Finnish war goals

[John Hilly]

I do very frequently hear this argument, but I cannot understand: WHY?

Rights and responsibilities of a neutral power

Belligerents may not invade neutral territory,[3] and a neutral power's resisting any such attempt does not compromise its neutrality.[4]

A neutral power must intern belligerent troops who reach its territory,[5] but not escaped prisoners of war.[6] Belligerent armies may not recruit its citizens,[7] but they may go abroad to enlist.[8] Belligerent armies' men and material may not be transported across neutral territory,[9] but the wounded may be.[10] A neutral power may supply communication facilities to belligerents,[11] but not war material,[12] although it need not prevent export of such material.[13]

Belligerent naval vessels may use neutral ports for a maximum of 24 hours, though neutrals may impose different restrictions.[14] Exceptions are to make repairs — only the minimum necessary to put back to sea[15] — or if an opposing belligerent's vessel is already in port, in which case it must have a 24-hour head start.[16] A prize ship captured by a belligerent in the territorial waters of a neutral power must be surrendered by the belligerent to the neutral, which must intern its crew.[17]

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neutrality_%28international_relations%29
In Russian: http://bse.sci-lib.com/article080918.html

With best regards
Juha-Pekka

[Slon-76]

Belligerents may not invade neutral territory,[3] and a neutral power's resisting any such attempt does not compromise its neutrality.[4]...

a) of the USSR was not the belligerent
b) of the USSR proposed to Finland to design a stay of the Soviet troops on Hango or adjacent islands in the manner that this it will want Finland.

[Philip S. Walker]

It would have allowed Finns only to take part in trading with Germany instead of further military co-operation - theoretically to do just like Swedes did.

If Sweden could trade with Germany as a neutral country, then why couldn't Finland do the same? Or indeed, trade with Denmark. We're nice people and Nordic brothers, you could have paid us after the War - just like the Germans promised to and never did.

Base at Jussarö would have still allowed Soviets full control of the sea east of Hanko including but certainly not limited to blockading all Finnish traffic past Jussarö (to Helsinki & Kotka as well blockading traffic to Hanko). It might not have been as beneficial for starting land invasion but it still would have been extremely useful in both blackmailing or threatening Finland as well as a potential forward base in an offensive against Finland. So not purely about protecting Leningrad. Getting islands (Lavansaari & Seiskari) in eastern Gulf of Finland would have been sufficient had the plan been just to protect Leningrad.

I still think it changes our view of the Soviet motives considerably.

When you read Paasikivi's memoirs it seems that Stalin and Molotov are truly appalled that the Finns didn't accept their offers, which they considered to be minimal considering the position of Leningrad. It is also clear that they were quite negotiable. They felt this thing could and should have been solved amicably, and in return for what they got, they would give the Finns large areas of East Karelia, which the Finns loved so much. It feels as though these two crooks have suddenly decided to be a bit nice for a change, and what do they get in return? Mistrust and army division caught in motties and frozen to death. "We were willing to give you a good deal, but look at the mess you've got everyone into with your pigheaded stubbornness!" Yes, they seem genuinely appalled according to old Paasikivi.

Regards, Vely

[John Hilly]

Maybe this recent interesting conversation should be discussed in:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=55&t=177023&p=1592104#p1592104
and
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=59&t=178498&p=1595562#p1595562?

With respect
Juha-Pekka

[Vaeltaja]

a) of the USSR was not the belligerent
b) of the USSR proposed to Finland to design a stay of the Soviet troops on Hango or adjacent islands in the manner that this it will want Finland.

It was not really that part but it is further down in the list.. Had there become a war between USSR and Germany that definition of neutrality would have required Finns to intern the whole Soviet base and its personnel while not allowing any support ships to reach it. Either Finns could have allowed Soviets to travel there and therfore forfeit the neutrality or not allow it and attempt to intern the base which i doubt Kremlin would have looked too kindly upon.

If Sweden could trade with Germany as a neutral country, then why couldn't Finland do the same? Or indeed, trade with Denmark. We're nice people and Nordic brothers, you could have paid us after the War - just like the Germans promised to and never did.

Finland did trade with Germany as if it had been a neutral country. At least most of the time (exemption being the military assistance in June/July 1944). And Finns did trade a lot directly with Danes. However without protection from Sweden against Soviet aggressions that alone did not cut it, Finns in 1941 needed more than just trade partner and Soviets did not look kindly upon various attempts of forming Nordic Defence Union (name may vary).

I still think it changes our view of the Soviet motives considerably.

I doubt that very as do most of (amateur or not) historians familiar with the subject.

When you read Paasikivi's memoirs it seems that Stalin and Molotov are truly appalled that the Finns didn't accept their offers, which they considered to be minimal considering the position of Leningrad. It is also clear that they were quite negotiable. They felt this thing could and should have been solved amicably, and in return for what they got, they would give the Finns large areas of East Karelia, which the Finns loved so much.

Except by this time Soviets had already renegaded parts of Tartu peace treaty (Karelian autonomy, Ladoga passage) with the Finns and the known oppression or purges did not really help either. So why exactly should Finns have trusted the Soviets? Because they had betrayed their former agreements then the new ones would be kept?

And yes, further discussion might be better to be handled in those other threads.

[Art]

Thanks. Although I did not also find conversations about the deportation of Finns in the interview with Isakov on-line.

Yes, that surprised me as well, because I certainly remember that part in the paper version.

[Anne G,]

All the same, the Soviet naval blockade across the Gulf of Finland would have meant the end of the Finnish neutrality.

I do very frequently hear this argument, but I cannot understand: WHY?

Juhani Paasivirta writes (in Suomi ja Europppa 1939-1956 p. 36-37) "Stalin stressed the importance of providing certainty that in the future Finland should stand firmly in friendly relations with the Soviet Union". According to Paasivirta, the Soviet demands were an attempt to connect Finland with a common front with the Soviet Union.

This of course meant that Finland couldn't be neutral but had to be on the same side as the USSR in the coming war. (Obs! in 1939 it meant also on the side of two dictatorship against the Western democracies.)

[Slon-76]

It was not really that part but it is further down in the list.. Had there become a war between USSR and Germany that definition of neutrality would have required Finns to intern the whole Soviet base and its personnel while not allowing any support ships to reach it. Either Finns could have allowed Soviets to travel there and therfore forfeit the neutrality or not allow it and attempt to intern the base which i doubt Kremlin would have looked too kindly upon.

I am not strong in the juridical casuistry. But I assume that in the case of the beginning of American-Chinese war (for example), Japan will not intern American military bases in its territory.
I.e. I want to say that the conclusion of similar agreements between not the countries at war without the conclusion of the military alliances in neutral status possible is not reflected.
But if I not rights, then it is obvious that my point "b" speaks, that Stalin attempted to somehow regulate these fears of Finnish government. I.e. to make so that the Soviet troops formally would be found not on the Finnish territory.

[Slon-76]

Juhani Paasivirta writes (in Suomi ja Europppa 1939-1956 p. 36-37) "Stalin stressed the importance of providing certainty that in the future Finland should stand firmly in friendly relations with the Soviet Union". According to Paasivirta, the Soviet demands were an attempt to connect Finland with a common front with the Soviet Union.

This of course meant that Finland couldn't be neutral but had to be on the same side as the USSR in the coming war. (Obs! in 1939 it meant also on the side of two dictatorship against the Western democracies.)

I assume that before the winter war Finland was, first of all, interesting as the territory, which the enemies of the USSR can use. To venture complex diplomatic games for the attraction to its side of the country with 3,5 mln. population was too impractical.
It is obvious that for this reason Stalin easily related to the failure of Finnish side to conclude "the mutual aid agreement" and no longer it returned to this question. As «the friendship» Stalin, probably, assumed not the military alliance, but the nonparticipation of Finland in any anti-Soviet block.

[Anne G,]

Vilho Harle and Sami Moisio writes in Missä on Suomi? p. 150:

"Any compromise would have meant a Finnish alignment at the Soviet camp and this was knocked out (by the Finnish government) with reference to Finnish neutrality, but there was no question of neutrality, but that Finland identified itself with Sweden, Nordic countries, Scandinavia, Western Europe and generally the West."

I think Harle and Moisio go that far to dismiss neutrality (staying outside the war) only as a codeword, but they have a point: by accepting the Soviet Union Finland would be in the "wrong crowd" and loose, maybe for ever, the possibility to be regarded as a Scandinavian country, i.e. loose its identity that was still not certain after 21 years of independence.

Even Paasikivi writes of this:

"Culturally, socially, historically and generally in the ideals, view of world and 'life style', all this which to our nation and its individual members will make life worth living, we do not belong to the east, but the Nordic region ...We belong to the Nordic countries and the Nordic nations. The question is, how to get things to go so that we get to that circle and we will not remain here. This the main question of our policy....History of centuries has once and for all drawn the border and exceeding it will mean destruction to us."

[Anne G,]

I assume that before the winter war Finland was, first of all, interesting as the territory, which the enemies of the USSR can use. To venture complex diplomatic games for the attraction to its side of the country with 3,5 mln. population was too impractical.
It is obvious that for this reason Stalin easily related to the failure of Finnish side to conclude "the mutual aid agreement" and no longer it returned to this question. As «the friendship» Stalin, probably, assumed not the military alliance, but the nonparticipation of Finland in any anti-Soviet block.

But did Stalin really dismiss "the mutual aid agreement"? Or did he put it temporaly aside? If the former, he was an amateur which I don't believe.

Considering that the pact was earlier suggested by Jartsev and that it was reali´zed (though not as mutual) in 1948, it was one of Stalin's long-time objectives, not as itself but as a part of bigger picture.

Further, a pact or no, the tactics of the Red army was not to wait for the enemy on the Rajajoki (or where the frontier happened to be).

[Juha Tompuri]

Maybe this recent interesting conversation should be discussed in:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=55&t=177023&p=1592104#p1592104
and
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?f=59&t=178498&p=1595562#p1595562?

Yes, seems that while I was away, some members forgot the original issue.
Back to the Finnish war goals, please.

Regards, Juha

[John Hilly]

@ Juha
Could the posts in question be transferred by you?

Regards
Juha-Pekka

[Juha Tompuri]

Could the posts in question be transferred by you?

Yes, I'll might clean the thread later when I'll have time for it.
IF I find it worth doing it.

Regards, Juha

[Mika68*]

All the same, the Soviet naval blockade across the Gulf of Finland would have meant the end of the Finnish neutrality.

I do very frequently hear this argument, but I cannot understand: WHY?

Juhani Paasivirta writes (in Suomi ja Europppa 1939-1956 p. 36-37) "Stalin stressed the importance of providing certainty that in the future Finland should stand firmly in friendly relations with the Soviet Union". According to Paasivirta, the Soviet demands were an attempt to connect Finland with a common front with the Soviet Union.

This of course meant that Finland couldn't be neutral but had to be on the same side as the USSR in the coming war. (Obs! in 1939 it meant also on the side of two dictatorship against the Western democracies.)

And YYA-tract was written 1948, after that Finland and Soviet Union were same side until 1990.
Finland was taken to second world war against her will!
Most likely Finland had same side as Sweden.