The Koreans were deployed initially along the coast in an enclave role.One needs to remember that a 1965 ROK Division did not have the mobility or firepower of a US Division.Photos show them with M-1 Garands at the time much like the ARVN.This was only 12 years after the end of the Korean War and before the'economic miracle' that transformed South Korea.Given this zone they stayed there.
MACV estimated in 1965 that a US Marine Battalion was equivalent to 3 ARVN Battalions,a US Airborne Battalion was equivalent to 2.5 ARVN Battalions.This had nothing to do with the calibre of the soldiers but with the firepower,mobility and equipment they had.I think the same ratio would have held for ROK Battalions at the time.
Photos from Osprey's Armies of the Vietnam War 1962-1975.
ROK Tiger Division,1967,still armed with US WW2 era weapons
South Korean troops in Vietnam
That was about right, the intention of using Koreans as garrison were to free Americans troops as mobile striking force, interestingly, later in the war, when Amricans begun retreating from vietnam,the speed of retreat of Korean troops was far slower than Americans, that caused Koreans to take more and more responsiblity from Amricans, in the NVA sping offensive 1972, Koreans were committed into many fighting simply because there were no American troops there, that caused some bittness among Koreans "we came here to help Americans to fight their war, now Americans were gone, and leave those S**t to us".Peter H wrote:The Koreans were deployed initially along the coast in an enclave role.One needs to remember that a 1965 ROK Division did not have the mobility or firepower of a US Division.Photos show them with M-1 Garands at the time much like the ARVN.This was only 12 years after the end of the Korean War and before the'economic miracle' that transformed South Korea.Given this zone they stayed there.
MACV estimated in 1965 that a US Marine Battalion was equivalent to 3 ARVN Battalions,a US Airborne Battalion was equivalent to 2.5 ARVN Battalions.This had nothing to do with the calibre of the soldiers but with the firepower,mobility and equipment they had.I think the same ratio would have held for ROK Battalions at the time.
Photos from Osprey's Armies of the Vietnam War 1962-1975.
ROK Tiger Division,1967,still armed with US WW2 era weapons
An interesting episode :
When a Korean platoon leader knew that US fighters were panned to strike a Vietnamese village, he didn't know how to inform this urgent warning to a Vietnamese village head. But he thought the old Vietnamese village head could the Chinese characters. As you know, the old generation of Vietnam understood the Chinese characters.
The platoon leader wrote time and location of the American air strike in the Chinese characters so that villagers left their village safely before the air raid. The platoon leader and Vietnamese didn't know that they could communicate in such a dramatic and simple way. They realized that they have lived in the same cultural sphere more than two millenia.
When a Korean platoon leader knew that US fighters were panned to strike a Vietnamese village, he didn't know how to inform this urgent warning to a Vietnamese village head. But he thought the old Vietnamese village head could the Chinese characters. As you know, the old generation of Vietnam understood the Chinese characters.
The platoon leader wrote time and location of the American air strike in the Chinese characters so that villagers left their village safely before the air raid. The platoon leader and Vietnamese didn't know that they could communicate in such a dramatic and simple way. They realized that they have lived in the same cultural sphere more than two millenia.
Wasn't the area protected by the Koreans very quite due to the cruel way they treated their opponents (because they had an intense hate of communists)? In the early period of the war there were some intense fights between ROK troops and VC. But after these clashes it seemed the VC feared the Korean troops and avoided battles with them.
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Allen Milcic
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Though Canada did not officially participate in the Vietnam conflict, a large number of Canadians enlisted in US forces in order to assist our neighbours in their time of need. The following is an excerpt from an article written by a Canadian citizen who fought in Vietnam:
The entire article is found here: http://www.mystae.com/reflections/vietnam/canada.htmlAnonymous Warriors
"The worst of ours are going north, and the best of theirs are coming south."
- Unknown marine quoted in Leatherneck magazine
When I was in Vietnam I was told that there were only 100 other Canadians in-country at the time (including my brother who served up north as a tech inspector for the choppers of the 2nd Signal Brigade at Phu Bai.) I had been drafted but almost all Canadian Vietnam veterans I have met were volunteers who crossed the border to enlist. Since most Canadians gave the US border city they enlisted in as their point of origin, the actual number of Canadians who served in Vietnam may never be known. In addition, many Canadians serving in Vietnam become US citizens and stayed in the United States after their return.
"Colonel Shields said the Defense Department had no figures because the records of soldiers who served in Vietnam had been retired."
"Roderick Engert, chief of the reference branch of the Center of Military History of the Pentagon, said the number might be only 2,500 to 3,000. He extrapolates his figures from the casualty ratio in the war, in which 2.7 million Americans served and 58,000 died. A Canadian Government official said he doubted that more than 5,000 Canadians had served in Vietnam."
- Christopher S. Wren, "Vietnam War Also Haunts Canadian Volunteers", The New York Times, Jan. 24, 1985
"...The war also lured an estimated 5,000 Canadians to enlist in its jungle hells."
- Marci McDonald, "Vietnam's Bitter Legacy", Maclean's, Apr. 29, 1985.
"Some estimate that their numbers far surpassed the more than 30,000 American draft dodgers who fled to Canada to avoid military service during the war. While exact numbers are impossible to obtain, from my work as a military historian with the Canadian War Museum, I estimate that of the many thousands who served in the U. S. Vietnam-era military, some 12,000 Canadians actually served in Vietnam itself."
- Fred Gaffen in "Perspectives", Vietnam magazine, August 1991
Fred Gaffen is the chief historian at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa.
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Allen Milcic
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Since the number of Canadians serving in Vietnam is still entirely in dispute, and likely will remain so, it is difficult to examine the casualty figure exactly as well. The quoted article examines potential casualty figures (scroll down to the end of the article linked in my previous post for calculations), and comes up with a number between 135 and 149 KIA and MIA Canadians during the conflict.mars wrote:so what was the casualities of Canadian in the Vietnam War ?
Allen/
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George Lepre
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Hi All -
This has become quite a thread.
Regarding Canadians in Vietnam: it should be added that one of them, Peter C. Lemon of the U.S. Army, was awarded the Medal of Honor.
As for South Korean forces, one should add that they were always held in high regard by the Allies and communists alike. What follows is an excerpt from the "senior officer debriefing report" of Brigadier General DeWitt C. Armstrong, who was the commander of Allied troops in II Corps (Military Region II) for much of 1971:
"...ROK FORCES
a. The two ROK divisions operating in M(ilitary) R(eegion) 2 are extremely effective at what they undertake to do. Their discipline is superb, their leadership skilled and eager, their equipment beautifully maintained, and their firebases immaculate. They plan most meticulously for field operations, gather intelligence quite intensively, and emphasize local security; hence, their casualties are very, very few and the enemy's are many, with the ROK's having the highest ratios of weapons captured.
b. But they are unflexible. Once set on a course of action, they will doggedly persist. A sudden, fleeting tactical opportunity, where US troops would swiftly adapt and pile on, the ROK's will let pass.
(G.L. Note - This was perhaps true in the period 1965-1968, when the U.S. military was at its prime and was a well-disiplined, experienced fighting force; by 1971, the U.S. military couldn't "pile on" against anybody.)
c. The ROK's do not cooperate with RVNAF (the South Vietnamese Armed Forces). Many ROK officers feel more contempt than sympathy for ARVN and do not always hide it. Toward territorial forces their attitude is perhaps more one of stern indulgence. But basically the ROK's are tenaciously fixed on doing their own thing, and they seem to view the Vietnamese involvement as most likely to yield trouble and casualties. They refuse to let anyone in RVNAF in on operational plans, although they tell US officers freely enough.
d. The ROK leaders have profound respect and indeed affection toward the US Army.... One must avoid getting in their business tactically. They neither need nor want advisors, especially for tactical operations. There is intense pride in ROK operational maturity, yet they listen carefully for praise from US professionals...."
Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, DAAG-PAP-A (M), "Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Dewitt C. Armstrong, CG, US Army Forces MR 2 (U)" dated 9 May 1972 (National Archives Records Group 550, HQ, U.S. Army Pacific, Military Historian's Office, Command Reporting Files, 1963-1972, Box 193).
Best regards,
George
This has become quite a thread.
Regarding Canadians in Vietnam: it should be added that one of them, Peter C. Lemon of the U.S. Army, was awarded the Medal of Honor.
As for South Korean forces, one should add that they were always held in high regard by the Allies and communists alike. What follows is an excerpt from the "senior officer debriefing report" of Brigadier General DeWitt C. Armstrong, who was the commander of Allied troops in II Corps (Military Region II) for much of 1971:
"...ROK FORCES
a. The two ROK divisions operating in M(ilitary) R(eegion) 2 are extremely effective at what they undertake to do. Their discipline is superb, their leadership skilled and eager, their equipment beautifully maintained, and their firebases immaculate. They plan most meticulously for field operations, gather intelligence quite intensively, and emphasize local security; hence, their casualties are very, very few and the enemy's are many, with the ROK's having the highest ratios of weapons captured.
b. But they are unflexible. Once set on a course of action, they will doggedly persist. A sudden, fleeting tactical opportunity, where US troops would swiftly adapt and pile on, the ROK's will let pass.
(G.L. Note - This was perhaps true in the period 1965-1968, when the U.S. military was at its prime and was a well-disiplined, experienced fighting force; by 1971, the U.S. military couldn't "pile on" against anybody.)
c. The ROK's do not cooperate with RVNAF (the South Vietnamese Armed Forces). Many ROK officers feel more contempt than sympathy for ARVN and do not always hide it. Toward territorial forces their attitude is perhaps more one of stern indulgence. But basically the ROK's are tenaciously fixed on doing their own thing, and they seem to view the Vietnamese involvement as most likely to yield trouble and casualties. They refuse to let anyone in RVNAF in on operational plans, although they tell US officers freely enough.
d. The ROK leaders have profound respect and indeed affection toward the US Army.... One must avoid getting in their business tactically. They neither need nor want advisors, especially for tactical operations. There is intense pride in ROK operational maturity, yet they listen carefully for praise from US professionals...."
Source: Department of the Army, Office of the Adjutant General, DAAG-PAP-A (M), "Senior Officer Debriefing Report: MG Dewitt C. Armstrong, CG, US Army Forces MR 2 (U)" dated 9 May 1972 (National Archives Records Group 550, HQ, U.S. Army Pacific, Military Historian's Office, Command Reporting Files, 1963-1972, Box 193).
Best regards,
George
Good morning Allen,
A technical refinement re Canada and the Vietnam conflict.
Of course Canada was not a belligerent.
Canada did participate as a member of the International Control Commission. The ICC was composed of an Eastern bloc nation, a neutral and a Western bloc nation. They were Poland, India and Canada, respectively.
The first ICC was a product of the 1954 conference in Geneva.
A technical refinement re Canada and the Vietnam conflict.
Of course Canada was not a belligerent.
Canada did participate as a member of the International Control Commission. The ICC was composed of an Eastern bloc nation, a neutral and a Western bloc nation. They were Poland, India and Canada, respectively.
The first ICC was a product of the 1954 conference in Geneva.
One day in Spring , 1969 at the valley of Hon Ba mountain in Vietnam, soldiers of 2nd battalion,28th Regiment of the White Horse Division conducted an ambush operation in the jungle of the Hon-Ba valley and discovered an object slowly approaching. The soldiers stealthily induced the object to be in the complete firing range and then poured all-out firing with M-16 rifle including craymores. And finally found a huge tiger was shot down after being hit on its ankle.