Why Finland retained her independence after the Continuation War
Re: Why Finland retained her independence after the Continuation War
To claim that Finns supported the annexation of Estonia to USSR is rather absurd. One could claim with more right that Estonia was supporting Soviets against Finland during the Winter War by giving bases for Soviet naval and air forces, which were effectively used against Finland. However my guess is that the majority of Estonian people were not supporting or sympathizing Soviets during the Winter War.
Re: Why Finland retained her independence after the Continuation War
I think he is referring to the events of 1944.durb wrote:To claim that Finns supported the annexation of Estonia to USSR is rather absurd. One could claim with more right that Estonia was supporting Soviets against Finland during the Winter War by giving bases for Soviet naval and air forces, which were effectively used against Finland. However my guess is that the majority of Estonian people were not supporting or sympathizing Soviets during the Winter War.
Re: Why Finland retained her independence after the Continuation War
Even with Soviet Baltic offensive on Sept. 1944 the Finnish "support" to Soviets was very passive if existent. But more interesting question is how the battle of Suursaari on 15.9.1944 affected Finnish position - I think that it improved it as Finns toward Soviet/Allied positions as Finns were clearly fighting against Germans - and at the same time Germans took the "moral responsablity" to begin hostilities in Finnish-German war (declared officially as late as in March 1945!), which conflict was unavoidable after the armistice and separate peace with USSR. The timetable for German withdraw set up by Soviets was so tight that it could have given good pretext for Soviets to annex or start hostilities with Finland again, if Finns had not pressurized Germans with some real military operations like those in Tornio in Oct. 1944.
When it comes to Estonia, there was very little that Finland could have made to help her by September 1944 and during the postwar years. I do not know if there was any real possibility to receive, take in and even nationalize Estonian refugees in Finland by late 1944 - I think that Estonians understood this perfectly so those who flew (or managed to do so) opted for Sweden.
It took until early 1960´s when the first possiblities to open some official contacts with Estonia became possible - in Finland Kekkonen is remembered as arch-appeaser of Soviets or "finlandizator" or claimed even as a "traitor of fatherland", but Kekkonen´s visit in (Soviet) Estonia in 1964 is well remembered in Estonia and was important step to open some outside world contact for Estonians. The Estonians whom I know are less critical with Kekkonen as they are with Koivisto.
When it comes to Estonia, there was very little that Finland could have made to help her by September 1944 and during the postwar years. I do not know if there was any real possibility to receive, take in and even nationalize Estonian refugees in Finland by late 1944 - I think that Estonians understood this perfectly so those who flew (or managed to do so) opted for Sweden.
It took until early 1960´s when the first possiblities to open some official contacts with Estonia became possible - in Finland Kekkonen is remembered as arch-appeaser of Soviets or "finlandizator" or claimed even as a "traitor of fatherland", but Kekkonen´s visit in (Soviet) Estonia in 1964 is well remembered in Estonia and was important step to open some outside world contact for Estonians. The Estonians whom I know are less critical with Kekkonen as they are with Koivisto.
Re: Why Finland retained her independence after the Continuation War
I would say Kekkonen is far more disliked for being a complete turncoat.durb wrote:It took until early 1960´s when the first possiblities to open some official contacts with Estonia became possible - in Finland Kekkonen is remembered as arch-appeaser of Soviets or "finlandizator" or claimed even as a "traitor of fatherland", but Kekkonen´s visit in (Soviet) Estonia in 1964 is well remembered in Estonia and was important step to open some outside world contact for Estonians. The Estonians whom I know are less critical with Kekkonen as they are with Koivisto.
Re: Why Finland retained her independence after the Continuation War
To be a turncoat after WW2 was not uncommon in Europe - Finland was by far not the only country in that respect. I think that "turning a coat" was a fairly usual and rational survival strategy after a lost war. Lets say that you were a supporter of Greater Finland in 1941 and counting on German victory (which would have been logical at that time) - however by 1943/1944 you would have been just a fool if not changing opinion on those matters and starting to "turn a coat".
There were turncoats in Finland also during the years 1940 - 1941. Many of these turncoats were earlier critical on Germany and specially on national socialism. They changed their opinions during the 1940-1941 when Germany was the only possible ally from where to get support against Soviet pressure. One to mention at intellectual field is Olavi Paavolainen - he made at least two serious turn coats: in late 1930´s he was rather critical on German national socialism, but in 1941 strong supporter of Germany studying Mein Kampf (and recommending it as a read) but by 1944 he was somewhat leftist and pro-Soviet rewriting his diaries of wartime. He was not the only to rewrite his diaries and memories - there were very many others in postwar Europe doing the same thing. I think that we should be careful when judging people of the past when dramatic changes in precarious political situations made more than one person to "turn a coat" - sometimes more than once.
How about postwar Finland governed by those who never were turncoats but consistent with their ideology and principles - was that more respectable choice? I think that bourgeois turncoats were far better alternative as political leaders than the consistently pro-Soviet communists. "Finlandization" was far better alternative than to be a Soviet Republic or a People´s Republic.
"Finlandization" limited the maneuvering room in foreign policy but allowed the country still to be independence with its own political and economic system. No occupation, no forced collectivism and no gulag and still open to west. Although not liked by Paasikivi and Kekkonen, critical opinions on Soviet Union could be still freely expressed and published (like the ex-communist "turncoat" Arvo Tuominen´s gloomy description of his Komintern years in Moscow - the "Kremlin kellot" [Clocks of Kreml] published in 1956).
I think that the "Finlandized" position was the best that could be gained in 1944 and postwar years - the Finnish position was not the same as that of Sweden or Norway after WW2 and a different (or somewhat worse) situation had to be accepted. I think that US and other "Western" diplomats in postwar Helsinki understood perfectly the Finnish position and saw the "Finlandization" as the best survival strategy for Finland, although it meant that Soviet Union was the most influential foreign power in Finnish policy.
When it comes to politics, Darwin´s evolutionary phrase "survival of the fittest" should be modified as "survival of the most flexible" (which I think Darwin actually meant: the lifeform which most flexibly and successfully adapts to changing environment survives best).
There were turncoats in Finland also during the years 1940 - 1941. Many of these turncoats were earlier critical on Germany and specially on national socialism. They changed their opinions during the 1940-1941 when Germany was the only possible ally from where to get support against Soviet pressure. One to mention at intellectual field is Olavi Paavolainen - he made at least two serious turn coats: in late 1930´s he was rather critical on German national socialism, but in 1941 strong supporter of Germany studying Mein Kampf (and recommending it as a read) but by 1944 he was somewhat leftist and pro-Soviet rewriting his diaries of wartime. He was not the only to rewrite his diaries and memories - there were very many others in postwar Europe doing the same thing. I think that we should be careful when judging people of the past when dramatic changes in precarious political situations made more than one person to "turn a coat" - sometimes more than once.
How about postwar Finland governed by those who never were turncoats but consistent with their ideology and principles - was that more respectable choice? I think that bourgeois turncoats were far better alternative as political leaders than the consistently pro-Soviet communists. "Finlandization" was far better alternative than to be a Soviet Republic or a People´s Republic.
"Finlandization" limited the maneuvering room in foreign policy but allowed the country still to be independence with its own political and economic system. No occupation, no forced collectivism and no gulag and still open to west. Although not liked by Paasikivi and Kekkonen, critical opinions on Soviet Union could be still freely expressed and published (like the ex-communist "turncoat" Arvo Tuominen´s gloomy description of his Komintern years in Moscow - the "Kremlin kellot" [Clocks of Kreml] published in 1956).
I think that the "Finlandized" position was the best that could be gained in 1944 and postwar years - the Finnish position was not the same as that of Sweden or Norway after WW2 and a different (or somewhat worse) situation had to be accepted. I think that US and other "Western" diplomats in postwar Helsinki understood perfectly the Finnish position and saw the "Finlandization" as the best survival strategy for Finland, although it meant that Soviet Union was the most influential foreign power in Finnish policy.
When it comes to politics, Darwin´s evolutionary phrase "survival of the fittest" should be modified as "survival of the most flexible" (which I think Darwin actually meant: the lifeform which most flexibly and successfully adapts to changing environment survives best).
Re: Why Finland retained her independence after the Continuation War
Kimmo Rentola has just published a new book, Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo (Stalin and Finland's Fate), where he uses a wide variety of sources, mainly Soviet and Russian, to research the reasons behind Stalin's decisions regarding Finland.
In the chapters about the Continuation War and its aftermath, Rentola's conclusions largely support the points I made in my first post to this thread. Rentola argues that once Stalin was unpleasantly surprised by Finnish resistance in the Winter War, he came to regard Finland as something of a special case that needed different approach from, say, the Baltic States or Hungary. But Stalin's approach to Finland was also very much influenced by the situation in the world at large, and that often played to Finland's advantage. When relations between the USSR and the Western Block grew more tense in the latter half of the 1940s, Stalin often made concessions to Finland to mollify the West.
Some additional points:
Sweden
Stalin recognized that the harder he pressured Finland, the more Sweden would lean to the West. And Stalin didn't want to drive Sweden to USA's arms. Therefore the Soviet policy toward Finland was influenced by how Stalin thought Sweden would react. Finland was geographically lucky in the respect that not only she wasn't located on the way to Central Europe, but also that it mattered greatly to Sweden what happened in Finland.
"The Years of Danger"
At the end of 1947 Stalin started to prepare for a possible World War III against the emerging Western Block. In this respect Finland was unfinished business and Stalin now decided to finish it in one way or another. He approached the solution from two directions: open and secret.
Openly Stalin wanted to conclude with Finland a military pact that would ensure Soviet supremacy. But he didn't want it to look like the USSR was pressuring Finns, and therefore Stalin needed Finns to turn to Stalin and request such a pact from him. This wasn't going to be an easy task, as Stalin recognized. Stalin needed a new ambassador in Finland, whose most important task was to get Finns to make that request. Unfortunately for Stalin, he chose the wrong man for the job. Lieutenant-General Grigory Savonenkov was familiar to Finns as Zhdanov's number two man in the Allied Control Commission (due to Zhdanov's frequent absences Savonenkov was in practice the Commission's director for the last couple of years). But Savonenkov was a military man who was used to getting orders and then implementing them. The subtlety needed for this new task was beyond him. And against President Juho Paasikivi even a more capable diplomat would most certainly have failed.
While Paasikivi was ready accommodate the USSR as much as was reasonable, he had his limits, and the kind of pact Stalin wanted was beyond them. In the end Stalin had to send a letter suggesting a military treaty. Such suggestion of course was impossible to ignore, but the final result, Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, was much more palatable to Finns that the pact Stalin had originally in mind. Most importantly, it allowed Finland to retain her neutrality and avoid being drawn to the Soviet Block. At least for the time being, that was enough to Stalin.
Secretly Stalin was ready to provoke a communist takeover in Finland in case he didn't get what he wanted. In early 1948 Finnish communists were instructed to make up a conspiracy led by right-wing Social Democrats that could be used as excuse to incite strikes, mass demonstrations and finally communist coup. Finnish communists were to organize revolutionary cells all around the country to be ready when the time came. It's not known how far the preparations advanced, but in the end Stalin decided to make a treaty with the legal Finnish government and the communists were stood down. Despite this, rumors of a revolution were rife, and Finnish government showed its readiness to use force to crush any communists attempts. In a meeting with leading Finnish communists Paasikivi thundered to them that if the communists want to take power, "They [the Soviets] would have to kill half a million Finns and then me!".
In the chapters about the Continuation War and its aftermath, Rentola's conclusions largely support the points I made in my first post to this thread. Rentola argues that once Stalin was unpleasantly surprised by Finnish resistance in the Winter War, he came to regard Finland as something of a special case that needed different approach from, say, the Baltic States or Hungary. But Stalin's approach to Finland was also very much influenced by the situation in the world at large, and that often played to Finland's advantage. When relations between the USSR and the Western Block grew more tense in the latter half of the 1940s, Stalin often made concessions to Finland to mollify the West.
Some additional points:
Sweden
Stalin recognized that the harder he pressured Finland, the more Sweden would lean to the West. And Stalin didn't want to drive Sweden to USA's arms. Therefore the Soviet policy toward Finland was influenced by how Stalin thought Sweden would react. Finland was geographically lucky in the respect that not only she wasn't located on the way to Central Europe, but also that it mattered greatly to Sweden what happened in Finland.
"The Years of Danger"
At the end of 1947 Stalin started to prepare for a possible World War III against the emerging Western Block. In this respect Finland was unfinished business and Stalin now decided to finish it in one way or another. He approached the solution from two directions: open and secret.
Openly Stalin wanted to conclude with Finland a military pact that would ensure Soviet supremacy. But he didn't want it to look like the USSR was pressuring Finns, and therefore Stalin needed Finns to turn to Stalin and request such a pact from him. This wasn't going to be an easy task, as Stalin recognized. Stalin needed a new ambassador in Finland, whose most important task was to get Finns to make that request. Unfortunately for Stalin, he chose the wrong man for the job. Lieutenant-General Grigory Savonenkov was familiar to Finns as Zhdanov's number two man in the Allied Control Commission (due to Zhdanov's frequent absences Savonenkov was in practice the Commission's director for the last couple of years). But Savonenkov was a military man who was used to getting orders and then implementing them. The subtlety needed for this new task was beyond him. And against President Juho Paasikivi even a more capable diplomat would most certainly have failed.
While Paasikivi was ready accommodate the USSR as much as was reasonable, he had his limits, and the kind of pact Stalin wanted was beyond them. In the end Stalin had to send a letter suggesting a military treaty. Such suggestion of course was impossible to ignore, but the final result, Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, was much more palatable to Finns that the pact Stalin had originally in mind. Most importantly, it allowed Finland to retain her neutrality and avoid being drawn to the Soviet Block. At least for the time being, that was enough to Stalin.
Secretly Stalin was ready to provoke a communist takeover in Finland in case he didn't get what he wanted. In early 1948 Finnish communists were instructed to make up a conspiracy led by right-wing Social Democrats that could be used as excuse to incite strikes, mass demonstrations and finally communist coup. Finnish communists were to organize revolutionary cells all around the country to be ready when the time came. It's not known how far the preparations advanced, but in the end Stalin decided to make a treaty with the legal Finnish government and the communists were stood down. Despite this, rumors of a revolution were rife, and Finnish government showed its readiness to use force to crush any communists attempts. In a meeting with leading Finnish communists Paasikivi thundered to them that if the communists want to take power, "They [the Soviets] would have to kill half a million Finns and then me!".