Hey Kim,
Yeah I knew that but last one much detailed right? specialy mentioned with US 24th Blacks reg. Black History! if they were not cowardly deserted those Brave Turkish squadron could live!
Document created: 20 March 00
Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea by William Bowers, William Hammond, and George MacGarrigle. Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C. 20005-3402, 1996, 294 pages, $26.00.
Black Soldier, White Army should be known to anyone concerned with or interested in race relations in the US military. It is an excellent case study that explores the impact of segregation and prejudice on a military unit and on combat perfor-mance. It is an important book but not a pleasant or uplifting one.
Although President Harry Truman ordered the US military to desegregate in 1948, the US Army fought the first half of the Korean War with segregated forces. (The Navy and the Marine Corps were also laggards in this regard, while the Air Force did considerably better.) The principal segregated Army unit employed in the Korean War was the 24th Infantry Regiment in the Army’s 25th Division. It consisted entirely of black enlisted troops with both black and white officers. (All of the unit’s commanders were white since Army policy would not allow a black officer to command a white officer.) The kindest and least controversial thing to say is that the 24th did not do well in action, and the unit’s alleged failings led to its dissolution in October 1951. The regiment’s combat record and the causes of this performance are all very much in dispute. Because of these questions and a critical Army history of 1961 that some have called grossly inaccurate, racist, and a public lynching, veterans and supporters of the unit urged the Army to reassess the regiment’s record. The result of that nine-year effort is Black Soldier, White Army, which also proved controversial and, under threat of lawsuits, was reviewed at the highest level of the Department of the Army before publication.
Black Soldier, White Army begins with an introductory chapter that covers the service of black troops in the US Army up through World War II. Using extensive interviews and official documents, the authors discuss the 24th Infantry’s occupation service in Japan in the 1940s and then focus on the unit’s operations in the Korean War, until it was disbanded. They are critical of the unit’s preparations for war and brutally candid about the racism present in the unit and the US Army, as well as the 24th’s deficiencies. In battle, the regiment became known as unreliable, prone to panic, and the weakest of all US Army units in Korea. The reality, however, was much more complex and ambiguous. Clearly, the unit performed poorly, but so did other units early in the war. The authors also note the numerous acts of unit and individual achievement and courage in the 24th (including two Medals of Honor won by black enlisted soldiers).
The authors produce a detailed, balanced, abundantly documented, and critical study. As should be expected in a history on a very sensitive and complicated subject, particularly by official historians, they are very circumspect with both their language and conclusions. One can summarize their monograph in one sentence: the unit did worse than other regiments primarily because of a lack of unit cohesion due to long-standing racism and inadequate leadership.
Because of the controversy and sensitivity of this subject, Black Soldier, White Army has gained more attention than most historical studies. It has been and will be criticized, on the one hand as too sympathetic (politically correct) and on the other as unfairly critical. I would only question the heavy reliance on oral interviews, especially those done so many years after the events, when time has dimmed memories and radically changed the social climate. That said, I recognize that there is probably no way other than interviews to get at what happened and why it happened. Another possible criticism is that this study should have more vigorously compared the 24th’s performance with that of other regiments fighting in similar circumstances. The comparative performance of the 24th with other segregated US infantry units (3d Battalion, 9th Infantry; and 3d Battalion, 15th Infantry) would also have been relevant to this study. That said, I question if the unit’s record could be more accurately appraised even if more facts could be gathered. In any case, the underlying factors responsible for this performance are more difficult—perhaps impossible—to assess. In short, I don’t see how this subject could have been covered much better.
Critics accuse the military, military historians, and official historians of producing tepid, self-serving histories that glorify and romanticize war and the military. This well-done study certainly refutes such allegations. Thus, the Army and its historical branch deserve high praise. Black Soldier, White Army indicates how far the military has come in 50 years and makes clear that the “good old days” were not so good for all. Most of all, it highlights the consequences of both an unprepared military as well as a segregated military on combat performance.
Kenneth P. Werrell
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University
Turkish Brigade in Korean War
The 24th Infantry and the
Failure of the Segregated Army
By Joseph L. Galloway
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"When them Chinese mortars begins to thud, the Old Deuce-Four begin to bug."
--FROM "THE BUGOUT BOOGIE," A DERISIVE SONG ABOUT THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN THE KOREAN WAR
For almost a century, the U.S. Army's 24th Regiment, established by Congress shortly after the Civil War in honor of the sacrifices of nearly a quarter of a million blacks who fought for the Union, was a segregated but integral part of the Army. The Buffalo Soldiers of the 24th fought Indians and outlaws on the Texas frontier in the 1870s and 1880s, covered themselves with glory on San Juan Hill in Cuba during the Spanish-American War, served honorably in the Philippines insurrection and marched with Gen. John J. Pershing into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa and his revolutionaries.
But in the panicky first days of the Korean War, when US and South Korean forces were driven back to the Pusan Perimeter, entire platoons and companies of the 24th evaporated from their foxholes and had to be rounded up at Regimental or Division Headquarters. The Army's official history of the Korean War, published in 1961, describes the 24th's soldiers as often "frightened and demoralized" and says they had a tendency to panic and needed two officers per platoon where other units needed only one: "One must command and the other must drive." Conventional wisdom said black soldiers were lazy, afraid of the dark, couldn't take care of their weapons, wouldn't dig foxholes, didn't trust each other and thus would not stand and fight. The 24th Regiment finally was disbanded on Oct. 1, 1951. The 8th Army high command and the Pentagon had come to agree with the commander of the 25th Division, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, who said that in just 90 days in Korea the 24th had proved it was unreliable in combat and a hindrance to the division.
Now, after 45 years, the Army is trying to set the record straight, to highlight the racism that dogged the 24th and to document the unit's successes and failures in the peacetime occupation of Japan and on the battlefields of Korea. Army historians have vacuumed official records and the memories of some 300 soldiers and commanders. The result is a 276-page book, Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, by William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond and George L. MacGarrigle, to be published this summer under the imprimatur of the Army's Center for Military History.
"No changes." The first question, of course, is why all-black units like the 24th Regiment still existed in 1951--three years after President Truman issued an executive order ending discrimination in the military. Lt. Gen. Julius Becton (Ret.), a veteran of combat in both Korea and Vietnam, provides one answer. He recalls doing summer training as a young black reserve lieutenant at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland in 1948. "The post commander assembled all officers in the theater and he read Executive Order 9981 [Truman's anti-discrimination order], and then he said: `Now, gentlemen, as long as I am in command, there will be no changes. There'll be Officers Club No. 1 and Officers Club No. 2; NCO Club No. 1 and No. 2; swimming pool No. 1 and No. 2.' That was stated by a colonel carrying out the orders, as he interpreted them, of the president of the United States. Now what does that do to the blacks sitting in that audience?"
Doubts about the reliability of black troops were not new. The 24th was not sent into the trenches in World War I, and the regiment's role in the Pacific theater in World War II was limited to policing up pockets of holdout Japanese troops after the main fighting was over. After World War II, the 24th was sent to Japan, garrisoned at Camp Gifu and assigned to guard the docks at Kobe. There the seeds of doubt that would sprout on Korean battlefields were sown. "They were great on parade; they won all the baseball championships, all the basketball championships," says General Becton. "They screwed anything they could find away from home. They were dealing narcotics. That's a failure of leadership. The 24th had people who should not have been leaders--cowards really."
In the words of Black Soldier: "In companies commanded by white officers who treated their men with respect but refused to accept low standards of discipline and performance, racial prejudice tended to be insignificant. In other companies, often commanded by officers who failed to enforce high standards because they wished to avoid charges of racial prejudice or because they were simply poor leaders, mutual respect and reliance were weak. . . . Hostility and frustration lingered, to break forth only when those units faced combat and their soldiers realized their lives depended on officers they did not trust."
Misadventures. In late June 1950, when Kim II Sung's People's Army stormed across the border into South Korea and US commanders were desperate for reinforcements, 8th Army Headquarters agonized over whether to send the 24th. When units of the 24th took the town of Yech'on back from the North Koreans on July 20, 1950, the victory was cheered back home. But before the taste of even so small a victory could be savored, the 24th stumbled into a series of misadventures that shattered the faith of the troops in their officers, and vice versa. The authors write, "There was no single reason for what happened. An aggressive enemy, inadequate equipment, inexperience at all levels, leadership failures high and low, casualties among key personnel and a lack of bonding and cohesion . . . all played their part.
". . . When disturbing trends emerged, no one took action. Although straggling increased to sometimes epidemic proportions, the leadership of the regiment did little more to stop it than to return offenders to their units. Every occurrence made the next one easier. In an attempt to lead by example, commissioned and noncommissioned officers stayed at their posts with those of their men who were willing to hold and suffered inordinately high casualties as a result. As they did, suspicions took root among them and rumors began to rise about how black soldiers would sometimes abandon wounded white officers."
The regiment's three battalions went through 13 commanders in the first 90 days of Korean combat. Replacements to command companies and lead platoons were often inexperienced and untrained, according to the new history, and enlisted replacements were swept up from all over the Army, including the stockades, many arriving unable to load and fire their rifles. When the 24th pulled back into the Pusan perimeter it was placed in poor defensive positions. And on Sept. 1, 1950, when the enemy attacked, the 24th's 2nd Battalion collapsed. The white leadership blamed the soldiers, "but they themselves were at least as much at fault," says Black Soldier. "The new regimental commander, Col. Arthur J. Champeny, and his staff had not only approved the weak tactical dispositions of the 2nd Battalion, Champeny himself had done much to destroy whatever trust was left in the regiment with ill-advised public remarks about the conduct of blacks in World War II."
Not until early September 1950, after two other regimental commanders of the 24th either excused themselves or were relieved, did the 24th finally get the commander it so desperately needed: Lt. Col. John T. Corley, a tough World War II combat veteran who had earned two Distinguished Service Crosses and eight Silver Stars. Corley ordered punishment of chronic stragglers and instituted much needed reforms.
Rush to disband. Units of the 24th fought well as United Nations forces broke out of the Pusan perimeter and counterattacked into North Korea. Two battalions collapsed in the face of the massive Chinese invasion that began the night of Nov. 25, 1950, but the new study finds that was partly because neither battalion got orders to pull back. By March 1951, the 24th was back in action, performing credibly in combat in the Han River crossing. Under its last commander, Col. Thomas D. Gillis, who took over in August 1951 and relieved a number of officers, the 24th showed signs of flourishing, but its achievements were lost in the rush to disband a star-crossed outfit.
The authors of Black Soldier, White Army conclude: "All told, it seems clear that if the unit failed at times, the race of its people was not the reason." Instead, they found, racial stereotypes kept the best black officers from rising to positions of responsibility, and too few talented white officers were assigned to the regiment. As the unit's leaders failed, the new history says, "the self-confidence and motivation of the common soldier declined and he began to lose any sense that he was part of something worthwhile, larger than himself. In the end every man stood alone, unsure not only of his own abilities but also of those of the soldier next to him. Many fought well but others fled. In that light, the regiment's achievements . . . bear a special mark. They underscore the courage, the resilience and determination of those among the unit's members who chose to do their duty, to fight in the face of adversity and to prevail."
Two 24th Infantry soldiers, Pfc. William Thompson and Sgt. Cornelius H. Charlton, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for their heroism. They were the first black soldiers to receive the Medal of Honor since the Spanish-American War.
Failure of the Segregated Army
By Joseph L. Galloway
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
"When them Chinese mortars begins to thud, the Old Deuce-Four begin to bug."
--FROM "THE BUGOUT BOOGIE," A DERISIVE SONG ABOUT THE 24TH INFANTRY REGIMENT IN THE KOREAN WAR
For almost a century, the U.S. Army's 24th Regiment, established by Congress shortly after the Civil War in honor of the sacrifices of nearly a quarter of a million blacks who fought for the Union, was a segregated but integral part of the Army. The Buffalo Soldiers of the 24th fought Indians and outlaws on the Texas frontier in the 1870s and 1880s, covered themselves with glory on San Juan Hill in Cuba during the Spanish-American War, served honorably in the Philippines insurrection and marched with Gen. John J. Pershing into Mexico in pursuit of Pancho Villa and his revolutionaries.
But in the panicky first days of the Korean War, when US and South Korean forces were driven back to the Pusan Perimeter, entire platoons and companies of the 24th evaporated from their foxholes and had to be rounded up at Regimental or Division Headquarters. The Army's official history of the Korean War, published in 1961, describes the 24th's soldiers as often "frightened and demoralized" and says they had a tendency to panic and needed two officers per platoon where other units needed only one: "One must command and the other must drive." Conventional wisdom said black soldiers were lazy, afraid of the dark, couldn't take care of their weapons, wouldn't dig foxholes, didn't trust each other and thus would not stand and fight. The 24th Regiment finally was disbanded on Oct. 1, 1951. The 8th Army high command and the Pentagon had come to agree with the commander of the 25th Division, Maj. Gen. William B. Kean, who said that in just 90 days in Korea the 24th had proved it was unreliable in combat and a hindrance to the division.
Now, after 45 years, the Army is trying to set the record straight, to highlight the racism that dogged the 24th and to document the unit's successes and failures in the peacetime occupation of Japan and on the battlefields of Korea. Army historians have vacuumed official records and the memories of some 300 soldiers and commanders. The result is a 276-page book, Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea, by William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond and George L. MacGarrigle, to be published this summer under the imprimatur of the Army's Center for Military History.
"No changes." The first question, of course, is why all-black units like the 24th Regiment still existed in 1951--three years after President Truman issued an executive order ending discrimination in the military. Lt. Gen. Julius Becton (Ret.), a veteran of combat in both Korea and Vietnam, provides one answer. He recalls doing summer training as a young black reserve lieutenant at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland in 1948. "The post commander assembled all officers in the theater and he read Executive Order 9981 [Truman's anti-discrimination order], and then he said: `Now, gentlemen, as long as I am in command, there will be no changes. There'll be Officers Club No. 1 and Officers Club No. 2; NCO Club No. 1 and No. 2; swimming pool No. 1 and No. 2.' That was stated by a colonel carrying out the orders, as he interpreted them, of the president of the United States. Now what does that do to the blacks sitting in that audience?"
Doubts about the reliability of black troops were not new. The 24th was not sent into the trenches in World War I, and the regiment's role in the Pacific theater in World War II was limited to policing up pockets of holdout Japanese troops after the main fighting was over. After World War II, the 24th was sent to Japan, garrisoned at Camp Gifu and assigned to guard the docks at Kobe. There the seeds of doubt that would sprout on Korean battlefields were sown. "They were great on parade; they won all the baseball championships, all the basketball championships," says General Becton. "They screwed anything they could find away from home. They were dealing narcotics. That's a failure of leadership. The 24th had people who should not have been leaders--cowards really."
In the words of Black Soldier: "In companies commanded by white officers who treated their men with respect but refused to accept low standards of discipline and performance, racial prejudice tended to be insignificant. In other companies, often commanded by officers who failed to enforce high standards because they wished to avoid charges of racial prejudice or because they were simply poor leaders, mutual respect and reliance were weak. . . . Hostility and frustration lingered, to break forth only when those units faced combat and their soldiers realized their lives depended on officers they did not trust."
Misadventures. In late June 1950, when Kim II Sung's People's Army stormed across the border into South Korea and US commanders were desperate for reinforcements, 8th Army Headquarters agonized over whether to send the 24th. When units of the 24th took the town of Yech'on back from the North Koreans on July 20, 1950, the victory was cheered back home. But before the taste of even so small a victory could be savored, the 24th stumbled into a series of misadventures that shattered the faith of the troops in their officers, and vice versa. The authors write, "There was no single reason for what happened. An aggressive enemy, inadequate equipment, inexperience at all levels, leadership failures high and low, casualties among key personnel and a lack of bonding and cohesion . . . all played their part.
". . . When disturbing trends emerged, no one took action. Although straggling increased to sometimes epidemic proportions, the leadership of the regiment did little more to stop it than to return offenders to their units. Every occurrence made the next one easier. In an attempt to lead by example, commissioned and noncommissioned officers stayed at their posts with those of their men who were willing to hold and suffered inordinately high casualties as a result. As they did, suspicions took root among them and rumors began to rise about how black soldiers would sometimes abandon wounded white officers."
The regiment's three battalions went through 13 commanders in the first 90 days of Korean combat. Replacements to command companies and lead platoons were often inexperienced and untrained, according to the new history, and enlisted replacements were swept up from all over the Army, including the stockades, many arriving unable to load and fire their rifles. When the 24th pulled back into the Pusan perimeter it was placed in poor defensive positions. And on Sept. 1, 1950, when the enemy attacked, the 24th's 2nd Battalion collapsed. The white leadership blamed the soldiers, "but they themselves were at least as much at fault," says Black Soldier. "The new regimental commander, Col. Arthur J. Champeny, and his staff had not only approved the weak tactical dispositions of the 2nd Battalion, Champeny himself had done much to destroy whatever trust was left in the regiment with ill-advised public remarks about the conduct of blacks in World War II."
Not until early September 1950, after two other regimental commanders of the 24th either excused themselves or were relieved, did the 24th finally get the commander it so desperately needed: Lt. Col. John T. Corley, a tough World War II combat veteran who had earned two Distinguished Service Crosses and eight Silver Stars. Corley ordered punishment of chronic stragglers and instituted much needed reforms.
Rush to disband. Units of the 24th fought well as United Nations forces broke out of the Pusan perimeter and counterattacked into North Korea. Two battalions collapsed in the face of the massive Chinese invasion that began the night of Nov. 25, 1950, but the new study finds that was partly because neither battalion got orders to pull back. By March 1951, the 24th was back in action, performing credibly in combat in the Han River crossing. Under its last commander, Col. Thomas D. Gillis, who took over in August 1951 and relieved a number of officers, the 24th showed signs of flourishing, but its achievements were lost in the rush to disband a star-crossed outfit.
The authors of Black Soldier, White Army conclude: "All told, it seems clear that if the unit failed at times, the race of its people was not the reason." Instead, they found, racial stereotypes kept the best black officers from rising to positions of responsibility, and too few talented white officers were assigned to the regiment. As the unit's leaders failed, the new history says, "the self-confidence and motivation of the common soldier declined and he began to lose any sense that he was part of something worthwhile, larger than himself. In the end every man stood alone, unsure not only of his own abilities but also of those of the soldier next to him. Many fought well but others fled. In that light, the regiment's achievements . . . bear a special mark. They underscore the courage, the resilience and determination of those among the unit's members who chose to do their duty, to fight in the face of adversity and to prevail."
Two 24th Infantry soldiers, Pfc. William Thompson and Sgt. Cornelius H. Charlton, were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for their heroism. They were the first black soldiers to receive the Medal of Honor since the Spanish-American War.
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Mehmet Fatih
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In his memoires, Colonel Celal Dora blames the black regiment for many critical situations the Turks had to face. He also tells about his visit to this regiment and tells how he was shocked by those undisciplined soldiers. The Regiment CO has told him that he had no authority on his men. After that visit, Celal Dora has learned to never trust that regiment in combat.
Brave Ethiopian Black Soldiers!
The group first went to see what was to be right half of the Turkish positions This area was held by a battalion of the 32nd American regiment, after quick look at he Battalion command post, the party proceeded to the right contact point The neighbouring unit was the Ethiopian battalion, The Turks were impressed by the appearance of this fine troops .Among the Americans they had a reputations for toughness,determination and discipline . The Ethiopians liked hand to hand fighting A short time before the enemy had occupied 40 yards of their trenches . The Ethiopians took this in their side they emerged from their bunkers and cleared the positions with bayonets.
The Americans had no resisted the temptation of sadling the Ethiopians with a nickname. This was a tribute to both their aggressiveness and dusky skin. They called them < Night Fighters>
Situation Negative by Basri Danisman, page 77
Book by Sout -East Asia treaty Org.-Mil Planning Office, Bangkok -Thailand, May 1969.
The group first went to see what was to be right half of the Turkish positions This area was held by a battalion of the 32nd American regiment, after quick look at he Battalion command post, the party proceeded to the right contact point The neighbouring unit was the Ethiopian battalion, The Turks were impressed by the appearance of this fine troops .Among the Americans they had a reputations for toughness,determination and discipline . The Ethiopians liked hand to hand fighting A short time before the enemy had occupied 40 yards of their trenches . The Ethiopians took this in their side they emerged from their bunkers and cleared the positions with bayonets.
The Americans had no resisted the temptation of sadling the Ethiopians with a nickname. This was a tribute to both their aggressiveness and dusky skin. They called them < Night Fighters>
Situation Negative by Basri Danisman, page 77
Book by Sout -East Asia treaty Org.-Mil Planning Office, Bangkok -Thailand, May 1969.
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Mehmet Fatih
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"Distinguished Service Cross" Recipient Turks in Korean War
ERGIN, MEHMET
Citation:
The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to Mehmet Ergin, Sergeant, Turkish Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations in action against enemy forces at Sanggorangp'o, Korea on 28 and 29 May 1953. Sergeant Ergin's unit was dispatched to reinforce Outpost Vegas, which was under heavy enemy attack. Upon arrival he found the strength of friendly forces depleted and the enemy holding a portion of the position. Organizing his forces, he led them through heavy artillery, mortar and small arms fire in a valiant counterattack which drove the enemy back several hundred meters. When the enemy launched a counterattack against the newly won positions, he successfully met the attack and stopped the enemy's advance, forcing their withdrawal. With complete disregard for personal safety, he moved from one position to another encouraging his men despite heavy barrages of artillery and mortar fire. Later, using grenades and any weapon at his disposal, he led his unit forward again in counterattack, which succeeded in driving the enemy front the last friendly position under their control. His actions made it possible for friendly forces to regain control of a major outpost while inflicting numerous casualties on the enemy forces.
Department of the Army: General Orders No. 43 (June 24, 1955)
SUKAN, SINASI
Citation:
The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to Sinasi Sukan, Captain, Turkish Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations in action against enemy forces at Sanggorangp'o, Korea on 29 May 1953. Captain Sukan voluntarily accompanied one of his platoons ordered to reinforce Outpost Carson, which was under heavy enemy attack. Upon hearing that both Outposts Carson and Elko had been surrounded, he led his troops in a successful counterattack, breaking through enemy lines, retaking Outpost Elko. He then quickly deployed his forces for defense, cautioning his men of the necessity of holding the position at all costs. He obtained a carbine and resupply of grenades and moved forward to an exposed position in a critical sector of the Outpost. Although exposed to a continuous devastating mortar and artillery barrage, he moved constantly around the fighting positions, encouraging the men, directing fire, and fighting with grenades and any weapon he could find, killing an estimated seventy-five enemy himself. After fighting continuously for sixteen hours he was wounded but refused to be evacuated.
Department of the Army: General Orders No. 43 (May 29, 1953)
URER, RUSTU
Citation:
The Distinguished Service Cross is presented to Rustu Urer, First Lieutenant, Turkish Army, for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy of the United Nations in action against enemy forces at Sanggorangp'o, Korea on 28 and 29 May 1953. First Lieutenant Urer's unit, while defending Outpost Carson, was attacked by determined enemy forces estimated to have been of battalion strength. Undaunted by heavy barrages of artillery and mortar falling on the position, he moved from one position to another, encouraging his men and directing the fire of his command until he was wounded. Refusing to be evacuated and with complete disregard for personal safety, Lieutenant Urer led his platoon forward in a valiant counterattack, which drove the hostile forces from the trenches and killed sixteen of the seventeen enemy encountered. Although surrounded and subjected to repeated attacks, the small outpost, greatly outnumbered by the enemy, fought back for more than two hours until it was finally annihilated by a numerically superior force. Lieutenant Urer continued to fight from his bunker until he was mortally wounded by enemy grenades.
Department of the Army: General Orders No. 17 (March 8, 1954)
Foreign Allied Recipients of The Distinguished Service Cross in Korean War - Compiled & Edited By C. Douglas Sterner
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Fallschirmjäger
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Tosun Saral
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Grave of Turkish Soldier Bekir Kara KIA in Korea: His cousen Mehmet Kara visited him with a group of friends.
may he rest in peace
So more it be!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m76VNVAPfaU
may he rest in peace
So more it be!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m76VNVAPfaU
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Tosun Saral
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Sorrow Sorrow Sorrow
We lost Inf. Col. Cihan Kumbasar, Turkish Army (R) (Army serial Number: P.1942-A 84) on June 7th 2007.
He fought at the famous Kunu-ri Kessel as a company commander. He saved the standard of the Turkish Regiment to get captured by the Cineese. He was one of the few Turkish Korean War Veterans still living.
May his grave be in light!
Allah rahmet Eylesin!
Dilerim ki öyle olsun!
So mote it be!
We lost Inf. Col. Cihan Kumbasar, Turkish Army (R) (Army serial Number: P.1942-A 84) on June 7th 2007.
He fought at the famous Kunu-ri Kessel as a company commander. He saved the standard of the Turkish Regiment to get captured by the Cineese. He was one of the few Turkish Korean War Veterans still living.
May his grave be in light!
Allah rahmet Eylesin!
Dilerim ki öyle olsun!
So mote it be!
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Mehmet Fatih
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Tosun Saral
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Col. Celal Dora, commander of 241st Inf. Regt, the Regiment of Heroes with Turkish war corrospondent, journalist Mr. Hikmet Feridun Es from newspaper Hürriyet during his visit in Korea Battle fields. Mr. Es says about him " a distinguished soldier, a man his hearth full of love, a good man and a unique friend"
source: Yıllarboyu Tarih, (History through Years) May 1984 nr.5 vol.12, p.22
Col. Celal Dora at operator with his men.
US General Shepard decorates Col. Celal Dora with Silver Star Madal.
source: Yıllarboyu Tarih, (History through Years) May 1984 nr.5 vol.12, p.22
Col. Celal Dora at operator with his men.
US General Shepard decorates Col. Celal Dora with Silver Star Madal.
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Tosun Saral
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Tosun Saral
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Tosun Saral
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A Japaneese Nurse careing wounded Turkish soldier at a military hospital in Tokyo.
Journalist Mr. Hikmet Feridun Es wrots from Tokyo
"At the moment I'm writing this, all the hospital corridors in Japan are filled with the wounded. Our own wounded boys are being sent to Japan from Korea by airplane.mostly to Japan's General and Apex hospitals.
When I came to Japan for a couple of days to mail my photos and (journalistic) reports, I got a telephone call in the early morning. The hospital's doctors asked me I needed to hop in a car and go to the hospital right away. In a situation like this, the word "request" has no meaning. Our boys in the hospital could not communicate with the doctors in the doctors' language. I happily rushed to the hospital.
Let me explain the courtesy and attitude of our boys in their own words. I asked one of the young men whose body was riddled with holes, carrying ten to fifteen wounds, "What's wrong?"
As much as he was capable of mustering, in a sweet tone, he replied,
"I have nothing, efendim!"
This attitude from the Turkish soldiers so affected the American doctors, they were in tears.
"We never, ever saw any kind of wounded like these men. These men act as if their bullet, machine gun and bomb wounds are nonexistent. The wounded from any other nation, in similar shape, would be crying and shaking in their situation. Your boys never utter a word of complaint.
These American doctors, so moved by the uncomplaining attitude of the Turkish soldiers, attempted to go the extra mile to minimize their pain.
"Aci!.." This is the first Turkish word ("pain") that the American doctors in the Tokyo and Anex hospitals learn. Every time they encounter a wound, an aching chest, a throbbing back, when they feel with their fingers, they ask in Turkish:
"Aci?.."
In the Anex hospital, we stood in front of a bed. A Turkish soldier, so young, one would call him a kid. Wrapped totally in bandages. His name is Ahmet Cicek. (Chi-chek.) From "Cankir." Many parts of his body were injured from an exploding bomb.
What's wrong?" I asked.
"Nothing is wrong..."
( Oh My darling boy!)
The doctor unwrapped the bandage from one of his hands. I could never have imagined a hand to be in such a mutilated shape.
Signaling one of the patient's fingers, the doctor told me in English:
"Tell him we need to amputate this finger from the root...today."
When the other doctors noticed my reluctance, they continued:
"What's the matter? This is very important."
Ahmet Cicek from Cankiri first looked at me with foggy eyes... then at the men,dressed in white.
I protested. I added I had much experience, spending days and nights in hospitals, and mentioned by helping them I needed to be free in my actions:
"Please permit me, Doctor, don't make me give this boy such news."
The doctors replied, "However, he must know what is to happen to him. And we must begin the operation immediately."
When he noticed the ongoing argument, Ahmet Cicek from Cankiri asked, "What are they saying, big brother?"
I finally revealed: "Ahmet. One of your fingers is no good anymore, my son. If it's not removed, your whole hand will be endangered. They now want to take you into the operating room."
At that moment, something happened I would have never expected. Ahmet Cicek began to laugh! Yes, he was laughing:
"Only one finger, big brother?"
"Yes... Only one finger!"
"Really, what is there to be sad about? I already realized that finger could rot my entire arm four days ago. I was going to cut it myself, but I didn't have enough strength in my other hand. I tried, but I couldn't. Let them cut it.... nine fingers are enough for a rifle!"
Journalist Mr. Hikmet Feridun Es wrots from Tokyo
"At the moment I'm writing this, all the hospital corridors in Japan are filled with the wounded. Our own wounded boys are being sent to Japan from Korea by airplane.mostly to Japan's General and Apex hospitals.
When I came to Japan for a couple of days to mail my photos and (journalistic) reports, I got a telephone call in the early morning. The hospital's doctors asked me I needed to hop in a car and go to the hospital right away. In a situation like this, the word "request" has no meaning. Our boys in the hospital could not communicate with the doctors in the doctors' language. I happily rushed to the hospital.
Let me explain the courtesy and attitude of our boys in their own words. I asked one of the young men whose body was riddled with holes, carrying ten to fifteen wounds, "What's wrong?"
As much as he was capable of mustering, in a sweet tone, he replied,
"I have nothing, efendim!"
This attitude from the Turkish soldiers so affected the American doctors, they were in tears.
"We never, ever saw any kind of wounded like these men. These men act as if their bullet, machine gun and bomb wounds are nonexistent. The wounded from any other nation, in similar shape, would be crying and shaking in their situation. Your boys never utter a word of complaint.
These American doctors, so moved by the uncomplaining attitude of the Turkish soldiers, attempted to go the extra mile to minimize their pain.
"Aci!.." This is the first Turkish word ("pain") that the American doctors in the Tokyo and Anex hospitals learn. Every time they encounter a wound, an aching chest, a throbbing back, when they feel with their fingers, they ask in Turkish:
"Aci?.."
In the Anex hospital, we stood in front of a bed. A Turkish soldier, so young, one would call him a kid. Wrapped totally in bandages. His name is Ahmet Cicek. (Chi-chek.) From "Cankir." Many parts of his body were injured from an exploding bomb.
What's wrong?" I asked.
"Nothing is wrong..."
( Oh My darling boy!)
The doctor unwrapped the bandage from one of his hands. I could never have imagined a hand to be in such a mutilated shape.
Signaling one of the patient's fingers, the doctor told me in English:
"Tell him we need to amputate this finger from the root...today."
When the other doctors noticed my reluctance, they continued:
"What's the matter? This is very important."
Ahmet Cicek from Cankiri first looked at me with foggy eyes... then at the men,dressed in white.
I protested. I added I had much experience, spending days and nights in hospitals, and mentioned by helping them I needed to be free in my actions:
"Please permit me, Doctor, don't make me give this boy such news."
The doctors replied, "However, he must know what is to happen to him. And we must begin the operation immediately."
When he noticed the ongoing argument, Ahmet Cicek from Cankiri asked, "What are they saying, big brother?"
I finally revealed: "Ahmet. One of your fingers is no good anymore, my son. If it's not removed, your whole hand will be endangered. They now want to take you into the operating room."
At that moment, something happened I would have never expected. Ahmet Cicek began to laugh! Yes, he was laughing:
"Only one finger, big brother?"
"Yes... Only one finger!"
"Really, what is there to be sad about? I already realized that finger could rot my entire arm four days ago. I was going to cut it myself, but I didn't have enough strength in my other hand. I tried, but I couldn't. Let them cut it.... nine fingers are enough for a rifle!"
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Tosun Saral
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- Joined: 02 Nov 2005, 20:32
- Location: Ankara/Turkey
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