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amateur wrote: We know that Soviet Union had detailed offinsive plans for invasion into the Baltic countries.
So, I personally have not seen the entire document ("Considerations for Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Case of War with Finland"). In his book Mark Solonin has referred to the source: TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, t. 237, l. 138 - 156. If anybody can provide the full text of the document then that would clear things up.
Nope, before 1939 they were concenred in the regular military planning only as possible allies of Germany. The same applies to Finland. From September 1939 to the summer of 1940 there were no regular planning in the Soviet General Staff, at least nothing is known of it.
Do you happen to mean Juhani Putkinen?Juha Tompuri wrote:So I have to ask again.Mika68* wrote:I'm sure that you know who is J . Putkonen.Juha wrote:Who is "J. Putkonen"?
Philip S. Walker wrote:I have been surfing a bit on this and found an interesting link:
http://jussina.puheenvuoro.uusisuomi.fi ... an-suomeen
amateur wrote: I don't know if there was any "regular" planning, but Soviet Gen. Staff definitely had prepared specific invasion plans against Baltic countries (that were not in any way connected to the potential armed conflict with Germany), which would have been carried out if the governments would not have agreed on the Soviet demands on military bases.
That means apparently that no plan existed on a district level before 26.09, in other words these were imporvised preparation and very hasty ones. I'm not sure that any "consideration"-type plan existed on the General Staff level.
Philip S. Walker wrote:1. Sometime during the summer of 1940 the political leadership in Moscow asked for a plan to be made concerning a Soviet grand attack on two fronts: east and west (i.e. Japan and Germany).
2. The plan was worked out and presented on an unknown date, presumably August 16.
3. The plan was turned down and revised, and a memorandum from the new version was signed September 18th and presented to the political leaders.
4. On the same day three single plans for isolated attacks on Finland, Romania and Turkey were also presented.
5. Shortly after a meeting between Meretskov, Stalin and Molotov on October 5th the major plan and the three smaller plans were all accepted.
6. On November 25th the Leningrad military district was ordered to work out a plan concerning troop deployment in connection with an attack on Finland.
The plan, codenamed SZ-20, was finished as ordered on February 15th 1941.
"Attack" is not the most correct word in this context. Officially it was known as a plan for strategical deployment of the USSR's armed forces in the East and West.
"Finnish" plan based on later events was accepted as well
The part pertaining to the North-West Front.
As Vaslievsky himself noted war against Finland alone was considered of little probability, the case of joint actions of Finland and Germany was the most realistic, hence the principal character of the plan 1).
Philip S. Walker wrote:Are you saying that the "Finnish" plan was accepted on a later date than the major plan?
Does that mean that the order given to the Leningrad military district was not in relation to the plan for an isolated attack on Finland, but in relation to the general plan?
Philip S. Walker wrote:As Vaslievsky himself noted war against Finland alone was considered of little probability, the case of joint actions of Finland and Germany was the most realistic, hence the principal character of the plan 1).
Care to elaborate a bit on this?
Deployment at our north-west borders.
Regardless of decision on deployment in the West, strategic deployment at our north-west borders must be subordinate first of all to defense of Leningrad, protection of the Murmansk Railroad and retention of our full control on the Finnish Gulf. Reliable protection of Leningrad is the main task in the North. Leningrad must be firmly held by us in all possible conditions.
It is of little probability that Finland would enter the war alone, the most probable case is Finland and Germany simultaneously participating in war.
Taking into account the ratio of forces given above, our actions in the North-West must be in general limited to active defense of our borders.
Does it make any practical difference? I mean, doesn't the very way the forces are deployed indicate that we are dealing with an offensive plan?
Finland Teetered on Knife's Edge in the Winter of 1941
Soviet academic's diaries talk of Finland's rapid takeover as a real project
Weighty information about Finland from 70 years ago were recently published in Russia. The Moscow newspaper Vlastj recently cited the diaries of a distinguished scientist, Soviet academic Vladimir Vernadsky, from the winter of 1941, time before the Continuation War.
On 7 February 1941 Vernadsky wrote up the information he had heard from a colleague scientist: "Boris Leonidovich (Litschkov) told, that instead of Samarkand he was offered Petrozhavodsk, where it is intended to found a great Russian university. 'Great' amount of money will be invested in it. It was hinted that he will be in Petrozhavodsk only temporarily -- later on he will be moved to Gelsingfors. Rumors are diffusing from party circles to general society about a takeover [zanyatie] of Finland, which clearly have a factual basis." The name "Gelsingfors", originating from the Czarist times, meant Helsinki.
But is the information itself credible? Was Finland threatened by a "zanyatie"? "There was this kind of thinking in Kremlin's top level at the turn of 1940/41, but soon enthusiasm for occupation was replaced by the concern how to separate Finland from Germany's tow." reflected Professor of history Kimmo Rentola. According to Rentola the détente was also evident when the easily-angered ambassador at Helsinki, Ivan Zotov was replaced by the more moderate Pavel Orlov precisely in January 1941. "Still it's new information that talk about occupation really did diffuse from Kremlin so widely, even to university and scientist circles." Rentola says. "There's certain difference in what Stalin and Molotov plan among themselves, and what those below them are let to know."
In November 1940 Vyachechlav Molotov had visited in Berlin and persistently asked whether Finland still belonged to the Soviet sphere of interest. According to the August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact the Baltic States and eastern Poland were taken care of and only Finland's fate was unsolved. But Molotov didn't receive Hitler's permission to occupy Finland, which at the time was increasingly leaning towards Germany. Initially Stalin was outraged by the negative answer Molotov received. Most clearly Vernadsky's note suggests of Kremlin's bitter and angry bluster in late 1940. Professor of military history Ohto Manninen states that Vernadsky's information reflected a real military plan. Among other things Manninen mentions that he had seen military maps printed in the spring of 1941, which the Red Army had used to practice the imminent occupation of Finland.
Vernadsky was no ordinary crystal-gazer. In addition of being a recognized natural scientist and recipient of the 1943 Stalin Prize, he also was an advisor of the Soviet nuclear bomb program. His diaries from the years of 1935-41 have been published in Russian in two volumes in 2006. The Vlastj magazine that cited Vernadsky's diaries is a weekly supplement of the prestigious quality newspaper Kommersant. It's not an everyday phenomenon that historical information like this is published in such an emphasized way.
Weighty information ...
Initially Stalin was outraged by the negative answer Molotov received.
Most clearly Vernadsky's note suggests of Kremlin's bitter and angry bluster in late 1940.
Among other things Manninen mentions that he had seen military maps printed in the spring of 1941, which the Red Army had used to practice the imminent occupation of Finland.
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