Finnish war goals

[Anne G,]

@

Ryti's early remark in his diary shows that he didn't think that it would be bad if Germany would weaken - if only it would at first beat the USSR.

It would be helpful if you could give us an exact quote with a reference.

"Germany is the only state that currently is able to defeat Russia, or at least greatly weaken, or perhaps to the detriment of the world, even in the play of Germany would be weakened." Risto Ryti's diary on 9th June 1941 (Ohto Manninen and Kauko Rumpunen have edited the diaries: "Käymme omaa erillistä sotaamme". Risto Rytin päiväkirjat 1940-1944. Edita 2006, p. 96.)

[peeved]

"Germany is the only state that currently is able to defeat Russia, or at least greatly weaken, or perhaps to the detriment of the world, even in the play of Germany would be weakened." Risto Ryti's diary on 9th June 1941 (Ohto Manninen and Kauko Rumpunen have edited the diaries: "Käymme omaa erillistä sotaamme". Risto Rytin päiväkirjat 1940-1944. Edita 2006, p. 96.)

IMO there should be a negative more in the middle of that sentence or something like
"Germany is the only state that currently is able to defeat Russia or at least considerably weaken it, and it probably is not to the detriment of the world even if Germany would be weakened in play."

Markus

[Anne G,]

Likewise, a Finland more independent of Germany would not have been cut off from Swedish supplies in the way it happened due to Allied pressure on the Swedish leaders,

This is pure fantasy, considering what happened already in the spring 1940.

Juhani Aunesluoma tells in Paperipatruunat. Metsäteollisuus sodassa ja jälleenrakennuksessa 1939-1950. (Papers bosses. The forest industry in war and reconstruction) by Juhana Aunesluoma. Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura, 2007):
At the end of March 1940, President Ryti sent a message to Britain, where the hoped for a commercial agreement. The Finnish forest industry was completely dependent on exports, particularly to Britain, so it was important to get the protection of the Royal Navy protection. Money from exports would have strengthened the Finnish economy in the conditions of a prolonged world war as well as made possible to develop military readiness and arms.
At the same time, this meant abandoning neutrality and sided Britain in World War II.
However, the Finnish hopes were crushed when Germany invaded Denmark and Norway. In the spring of 1940, Finland was left blocked in the Baltic, commercially and strategically at the mercy of Germany and the Soviet Union.
Essential goods were able to bring with difficulty along the route to Pechenga, but the British still tightened the embargo, thereby reducing the importance of the trade. In the autumn 1941 Ryti appealed to England, that it would foreclose the Finnish commercial from England, and that “in negotiations with the Russia, it would not sacrifice Finland”.
Only one cargo of paper was shipped to Manchester in June 1940. Britain gave reluctant sailing permits, fearing that the goods that were sold to Nordic countries would be seized in the end Germany.
The Finnish government hurried to make conclusions. The course was changed towards Stockholm and Berlin. However, the Swedes (nor the Soviets) didn’t want to buy the products of the Finnish forest industry as they those themselves enough.
That left Germany that was also an only one who could sell food that Finland, after losing Karelia, desperately needed.
The Finnish forest industry was traditionally Anglophile as Britain was, besides the greatest customer after Finland became independent, a supporter of free trade, whereas the Finns industrialists had very bad memories of Germany’s colonialist tendencies in 1918. But as Germany was only possible buyer, the former Anglophile leaders were set aside.
The trade negotiations in June 1940 were a success. Germany expressed its readiness to buy paper products in significant quantities.
In the same time, the Finns got the first though informal messages that the attitude of Germany had changed. The Nazis in high positions even hinted that the USSR was despite all the most important enemy of Germany – its turn would come after the fall of Britain.
In the longer perspective, however, the Finns didn’t like the German economic views as Finland’s economic success depended on free trade which was anathema to Germany.

[Anne G,]

"Germany is the only state that currently is able to defeat Russia, or at least greatly weaken, or perhaps to the detriment of the world, even in the play of Germany would be weakened." Risto Ryti's diary on 9th June 1941 (Ohto Manninen and Kauko Rumpunen have edited the diaries: "Käymme omaa erillistä sotaamme". Risto Rytin päiväkirjat 1940-1944. Edita 2006, p. 96.)

IMO there should be a negative more in the middle of that sentence or something like
"Germany is the only state that currently is able to defeat Russia or at least considerably weaken it, and it probably is not to the detriment of the world even if Germany would be weakened in play."

Markus

Yes, thank you. I put too much trust in Google.

Otherwise, Ryti seems to be quite enthusiatic to make scenarios of Greater Finland. Luckily Tanner had a cooker head.

[Anne G,]

In any case, Paasikivi and Mannerheim before the Winter War were only trying to save thousands of Finnish lives when they suggested more leniency.

Mannerheim never uttered that he had such a motive, in this or any connection. On the contrary, he despised the Czechs who had surrendered without fighting (he had an old grudge against them from the Russian civil war).. Also Paasikivi said: "We are no Czechs."

They tried to act intelligently with a humanistic scope, while the people who were sent to the front acted on instincts. To put these two approaches up against each other in a monochrome comparison is a dangerous act, in my weak and wimpy opinion.

Not at all, Rintala only follows Tolstoy (War and Peace) in that acts of "great men" are greatly overvalued and the those of common men are undervalued.

Besides, Mannerheim was too pessimistic believing that Finland would last two or three weeks. More still, he spoke of this to the British, and Stalin got to know of this by his spies. Luckily his soldiers didn't.

And though Mannerheim had practically alone made a decision about peace in 1944, afterward he thought that Finland was lost, but the common soldiers built houses and made babies in record-time, so they had a strong faith in the future.

As for Paasikivi, remember that Rintala wrote in 1989 when the Finns had over decades been taught by Presidents Paasikivi, Kekkonen and Koivisto that there is no moral in the world - it was the result of this lesson Rintala abhorred. BTV, Kekkonen learned the methods of dealing with the great power from his friend Hillilä who dealt with the Germans in Lapland and he used them with the Soviets.

[Seppo Koivisto]

Natalia Lebedeva, a senior researcher at the Russian Academy of Sciences, has stated that the Katyn massacre was was moved ahead to make room for Finnish and Baltic prisoners.

Russian historians also can erroneous conclusions.
Аlready to 30.11.39 for the Finnish POW of war were prepared four camps: Yuzhskiy, Potma, Gryazovets and Putvil. These of camp could contain 17,5 thousand people.
As the reserve were prepared 3 additional camps - Tayshet, Karaganda and Velikiy Ustyug. (additional 15 thousand places). Taking into account deportation points already on 30.11.1939 finished of camp could place 36 thousand prisoners of war of Finns.
Galitskiy V. P. Finnish POW in the camp of NKVD. – Moscow, 1997, p. 29
I think you you know that these of camp remained empty. Why then to free still camp under the Finnish POW of war, if already at the beginning March it was obvious that no other prisoners of war it will be?

Head of the special section of Ostashkov POW camp, 2nd Lt. Grigory Korytov wrote in his report: "But it is rumored that in March we must basically clear out the camps and prepare to receive the Finns."

Here the main word of "rumors"

Korytov probably heard that "rumors" at the meeting in Moscow. NKVD executed 22 000 Polish POWs after the failure to educate them to the Soviet system. After that experience Finnish officers and other bourgeois elements would probably be executed right away. By NKVD standars this extermination would not be very large scale.

[Philip S. Walker]

@Anne G

Thanks for some splendid information (as always), but I can't really see where you and I are supposed to disagree so much. I just meant that if Finland hadn't been so involved with Germany, the British would not have had reason put so much pressure on the Swedes to cut off export and help to Finland. At the same time, Finland might still have been able to maintain imports and help from Denmark also, which the Danes would have been more than happy to supply. That takes the whole foodstuffs issue out of the argument when we discuss neutrality as an option to German cooperation.

It seems to me that this view is supported by the fact that the Finnish leaders wanted and worked to establish a union with Sweden as an alternative to cooperation with Germany, and they seem to have felt this was a viable option.

The British reluctance to help Finland even before the Finnish-German cooperation sounds to me more like a security problem for the Royal Navy at an extremely difficult time than an deliberate attempt to cut Finland off.

With regard to Mannerheim's motives for trying to prevent the Winter War, I'm sure he was trying to save lives. The fact he didn't want to just let the Soviets in hardly contradicts that. He wasn't trying to save lives at any cost, just where it wasn't necessary to save Finland's independence and honour (I don't know how much honour meant to Mannerhiem, but it would be interesting to know that also if you have an opinion on it). If the Soviets would have accepted Jussarö etc. as an alternative to Hangö, it really opens up a whole new door into the Soviet motives with regard to Finland at this time and strongly reduces our suspicion of aggressive plans.

Or have I got it all wrong?

Regards Vely

[Art]

It is very interesting… It would be interesting to know, from where the respected Major General took this information.

The part about deportations was apparently from based the Simonov's interview with Isakov (strangely enough I can't find this part online), although why it is called a decision is clouded with mystery.

[Anne G,]

I can't really see where you and I are supposed to disagree so much. I just meant that if Finland hadn't been so involved with Germany, the British would not have had reason put so much pressure on the Swedes to cut off export and help to Finland. At the same time, Finland might still have been able to maintain imports and help from Denmark also, which the Danes would have been more than happy to supply. That takes the whole foodstuffs issue out of the argument when we discuss neutrality as an option to German cooperation.

As I said, it was just the other way: the British stopped already in the spring 1940 to buy Finnish products of forests, and after that Finland got involved with Germany. Even before military connections, there was commercial ones.

The second point was, that in order to buy anything, be it food or arms, Finland had at first to sell products of forests, as they were practically only items it could sell. But Seden had those as well as the USSR. So the only buyer was Germany.

I also tried to explain what "Anglophile" meant: not only general admiration of British and democratic values etc. but first of all common interests (free trade). When these common interests were no more, the paper bosses looked for buyers elsewhere.

On the other hand, these common interest (Britain needed Finnish paper) got Britain in the summer 1944 to pressure the USSR, so that the latter made the war reparations lesser and they consisted more of products of metall industry, so that Finland could sell paper to Britain.

Considering the attitudes of great powers in general (if they do something, they do it because it is for their interests, not for someone's blue eyes), I don't believe that Britain would done anyt more even if Finland had acted otherwise. After all, it didn't help Poland, its own ally.

The British reluctance to help Finland even before the Finnish-German cooperation sounds to me more like a security problem for the Royal Navy at an extremely difficult time than an deliberate attempt to cut Finland off.

That's of course true, but to Finland it made no difference. After fall of Denmark and Norway, no help could be got from Britain.

With regard to Mannerheim's motives for trying to prevent the Winter War, I'm sure he was trying to save lives. The fact he didn't want to just let the Soviets in hardly contradicts that. He wasn't trying to save lives at any cost, just where it wasn't necessary to save Finland's independence and honour (I don't know how much honour meant to Mannerhiem, but it would be interesting to know that also if you have an opinion on it). If the Soviets would have accepted Jussarö etc. as an alternative to Hangö, it really opens up a whole new door into the Soviet motives with regard to Finland at this time and strongly reduces our suspicion of aggressive plans.

Mannerheim certainly spoke of honor and it is the reason why he so despised Czechs (because the deeds of the Czech legion in the Russian civil war). Yet, honor never prevented Mannerheim from doing anything he deemed necessary,

The reason why he was for conceessions was to gain time, in order to get ready to the war in the future (he was certain it would come). Now, if this scenario had come true, say in 1940, Finland's position wouldn't have been stronger but weaker as later there was no possinle threat from the help outside.

As for Jussarö, it is of course true that it wouldn't have been as dangerous to Finland as Hangö from where one could threaten Helsinki. All the same, the Soviet naval blockade across the Gulf of Finland would have meant the end of the Finnish neutrality. And with neutrality was then meant also the identity as a Nordic country,

[John Hilly]

If the Soviets would have accepted Jussarö etc. as an alternative to Hangö, it really opens up a whole new door into the Soviet motives with regard to Finland at this time and strongly reduces our suspicion of aggressive plans.

"Tannerin kirjasta käy selville neuvottelujen vaikeus Moskovassa, kun Stalin vaati alueluovutuksia. Yhtäkkiä kuitenkin vaatimukset lievenivät. Hanko vaihtui muutaman saaren luovutukseen jne. Valtuuskunnalla Moskovassa vain ei ollut valtuuksia asioista sopia."

"Tanner's book reveals the difficultness of the negotiations in Moscow, when Stalin demanded territorial concessions. Suddenly, however, demands became milder. Hanko changed to concession of some islands etc. But the delegation in Moscow just hadn't mandate to settle the matters."
Source: Väinö Tanner: Olin ulkoministerinä talvisodan aikana, Tammi 1951.
From: http://www.kotiaine.com/getessay120.html

History: http://www.hangonrintama.fi/SUOMI/Historia.html

Greets
Juha-Pekka

[Philip S. Walker]

@Anne G

As I said, it was just the other way: the British stopped already in the spring 1940 to buy Finnish products of forests, and after that Finland got involved with Germany. Even before military connections, there was commercial ones.

I was merely trying to make a point about the way the British were blocking Swedish help to Finland later on. This only happened because Finland had teamed up with the Germans. Without that cooperation, help from Sweden would not have been blocked. That was my only point.

The second point was, that in order to buy anything, be it food or arms, Finland had at first to sell products of forests, as they were practically only items it could sell. But Seden had those as well as the USSR. So the only buyer was Germany.

If this is so completely crucial, then how can a military union with Sweden have been a viable alternative to cooperation with Germany?

I also tried to explain what "Anglophile" meant: not only general admiration of British and democratic values etc. but first of all common interests (free trade). When these common interests were no more, the paper bosses looked for buyers elsewhere.

Good that you clear this up, because I was mystified. This looks to me like one of several crucial examples where we have encountered a word which looks the same in Finnish and English, but in fact has very different meanings. An Anglophile, in the English sense of the word, feels a deep emotional attachment to British culture. In this historical period, it will often mean he is prepared to fight and even die for it. In Denmark such people were spearheads of the Resistance Movements, people like John Christmas Møller (former Conservative Party leader who escaped to England and became head of the Danish department at the BBC, his son died in battle as a British officer), Colonel Svend Bartholin Palludan-Müller (head of the Border Gendarmes in Southern Jutland and translator of Shelly into Danish; he died after a 3 1/2 hour one man combat against the Gestapo at his home - they never got him until they burned his house down to the ground), Peter de Hemmer Gudme (reporter, author, Lieutenant in the White Finnish Army during the Civil War, Egyptologist, translator of T.E. Lawrence into Danish, also a devoted "Finno-phile" who went to great lengths to defend Finland's stance in the Continuation War, one of the leading members of the illegal "Freedom Council" for the Resistance in Denmark, committed suicide between two Gestapo torture interrogations at the Shell-House in central Copenhagen); and of course the Danish sailor Anders Lassen, who became a major in the British army; he died in battle and was the only non-British citizen to receive the Victoria Cross during WWII (a commemorative plague for him hangs at the entrance of the British War Museum).

The reason why he was for concessions was to gain time, in order to get ready to the war in the future (he was certain it would come).

Sure. Still, what he suggested also gave a bigger possibility of avoiding a war altogether, which I'm sure he would have preferred even more.

As for Jussarö, it is of course true that it wouldn't have been as dangerous to Finland as Hangö from where one could threaten Helsinki.

If the Soviet Union had been willing to go for this, it completely changes our view of their plans for Finland. Then getting Hangö was not about gaining easy access to attack Helsinki, it was purely about protecting Leningrad.

All the same, the Soviet naval blockade across the Gulf of Finland would have meant the end of the Finnish neutrality. And with neutrality was then meant also the identity as a Nordic country

It would be understood what kind of pressure Finland was under. The country wasn't exactly known for its Soviet sympathies. But I agree it was a very unpleasant situation that might have lead to something worse.

Regards, Vely

[Vaeltaja]

If this is so, then how can a military union with Sweden have been a viable alternative to cooperation with Germany?

It would have allowed Finns only to take part in trading with Germany instead of further military co-operation - theoretically to do just like Swedes did.

If the Soviet Union had been willing to go for this, it completely changes our view of their plans for Finland. Then getting Hangö was not about gaining easy access to attack Helsinki, it was purely about protecting Leningrad.

Base at Jussarö would have still allowed Soviets full control of the sea east of Hanko including but certainly not limited to blockading all Finnish traffic past Jussarö (to Helsinki & Kotka as well blockading traffic to Hanko). It might not have been as beneficial for starting land invasion but it still would have been extremely useful in both blackmailing or threatening Finland as well as a potential forward base in an offensive against Finland. So not purely about protecting Leningrad. Getting islands (Lavansaari & Seiskari) in eastern Gulf of Finland would have been sufficient had the plan been just to protect Leningrad.

[Slon-76]

The part about deportations was apparently from based the Simonov's interview with Isakov (strangely enough I can't find this part online), although why it is called a decision is clouded with mystery.

Thanks. Although I did not also find conversations about the deportation of Finns in the interview with Isakov on-line. Well then are now intelligible the sources of all Aatolainen's "three points". In essence this of different kind conversations and the distorted interpretation of Stalin's words.

Korytov probably heard that "rumors" at the meeting in Moscow.

Rumors - this is rumors. About what Finnish POW they could speak in March 1940? From where prisoners could undertake in such quantity, which the already existing 36 thousand places was little? Why to plan the destruction of the prisoners, who are not?
In any event, to build this scale conclusions on THE ONLY phrase of small prison chief - this is not serious.
And all the more, relying on certain of "the NKVD standards".

[Seppo Koivisto]

I was merely trying to make a point about the way the British were blocking Swedish help to Finland later on. This only happened because Finland had teamed up with the Germans. Without that cooperation, help from Sweden would not have been blocked. That was my only point.

Britain blocked Swedish help to Finland, but allowed exports to Germany? I think it was more Sweden´s own choice, trade with Germany was too lucrative, but otherwise they did not want to endanger oil imports.

[Slon-76]

All the same, the Soviet naval blockade across the Gulf of Finland would have meant the end of the Finnish neutrality.

I do very frequently hear this argument, but I cannot understand: WHY?