-13. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#3

Post by Skarpskytten » 17 Aug 2016, 10:08

Thank you, tigre!

What does " FMFRP" stand for?

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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#4

Post by tigre » 19 Aug 2016, 21:57

Hello to all :D; thanks Skarpskytten :wink:. Something more..........................................

NAPOLEON'S SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS.

The maneuver of Lodi, 1796. General situation. Campaign of Italy, 1796. Austrian and Sardinian forces opposed the French along the Appenines and the Alps. In a typical "operation on interior lines" directed against the point of junction of the Allied forces, Napoleon isolated the Sardinians and concluded an armistice with them. The Austrians continued to hold in the area: Acqoi—Alexandrie—Tortone.

What was the decision of the French commander? The answer is contained in Napoleon's own sardonic words in his famous report to the French War Department, 29 April 1796:

"I have no doubt that you approve of my decisions. Here is one wing of a hostile army, agreeing to an armistice—in order to give me time to defeat the other".

It is obvious that in this particular situation every effort had to be made to defeat the Austrians before the Armistice with the Sardinians should elapse; in this situation the time factor had become all-important; a maneuver solution that was time-consuming was useless.

Now let us turn to the Austrian commander. What plans were open to him? Pending the expiration of the armistice he had to keep in mind the possibility of rejoining his ally; for the present there was the imperative necessity to fight the French_by disputing every inch of ground.

The Austrian main supply depots were located at Milan and Mantoue. Note that the route to Milan crossed a series of parallel river-lines, the Sesia, Agogna, Tessin, Lembro and Adda, that lent themselves to protracted defense or delaying actions and that the Po, an immense stream, would cover the Austrian south flank in the course of such an operation.

Note that the Adda represented a "strategic barrier" across the Austrian routes of withdrawal to the east, to their home territory and the strong fortifications of Mantua.

What plans were open to Napoleon? How did he propose to operate against the Austrians? At least one plan open to him was to continue operations in the valley of the Tanaro, i.e., frontal pressure in the direction of Alexandria and attack the Austrians where found.

What objections, if any, may be made against this operation? Napoleon's present task consisted in keeping the Allies divided and defeating one before the Armistice expired; this meant prompt, decisive action against the Austrians.

In this situation Napoleon was "counting minutes," a veritable race against time, against the date of expiration of an armistice. As a matter of fact he adopted "frontal pressure" as it should be used, as a preliminary operation, as a demonstration or feint under cover of which he planned a more decisive stroke.

On 30 April, the Austrians evacuated their forward positions. Massena was ordered to push on in the direction of Alexandrie and engage in "frontal pressure." Napoleon then formed a detached corps and directed it deeply into Austrian territory, to seize a crossing of the Po. His ultimate plan was fully revealed in his report to the French War Department, 6 May:

"My intention is to force a crossing of the Po, as close to Milan as possible, to avoid further obstacles to that city. By this movement, I turn the successive lines of defense which (the Austrians) have prepared along the Agogna and Tessin. I move on Plaisance today, and shall be between the enemy and his depots . . . I may be accused of being bold, but not of being slow................."

By 8 May, Napoleon was across the Po. He fought a sharp engagement with an Austrian detached force and secured the crossing of the Adda at Pizzighettane; he then moved north to seize Lodi and Cassano and cut off the last avenues of retreat left open to the Austrians.

The reaction of the Austrians was violent; the threat to the rear was sufficient to cause their retreat on Milan and Mantoue; their rear guards barely cleared the crossing at Lodi when the leading element of the French Army appeared there.

Napoleon was not able to intercept his opponent entirely; there were delays due to his lack of bridge equipment and the state of exhaustion of some of his units. Nevertheless, he had forced the Austrians to evacuate Lombardy in disorder and completely isolated their former ally, the Sardinians, with immediate political effect. Seemingly abandoned by the Austrians, the Sardinians promptly negotiated for a separate peace.

Source: Maneuver in War. FMFRP 12-13. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
What does " FMFRP" stand for?
Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication.
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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#5

Post by Stiltzkin » 19 Aug 2016, 23:41

Thanks tigre, do you perhaps know what kind of maneuver Nappy utilized during his Egypt campaign?

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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#6

Post by tigre » 20 Aug 2016, 19:01

Hello Stiltzkin :D; seeing and reading about the battles in Egypt, I'm tending to think that the battles of the Pyramides (1798) and Aboukir (1799) were turning maneuvers (IMO), so I would choose the option attack against flank and rear (my two cents so to speak). Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#7

Post by Skarpskytten » 20 Aug 2016, 21:35

Thanks tigre!

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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#8

Post by Stiltzkin » 22 Aug 2016, 01:41

I see, if I remember correctly he used the Square formation and pushed the forces towards the water with a flank maneuver

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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#9

Post by tigre » 23 Aug 2016, 05:13

Hello Stiltzkin :D; you're rigth.....the square formation was used in order to draw away and hold on the hostile forces like a frontal attack. Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#10

Post by Stiltzkin » 26 Aug 2016, 01:42

I would think that the victories in the Egypt campaign were probably won by technical superiority. Mamelukes fielded a lot of Cavalry and the French (in Square) shot them from point blank ranges.
I always wondered how the attack columns worked so well, that never seemed to be too practical. Was it 500 for each section?

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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#11

Post by tigre » 27 Aug 2016, 01:04

Hello to all :D; something more..........................................

NAPOLEON'S SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS.

The maneuver of Ulm, 1805. In analyzing the maneuver of Lodi, only one of the many similar operations has been selected. Advancing about ten years to the next example, in 1805, one recognizes the same general maneuver on a more ambitious scale. The preliminaries of the campaign of Ulm, 1805, represent one of the most interesting examples of a command decision.

Note the initial French concentrations along the channel with a view to attempting a landing in England. Suddenly evidence developed that Austria and Russia were making war-like preparations. By early September, Austrian armies were actually advancing west to the line of the Rhine. The Austrian strategic dispositions would indicate dispersion; at this stage of the game, this was understandable, as they were trying to cover both northern Italy and the Tyrol.

Napoleon decided on a complete reversal of plans—to abandon the initial project of an invasion of England, for the time being, and by a colossal march of concentration to move his army from the Channel to the Rhine in order to turn against the Austro-Russian combination. The next movements in this great military drama should be plain because you already know the secret of the Napoleonic system: a maneuver against the rear of the enemy.

In a huge wheel to the south, his corps converge on the junction of the Danube, Iller and Lech. With his mass in vicinity of Augsburg, astride the Austrian communications, Napoleon initiated a concentric movement against his opponent. On 12 October, he was certain to be able to surround the Austrians and wrote Soult:

"It is not now a question of merely attacking the enemy; I now expect not a single man to escape—not a man to carry the news to Vienna.....".

After a vague attempt to break through the tightening cordon, the Austrian First Army was forced to capitulate at Ulm. As one views this campaign in its entirety, one is impressed with the fact that the final battle dispositions around Ulm seem almost visibly forecast in the strategic advance that began on the English Channel and terminated in a city in Bavaria, as if a gigantic hand had stretched across a continent to gather in the Austrian forces.

Source: Maneuver in War. FMFRP 12-13. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#12

Post by pugsville » 28 Aug 2016, 16:50

The Ulm campaign was an almost accidental victory, Napoleon was merely trying to drive the bulk of forces straight to the decisive theatre the fact that ended up with the encirclement of Mack's forces was not an Aim of Napoleon's strategic movement, Mack could have escaped by withdrawing as he was urged by other generals. Napoleon repeatedly misread mack's intentions (as Mack's plans made no sense at all it's not that surprising) IMHO far too much is made of the Ulm campaign. All battles and campaigns there is an intersection actions/strengths of the victory and acton/weaknesses of the loses, if this case most of the credit for Napoleon's complete and total victory should go to Mack. Any other Austrian General would have ha the common sense to withdraw, which they had the time to do.

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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#13

Post by tigre » 02 Sep 2016, 22:41

Hello to all :D; thanks for your point of view pugsville :wink:.something more..........................................

NAPOLEON'S SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS.

The maneuver of Jena, 1806.

Another example of the favorite Napoleonic maneuver is shown in his campaign against Prussia, culminating in her defeat at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806. The usual recapitulation of essential factors will be followed:

(1) Initial dispositions. Wide dispersion of French corps in cantonments. Initial Prussian concentrations, with a view to attacking the French in the western area; Russian support was arranged for and they were en route from the east.

(2) Enemy lines of communications, supply bases, and avenues of retreat.

(a) The route: Erfurt—Leipzig—Berlin.
(b) The route: Jena—Gera—Dresden, towards Russian reinforcements.
(c) The route: Eisenach—Mansfeld—Magdeburg.
Like the Austrians in 1796 and 1805, the Prussian Army was dependent on convoys and depots for supplies.

(3) Strategic barrier: A river line cutting the line of communication, in this particular situation the river Saale and its tributaries.

(4) Strategic screen to cover the movements of the French: The line of the Thuringer Wald; a belt of forests.

(5) Demonstration to deceive the enemy. Demonstration against Wesel by the King of Holland. Occupation of cantonments until the last moment, in order to give the impression that no offensive was contemplated.

(6) Movement and objective of the French: Rapid concentration by forced marches in the direction of Berlin and seizure of the crossings of the Saale, which control the avenues of retreat of the Prussian Armies on Leipzig and Dresden.

(7) The decisive battle: Converging movement against the enemy, who was retreating in several columns, and defeat of fractions in detail at Jena and Auerstadt.

Source: Maneuver in War. FMFRP 12-13. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#14

Post by tigre » 09 Sep 2016, 22:12

Hello to all :D; something more..........................................

NAPOLEON'S SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS.

The Adige 1813.

In 1813 Prince Eugene was holding the Adige with 40,000 men; the Austrians were between the Brenta and the Adige. The Prince wrote Napoleon for advice.

The master replied:

"Do not give up the Adige without a fight. This is the maneuver which I would undertake: Move via Brondolo-Mestre on Trevise and the Piave . . You can expect incalculable results. The enemy communications run via Trevise and Conegliano; cut them . . . Perhaps I should not insist on this bold maneuver, but it is my style, my manner of doing things..."

So Napoleon had a "style," a "manner of doing things." A favorite system, that of a maneuver against the enemy's rear! A wide turning movement—and not the frontal pressure that head-on collision which for some inexplicable reason has become a favorite tactical solution by the average commander.

Source: Maneuver in War. FMFRP 12-13. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).
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Re: Napoleon's system of operations

#15

Post by tigre » 16 Sep 2016, 22:35

Hello to all :D; something more..........................................

NAPOLEON'S SYSTEM OF OPERATIONS.

THE MANEUVER ON INTERIOR LINES.

We are now ready to cover the second of Napoleon's favorite maneuvers, a maneuver from a central position, i.e., operations on interior lines.

What constitutes the "maneuver from a central position?" When Napoleon had no effective superiority of strength or numbers or was unable to make the necessary concentration to that effect, he did not fall back to "position warfare" or a purely "defensive battle" but had recourse to maneuvers from a central position, or operations on interior lines. He sought to divide the opponent or profit from an initial division if it existed; he then maneuvered for a central position between enemy fractions in order to defeat them in detail, viz:

(a) Operation from a central position. as an "initial offensive":
The opening campaigns of 1796, 1812, and 1815.

(b) The central position, as a "position of readiness":
1796—Operations at Castiglioni, Arcole, Rivoli. Central position: Mantoue.
1805—Before Austerlitz. Central position: Vienna.
i806—Before entry into Warsaw. Central position: Warsaw.
1809—Before Essling. Central position: Vienna.
1813—Fall Campaign. Central position: Goerlitz.

The characteristic execution of this maneuver, conceived as an "initial offensive," may be summarized as follows:

As an initial offensive stroke, Napoleon threw his mass into a gap existing in the enemy's dispositions. He attempted to destroy the separated fractions in detail by concentrating mass against one while containing the other until he could turn against the latter.

This maneuver ordinarily required a painstaking preparation in which certain essential factors must be satisfied in advance:

(1) Selection of initial direction of offensive.
(2) Selection of enemy fraction to be attacked.
(3) Secondary operation, demonstration, to deceive the enemy as to the actual area of offensive.
(4) Special measures to insure secrecy.
(5) The strategic concentration.
(6) Organization of alternate lines of operation.

Source: Maneuver in War. FMFRP 12-13. Reprint 1939 Edition. USMC 1990.

Cheers. Raúl M 8-).

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