The Finnish artillery doctrine
- Panssari Salama
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Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
Addendum: Yes, corrections were absolutely given as direct orders also, such as the "left 300 add 200" orders. I served in Vaasa Motorised Coastal Artillery Battalion, and we trained for land and sea targets, where the latter targeting was done precisely as JariL described.
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Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
The correction converter seems to be a tool, that allows graphical conversion of corrections along the observer-target line into those at the gun (battery)-target line.Simple "correction converter" for forward observers introduced in 1943 helped them making more rapid and accurate corrections because slow calculations were not needed anymore. Correction converters were so secret that they were not even shown to Germans. Full circle in Finnish artillery was 6000 points.
It has already mentioned in another thread at another forum, that similar devices had been long in use for conversion of air observations into fire corrections, e.g. the Brits seems to have developed such a tool in WW1.
And as I have mentioned there as well, it seems that Germans had at least some knowledge of Finnish methods/devices (hardly surprising given the level of cooperation between both armies). I have found in the records of the General der Artillerie im OKH (NARA T78, Roll 269) a short memo from early 1944 on improvement of fire direction methods, where one expert comments on the question (unfortunately unspecified who brought it up) of copying what was called the "Finnische Schießplatte" (probably referring to the so called "correction converter") and introduce it in the German army as well. The author of the memo argued against it, as he saw the newer German devices introduced during the war, e.g. the "Schießspinne"), as superior. It should be mentioned that the Germans were already introducing mechanical computers (the so called Koppelungsgerät), linked to radio teletypers) into some larger artillery units (division/brigades) for improved centralized fire direction as well during that time.
Unfortunately otherwise no additional information is provided in the memo.
Just for the record, Germans introduced radio sondes for measuring weather conditions at roughly the same time (IIRC, the Telefunken company had offered such sondes commercially already before WW2). Balloon speed was measured either by theodolite or RADAR.The introduction of weather detecting radio-sonde in 1942 meant revolution in ballistic preparation. Sonde could measure three important factors: air temperature, air moisture and air pressure. Wind speeds and directions were measured using teodolite as earlier.
No pun intended, but this seems to be a bit of the usual horse feathering in combination with lack of knowledge what others did. (Mostly) Well working radios and fire concentrations of 10, or more, battalions, for instance, were nothing uncommon for German artillery (concentrations of up to 20 battalions admittedly were more seldom but I have a few examples as well), which anyone will quickly find out who bothers to have a look into the relevant literature.By 1944 Finnish field artillery had reached the level in indirect fire which far ecceeded the Soviet and German ones. When also the number of well working radios had incresed a lot reliability of fire directing orders had improved substantially. Concentrated salvoes of all field artillery batteries and mortar platoons within range were now finally possible. In the summer 1944 timed highly accurate artillery and mortar concentrations of even 10 - 20 artillery battalions and mortar companies were used very destructively."
Not even to mention what US and UK/CW did (the latter achieving rapid concentrations of the fire of up to 1,000 guns, it seems).
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Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
I think Finnische Schießplatte is not the correction converter but tasomittari, which was used at batteries to calculate firing data.
The basic idea of the correction converter was, that is made correction of fire easier for the forward observer, who also didn´t need to know where the artillery shooting for him was. All calculations were made in the cozy tent at the battery. This way it is done today everywhere, but I don´t know when it was introduced in other armies.
Concentrating 1000 guns would probably have been demanding, because of the lack of air superiority and the Finnish forested landscape, which doesn´t offer too many suitable firing positions.
The basic idea of the correction converter was, that is made correction of fire easier for the forward observer, who also didn´t need to know where the artillery shooting for him was. All calculations were made in the cozy tent at the battery. This way it is done today everywhere, but I don´t know when it was introduced in other armies.
Concentrating 1000 guns would probably have been demanding, because of the lack of air superiority and the Finnish forested landscape, which doesn´t offer too many suitable firing positions.
Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
Ah, very interesting, could you provide some more information about that tool?I think Finnische Schießplatte is not the correction converter but tasomittari, which was used at batteries to calculate firing data.
Yep, as I said, convert corrections from observer-target to battery-target line. Surely, that makes correction for the observer more easy. From what I have read, many armies (German, anyway) still use both methods, according to circumstances.The basic idea of the correction converter was, that is made correction of fire easier for the forward observer, who also didn´t need to know where the artillery shooting for him was. All calculations were made in the cozy tent at the battery. This way it is done today everywhere, but I don´t know when it was introduced in other armies.
Of course, combined with the simple need to distribute enough guns to cover the various sectors of the front that did not allow to mass so large a number of guns in a small sector of the front (15 - 25 km) that their fire could be concentrated on a single target. The Brits in some instances had 70 to 80 guns per km of front in some instances, so that such concentrations were possible.Concentrating 1000 guns would probably have been demanding, because of the lack of air superiority and the Finnish forested landscape, which doesn´t offer too many suitable firing positions.
Actually that remark was meant just to express my indifference whether it is 10, 15, or 20, or more battalions, whose fire you mass. I think, what we are talking about here is the capability to mass all guns in range of a certain target onto that target, on call of an observer, across divisional, and maybe corps or army, boundaries. Something which most armies had mastered in principle in the later stages of WW2, irrespective of certain differences (and remaining problems) in detail.
It is well possible IMHO that Finns were a little bit more advanced than others in this regard, but a more reliable judgment necessitates a detailed comparison.
Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
That is a document from the summer of 1944, could be of interest here:
From a summary of the report on war experience of the 21 Army HQ, TsAMO RF 375/6675/405Enemy artillery actions
1. On the first and second defense lines and in combat for the former Mannerheim line enemy artillery revealed insignificant activity, being suppressed by our fire.
Before the start of our offensive artillery conducted methodical fire using a limited number of rounds.
2. It was only on 9 June [1944] when artillery intensified activity, methodical fire was strengthened, fire attacks became more frequent. Wandering guns and gun platoons were extensively used.
3. After our troops reached the lake region north of Vyborg, wandering started to be used by all the artillery. As a rule enemy artillery beginning from every morning was working from new firing positions. Our counterbattery actions didn't produce desirable results.
4. The principal method of fire were artillery-mortar fire attacks. During defense of the first line attacks were performed with small ammunition expenditure (100-150 rounds), fire was directed on areas and was of little effect. In the period that followed enemy started to conduct fire by a battalion, repeating it 2-3 times. Fire was directed by observation group in forward trenches. Composition of the observation group (according to prisoners) was from 2 men to 2 10-men squads with means of communications and observation. Registration before fire attacks was hardly ever made, only sometimes there was a registration using air bursts, after that in 8-10 minutes a fire attack followed.
5. After taking Vyborg enemy artillery increased its activity. Maneuver of trajectories started to be used extensively. Fire attacks became powerful and were combined with bombing attacks of aviation. Fire started without any registration with a sudden fire attacks by several batteries and lasted 3-5 minutes with following repeated attacks after irregular time intervals.
Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
It is of very much interest at least for me, thank you for posting.That is a document from the summer of 1944, could be of interest here:
...
However, it raises a number of questions as well:
- I cannot bring points 1 and 2 together concerning the timeframe. AFAIK, fighting on a big scale did not start until 9 June 1944 with the breaking of the first, and in subsequent days, second Finnish lines?
- Concerning the lack of registration mentioned in points 4 and 5, from what I have read from Finnish posters on various forums, a special feature of battles near Tali-Ihantala was very extensive pre-plotting of target reference points. I am not sure wht precisely is meant by this term in Finnish parlance, but I assume it is something similar to the German term "Zielpunkt", i.e. a a distinct terrain and map point, for which fire solutions are pre-calculated and which serve to help observers localizing targets and designating them to call down fire missions on these targets. If this is indeed the case, this might explain the lack of need for registration.
- John Hilly
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Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
"Zielpunkt" must mean "Sulku" or "Sulkumaali", where fire solutions are pre-calculated.Michate wrote: I am not sure wht precisely is meant by this term in Finnish parlance, but I assume it is something similar to the German term "Zielpunkt", i.e. a a distinct terrain and map point, for which fire solutions are pre-calculated and which serve to help observers localizing targets and designating them to call down fire missions on these targets. If this is indeed the case, this might explain the lack of need for registration.
I remember reading the famous fire command during the fierced battles in Tali-Ihantala battles:
From a forward observer, a Liutenat or Captain ordering by radio:
By my command and with my responsibilty shoot "Sulut Konkkala, ja Kyöpeli" with all there is! resulting several battalions concentrated fire to those two "Zielpunkte" so stopping the enemy assault at its beginning.
Regards
Juha-Pekka
"Die Blechtrommel trommelt noch!"
Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
Interesting. Where such "Sulku" points, or areas, and were they designated by names (as it seems from the description), or numbers?"Zielpunkt" must mean "Sulku" or "Sulkumaali", where fire solutions are pre-calculated.
I remember reading the famous fire command during the fierced battles in Tali-Ihantala battles:
From a forward observer, a Liutenat or Captain ordering by radio:
By my command and with my responsibilty shoot "Sulut Konkkala, ja Kyöpeli" with all there is! resulting several battalions concentrated fire to those two "Zielpunkte" so stopping the enemy assault at its beginning.
In German parlance, there was, and probably still is, a distinction between points (the mentioned "Zielpunkte"), used for target localization and target designation in general, and given numbers, and more extended (at least 200x200 square meters) areas ("Feuerräume", in particular "Vernichtungsfeuerräume") for prepared fire concentrations, probably to account for the observation, that there is always some spread in the fall of shot especially from a larger number of distributed batteries. These areas were designated normally by names, not numbers, though larger areas were subdivided into smaller areas by adding a running number (1, 2, ...) to the name. One reason was to make participation of batteries across divisional boundaries easier (double use of numbers might cause misunderstandings) Calling the fire of such a prepared concentration was very similar to what is described in this example for the Finnish artillery.
Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
I believe what they mean is that during the static front phase Finnish artillery fire was weak, after 9 June it intensified, of course, but wasn't as strong and effective as on the VKT line. From the Soviet side 9 June 1944 was a day of preliminary destruction of Finnish defenses with artillery fire and air bombardment, other actions were limited to several forays each made by forces not larger than a battalion. However they still caused a local crisis, so Finnish historiography traditionally viewed 9.06 as the first day of the offensive. What was called "a first line" in the text is a static frontline in 1941-1944, "second line" is the Finnish VT position.Michate wrote: - I cannot bring points 1 and 2 together concerning the timeframe. AFAIK, fighting on a big scale did not start until 9 June 1944 with the breaking of the first, and in subsequent days, second Finnish lines?
The text says that Finnish batteries changed firing positions every night, so they must renew firing settings even for the same targets. It's not explained how it was made. In this connection I don't understand what exactly "without any registration" means: without registration before the fire was opened or without preliminary registration on a pre-planned target or without any registration even on a checkpoint. Probably someone would be able to clarify this from a Finnish perspective.- Concerning the lack of registration mentioned in points 4 and 5, from what I have read from Finnish posters on various forums, a special feature of battles near Tali-Ihantala was very extensive pre-plotting of target reference points.
Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
That might clear up a remark I have read at another forum, but not understood so far, where it was claimed that pre-plotting also took place extensively for new firing positions. So maybe gun laying data was pre-calculated already in advance for potential fire positions after screening and marking them, and the data provided to the battery whih should move the position so it was ready once they had moved there. Which requires a very tight organisation of calculation operations IMHO.The text says that Finnish batteries changed firing positions every night, so they must renew firing settings even for the same targets. It's not explained how it was made.
I'd second that.In this connection I don't understand what exactly "without any registration" means: without registration before the fire was opened or without preliminary registration on a pre-planned target or without any registration even on a checkpoint. Probably someone would be able to clarify this from a Finnish perspective.
Thanks for clearinng up my question on points 1 and 2.
- John Hilly
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Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
As I have mentioned before, I'm no expert in Field Artillery - far from it.
Intensive aerial mapping was done throughout the war, and artillery mesurements were made in advance. This was also done in a couple of days before the U-line fights Norht-East of Ladoga, so when batteries arrived after retreating, they had pre-planned fire plans calculated and ready to use. And this was made only in a few days beforehand.
Hope you understand what I'm trying point out...
Finnish Artillery Experts, Arise!!!
Regards
Juha-Pekka
Intensive aerial mapping was done throughout the war, and artillery mesurements were made in advance. This was also done in a couple of days before the U-line fights Norht-East of Ladoga, so when batteries arrived after retreating, they had pre-planned fire plans calculated and ready to use. And this was made only in a few days beforehand.
Hope you understand what I'm trying point out...
Finnish Artillery Experts, Arise!!!
Regards
Juha-Pekka
"Die Blechtrommel trommelt noch!"
Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
Not that I'm proficient in Finnish terms, but I believe "sulku" is a defensive barrage.Michate wrote: Interesting. Where such "Sulku" points, or areas, and were they designated by names (as it seems from the description), or numbers?
http://www.winterwar.com/forces/FinArmy/FINartiller.htm
Similar observations were made in their documents. "Analysis of intelligence data doesn't correspond to the actual situation, because enemy constantly changes his firing positions" (from a memo of the artillery staff of the Leningrad Front, 5.7.1944). Also Finnish propensity to concentrate fire from several batteries deployed on a broad front on the same target was frequently mentioned. Then a good cooperation between infantry and artillery was emphasized: in particular counterattacks were almost always made after fire preparation. On the other hand it was said that Finnish artillery was reluctant to fire counterbattery missions. That is another more or less detailed account I could find:The text says that Finnish batteries changed firing positions every night
That is from and after-action report of the 30 Guards Rifle Corps covering 25.6-3.7.1944.The fact that enemy artillery and mortars set accurate barrages before own defensive positions and capture of an artillery observer with a radio at hill 36.0 give a ground to suggest that enemy constantly has forward observers with means of communications in combat formations of his infantry, via whom he carries out constant cooperation between artillery and infantry, that enables rapid maneuver of trajectories, having firing positions far from the frontline, thus ensuring planned withdrawal without ceasing fire if infantry retreats.
.....
Enemy artillery groups mostly at maximal distance from the frontline near roads, thus ensuring dense antitank defense and ease of movement to new firing positions.
Limited possibility of artillery's maneuver on "wheels" due to poorly developed road network and also a lack of artillery weapons is compensated by extensive use of maneuver of trajectories, concentrating in some case fire from 20 batteries on a single area.
In a period before a counterattack enemy artillery sometimes imitates a fire attack on an area far from a direction of the counterattack. Single wandering guns in that period conduct rapid fire on firing positions of our artillery, trying to draw a considerable part of it to counterbattery actions. In this way the enemy tries to disperse our artillery means in order to ensure success of counterattacking units.
Enemy artillery when his infantry retreats conduct fire mostly from depth, artillery from nearby firing positions in that periods leaves positions and withdraws behind a prepared defense line.
- John Hilly
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Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
Great work, Art!
Regards, Juha-Pekka
Regards, Juha-Pekka
"Die Blechtrommel trommelt noch!"
Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
Your remarks have been very helpful, thanksHope you understand what I'm trying point out...
Great info indeed, and it is very interesting to spot a bit of the views from both sides of the hill!Great work, Art!
Re: The Finnish artillery doctrine
All seems pretty normal to me. Of course UK had one particular advantage, no need to calculate elevation angles because range (corrected for meteor, etc) was set directly on the sights, which were 'calibrating', ie they also compensated for the muzzle velocities difference from standard.