Why did the German forces fight in Lapland?

[Ilmarinen]

Lack of Finnish interests in the north. It was not where the Finns wanted to use their very limited resources. The lost territory in Karelia was where Finland's war was and to a slightly lesser extent in Viena and East-Karelia (and partially for different reasons). If the Germans wanted anything done in the north they would have to do it themselves. The "bigger picture" i.e. German larger scale objectives were not the first thing to look after for the Finns. I think that when they discussed the distribution of troops the Finns were clear on this, and I don't recall reading about the Germans strongly demanding anything else either. The Finns looked after their own interests, and almost only that.

[Janne]

To keep Vyborg and Eastern Karelia. It was clear that if the Germans would lose the war Finland would lose those territories.

Well, the Germans had lost the previous war, but Finland had emerged out of it with (roughly) the borders of the Grand Duchy. So it wasn't quite absolutely clear at the time that a good result for the Finns was inevitably tied with a grand German victory. It would've sufficed that the Soviet Union would lose the war. And _that_ was pretty clear at the time...

Eastern Karelia wasn't unimportant, but it wasn't worth burning all bridges to the part of the world that Finland aspired to be a part of and that had played a huge part in ending the last war.

[ThomasG]

Lack of Finnish interests in the north. It was not where the Finns wanted to use their very limited resources. The lost territory in Karelia was where Finland's war was and to a slightly lesser extent in Viena and East-Karelia (and partially for different reasons). If the Germans wanted anything done in the north they would have to do it themselves. The "bigger picture" i.e. German larger scale objectives were not the first thing to look after for the Finns. I think that when they discussed the distribution of troops the Finns were clear on this, and I don't recall reading about the Germans strongly demanding anything else either. The Finns looked after their own interests, and almost only that.

IMO, Finns should have demanded that the Germans send a panzer division to blitzkrieg through the Karelian Isthmus. This should have decreased the heavy casualties the Finnish army suffered during the 1941 offensive. The Finnish army was not well suited to offensive combat against the tank-heavy Red army. At least more AT equipment was needed.

[ThomasG]

Well, the Germans had lost the previous war, but Finland had emerged out of it with (roughly) the borders of the Grand Duchy. So it wasn't quite absolutely clear at the time that a good result for the Finns was inevitably tied with a grand German victory. It would've sufficed that the Soviet Union would lose the war. And _that_ was pretty clear at the time...

Absolutely. The Soviets had to lose and Finland should have done everything possible to accomplish that objective. It didn't.

Eastern Karelia wasn't unimportant, but it wasn't worth burning all bridges to the part of the world that Finland aspired to be a part of and that had played a huge part in ending the last war.

It was not in the strategic interests of the US to allow Finland to fall to the Soviet domain of influence. The resignation of pro-German Finns (like Risto Ryti) should be sufficient to allow friendly relations with the West even in the case of German defeat.

More aggressive pro-German policy during WWII would likely burn the bridges to the Soviet Union though which would place Finland firmly to the Western camp during the cold war and allow it to avoid the ugly period of Finlandization. This is what Mannerheim and the political leaders would want.

[Hanski]

No, in 1941-1942 it was reasonable to fear that if Germany lost the war Finland would be defeated and occupied by the USSR.

It would be totally irresponsible to presume that Germany would lose and Stalin would have good will towards Finland if Finns tried appease the Soviet Union militarily.

Furthermore, even in the case Germany ultimately lost the war Finland would be in better defensive position in 1944 if it cut the Murmansk railway and advanced to Sorokka.

In 1941 Finland had very good reasons to fear defeat and occupation by the USSR anyway, entirely regardless of what the Finns themselves did -- it was a stated goal of the Soviet leadership. See the transcript of the negotiations between Hitler and Molotov on November 13, 1940: http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaste ... 12,%201940

In fact, Stalin may indeed have shown, if not good will, at least better tolerance towards Finland from 1944 on precisely because he did acknowledge the significance of those political restraints that the Finns voluntarily put in place (refraining from attacking Leningrad; not cutting the Murmansk railway line; consistently emphasizing a separate war of her own, co-belligerence instead of alliance with Germany; and turning weapons against the Germans to make a separate peace). So, what you call "totally irresponsible" apparently worked -- we did not share the fate of Eastern European countries.

But it was a necessary requirement to have the USSR first bleeding its strength in the battles of the Eastern Front against Germany 1941-1944. Prior to that, a negotiated settlement between the Soviet Union and Finland would not have been possible, and like the attitudes of Molotov in November 1940 clearly point out, the Soviet intention was to finish what was left incomplete in the Winter War. Only a war-weary Red Army could understand that fighting yet another war to conquer Finland was not worth it, even though there is no doubt they were still capable of it at a high price.

[Hanski]

More aggressive pro-German policy during WWII would likely burn the bridges to the Soviet Union though which would place Finland firmly to the Western camp during the cold war and allow it to avoid the ugly period of Finlandization. This is what Mannerheim and the political leaders would want.

I strongly disagree -- with more aggressive pro-German policy, Finland would have been overrun by 1945. Instead of Finlandization, the world would have seen Estoniazation of Finland before, during, and after the cold war. And the Western camp could not have cared less about it.

[Juha Tompuri]

Exellent posts Hanski !

Regards, Juha

[Simon Orchard]

IMO, Finns should have demanded that the Germans send a panzer division to blitzkrieg through the Karelian Isthmus. This should have decreased the heavy casualties the Finnish army suffered during the 1941 offensive. The Finnish army was not well suited to offensive combat against the tank-heavy Red army. At least more AT equipment was needed.

Panzer Divisions were thin on the ground and were badly needed on the continent, by putting forward a 'what if' like this you have to also take into account the effect the removal of that division from it's historical area of operations might have had. An increase of 2-3 infantry divisions, perhaps light or mountain divisions would have been more realistic and better suited, but clearly OKW felt nothing could be spared, hence the hodge podge of battalions, regiments, coastal artillery employed as field artillery, the large proportion of captured weapons in use and low priority on new equipment.

Another question might be, had the Germans commited more forces to the North, could they sustain them given the poor infrastructure and difficulties in getting supplies to the widely spread frontlines?

[ThomasG]

In 1941 Finland had very good reasons to fear defeat and occupation by the USSR anyway, entirely regardless of what the Finns themselves did -- it was a stated goal of the Soviet leadership. See the transcript of the negotiations between Hitler and Molotov on November 13, 1940: http://www.worldfuturefund.org/wffmaste ... 12,%201940

In fact, Stalin may indeed have shown, if not good will, at least better tolerance towards Finland from 1944 on precisely because he did acknowledge the significance of those political restraints that the Finns voluntarily put in place (refraining from attacking Leningrad; not cutting the Murmansk railway line; consistently emphasizing a separate war of her own, co-belligerence instead of alliance with Germany; and turning weapons against the Germans to make a separate peace). So, what you call "totally irresponsible" apparently worked -- we did not share the fate of Eastern European countries.

The Finnish political restraints (not attacking towards Leningrad or Murmansk railway line) had no effect on Stalin's actions in 1944.

The 1944 Soviet offensive was halted because Stalin had a more important military objective: the capture of Berlin before the Western allies. He could not afford to delay his offensive in Belarus because of Finland.

Stalin had no good will or tolerance towards Finland. He simply decided that it was more important to defeat Germany quicker and with less blood than to occupy Finland. Finland did not share the fate of Eastern European countries because the military resistance in 1944 was strong enough.

The consequence of the actions of Finnish leadership was that relations with Germany became worse and Finland did not have possibility to acquire the needed German equipment. Lack of e.g. good anti-tank weapons caused the needless death of many Finns in 1944.

[ThomasG]

I strongly disagree -- with more aggressive pro-German policy, Finland would have been overrun by 1945. Instead of Finlandization, the world would have seen Estoniazation of Finland before, during, and after the cold war. And the Western camp could not have cared less about it.

If Finland did not believe in German victory in after Barbarossa failed to achieve its objectives why did Finland enter to the Anti-Comintern Pact on 25 November 1941? It effectively prevented the possibility of a separate peace with the USSR. In 1941 and 1942 Finland would still have been able to get a peace with good terms but Finland chose not to do so because it trusted in the might of the Wehrmacht.

In reality, the basis of the Finnish policy in 1941 and 1942 was the assumption that Germany would win the war against the USSR. Mannerheim had his doubts but Finns did not have other choice than to trust in German victory.

Finland's mistake was the faith that Germany would win the war anyway and Finland would not need to commit troops to offensives which might be costly.

[ML]

The resignation of pro-German Finns (like Risto Ryti) should be sufficient to allow friendly relations with the West even in the case of German defeat.

Risto Ryti is usually described as an anglophile, definitely not pro-German.

[ThomasG]

Risto Ryti is usually described as an anglophile, definitely not pro-German.

Ryti did not hesitate to cooperate with Germans if that was in Finland's national interest. He signed the Ryti-Ribbentrop treaty which improved Finland's position in the 1944 battles and peace negotiations.

However, the Ryti-Ribbentrop treaty was too little too late as most of the German weapons did not arrive in time. Ryti made the mistake that he did not sign the treaty earlier, already in 1941 or 1942. Then the German weapons and materials would be available in the defense of the Karelian Isthmus in 1944. In the end, Finland was forced to enter to military alliance with Germany and suffer all the consequences when Germany lost.

It is speculative whether Finnish offensives to fully siege Leningrad and to cut the Murmansk railway could have caused the defeat of the Soviet Union and therefore the creation of Greater Finland. It is however nearly certain that they would have weakened the Soviet position in 1944 and made Finland stronger.

[JTV]

Risto Ryti is usually described as an anglophile, definitely not pro-German.

Ryti did not hesitate to cooperate with Germans if that was in Finland's national interest. He signed the Ryti-Ribbentrop treaty which improved Finland's position in the 1944 battles and peace negotiations.

However, the Ryti-Ribbentrop treaty was too little too late as most of the German weapons did not arrive in time. Ryti made the mistake that he did not sign the treaty earlier, already in 1941 or 1942. Then the German weapons and materials would be available in the defense of the Karelian Isthmus in 1944. In the end, Finland was forced to enter to military alliance with Germany and suffer all the consequences when Germany lost.

It is speculative whether Finnish offensives to fully siege Leningrad and to cut the Murmansk railway could have caused the defeat of the Soviet Union and therefore the creation of Greater Finland. It is however nearly certain that they would have weakened the Soviet position in 1944 and made Finland stronger.

IMHO the term "Ryti-Ribbentrop treaty" is inaccurate and probably originally introduced for claiming it something comparable to Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty - which it was not. So, in a way it gives very false idea what the particular document actually was. Being very capable lawyer Ryti wrote the particular document (his letter to Hitler) intentionally in such form that it was not a treaty binding to Finnish government. Since he also didn't take the matter to parliament (as would have been needed for making legal military allience) there was no real military allience created with this document. From legal viewpoint it was his personal letter, in which he promised that Finland would continue fighting Soviet Union as long as he was President of Finland (which left door open for starting peace negotiations as soon as he resigned). Also, when it comes to peace negotiations the particular document certainly didn't improve Finnish chances in peace negotiations - what it did give was a good excuse for sentencing Ryti to prison after the war in "responsibles for the war" trial orchesterated by Kekkonen with the Soviets.

Ryti wrote this document because Ribbentrop demanded it. What I know it seems that the document didn't actually effect in deliveries of armaments coming from Germany - and may have well been own Ribbentrop's "glory gathering show" (what I have read such a one man shows were not exactly unknown among Hitler's inner circle). What is known the demands didn't effect Finland getting weaponry in 1944 - and probably not earlier either. Had Ribbentrop even demanded such a document before 1944? - I am asking because according what I have read earlier I have not found any mentioning of such demands of earlier date.

Jarkko

[ThomasG]

IMHO the term "Ryti-Ribbentrop treaty" is inaccurate and probably originally introduced for claiming it something comparable to Molotov-Ribbentrop treaty - which it was not. So, in a way it gives very false idea what the particular document actually was. Being very capable lawyer Ryti wrote the particular document (his letter to Hitler) intentionally in such form that it was not a treaty binding to Finnish government. Since he also didn't take the matter to parliament (as would have been needed for making legal military allience) there was no real military allience created with this document. From legal viewpoint it was his personal letter, in which he promised that Finland would continue fighting Soviet Union as long as he was President of Finland (which left door open for starting peace negotiations as soon as he resigned). Also, when it comes to peace negotiations the particular document certainly didn't improve Finnish chances in peace negotiations - what it did give was a good excuse for sentencing Ryti to prison after the war in "responsibles for the war" trial orchesterated by Kekkonen with the Soviets.

It improved the situation in peace negotiations because the Finnish military could rely on the German war materials and air support. Finns were still capable to effective resistance. Without the German aid the Finns would be militarily weaker in September 1944 and instead of signing the Moscow Armistice the Soviets might have decided to continue the offensive or at least extort more concessions.

Ryti wrote this document because Ribbentrop demanded it.

No, Mannerheim pressured Ryti to sign the document. Mannerheim knew that the Finnish military was not strong enough to long resist a Soviet offensive without German support and weapons.

What I know it seems that the document didn't actually effect in deliveries of armaments coming from Germany - and may have well been own Ribbentrop's "glory gathering show" (what I have read such a one man shows were not exactly unknown among Hitler's inner circle). What is known the demands didn't effect Finland getting weaponry in 1944 - and probably not earlier either. Had Ribbentrop even demanded such a document before 1944? - I am asking because according what I have read earlier I have not found any mentioning of such demands of earlier date.

Naturally. From the beginning the Germans made demands that Finland would join the Tripartite Pact and Finnish refusal to join it led to a crisis in food supply as the Finns were dependent of German grain. The Germans were very disappointed when the Finnish high command decided to halt the offensive in 1941 and spend the year 1942 in Sitzkrieg. They were very outraged in 1943 when the Linkomies government informed Berlin that Finland would like to make a separate peace. Ribbentrop demanded a treaty of alliance.

The hostility of Finns towards German aims led to cool relations between the powers and Germany discontinued the shipments of grain and munitions to Finland in March 1944. The consequence was that the Finnish army lacking e.g. AT-weapons was not prepared to the Soviet offensive and Viipuri was lost.

[Juha Tompuri]

In reality, the basis of the Finnish policy in 1941 and 1942 was the assumption that Germany would win the war against the USSR. Mannerheim had his doubts but Finns did not have other choice than to trust in German victory.

No.
As Finland had in WWII different goals as Germany, our wishes also were different:

Finnish president Risto Ryti speaking to the members of Finnish government 9th June 1941:

The Soviet intentions towards Finland have been very clear during the past year, proved by how the events have taken place.
The Soviet world policy seems to be to stay neutral while the other powers wear themselves out quarriling with each other. When that development had taken place long enough, Soviet Union would start to spread the world revolution and chaos, in order to reach their initial goal, Russia and bolshevism reaching the world power.
Germany is at the moment the only state that can beat Russia, or at least significally weaken it, and it wound not be a harm to the world, if Germany too would weaken at that game.
But the, as great as possibe weakening of Russia, is the key factor at our survival.
If Russia wins the war, becomes our situation too very difficult, even hopeless. When Russia ruling the world affairs as winner, nobody can back up or help us.
But Russia is now incredibly strong, and if it still manages to stay in peace for a year, while other superpowers fighting against each other, could not Germany, or any other beat it.
So, as cruel as it may sound, we almost should wish that a war between Germany and Russia would broke out, of course wishing that we could stay outside of it.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &highlight

Finland's mistake was the faith that Germany would win the war anyway and Finland would not need to commit troops to offensives which might be costly.

Partially yes.
Attacking Leningrad and/or to White Sea might well have proven costly both militarywise and politically.

Ryti did not hesitate to cooperate with Germans if that was in Finland's national interest.

A bit like Winston Churchill wouldn't hesitate to co-operate with devil, if in national interest:

If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the devil in the House of Commons.

http://refspace.com/quotes/Winston_Churchill/hitler

In the end, Finland was forced to enter to military alliance with Germany and suffer all the consequences when Germany lost.

No.
Finland stayed independent and avoided the "East-Germanization" when Germany lost.

From the beginning the Germans made demands that Finland would join the Tripartite Pact and Finnish refusal to join it led to a crisis in food supply as the Finns were dependent of German grain.

Partially yes.
The lack of food, was partially because Finland AFAIK had the highest level of mobilization of the wargoing nations. We took the war quite seriously. If Germany had understood the same from beginning, that could have prolonged their war (if that would then done any good for them).

The Germans were very disappointed when the Finnish high command decided to halt the offensive in 1941 and spend the year 1942 in Sitzkrieg. They were very outraged in 1943 when the Linkomies government informed Berlin that Finland would like to make a separate peace. Ribbentrop demanded a treaty of alliance.

Sort of wish that the Finns should fight for Germany to the last Finn.

The hostility of Finns towards German aims led to cool relations between the powers and Germany discontinued the shipments of grain and munitions to Finland in March 1944.

Not hostility, but different aims.

The consequence was that the Finnish army lacking e.g. AT-weapons was not prepared to the Soviet offensive and Viipuri was lost.

No.
We had modern AT-weapons already before the attack.
Consequence also was that Finland became even more ready to dump Germany.
Viipuri, the only Finnish city USSR was able to occupy from Finland during the Wars.


Regards, Juha