Was the Continuation war unavoidable?

[Tuco]

"We felt that alone "
I think that is a big key to all of this. Finland was alone and in the middle of Hitler and Stalin. I do not see a way Finland could not have been in the fighting.

[John T]

Over 60% of the grain was imported during 1910s and 20s. This situation has been the same since then. Still over half of the grain used in Finland is imported from elsewhere.[2]

Martti

[2] http://www.mmmtike.fi/fi/index/tiedotte ... e0405.html

Hi

First of all I do not belive that data from 1918 and 2004 are valid as comparisons for the war period.

I prefer the same sites datastorage, Matilda - it will give you the yearly data for the right period. You have to get yourself a username to log in but it worth it.
http://www.matilda.fi/servlet/page?_pag ... a=PORTAL30

But I did not find anything on Imports of foodstuff during the war there.
Do anyone have imports in tons per year available?

I do have some doubt about the viability of food supply as an explanation why Finland had to join the the war, and how it would affect the descision in 1941.
The dire supply situation from 42 onwards was not known in June 1941, only the general perception that ~20% of the land had been lost. And the only way to ignore the strain on food supply by a war was to assume that war would be over by next spring.

What promises did Germany make to deliver foodstuff to Finland that was connected to a entry in the war?

Did Germany threaten to curtail food deliveries in case of Finland did not enter the war?

I have found index serie of area used for bread-grain production,
Average 35 -39 is 100%
39 - 99%
40 - 72%
41 - 67%
42 - 69%
43 - 71%
44 - 60%
45 - 49%
and area used for total grain production,
Average 35 -39 is 100%
39 - 102%
40 - 94%
41 - 89%
42 - 83%
43 - 84%
44 - 80%
45 - 79%

This shows that Finland utilised less farming areas as war went on and the only explanations I can find is that Finland either did not want to cultivate the land as it was easier and cheaper to import (Might be valid today, but hardly in 1942)
Or that the farming population did not manage to work available lands with available hands.

Source G Ekholm, "Det svenska jordbruket och folkförsörjningen under andra världskriget". A thesis regarding Swedish farming during the war and it has a chapter with some comparisons of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and UK. For his purpose it makes sense to only present index values in his comparison.
but it is a bit frustrating that he does not show the base numbers in tons of grain.

And last but not least, Sweden did in 1942 import
86 497 ton wheat, 6 475 ton oats, 11 172 ton rice and 120 000 tons of fodder cakes from South America. And with a neutral Finland I see no reason why these quantities could not been increased with 60%. In addition Sweden could freely sell goods to a neutral Finland and still apply to Allied blockade rules.

I feel that I have a reasonable clear case that a neutral Finland would have had more options than you credit.
Or at a very least, put it this way
- If Finland had have a chance to keep out of the fight for other reasons, food supply was not a compelling reason to enter the war.

Cheers
/John T

[John T]

ThomasG

The Red Army had a land border with Finland. Germany didn't except for the small area in the North which was not suitable for a large offensive.

The German troops would have to land to the Finnish coast which would be a logistical nightmare. There would be no guarantee that Germany would be victorious.

Are you deliberately forgetting the troop shipments across Sweden ? How loyal would the Swedes had been if the Germans applies real pressure. Coming across from Haparanda, Umeå and island hopping via Åland would have been far easier than sailing all the way across the Baltic Sea.

Germany already had put Sweden to that test in April and May 1940, when Sweden refused to transfer arms to Narvik as long the fighting continued.

That Sweden allowed the transfer of 163 ID trough Sweden to Finland was accepted as it was a finn (Wasastjerna) who asked if Sweden could help in this delicate matter.

That most Swedes had loyaly defended Swedish soil was percieved by the German staffs and the following qoute from
OKH, Oberquartiermeister IV, Abteilung Fremde Heere Ost, Die Wehrmact Schwedens, Norwegens, Dänemarks late 1940:
"Die Armee erscheint zu Verteidigungsaufgaben auch in Verbinung mit Teilangriffen gegen einen nich wesentlich überlegenden Gegner geeignet."
(Swedish) Army is evaluated to be able to defend and mount local counterattacks against a not considerable superior enemy.

There simply wasn't any benefit to be had. Germany's strategic enemies were the Soviet Union and Britain and an invasion to Finland would do nothing to help Germany defeat them.

Gaining unlimited access to the Swedish and Finnish strategic resources would have been incentive enough, IMO.

As a Neutral Sweden was important to Molotov, the political cost would not been cheap.
And if USSR had been prepared on Barbarossa very little benefit for Germany to military size what could be bought for money.

The you have to add the time wasted and military cost too.
Most Swedes with a interest in military history knews that Finland had twice as long concript training before the war, few Swedes have noted the fact that the Swedish defence expenditure in 1938 (converted to USD) was twice as big as the Finns.

In fact, an invasion to Finland would be harmful to German interests very likely postponing Barbarossa, damaging relations with Sweden etc.

You really think the Germans would have had any moral dilemmas about taking care Sweden ahead of schedule ? As to postponing Barbarossa: do you really think that it would have mattered to Hitler if he had attacked the Soviets a year or two later (as he had planned to originally anyway) if he would have gotten all those strategic resources ?

As status quo summer 1940 Hitler could buy those resources paying with loot from occupied territories.

See, when you play a what if you can not assume that there are set points which will be immune to variation.

Yes, that importat and that's why I'm so persistent.

You think that Germans and Soviets planned to invade together in 1941??

Please stop being an ass.

There were troops already in Hanko. Do you really think they would have been incapable of massing the necessary troops for the invasion, especially if Molotov was already bugging Hitler to get permission for the invasion.

Actually the way I interpret The German planning for operation Renntier assumed an initial Soviet attack on Finland where the Germans moved forward to secure the Nickel mines.

Cheers
/John T

[Whiskey]

Either you are trolling or you are ignorant...

I have found index serie of area used for bread-grain production,
Average 35 -39 is 100%
39 - 99%
40 - 72%
41 - 67%
42 - 69%
43 - 71%
44 - 60%
45 - 49%
and area used for total grain production,
Average 35 -39 is 100%
39 - 102%
40 - 94%
41 - 89%
42 - 83%
43 - 84%
44 - 80%
45 - 79%

This shows that Finland utilised less farming areas as war went on and the only explanations I can find is that Finland either did not want to cultivate the land as it was easier and cheaper to import (Might be valid today, but hardly in 1942)
Or that the farming population did not manage to work available lands with available hands.

I'm surprised that the fall is so small. First, you have to make a reduction of 20% because of area lost in Moscow Peace Treaty. Second, the loss of fertilizer imports made farming more dependent on home made fertilizers, which means increased areas to pastures for cattle and their dung and growing nitrogen binding plants, from which not a single belongs to the grains. The loss of fertilizers hit most heavily to the bread grains, as Finland was (and still is) near the northern edge where they survive. That means that it is more wise in nutritional sense to grow non-bread grains in more difficult fields than try to grow bread grains with a good likelihood that it never gets ready at all due to short growing season.

And last but not least, Sweden did in 1942 import
86 497 ton wheat, 6 475 ton oats, 11 172 ton rice and 120 000 tons of fodder cakes from South America. And with a neutral Finland I see no reason why these quantities could not been increased with 60%. In addition Sweden could freely sell goods to a neutral Finland and still apply to Allied blockade rules.

Thanks, but at June 1940, when the full effect of the lost fertilizer imports were not yet known, Finland tried to negotiate with Soviet Union an import treaty for 100 000 tons of grain. One has to remember, that Finland still imported tens of thousends of tons grain from other European countries and from overseas through Petsamo.

So, it wasn't a question about 60% rise but more like 110%-160% rise, if Sweden would have imported the needed amount of grain.

[John T]

Either you are trolling or you are ignorant...

If I'm trolling I expect the moderators to intervene.
That I do not know much about finnish agriculture and food supply is also true but remember the motto of this forum, so please enlight me.

I would label myself as questioning and with a special interest in kontrafactual reasoning.
So when I see a statement like
"Finland had to join the war otherwise the population would starve to death"
I gets an urge to understand what facts that kind of sweeping contrafactual reasoning is based on. In my experience these assumptions often based on one fact from reality that is not valid in the context presented.

So that Finland could wage a war while not importing food is impossible -Fine.
But thats not the same thing as saying that if Finland does not go to war there is no possibility to import food.
Or saying that the same quantities needed to be imported in peace as where needed during the war.

I have found index serie of area used for bread-grain production,

I'm surprised that the fall is so small. First, you have to make a reduction of 20% because of area lost in Moscow Peace Treaty. Second, the loss of fertilizer imports made farming more dependent on home made fertilizers, which means increased areas to pastures for cattle and their dung and growing nitrogen binding plants, from which not a single belongs to the grains. The loss of fertilizers hit most heavily to the bread grains, as Finland was (and still is) near the northern edge where they survive. That means that it is more wise in nutritional sense to grow non-bread grains in more difficult fields than try to grow bread grains with a good likelihood that it never gets ready at all due to short growing season.

I bolded area because thats what the data is based on,
But it shows you knowledge that you anyhow explained the reason why area of bread grain deminished.
The data on actual crop in tons vary wildly and since you have to correlate data between different species it was harder to analyse.
The Swedish words used where "Spannmål" and "Brödsäd" and my dictionary dont give the agricultural distinction between the two.

Thanks, but at June 1940, when the full effect of the lost fertilizer imports were not yet known, Finland tried to negotiate with Soviet Union an import treaty for 100 000 tons of grain.

Wich of Pasiikivi eventually got something like 20 000 tons as a goodbye gift just before the continuationwar broke out? Or was it only a part that was delivered before?

One has to remember, that Finland still imported tens of thousends of tons grain from other European countries and from overseas through Petsamo.

So, it wasn't a question about 60% rise but more like 110%-160% rise, if Sweden would have imported the needed amount of grain.

The volumes cited where the volumes Sweden got based on her own needs and where a trade off between other needs. the total import volume 1942 through "Göteborgstrafiken" was 426 205 tons.
And it was just shown as a example of that Neutral Sweden did trade even with south america during the war.


Sorry if you concider me to troll but I have to restate my question since I don't see how you answered it above.

If Finland remains Neutral why should Germany stop deliveries of food stuff in July if they allowed it in May?

Cheers
/John T.

[JariL]

Hi,

I do not think it is correct to say that Finland had to go to war because of the food situation. However, it is correct to state that Finlands neutrality was easy to undermine by both Sovjet Union and Germany by using the food situation as a weapon. Both could block Finnish harbours and make imports and exports impossible and thus starve Finland into submission if they so wished. Food was one more factor that underlined to the Finnish leadership that they have to side with one or the other and hopefully the winner in the coming war between Soviet Union and Germany.

I recomend getting acquainted with the British Navy Certificate system for those who want to learn how great powers controlled exports and imports to neutral countries during WWII. These naturally concerned Finland only till Dec 6, 1941 after which Finnish merchants in high sees were confiscated by the allied powers. But Sweden had its imports controlled by Great Britain through this system for the duration of the war. Great Britain naturally had to do a balancing act in restraining imports without pushing Sweden into the arms of Germany. The same applied for example to Switzerland. Britains power was naturally dimished by its unability to exert direct military power to Sweden or Switzerland. Had it been able to do so it could have been able to force Sweden and Switzerland to at least tilt their neutrality into its favour much earlier than was the case.

Regards,

Jari

[Ilmarinen]

Germany already had put Sweden to that test in April and May 1940, when Sweden refused to transfer arms to Narvik as long the fighting continued.

That Sweden allowed the transfer of 163 ID trough Sweden to Finland was accepted as it was a finn (Wasastjerna) who asked if Sweden could help in this delicate matter.

What motivation, do you think, did they have in mind in July 1940 allowing passage of German troops through Swedish territory, to and from Narvik? This was before Germany had approached Finland with a similar proposal, and before the 163rd Division was heading to Finland. Or was it just "why not"?

[John T]

Hi,

I do not think it is correct to say that Finland had to go to war because of the food situation. However, it is correct to state that Finlands neutrality was easy to undermine by both Sovjet Union and Germany by using the food situation as a weapon. Both could block Finnish harbours and make imports and exports impossible and thus starve Finland into submission if they so wished.

But this assumes that Germany and USSR where in a position to cooperate with each other, so isn't that a variant of the Finland divided like Poland scenario?

And in real life when USSR applied pressure Finland did go to Germany for support.

A neutrals two best weapons are
- to deny a would be enemy the benefits given by the neutral and
- threaten to join the would be enemy's enemy.

And in this context Germany where so good at making deals that looked favorable for the Finns, that it was hardly seen as preassure.
"Let us use some of your roads and we sell you weapons"
"Sell us all your Nickel and cupper and we'll have an interest that you can deliver those goods next year too..."
And eventually followed by the "Do you want Carelia back?"

I have no problem to understand why it happend,
just a problem with that it was inevitable.

Food was one more factor that underlined to the Finnish leadership that they have to side with one or the other and hopefully the winner in the coming war between Soviet Union and Germany.

Yes, and the different reasons converged into one direction.

I recomend getting acquainted with the British Navy Certificate system for those who want to learn how great powers controlled exports and imports to neutral countries during WWII. These naturally concerned Finland only till Dec 6, 1941 after which Finnish merchants in high sees were confiscated by the allied powers. But Sweden had its imports controlled by Great Britain through this system for the duration of the war. Great Britain naturally had to do a balancing act in restraining imports without pushing Sweden into the arms of Germany. The same applied for example to Switzerland. Britains power was naturally dimished by its unability to exert direct military power to Sweden or Switzerland. Had it been able to do so it could have been able to force Sweden and Switzerland to at least tilt their neutrality into its favour much earlier than was the case.
Regards,
Jari

Yes, three books on Navicerts:

The Economic Blockade, the Official British history, a bit rosy as most official histories.

Matson -Navicerts and Neutrality - to some extent what the official history did not say, not least about the contradiction between trade war and Neutrals.

America and the Winter War, most on how US domestic policy shaped her foreign policy but also how US dealt with UK over Finland.

Cheers
/John T.

[John T]

Germany already had put Sweden to that test in April and May 1940, when Sweden refused to transfer arms to Narvik as long the fighting continued.

That Sweden allowed the transfer of 163 ID trough Sweden to Finland was accepted as it was a finn (Wasastjerna) who asked if Sweden could help in this delicate matter.

What motivation, do you think, did they have in mind in July 1940 allowing passage of German troops through Swedish territory, to and from Narvik? This was before Germany had approached Finland with a similar proposal, and before the 163rd Division was heading to Finland. Or was it just "why not"?

Since they hade refused with the argument "No transfers as long the fighting continued" it was pretty much saying when the fighting is over you will get it. And the way it was phrased as soldiers on leave, not combat units that where transfered in this fashion made it easier to accept. (and initially it was soldiers on leave who left Norway. but pretty quickly it became a simple way of transporting soldiers to and from Norway in general)

I don't think that much on this but rather let the Prime Ministers diary talk.
"This day we lost our beloved Neutrality. "
Officially he still had to belittle the action and he did as much he thought was possible to avoid further demands.


Cheers
/John T.

[John T]

When you bow one way you moon the other way.

Great metaphor.

Mind you I don't think Sweden had many options either - it was, in my opinion, in neither Germany or USSR's interests for a strong Fenno-Scandinavian block to emerge.

The Option Sweden had and some, like the CinC argued for was to send a handfull of infantery divisions to northern Finland and join in the Crusade agains comunism.

They had two reasons -
1. to get rid of communism
2. To ensure that Sweden should maintain her leading role in Scandinavia, not becoming a object while Finland got a better position in the "post war" 1000 year Reich.

Happily for all Swedes the CinC's Breifing of the cabinet ended with him more or less being thrown out of the meeting.


Cheers
/John T.

[JariL]

Hi JohnT,

I think the unavoidability question can only be answered by answering the question "What were Soviet intentions with regards to Finland 1940-1941?" If we accept the view that Soviet Union seeked an opportunity to occupy Finland and was only held back because Germany changed its mind about the subject, then the war was unavoidable. Germany had an interest to protect an ally but would it have had an interest to protect neutral Finland? Militarily certainly not but would nickel and copper have been important enough reasons? Here we should remember that nickel production reached sufficient level for German needs first in 1943 and only after Albert Speer visited the site.

If on the other hand Soviet policy was not to finish off Finland then other alternatives would have been open and the war was avoidable.

All the above naturally with hindsight as the great majority of Finns seems to have felt at the time that Soviet Union was not happy and that it was only a matter of time before a new attempt to settle the scores with Finland would be made. Did this feeling actually make the war unavoidable? Was it "pay back" time? Can wars be explained with rational factors only in the first place?

Regards,

Jari

[Ilmarinen]

Germany had an interest to protect an ally but would it have had an interest to protect neutral Finland? Militarily certainly not but would nickel and copper have been important enough reasons? Here we should remember that nickel production reached sufficient level for German needs first in 1943 and only after Albert Speer visited the site.

Didn't the plan for "operation Renntier" call for German occupation of the Petsamo area - i.e. AOK Norwegen was in the summer of 1940 given an order to prepare to take possession of the Petsamo area in case the Soviet Union should attack Finland again. To secure the nickel they would not have needed to protect neutral Finland; having possession of the mines would have been enough - ?

[Harri]

Can wars be explained with rational factors only in the first place?

Only after 66 years using the "picking-the-raisins-from-the-bun" method.

----

I was a bit amused when I red about the discussion where John T tried to explain that there was only a insignificant lack of grain in Finland during the war. He just seems to forget something: the whole food sector and the strict rationing. The main foodstuff in Finland was not grain but potatoes. For example in early spring 1942 (due to bad harvest of 1941) there were only frozen potatoes left (+ the ones spared for next year's "seeds"). There was a several months gap in potato supply (until the next harvest) and this lack could be only partly replaced with other foodstuff and numerous substitutes. Virtually all Finns cultivated potatoes during the summer 1942 and afterwards. As a curiousity we still have a small "potatoe field" at our summer cottage, so the lessons learned during the war were real and really long lasting.

I think Finns expected that they would get food (grain, potatoes) from the occupied areas but found only empty fields and hungry people.

----

It is irrelevant to ask if someone wants his stolen areas back. And I think no-one has told that the Continuation War was "inevitable". If you take enough facts (not just the ones you want, or the "raisins") into consideration the desicion made in the summer 1941 looks more than reasonable in that situation. We have to remember that those who made the desicion didn't have the same amount of information as we now have and they didn't yet know if this information they had was right or wrong. In this respect Germany "manipulated" Finland 100 - 0.

If we study the facts behind the Continuation War we can't forget the following :
- USSR didn't accept the neutrality of Finland because Finland belonged to the sphere of interest of USSR.
- USSR forbade the military alliance between Sweden and Finland.
- USSR would have considered Finland as an ally of Germany in any case Germany had attacked USSR.
- Western Allies nor Sweden could not help Finland militarily after 1940 to meet the needs.
- The only way to get needed weapons, ammunition, fuels and foodstuff (mainly grain) was to obtained these from Germany.
- Like JariL told the true Soviet intentions were not known for sure.
- German intentions were known better (not fully and Germans gave also misleading and wrong information) but Finland made its own desicions taking into consideration that also Germany was a selfish military super power (like was later seen).

Finland was very cautious and consistent in its policy:
- Finland didn't cut the relationships with Western Allies nor declare war on them. Britain declared war on Finland on 6.12.1941 unreluctantly after the hard Soviet pressure. Relationships with USA continued during the whole war.
- Finland didn't join the Three Party Pact. Finland signed the Anti-Comintern Pact when it had already became insignificant.
- Finland didn't attack Leningrad despite of German wishes.
- Finland didn't cut the Murmansk railway.
- Finland had its own goals in war.

I could continue these lists.

[ThomasG]

It is irrelevant to ask if someone wants his stolen areas back. And I think no-one has told that the Continuation War was "inevitable". If you take enough facts (not just the ones you want, or the "raisins") into consideration the desicion made in the summer 1941 looks more than reasonable in that situation. We have to remember that those who made the desicion didn't have the same amount of information as we now have and they didn't yet know if this information they had was right or wrong. In this respect Germany "manipulated" Finland 100 - 0.

Most relevant factor was the Finnish faith in the German ability to win the world war. E.g. professor Ylikangas has arrived to this conclusion.

If Mannerheim and Ryti had been convinced that Germany would lose there would have been no Continuation war.

If we study the facts behind the Continuation War we can't forget the following :
- USSR didn't accept the neutrality of Finland because Finland belonged to the sphere of interest of USSR.

The situation would change when Germany would be at war with the USSR.

- USSR would have considered Finland as an ally of Germany in any case Germany had attacked USSR.

But it lacked the military possibilities to invade Finland after the German invasion.

- The only way to get needed weapons, ammunition, fuels and foodstuff (mainly grain) was to obtained these from Germany.

The food problem during the war (especially 1941-1942) was caused largely by the fact that the farmers were fighting in the Finnish army.

- Finland had its own goals in war.

But these goals were tied to the fate of the Third Reich in World War II. Greater Finland could only exist in "New Europe" dominated by Germany.

[patrik.possi]

My personal view is that professor Ylikangas theisis is wrong or very over stretched, and as we seen the recent weeks he hade been wrong at least in one case.

To my point of view the most importent event that got Finland into the continuation war was Molotovs visit in Berlin, as the finnish learned that how much they tried to pleas the russians they still wanted the whole of Finland. Finlands decision is all based on Security policy.