F19 claims and losses

[Esa K]

Hi again

...fast and short...

I have already sent a question for С. Geust about an origin of these data. On my data both planes have returned on the air station.

According to Geust 1997 page 54, one of the by F 19 attacked SB:s landed OK at airbase in Uhtua, the second one made a belly landing at the same airbase, and (Geust 1997 page 51) later, probably, was written off.


Best regards

Esa K

[Slon-76]

9 SB = 27 person! And you think everyone will be silent, if the commander of a squadron will run away from one fighter?

Can't say anything exact at the number, and how the raports were written, but as Toivo Uuttu case http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7&start=30 there were several Soviet planes there and no-one saw (including the pilot who was hit) Uuttu hitting the one I-16, but all(?) saw that I-16 being hit from AA-fire.

You exaggerate, Juha.
Shinkarenko attacked the first and has shot down Uuttu at once. Any " slipped forward " I-16 was not.
In the report the fact is marked only, that Pokryshev has lagged behind in area Siesjarvi why he has lagged behind - too nobody saw. The reason was found out when Pokryshev has returned back.

The performance of Swedish Gladiators was lower than Finnish and their ammo could not penetrate the Soviet plane armour nor (often) be able to set the Soviet plane self-sealing fuel tanks on fire.
Finnish had (some) such ammo that could do both (without them Sarvanto would not have been able to achieve the 060140 record).

I suggest to talk about more global questions. I already asked you about concrete examples when the Soviet planes left at occurrence of the Swedish fighters. Can it is valid it will be possible to find out such cases.
Under documents aviation regiments and the brigades working on Karelian isthmus, in southwest Finland, any occurrence of the Finnish fighters is anyhow marked, without dependence from result.
Under documents of the Air Forces of 14 and 9 armies of activity of Swedes especially and not appreciablly. I think, that the reason of low fighting efficiency of the Swedish fighters in it. They simply seldom met soviet bombers because of chosen passive tactics.
Your arguments for the benefit of opposite while, unfortunately, are not convincing.
Eventually " bad patrons" have not prevented them to shot down TB-3. Much more interestingly the question why Karlsson there was there one and that at this time was done by the others.

If I have understood correctly, here is mentioned that the Soviet side (Ageev crew?) mentioned 8-9 Finish fighters there, of which 5 were shot down:

As you know, one Soviet crew has returned only. And all history is written down from his words. Actually, it - same "memoirs". He could tell and about 25 Finnish fighters. To check his words there was nobody.

As an example: did the Soviet bombers report that they were lost and bombed Pajala 210240?

About losses - yes, informed. And that crews DB-3 bombed Pajala, I think they and did not know.

Actually I ment that did they report that they did'n know where they were flying and bombing.

I with this history in details did not understand yet, but in other cases I can assume: The leading crew has lost orientation and bombed Pajala, having accepted it for Rovaniemi. Bombed from height of 7200 meters, to mix it was possible anything you like...

Regards,

[JariL]

Hi,

Reading the posts above there seems to be a tendency to believe that pilots (soldiers) always do as they are told to do. If that was the case there would hardly be any survivors in modern war. In practise soldiers use common sense if it is possible, pilots included. It should also be noted that motivation is an important factor. In this case for example one could ask how motivated Soviet bomber crews were to drop bombs into what they surely could see were small villages? Was getting the task done really worth the risk if there was a fighter in the vicinity? People usually do not complain about surviving.

One should also take into account that Winter War took place in the beginning of the war when the public opinion all over the world still condemned attacks against civilian targets (even if intended targets may have had military value but bombs missed and hit something else). It was only later that bombings became so common place that nobody cared. This process was clearly visible for example among British bombing crews. It took significant effort to train them to fly in a manner that was needed for example in Cologne and Hamburg bombings. I should think that this applied also to Soviet bomber crews.

Finnish pilots on the other hand were fighting to defend their country which always boosts morale. However, I don't think for a second that for example all orderd attacks were fullfilled to the last letter regardless of the conditions.

To give an example, I have a relative who was given orders to take his platoon over ice to Suursaari (Hogland) when Red Army attacked against the island in January 1942. When he approached the island with his men they noticed that there was no sound of battle. In the cover of darkness they came to about 150 meters from the shore of the island. At that point this relative of mine made the decision to withdraw as he, quite rightly, came to the conclusion that the enemy was in control of the island and that his platoon would be butchered if he continued. Nobody blaimed him when he reached his base and there were no repercussions later on despite the fact that he had acted against direct orders.

regards,

Jari

[Esa K]

Hi

Reading the posts above there seems to be a tendency to believe that pilots (soldiers) always do as they are told to do. If that was the case there would hardly be any survivors in modern war.

Well, probably pretty close to the truth...

To give an example, I have a relative who was given orders to take his platoon over ice to Suursaari (Hogland) when Red Army attacked against the island in January 1942. When he approached the island with his men they noticed that there was no sound of battle. In the cover of darkness they came to about 150 meters from the shore of the island. At that point this relative of mine made the decision to withdraw as he, quite rightly, came to the conclusion that the enemy was in control of the island and that his platoon would be butchered if he continued. Nobody blaimed him when he reached his base and there were no repercussions later on despite the fact that he had acted against direct orders.

...but isnt the crucial point here then. How is this reflected, described, put and so on in the company, batallion and so on war diaries? Like "X returned with his platoon from mission Y without fullfilling it", or in some other manner...?

Well, again, just some initial thougts about it.


Best regards

Esa K

[JariL]

Hi,

As far as I know the person in question never talked about the insident. It was described in the unit diary as a statement: they were ordered to help, they went there, there was no action, decided to pull back. Most likely there was no more discussion about the insident because he made the right call.

Regards,

Jari

[Juha Tompuri]

Can't say anything exact at the number, and how the raports were written, but as Toivo Uuttu case http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 7&start=30 there were several Soviet planes there and no-one saw (including the pilot who was hit) Uuttu hitting the one I-16, but all(?) saw that I-16 being hit from AA-fire.

You exaggerate, Juha.
Shinkarenko attacked the first and has shot down Uuttu at once. Any " slipped forward " I-16 was not.
In the report the fact is marked only, that Pokryshev has lagged behind in area Siesjarvi why he has lagged behind - too nobody saw. The reason was found out when Pokryshev has returned back.

That is quite different to the Soviet fighter early Winter War tactics and Uuttu combat report.
Soviet fighters used the bit old fashioned three plane wedge formation at attacks, where when the leader opened fire, also the wingmen pushed the trigger.
Uuttu wrote at his report:
(my translation)
Uuttu patrolling over Muolaa at ca. 1500m height, and begining to descend:

...at the same time I pushed the plane downwards, tracers began to sputter all over me. The attack came from the sun. When I looked over my shoulder I saw three I-16 at by back. One was straight at my back and two others at the sides and also 2-3 planes above me.
I instinctively pulled an evasive maneuvre to the up left, and ater that I managed to fire a short burst to the side of the right side plane that was pulling up. After that i pushed the nose down to be able to execute a new evasive maneuvre. When I looked up, I saw a similar case. Then I pulled towards a plane coming at an oblique angle. That resulted the plane pulling up to the side, away. At that moment I managed to fire a well aimed brust to the fuselage bottom at plane nose. I noticed couple of puffs of black smoke coming from the [I-16, JT]engine. After that the plane swayed sideways two times and fell down wing first. After that I noticed a trail of pale smoke coming from the plane.
As the speed had reduced, I pushed the nose down twisting. Tracers sputtered all over me all the time. i felt the plane fuselage shaking, and when pulled the stick, it didn't move. I thought about jumping, but as I knew i would be shot I decided to try out to the last. I tried to evade my attackers using only rudder and aerlions. At ca. 200m when looking behind, I saw one still following and shooting. I shut off my engine and pulled with both hands from the stick and it moved a bit and the plane recovered from the dive but then the plane hit the trees and after the crash I became unconscious.

So there seemed to have been witnesses of the Pokryshev trying to attack Uuttu, and Pokryshev being hit and leaving the scene.
As well as verifying the ecxact point where Uuttu hit the I-16:

The bullet has got in an oil radiator I-16 (One more argument not for the benefit of Uutu. A radiator from below). The engine has jammed later.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 6#p1319996

The performance of Swedish Gladiators was lower than Finnish and their ammo could not penetrate the Soviet plane armour nor (often) be able to set the Soviet plane self-sealing fuel tanks on fire.
Finnish had (some) such ammo that could do both (without them Sarvanto would not have been able to achieve the 060140 record).

Eventually " bad patrons" have not prevented them to shot down TB-3. Much more interestingly the question why Karlsson there was there one and that at this time was done by the others.

The ball ammunition is not bad, but it's much more inefficient than the armour piercing and incendiary ammunition mix.
Karlsson was patrolling over Rovaniemi because the slow and not so good rate of climb Swedish planes had to be at air (and preferably above) to be able to catch attacking enemy planes.

If I have understood correctly, here is mentioned that the Soviet side (Ageev crew?) mentioned 8-9 Finish fighters there, of which 5 were shot down:

As you know, one Soviet crew has returned only. And all history is written down from his words. Actually, it - same "memoirs". He could tell and about 25 Finnish fighters. To check his words there was nobody.

Not he.
There were three crew members.

The leading crew has lost orientation and bombed Pajala, having accepted it for Rovaniemi. Bombed from height of 7200 meters, to mix it was possible anything you like...

Did they admit at their report that they had lost orientation?


Regards, Juha

[Slon-76]

You exaggerate, Juha.
Shinkarenko attacked the first and has shot down Uuttu at once. Any " slipped forward " I-16 was not.
In the report the fact is marked only, that Pokryshev has lagged behind in area Siesjarvi why he has lagged behind - too nobody saw. The reason was found out when Pokryshev has returned back.

That is quite different to the Soviet fighter early Winter War tactics and Uuttu combat report.
Soviet fighters used the bit old fashioned three plane wedge formation at attacks, where when the leader opened fire, also the wingmen pushed the trigger.

We come on the second circle? Distressful Uuttu already it is time to bear in a separate theme
I shall not deny, that Uuttu's version has the right to a life. Therefore to prove the correctness to me hardly it will be possible (however, to you too )
Therefore I think everyone can count how it is pleasant to him more. As was actually we hardly already we learn.
As the resume of the version I shall result reasons in her advantage.

1. The Soviet documents the version, that the Pokryshev’s plane have been damaged in air I fight do not confirm. You to me already let know, that for you it - not argument. But you should understand, that the argument nobody the confirmed Uuttu’s words is exact also for me not.
2. I consulted to knowing people concerning that, the plane with described Uuttu symptoms could to fly by about 30 kilometers. To me have answered, that with probability of 90 % - is not present. In any case, the squadron should lower speed that Pokryshev it was kept in group. I.e. to not notice, that his plane is damaged other pilots not could.
3. If I have correctly understood, Uuttu shot on I-16 from position "behind - above". To strike from such position an oil - radiator - very big success.
4. Pokryshev was rather skilled pilots and hardly could admit such gross blunder, having slipped forward not only the commander a part (him was not in structure of link Shinkarenko), but also the attacked opponent.
5. It is surprising, that Uuttu, being continuously under bombardment, could see where he has got, that has taken place with plane of the opponent where and as it has departed also what color a smoke let out. It is trusted in it hardly.
6. With Pokryshev’s words, him have damaged fire from the ground. As the plane have restored later, probably his words have found acknowledgement at survey of the machine. At least in all lists the plane appears as damaged fire from the ground.


By the way, try to prove, for example, to me that fact, that Kukkonen 1/12/39 has been shot down by own air defence, instead of ganners SB. The application on shot down above Viipuri D.XXI is present. And I (for cleanliness of experiment) shall trust, that any Soviet document "will be more fair" than Finnish contradicting to it.
I think, you can estimate complexity of my problem...

The ball ammunition is not bad, but it's much more inefficient than the armour piercing and incendiary ammunition mix.
Karlsson was patrolling over Rovaniemi because the slow and not so good rate of climb Swedish planes had to be at air (and preferably above) to be able to catch attacking enemy planes.

Here the question why it was necessary to patrol above taking place in 130 kilometers from the nearest point of front Rovaniemi would be pertinent. Where system of supervision over air?
Well and speed of "Gladiator" quite sufficient for interception TB-3 even from position " on the ground ".
And once again for the best understanding of my position:
My claims not to the Swedish pilots, and to the Finnish command organizing their fighting activity.

As you know, one Soviet crew has returned only. And all history is written down from his words. Actually, it - same "memoirs". He could tell and about 25 Finnish fighters. To check his words there was nobody.

Not he.
There were three crew members.

First of all, it is ONE crew. And the commander and the navigator basically - indirect witnesses. They in general could not see the Finnish fighters. Here the main word for the machine gunner. (as he, by the way, in English refers to?)

The leading crew has lost orientation and bombed Pajala, having accepted it for Rovaniemi. Bombed from height of 7200 meters, to mix it was possible anything you like...

Did they admit at their report that they had lost orientation?

I already spoke, that in this history in detail was not engaged. I did not see materials of investigation, therefore anything certain I can not inform. In the «report» about loss of orientation it is spoken nothing.

Regards,

[Juha Tompuri]

Uuttu already it is time to bear in a separate theme

Uuttu and Soviet reports, both.

1. The Soviet documents the version, that the Pokryshev’s plane have been damaged in air I fight do not confirm. You to me already let know, that for you it - not argument. But you should understand, that the argument nobody the confirmed Uuttu’s words is exact also for me not.

The Soviet report confirmed the Uuttu hit.

2. I consulted to knowing people concerning that, the plane with described Uuttu symptoms could to fly by about 30 kilometers. To me have answered, that with probability of 90 % - is not present. In any case, the squadron should lower speed that Pokryshev it was kept in group. I.e. to not notice, that his plane is damaged other pilots not could.

You mean that when smoke (symptom) starts coming out from Soviet engines they are of 90% probability not able to fly more than 30km?

3. If I have correctly understood, Uuttu shot on I-16 from position "behind - above". To strike from such position an oil - radiator - very big success.

Actually from oppposite position: " front - below".

4. Pokryshev was rather skilled pilots and hardly could admit such gross blunder, having slipped forward not only the commander a part (him was not in structure of link Shinkarenko), but also the attacked opponent.

Everybody makes mistakes - some report about them, some try to hide them.

5. It is surprising, that Uuttu, being continuously under bombardment, could see where he has got, that has taken place with plane of the opponent where and as it has departed also what color a smoke let out. It is trusted in it hardly.

Not continuously under the fire of the oppopnent, thanks to their tactics.
The Uuttu observations also were quite detailled and correct, and confirmed from the enemy:
-enemy plane type
-number of enemy
-where he hit

Also he reported about the enemy mg's, tactics, plane performance etc.

6. With Pokryshev’s words, him have damaged fire from the ground. As the plane have restored later, probably his words have found acknowledgement at survey of the machine. At least in all lists the plane appears as damaged fire from the ground.

Pokryshev is a bit alone with his words of being hit from the ground.
Does he mention any details: place, time, height, damage in detail?
And where he force landed?

By the way, try to prove, for example, to me that fact, that Kukkonen 1/12/39 has been shot down by own air defence, instead of ganners SB. The application on shot down above Viipuri D.XXI is present. And I (for cleanliness of experiment) shall trust, that any Soviet document "will be more fair" than Finnish contradicting to it.
I think, you can estimate complexity of my problem...

To be honest, I would have been more surprised, if that day would not have been an exception at the Soviet bomber gunner claims.

The ball ammunition is not bad, but it's much more inefficient than the armour piercing and incendiary ammunition mix.
Karlsson was patrolling over Rovaniemi because the slow and not so good rate of climb Swedish planes had to be at air (and preferably above) to be able to catch attacking enemy planes.

Here the question why it was necessary to patrol above taking place in 130 kilometers from the nearest point of front Rovaniemi would be pertinent. Where system of supervision over air?

At Lapland AFAIK the early warning net was not as "tight" as at Southern Finland.
The fighters there did not get the warnings of the Soviet attacks as early as at South.
At the early war there were no Finnish planes there, and no planned Finnish usage of planes there.
The planes were used where they were needed most: " to be strong everywhere " was not concidered as a good tactic.

Well and speed of "Gladiator" quite sufficient for interception TB-3 even from position " on the ground ".

I think they were expecting the planes that had attacked there before: DB-3's and SB-2's.

As you know, one Soviet crew has returned only. And all history is written down from his words. Actually, it - same "memoirs". He could tell and about 25 Finnish fighters. To check his words there was nobody.

Not he.
There were three crew members.

First of all, it is ONE crew. And the commander and the navigator basically - indirect witnesses. They in general could not see the Finnish fighters. Here the main word for the machine gunner. (as he, by the way, in English refers to?)

Actually there were four crew members.
About "he":
there were two gunners, Skovodnyj and Shlever, who both verified the five Fokkers shot down at Utti area?
( the total claim saldo of Soviet bomber gunners at the Kuopio bombing mission that day being 8.
5 at Utti + 3 at Mikkeli)

The leading crew has lost orientation and bombed Pajala, having accepted it for Rovaniemi. Bombed from height of 7200 meters, to mix it was possible anything you like...

Did they admit at their report that they had lost orientation?

In the «report» about loss of orientation it is spoken nothing.

I understand.

Regards, Juha

[Slon-76]

Uuttu already it is time to bear in a separate theme

Uuttu and Soviet reports, both.

I suggest in general on December, 1.

1. The Soviet documents the version, that the Pokryshev’s plane have been damaged in air I fight do not confirm. You to me already let know, that for you it - not argument. But you should understand, that the argument nobody the confirmed Uuttu’s words is exact also for me not.

The Soviet report confirmed the Uuttu hit.

Who whom hit? I have not understood.

2. I consulted to knowing people concerning that, the plane with described Uuttu symptoms could to fly by about 30 kilometers. To me have answered, that with probability of 90 % - is not present. In any case, the squadron should lower speed that Pokryshev it was kept in group. I.e. to not notice, that his plane is damaged other pilots not could.

You mean that when smoke (symptom) starts coming out from Soviet engines they are of 90% probability not able to fly more than 30km?

Not engines, and oils - tanks. I was not capable to explain it correctly with my English.

4. Pokryshev was rather skilled pilots and hardly could admit such gross blunder, having slipped forward not only the commander a part (him was not in structure of link Shinkarenko), but also the attacked opponent.

Everybody makes mistakes - some report about them, some try to hide them.

Everybody, behind exception Uuttu?

5. It is surprising, that Uuttu, being continuously under bombardment, could see where he has got, that has taken place with plane of the opponent where and as it has departed also what color a smoke let out. It is trusted in it hardly.

Not continuously under the fire of the oppopnent, thanks to their tactics.
The Uuttu observations also were quite detailled and correct, and confirmed from the enemy:
-enemy plane type
-number of enemy
-where he hit
Also he reported about the enemy mg's, tactics, plane performance etc.

1. Well also what?
2. Where you have seen it?
3. He knew, where flied.
4. Where you have found out it in his official report?

6. With Pokryshev’s words, him have damaged fire from the ground. As the plane have restored later, probably his words have found acknowledgement at survey of the machine. At least in all lists the plane appears as damaged fire from the ground.

Pokryshev is a bit alone with his words of being hit from the ground.
Does he mention any details: place, time, height, damage in detail?
And where he force landed?

And who confirms Uuttu’s words? Or his words do not require acknowledgement? Naturally Pokryshev informed a place of landing. His plane there also have found.

By the way, try to prove, for example, to me that fact, that Kukkonen 1/12/39 has been shot down by own air defence, instead of ganners SB. The application on shot down above Viipuri D.XXI is present. And I (for cleanliness of experiment) shall trust, that any Soviet document "will be more fair" than Finnish contradicting to it.
I think, you can estimate complexity of my problem...

To be honest, I would have been more surprised, if that day would not have been an exception at the Soviet bomber gunner claims.

The Finnish gunners - 0% productivities. Will continue to prove?

At Lapland AFAIK the early warning net was not as "tight" as at Southern Finland.
The fighters there did not get the warnings of the Soviet attacks as early as at South.
At the early war there were no Finnish planes there, and no planned Finnish usage of planes there.
The planes were used where they were needed most: " to be strong everywhere " was not concidered as a good tactic.

By February it was possible to reconsider premilitary plans?
As far as planes in area Oulu were necessary? Last strike was on January, 21.

Well and speed of "Gladiator" quite sufficient for interception TB-3 even from position " on the ground ".

I think they were expecting the planes that had attacked there before: DB-3's and SB-2's.

Expected but have not flied up?

Actually there were four crew members.
About "he":
there were two gunners, Skovodnyj and Shlever, who both verified the five Fokkers shot down at Utti area?
( the total claim saldo of Soviet bomber gunners at the Kuopio bombing mission that day being 8.
5 at Utti + 3 at Mikkeli)

Whence data on 4 members of crew?

Regards,

[John T]

Slon-76
I do have some problems to understand how you asses air forces and the term efficiency.

What strategies do you see as effective when your own air force is
out gunned,
outnumbered by a factor greater than five to one
and in general technical inferior?

And what are the objectives of an air force?
Might different forces have different objectives even if they are fighting each other?

To me it looks like your assessments are based on a theory of attrition which might make sense between two equal forces but are not applicable in an asymmetrical situation.

OK. I shall explain.

1. Tactics any victoriously for Swedes is not present in general. It is obvious from a ratio of forces.
2. In such conditions the only thing that it is meaningful to do - " to try to sell more dearly the life ", I.e. to try to put the enemy the maximal loss.
3. IMHO, the concentration of all group on protection of any one site could give the greatest effect. For example, lines Kemijarvi - Rovaniemi. It would allow to render to the Soviet bombers more serious losses => would increase efficiency of actions of group => would force command of the Air Forces of 9 armies to reckon with presence on the Finnish side fighters groups.
4. The variant chosen the Finnish command for Swedes has provided, at the best, " moral satisfaction ".

You are right that moral factors was a important factor but
I'd rather talk of "freedom of action" and the concept of "fleet in being".
As the main objective for F19 was to remain a fighting force.
If F19 had been annihilated in one big fight that would given Soviet bombers a free ride thereafter.
One risk with concentration would be that IF you met Soviet fighters you'd loose a significant percentage of your force. By spreading out you didn't make any decisive victories nor losses. But the bombers had always to look for fighters.

But this is not really a right/wrong question, possibly a matter of what we consider most efficient
Cheers
/John T.

[John T]

hi all
A couple of unsorted points:

F19 Gladiators where of the J8A model with 740 Hp engine.
Sweden had AP ammo but F19 wasn't equipped with it initially.
I don't know when they got it but I expect that they did get it.

Reading Falks F19 book , page 135 there is a list of day of combat air patrols per town
Rovaniemi 43 days
Posio 8
Uleåborg 53
Vaala 11
Kemis-Torneo 60

So the Spread out wasn't as thin (seen over time) as the initial quote i got from the list of towns expected to be defended.

Is there any support from Finnish side (IPAK?) that verifies F19 claims of Soviet bombers turning back or jettison bombs when meeting F19 fighters?


Thanks Esa K.
Geust article in Ikaros 1997 was interesting.


Cheers
/John T.

[Hanski]

Gentlemen,

Sorry to sidetrack to a subtopic, but perhaps someone could comment on this.

See: http://surfcity.kund.dalnet.se/sweden_f19.htm

Does anyone know if Soviet or Russan literature makes any reference to this F19 operation on 12 January 1940:

During the attack F19 lost three Hawker Harts (“X”, “Y” and “Z”). Two was lost in a collision with each other as reported by Wennerström. In the first Hart, the pilot löjtnant Sterner became a Soviet POW and the observer löjtnant Anders Zachau was killed. The second Hart’s pilot fänrik Arne Jung also became a Soviet POW but his observer sergeant (Flight Sergeant) Matti Sundsten managed to ski back to the Finnish lines. Fänrik Gunnar Färnström and sergeant Thure Hansson made a forced landing after being shot down in the third Hart (‘Z’) but both managed to ski back to the Finnish lines.

The course of events was later re-created and it was reported that fänrik Jung flew towards Salla at about 1000 meters height while taking evasive action when löjtnant Sterner’s Hart approached from behind on about 100 meters higher height and also taking violently evasive action. When Sterner was about 200 meters behind, he dived steeply to the same height as Jung’s Hart. Both aircraft then flew in a flank formation while still taking evasive action. Suddenly Sterner’s Hart got under the other Hart and they collided. The collision was violent and the airscrew on Sterner’s Hart ripped away the engine mount of the other Hart. Sterner later reported that he thought that he had been hit by Soviet anti-aircraft fire. Jung later reported that his Hart immediately became uncontrollable and that he twice turned around and signalled to his observer sergeant Sundsten to leave the aircraft. He also shouted ”Hoppa!” (Jump!) several times in the mouthpiece. He thought his observer had understood the situation and he left the aircraft at 400 meters height. When he loosened the shoulder straps, he was thrown free from the aircraft. The parachute opened without problem and he hit the ground unhurt.

Has anything been published in Russian on this raid, or on the later stages of the captured POW's?

[Juha Tompuri]

Discusion about Toivo Uuttu Bulldog against 6 Soviet I-16 has now a thread of it's own here:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9&t=152938

About Jorma Sarvanto shooting down 6 DB-3 down in 4 minutes 6th Jan-40 can be discussed at:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 9&t=152942

/Juha

[Juha Tompuri]

By February it was possible to reconsider premilitary plans?
As far as planes in area Oulu were necessary? Last strike was on January, 21.

Because of Gladiators?

F19 Gladiators where of the J8A model with 740 Hp engine.

840hp?

Is there any support from Finnish side (IPAK?) that verifies F19 claims of Soviet bombers turning back or jettison bombs when meeting F19 fighters?

I haven't seen very many IPAK reports at all.
Sorry, can't help, at least at the moment.

Regards, Juha

[Slon-76]

By February it was possible to reconsider premilitary plans?
As far as planes in area Oulu were necessary? Last strike was on January, 21.

Because of Gladiators?

No. Simply at the Air Forces of 9 armies more actual problems have appeared as a result of an environment of 54-th division.

Regards,