Soviet Invasion Plans?

[amateur]

Philip Walker asked me to explain my post in the above-mentioned thread. First of all, let me draw your attention to the fact that the quotes of my text are from a quiz. So, it’s not an analysis but rather a short summary of what I have read from a book.

The book I was referring to has been written by a Russian historian Mark Solonin and you can read about it here http://www.solonin.org/en/book_june25. I do not know if it has ever been translated into English, otherwise my first recommendation to Phil would be to obtain that book - it's an interesting take on the reasons and backgrounds of the Continuation War.

So, I personally have not seen the entire document ("Considerations for Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Case of War with Finland"). In his book Mark Solonin has referred to the source: TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, t. 237, l. 138 - 156. If anybody can provide the full text of the document then that would clear things up.

However, Mark Solonin claims that the above mentioned report no 103203 was a separate plan to explain Soviet invasion plans to Finland in case of a war with Finland. He also mentions that the word "German" has not been used in that document and the invasion plan had no association whatsoever to possibility of the German troops' deployment in Finnish territory. Let me translate a couple of passages from Mark Solonin's book that describe the tone and wording of the plan:

"... The North-Western Front is to give a blow of its major forces to Mikkeli over Savonlinna and Heinola over Lappeenranta, passing [this way] fortifications that have been built in the Helsiniki direction. At the same time [the North-Western army is] to strike Helsinki via Viipuri and Sippola, crush the main forces of the Finnish army there and conquer Central-Finland. This operation is to be coordinated with an attack from Hanko peninsula to Helsinki and the activities of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet in the Finnish Gulf..."

According to the plan four armies were to be used to carry out the plan. They had the following tasks:

"...
- 7th Army (headquartered in Suojärvi) - to give a blow in direction of Joensuu and conquer Kuopio district. Afterwards be ready to act in the direction of Jyväskylä.
- 22nd Army (headquartered in Käkisalmi, forces deployed in the North-Western bank of the lake Ladoga) - to take Mikkeli with offensive over Savonlinna. Afterwards to be ready to act according to the situation either with the 23rd Army in the direction of Heinola or the 7th Army towards Jyväskylä and further towards Tampere.
- 23rd Army (headquartered in Karisalmi, 30 km North-West from Viipuri) - to give a strike and conquer Heinola over Laapeenranta.
- 20th Army (headquartered in Viipuri) - to break through enemy's fortification and reach Kuopio - Kotka line. Afterwards to give a stike to Helsinki together with the forces of the 23rd Army and the advancing units from the Hanko peninsula."

Well, a lot of details... We know that Soviet Union had detailed offinsive plans for invasion into the Baltic countries. Why do you question the existence of the invasion plan to Finland, the country that Soviet Union just recently had had an armed conflict? But again, I am just referring to a book.

[Art]

We know that Soviet Union had detailed offinsive plans for invasion into the Baltic countries.

Nope, before 1939 they were concenred in the regular military planning only as possible allies of Germany. The same applies to Finland. From September 1939 to the summer of 1940 there were no regular planning in the Soviet General Staff, at least nothing is known of it.

So, I personally have not seen the entire document ("Considerations for Deployment of the Armed Forces of the USSR in Case of War with Finland"). In his book Mark Solonin has referred to the source: TsAMO, f. 16, op. 2951, t. 237, l. 138 - 156. If anybody can provide the full text of the document then that would clear things up.

I gave the link to the publication, see the previous messages.
As concerns planning itself, as I've allready explained in the other thread, there were several General Staff's case plans:
1) the principal plan of deployment against Germany and her allies in the West and Japan in the East, 2) secondary or partial plans of deployment against a) Finland, b) Romania, c) Turkey alone. As Vaslievsky himself noted war againt Finland alone was considered of little probability, the case of joint actions of Finland and Germany was the most realistic, hence the principal character of the plan 1).

[amateur]

Nope, before 1939 they were concenred in the regular military planning only as possible allies of Germany. The same applies to Finland. From September 1939 to the summer of 1940 there were no regular planning in the Soviet General Staff, at least nothing is known of it.

Art, I agree with you about the period prior to 1939. But I have to at least partly disagree about 1939, more specifically late September of 1939. I don't know if there was any "regular" planning, but Soviet Gen. Staff definitely had prepared specific invasion plans against Baltic countries (that were not in any way connected to the potential armed conflict with Germany), which would have been carried out if the governments would not have agreed on the Soviet demands on military bases.

I am quite busy at work right now, but will return to the discussion and provide some research info with sources showing that in the end of September 1939 Leningrad Military District had offensive plans ready and approved by Meretskov concerning Estonia and Latvia (in case they would intervene) at least on the operational level.

[Juha Tompuri]

Who is "J. Putkonen"?

I'm sure that you know who is J . Putkonen.

So I have to ask again.

Do you happen to mean Juhani Putkinen?

I have been surfing a bit on this and found an interesting link:
http://jussina.puheenvuoro.uusisuomi.fi ... an-suomeen

If so, not very impressing, I must say.

Regards, Juha

[Art]

I don't know if there was any "regular" planning, but Soviet Gen. Staff definitely had prepared specific invasion plans against Baltic countries (that were not in any way connected to the potential armed conflict with Germany), which would have been carried out if the governments would not have agreed on the Soviet demands on military bases.

Regular planning is a long-term planning performed in the piece-time or before the actual political crisis. To give an example the Russian Empire entered WWI having war plans approved in 1912 and 1913. As concerns Septmeber 1939 Meretzkov recieved a directive prescribing concentration of forces on the Estonian and Latvian border on 26 September, the same directive defined his taks in case of war and ordered to prepare a plan of operations by 27 (that is from Meltykhov). That means apparently that no plan existed on a district level before 26.09, in other words these were imporvised preparation and very hasty ones. I'm not sure that any "consideration"-type plan existed on the General Staff level.

[amateur]

That means apparently that no plan existed on a district level before 26.09, in other words these were imporvised preparation and very hasty ones. I'm not sure that any "consideration"-type plan existed on the General Staff level.

OK. I can agree with that. Hope you agree that the operational plans made in the end of September 1939, hasty or not, had no connection whatsoever with Estonia or Latvia being potential ally of Germany.

[Philip S. Walker]

I’m still struggling to get an absolutely clear image of the history behind the Soviet plan for an attack on Finland. There seems to be some inconsistencies between the sources, so I’m trying out this compromise whilst keeping the inconsistent namedropping to a minimum:

1. Sometime during the summer of 1940 the political leadership in Moscow asked for a plan to be made concerning a Soviet grand attack on two fronts: east and west (i.e. Japan and Germany).

2. The plan was worked out and presented on an unknown date, presumably August 16.

3. The plan was turned down and revised, and a memorandum from the new version was signed September 18th and presented to the political leaders.

4. On the same day three single plans for isolated attacks on Finland, Romania and Turkey were also presented.

5. Shortly after a meeting between Meretskov, Stalin and Molotov on October 5th the major plan and the three smaller plans were all accepted.

6. On November 25th the Leningrad military district was ordered to work out a plan concerning troop deployment in connection with an attack on Finland. The plan, codenamed SZ-20, was finished as ordered on February 15th 1941.

7. From there on we have no further information on any development of this plan. Presumably it lost its relevance because of Hitler's threat during his meeting Molotov in November 1940 that a major war would break our between Germany and the USSR if the latter made an attack on Finland.

Please correct me if (or rather where) I’ve got it wrong.

[Art]

1. Sometime during the summer of 1940 the political leadership in Moscow asked for a plan to be made concerning a Soviet grand attack on two fronts: east and west (i.e. Japan and Germany).

"Attack" is not the most correct word in this context. Officially it was known as a plan for strategical deployment of the USSR's armed forces in the East and West. It was a substitute an earlier plan of 1938.

2. The plan was worked out and presented on an unknown date, presumably August 16.

There is no date on the document. It was written before Shaposhnikov was relieved of his duties, i.e. 19 August 1940. An official source talks about July, though it doesn't make clear what it is based on.

3. The plan was turned down and revised, and a memorandum from the new version was signed September 18th and presented to the political leaders.

Apparently it was actually presented on a meeting in Kremlin in 5 October 1940. The word "submitted" doesn't mean that it was sent by mail, of course. The document existed in one copy, which was normally kept in the General Staff.

4. On the same day three single plans for isolated attacks on Finland, Romania and Turkey were also presented.

"Finnish" plan has a date 18 September on it, don't know about the rest even their exact content.

5. Shortly after a meeting between Meretskov, Stalin and Molotov on October 5th the major plan and the three smaller plans were all accepted.

After 5 October Timoshenko and Meretskov wrote a memorandum asking to accept all above-mentioned plans. The consensus in the historiography is that the "large" plan was accepted. "Finnish" plan based on later events was accepted as well, don't know about the other two.

6. On November 25th the Leningrad military district was ordered to work out a plan concerning troop deployment in connection with an attack on Finland.

The part pertaining to the North-West Front.

The plan, codenamed SZ-20, was finished as ordered on February 15th 1941.

It was ordered to be finished on 15 February. Nobody have published or described a completed plan, though.

[Philip S. Walker]

@Art

Thanks. I was hoping for a reply from you! I have a few more dumb questions, of course ...

"Attack" is not the most correct word in this context. Officially it was known as a plan for strategical deployment of the USSR's armed forces in the East and West.

Does it make any practical difference? I mean, doesn't the very way the forces are deployed indicate that we are dealing with an offensive plan?

"Finnish" plan based on later events was accepted as well

Are you saying that the "Finnish" plan was accepted on a later date than the major plan?

The part pertaining to the North-West Front.

Does that mean that the order given to the Leningrad military district was not in relation to the plan for an isolated attack on Finland, but in relation to the general plan?

And finally this, from one of your previous posts:

As Vaslievsky himself noted war against Finland alone was considered of little probability, the case of joint actions of Finland and Germany was the most realistic, hence the principal character of the plan 1).

Care to elaborate a bit on this?

[Art]

Are you saying that the "Finnish" plan was accepted on a later date than the major plan?

The Leningrad MO was ordered to start developing a plan in general repeating the plan described in the "Finnish" memorandum of 18.09.40. Which leads to the conclusion that this memorandum was approved in principle, although with possible amendments. That is what I mean.

Does that mean that the order given to the Leningrad military district was not in relation to the plan for an isolated attack on Finland, but in relation to the general plan?

The memorandum of 18.09 contemplated having two fronts deployed against Finland: North-West Front (HQ from the Leningrad Military District) and North Front (HQ from the Arkhangelsk Military District). The directive of 25 November 1940 outlined the task of the North-West Front and prescribed the Leningrad MD Staff to prepare various documents on its planned actions and submit them to the General Staff. The North Front and its plan wasn't their business.
I will answer the rest questions later.

[Philip S. Walker]

I will answer the rest questions later.

Please don't forget your promise. P

[Art]

As Vaslievsky himself noted war against Finland alone was considered of little probability, the case of joint actions of Finland and Germany was the most realistic, hence the principal character of the plan 1).

Care to elaborate a bit on this?

Here is a quote from "Considerations on strategic deployment in the West and East:

Deployment at our north-west borders.
Regardless of decision on deployment in the West, strategic deployment at our north-west borders must be subordinate first of all to defense of Leningrad, protection of the Murmansk Railroad and retention of our full control on the Finnish Gulf. Reliable protection of Leningrad is the main task in the North. Leningrad must be firmly held by us in all possible conditions.
It is of little probability that Finland would enter the war alone, the most probable case is Finland and Germany simultaneously participating in war.
Taking into account the ratio of forces given above, our actions in the North-West must be in general limited to active defense of our borders.

Then go the tasks of armies. In case of large war Finnish theater was considered to be secondary, only forces stationed in the peace-time in the Leningrad Military District would be deployed there. Hence the tasks were mainly defensive as opposed to the "Finnish" plans.

Does it make any practical difference? I mean, doesn't the very way the forces are deployed indicate that we are dealing with an offensive plan?

Attack as a military term is applied to tactical formations, as a political one it alludes to decision to start war, which doesn't really follow from the fact of military planning. But, yes, the Soviet plan was of offensive character: it was proposed to defeat the main forces of the German Army and and those portion of the Japanese Army deployed in Manchuria, before it could be reinforced with forces from other theaters.

[Mikko H.]

Today's Helsingin Sanomat newspaper published the following interesting news item by Veli-Pekka Leppänen in page C2 (my translation):

Finland Teetered on Knife's Edge in the Winter of 1941
Soviet academic's diaries talk of Finland's rapid takeover as a real project

Weighty information about Finland from 70 years ago were recently published in Russia. The Moscow newspaper Vlastj recently cited the diaries of a distinguished scientist, Soviet academic Vladimir Vernadsky, from the winter of 1941, time before the Continuation War.

On 7 February 1941 Vernadsky wrote up the information he had heard from a colleague scientist: "Boris Leonidovich (Litschkov) told, that instead of Samarkand he was offered Petrozhavodsk, where it is intended to found a great Russian university. 'Great' amount of money will be invested in it. It was hinted that he will be in Petrozhavodsk only temporarily -- later on he will be moved to Gelsingfors. Rumors are diffusing from party circles to general society about a takeover [zanyatie] of Finland, which clearly have a factual basis." The name "Gelsingfors", originating from the Czarist times, meant Helsinki.

But is the information itself credible? Was Finland threatened by a "zanyatie"? "There was this kind of thinking in Kremlin's top level at the turn of 1940/41, but soon enthusiasm for occupation was replaced by the concern how to separate Finland from Germany's tow." reflected Professor of history Kimmo Rentola. According to Rentola the détente was also evident when the easily-angered ambassador at Helsinki, Ivan Zotov was replaced by the more moderate Pavel Orlov precisely in January 1941. "Still it's new information that talk about occupation really did diffuse from Kremlin so widely, even to university and scientist circles." Rentola says. "There's certain difference in what Stalin and Molotov plan among themselves, and what those below them are let to know."

In November 1940 Vyachechlav Molotov had visited in Berlin and persistently asked whether Finland still belonged to the Soviet sphere of interest. According to the August 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact the Baltic States and eastern Poland were taken care of and only Finland's fate was unsolved. But Molotov didn't receive Hitler's permission to occupy Finland, which at the time was increasingly leaning towards Germany. Initially Stalin was outraged by the negative answer Molotov received. Most clearly Vernadsky's note suggests of Kremlin's bitter and angry bluster in late 1940. Professor of military history Ohto Manninen states that Vernadsky's information reflected a real military plan. Among other things Manninen mentions that he had seen military maps printed in the spring of 1941, which the Red Army had used to practice the imminent occupation of Finland.

Vernadsky was no ordinary crystal-gazer. In addition of being a recognized natural scientist and recipient of the 1943 Stalin Prize, he also was an advisor of the Soviet nuclear bomb program. His diaries from the years of 1935-41 have been published in Russian in two volumes in 2006. The Vlastj magazine that cited Vernadsky's diaries is a weekly supplement of the prestigious quality newspaper Kommersant. It's not an everyday phenomenon that historical information like this is published in such an emphasized way.

[Philip S. Walker]

Weighty information ...

Yes, very weighty. According to a Russian-into-Finnish translation of an article in a Moscow newspaper, a "distinguished" scientist wrote in his diary in February 1941 that a collegue had told him he had received a hint that his future position at a yet-to-be-build university in a small town in remote East Karealia would only be temporary, and that he would be moved instead to Helsinki.

Can only be taken as solid proof Stalin was intending soon to invade Finland!

However, there must be something wrong, says a Finnish professor of history, because the fact that a Russian ambassador was replaced by a more moderate person in "precisely January 1941" is clearly evidence that Molotov and Stalin's "enthusiasm" for an invasion of Finland was deterred more than two months earlier during a secret meeting between Molotov and Hitler.

And from where do we know this? Well, Molotov said something at that meeting that was translated into German, interpreted by a stenographer, whose resume was badly and erroneously translated into English and, more recently, filled with misleading underlinings and headlines by some mysterious website in the US. Funnily enough, if we look at the Russian resume from that same meeting, taken straight from Molotov's lips, he says nothing of the kind - he's just asking why on Earth there are suddenly German soldiers on Finnish soil.

Initially Stalin was outraged by the negative answer Molotov received.

No, he was outraged that Germany was intending to invade Russia, partly via Finland, as Hitler's reaction to Molotov's questions had clearly shown.

Most clearly Vernadsky's note suggests of Kremlin's bitter and angry bluster in late 1940.

Oh yes, very clearly. No other explanation is possible there either, because Vernadsky was a highly regarded scientist. Such people are endowed with a wonderful ability to only hear rumours that are true. This one is even more trustworthy, because he cooperated in the Soviet nuclear bomb program. A better man you will not find.

Among other things Manninen mentions that he had seen military maps printed in the spring of 1941, which the Red Army had used to practice the imminent occupation of Finland.

Perhaps the history professor would like to "mention" to the world a little bit more about this, because it's sounds to me like pretty groundbreaking stuff. Then again, who could blame the Soviets for wanting to invade Finland at his time, since a German attack was very soon going to be launched from there with the help of the Finns.

To be honest, I think enough was happening during 1940/41 to justify a serious worry in Finland for a Soviet attack. The fact that there are no factual evidence of any serious threat doesn't change that, so why these blatantly manipulative attempts to "prove" otherwise?

[Mika68*]

Is the main thing that Soviet tried occupy Finland 1939-40 and Germany didn't give another chance? I think, that is the main thinking when we want understand right situation between Finland and SU 1940-41.