Finnish war goals

[Vaeltaja]

And YYA-tract was written 1948, after that Finland and Soviet Union were same side until 1990.

I suggest you read through the YYA (or FCM) treaty again. All it does it declares and recognizes Finnish neutrality (willingness to remain outside great-power conflicts).

[Philip S. Walker]

Finland did trade with Germany as if it had been a neutral country. At least most of the time (exemption being the military assistance in June/July 1944). And Finns did trade a lot directly with Danes. However without protection from Sweden against Soviet aggressions that alone did not cut it, Finns in 1941 needed more than just trade partner and Soviets did not look kindly upon various attempts of forming Nordic Defence Union (name may vary).

I can appreciate that, but I was trying to look at the import situation in isolation. We are often told that a major factor that forced Finland into the arms of the Germans was the need for mainly foodstuffs.

Now it suddenly seems that a neutral Finland might even have been better off in this regard without joining the Germans.

Kind regards

[Jagala]

We are often told that a major factor that forced Finland into the arms of the Germans was the need for mainly foodstuffs.

Foodstuff, but far from only foodstuff.

(Swedish food self-sufficiency was much better, but only as long as Sweden could import things that Swedish agriculture depended on. Even then, Sweden could not export any significant quantities until near the very end of the war when it was certain that German import would be replaced with that from Allied countries.)

Now it suddenly seems that a neutral Finland might even have been better off in this regard without joining the Germans.

I'm no expert on the realities of the German occupation of Denmark on Danish agriculture, but I believe that the Germans were quite keen on policies designed to ensure that the surplus of agricultural production was exported to Germany. I have no doubt that Danish politicians and farmers would have been quite happy to sell to someone else - and especially to brave and still neutral Finns - but I am not sure that it could have happened at the cost of cutting export to Germany.

Do you have statistics on agricultural export at hand?

[Anne G,]

And YYA-tract was written 1948, after that Finland and Soviet Union were same side until 1990.

I suggest you read through the YYA (or FCM) treaty again. All it does it declares and recognizes Finnish neutrality (willingness to remain outside great-power conflicts).

Not at all. The text spoke only about the Finland's intention to stay neutral.

The Soviets never took this seriously though they only in the 70ies began actively to fight against using these words in the common official texts. Gorbatschov was the first and only Soviet leader who regognized Finland's neutrality.

To Finland, on other hand, "neutraility" after the war was like "separate war" during the war. As Timo Vihavainen says in Länsimaiden tuho, they were necessary means of politcs in the context of the period. Using them, FInland could be saved, abandoning them it could have been destroyed.

[Anne G,]

Finland did trade with Germany as if it had been a neutral country. At least most of the time (exemption being the military assistance in June/July 1944). And Finns did trade a lot directly with Danes. However without protection from Sweden against Soviet aggressions that alone did not cut it, Finns in 1941 needed more than just trade partner and Soviets did not look kindly upon various attempts of forming Nordic Defence Union (name may vary).

I can appreciate that, but I was trying to look at the import situation in isolation. We are often told that a major factor that forced Finland into the arms of the Germans was the need for mainly foodstuffs.

Now it suddenly seems that a neutral Finland might even have been better off in this regard without joining the Germans.

That's nonsense, Without foodstuffs and fertiliziers (without which the own harvest would be much smaller) from Germany and countries occupated by it (they naturally could their products only with the German consent) there would have basic hunger in Finland. The basic facts you can see yourself in Meinander's Finland 1944.

Food wasn't a major reason for joining Germany's attack, as it was believed that it would be only a short summer war. One couldn't know beforehand f.ex. that the potato crops would fail.

Yet, food was one of the things Finland asked from Germany and which was discussed in the the foreign affairs committee.

[Vaeltaja]

Not at all. The text spoke only about the Finland's intention to stay neutral.

Funny, since 6th article verifies sovereignty of both nations, and non-dependence of each other. 1st article states that Finland will act as independent nation defending itself (and attacks towards Soviet Union though its territory - OTOH neutrality would demand that as well). All in all what the treaty states is i) Finland is neutral ii) Finland is not allowed to ally itself against Soviet Union. That is what the treaty states, nothing else - it quite clearly and specifically sets the case that should Soviet Union be attacked - and that attack would not go through Finnish borders - Finns were required to do exactly nothing. According to the treaty even if the attack would go through Finnish borders Soviets still would have required Finnish permission to fight in Finland.

Its hardly Finns fault that Soviets signed a rather useless piece of paper (for them that is).

[Philip S. Walker]

I'm no expert on the realities of the German occupation of Denmark on Danish agriculture, but I believe that the Germans were quite keen on policies designed to ensure that the surplus of agricultural production was exported to Germany. I have no doubt that Danish politicians and farmers would have been quite happy to sell to someone else - and especially to brave and still neutral Finns - but I am not sure that it could have happened at the cost of cutting export to Germany.

It was mentioned on another thread, but I can't find it now since the search function around here is only a feeble shadow of what it used to be (basically just tells you in Swedish it can't find whatever it is you're looking for). However, I'm told that Danish export to Finland was considerable during WWII. Presumably, the goods would have gone via Germany. In any case, you are absolutely right that it would have been relying of German goodwill towards Finland and Germany's own demands, which got harder as the war progressed.

Do you have statistics on agricultural exports at hand?

For the period before Barbarossa (April 1940-June 1941) Danish foodstuff "export" to Germany consisted of:

3 million pigs
30,000 horses
750,000 cattle
128,000 tons of butter
78,000 tons of eggs
150,000 tons of fish

(Lars Lindeberg "De så det ske under besættelsen")

Anyway, that was only during the first year out of five very long ones. Of course, the goods were never paid for by those who received them.

Philip: Now it suddenly seems that a neutral Finland might even have been better off in this regard without joining the Germans.

Anne G: That's nonsense, Without foodstuffs and fertiliziers (without which the own harvest would be much smaller) from Germany and countries occupated by it (they naturally could their products only with the German consent) there would have basic hunger in Finland. The basic facts you can see yourself in Meinander's Finland 1944.

I have "Finland 1944", just haven't got around to reading it yet. Anyway, the stipulation I was making was based on a comparison with Sweden. If they could import from Germany etc. without fighting alongside the Nazis, then Finland might have been able to do the same.

Food wasn't a major reason for joining Germany's attack, as it was believed that it would be only a short summer war. One couldn't know beforehand f.ex. that the potato crops would fail.

Jokipii also plays down the importance of the foodstuffs situation. In any case, the foodstuffs that could be counted on from Germany because of the military cooperation must be seen in relation to the agricultural produce that could have been gained by not keeping the strongest and most productive part of the male population under arms.

Your comment also seems to raise another question: Would the Finnish leaders have found some way to avoid joining the Germans if they had understood how long and costly the war would actually be?

Regards, Vely

[Juha Tompuri]

As mentioned earlier, back to the original topic.

/Juha

[Anne G,]

Not at all. The text spoke only about the Finland's intention to stay neutral.

Funny, since 6th article verifies sovereignty of both nations, and non-dependence of each other. 1st article states that Finland will act as independent nation defending itself (and attacks towards Soviet Union though its territory - OTOH neutrality would demand that as well). All in all what the treaty states is i) Finland is neutral ii) Finland is not allowed to ally itself against Soviet Union. That is what the treaty states, nothing else - it quite clearly and specifically sets the case that should Soviet Union be attacked - and that attack would not go through Finnish borders - Finns were required to do exactly nothing. According to the treaty even if the attack would go through Finnish borders Soviets still would have required Finnish permission to fight in Finland.

Its hardly Finns fault that Soviets signed a rather useless piece of paper (for them that is).

It wasn't that. For guess whose interpretation would have won in real crisis situation (which 1961 wasn't).

The text says: "ottaen huomioon Suomen pyrkimyksen pysyä suurvaltojen välisten eturistiriitojen ulkopuolella,"
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/sopimukset/sops ... 8/19480017

[Anne G,]

Your comment also seems to raise another question: Would the Finnish leaders have found some way to avoid joining the Germans if they had understood how long and costly the war would actually be?

That's as useless to ask if Diana had married Charles if she had known that his affair with Camilla would continue.

What is instead useful, is to undertand that the Finnish leaders believed
1. the war will be a short one - so every able (or nearly able man) can be recruited for it and the men will be back at home for harvest time
2. a) Germany will win the war or b) at least beat the USSR before the Western allies will win the war

The secind point means that
1. a possibiity that the USSR would win the war, wasn't even taken into consideration (nor was many British believe it, either).
2. instead, the Finnish leaders had to seriously ponder also the possiblity (however horrible to us) the possibility 2a.

[Vaeltaja]

Which is only mentioned in the lead of the document, which is not relevant to any of the actually binding articles.

Had been a real crisis do you honestly think something next to worthless piece of paper like FCM treaty would have mattered? Which is pretty much the reason why Finnish Defence forces primary aimed to defend against Soviet invasion during the Cold War.

Regardless it is false to claim that FCM treaty would have meant siding with the Soviets. Nothing in the treaty states anything even remotely suggesting that.

EDIT: This would probably fit better to Cold War discussions...

[Philip S. Walker]

Philip S. Walker wrote: Your comment also seems to raise another question: Would the Finnish leaders have found some way to avoid joining the Germans if they had understood how long and costly the war would actually be?

Anne G: That's as useless to ask if Diana had married Charles if she had known that his affair with Camilla would continue.

Actually, I think that would be very relevant if this was a discussion about Diana's true motives and goals for marrying Charles.

But this is a thread about the war goals of the Finnish leaders, and I wonder how they could on one hand be hoping for and expecting an extremely swift German victory, and at the same time hope and expect that the victory would leave the Germans battered and torn.

1. a possibiity that the USSR would win the war, wasn't even taken into consideration (nor was many British believe it, either).

It seems a lot of military people hadn't read Clausewitz properly, or they thought they were cleverer than he when he says categorically:

The Russian state is not a country you can conquer, i.e. occupy in a normal way. A country like that can only collapse through its own weakness or internal disagreement.

And while we're at it, a bit of Paasikivi too:

All things considered, it would have been wise for us even in the spring of 1941 to take the Kremlin's outstretched hand. A careful attitude must be the ruling principle for the foreign policy of a small country. However, a mistrust of the Soviet Union's intentions had penetrated far too deeply into the Finnish people, while the trust in German military strength had become unshakable, particularly within the Finnish military. ("Minnen II", p.244-245)

Regards, Vely

[Anne G,]

1. a possibiity that the USSR would win the war, wasn't even taken into consideration (nor was many British believe it, either).

It seems a lot of military people hadn't read Clausewitz properly, or they thought they were cleverer than he when he says categorically:

The Russian state is not a country you can conquer, i.e. occupy in a normal way. A country like that can only collapse through its own weakness or internal disagreement.

Well, the Germans believed in the first sentence, the Finns more in the second.

One can't speak about "military people" in general. Younger offices like Halsti (they wasn't told about the truth, but could guess something was going but couldn't be sure) had in the spring 1941 "war plays". Halsti's conclusion: if the offensive begins in May, Leningrad and Moscow will fall bit Russia can't be beaten in the short campaign. Stalin can save his military industry and rose the national spirit. On the other hand, Hitler can use minority nationalities and other dissidents. Halsti's conclusion: Roosevelt will get help just so that the two dictatorship will exhsust themselves.

Afterwards, Halsti said that his mistake based on the belief that Hitler and Roosevelt would act rationally.

And while we're at it, a bit of Paasikivi too:

All things considered, it would have been wise for us even in the spring of 1941 to take the Kremlin's outstretched hand. A careful attitude must be the ruling principle for the foreign policy of a small country. However, a mistrust of the Soviet Union's intentions had penetrated far too deeply into the Finnish people, while the trust in German military strength had become unshakable, particularly within the Finnish military. ("Minnen II", p.244-245)

Well, what Paasikivi was at the time sorry for, was that he wasn't told by the government what was going on. He had a radio speech ready for Leningrad's fall.

Kremlin had 1 1/2 year to show his good intentions but failed to do so. If it a few weeks tried to act civilly, and that only out of fear, wasn't very convincing. And in any case, this policy would have an option only if the future has been seen.

In undertanding history, the first thing is to forget what happened afterwards. The second thing is to undertand that people were different from us and saw the world differently.

F.ex. Ryti was convinced that the Russia was a permanent threat to Finland, has been so 1000 years and will always be if nothing was done, and now was the one and only chance to remove that threat (= the Germans would do it) for ever. Mannerheim, on the other had was anti-Bolsehevik and would have been happy to see Staln's empire collapse but believed convinced that Russia will eventually rise again.

You were earlier quite right: in 1941 the Finnish leaders weren't reluctant to go to the war, they were eager for it. What Ryti feared in June, wasn't war but peace, i.e. that Germany and the USSR would make a new pact and Finland would be sold again.

Now, when the Finnish leaders saw this one and only chance, they also wanted to have their share of bounty. As well as making sure of the German good will in the future, with coudn't be gained by part-time participation.

[John Hilly]

What Ryti feared in June, wasn't war but peace, i.e. that Germany and the USSR would make a new pact and Finland would be sold again.

This is a very important point. Actually Ryti's fears begun much earlier. One result was the "unofficial" recruitment of the Finnish SS-battalion, the "pledge-battalion", to maintain good-will of Germany which began in March 1941.
Swedes later accused Ryti as not telling the truth, because he told to the Swedish government - was it on the first of May or June - that he had no knowledge of Germanys invasion plans to Soviet Union. He didn't, because all the discussions with German military so far, had been "hypothetical" i.e. "if war would broke up between Germany and Soviet Union, then what would you do?"

Greets
Juha-Pekka

[Philip S. Walker]

@Anne G

Kremlin had 1 1/2 year to show his good intentions but failed to do so. If it a few weeks tried to act civilly, and that only out of fear, wasn't very convincing. And in any case, this policy would have an option only if the future has been seen.

To this the Kremlin would reply that they had been very reasonable and shown good intentions in the negotiations before the Winter War, but the Finns had ruined everything. On top of that they totally humiliated the Red Army in the eyes of the world which is the worst thing you can do to a bunch of bully boys if they have a chance to get the upper hand on you later on.

Philip: The Russian state is not a country you can conquer, i.e. occupy in a normal way. A country like that can only collapse through its own weakness or internal disagreement.

Anne G:Well, the Germans believed in the first sentence, the Finns more in the second.

History also shows that once a nation is attacked by a foreign power, most internal disagreement immediately evaporates.

In understanding history, the first thing is to forget what happened afterwards. The second thing is to understand that people were different from us and saw the world differently.

Which is why we're trying to find out how the Finnish leaders saw the world, in order to discover what their elusive war goals might have been.

F.ex. Ryti was convinced that the Russia was a permanent threat to Finland, has been so 1000 years and will always be if nothing was done, and now was the one and only chance to remove that threat (= the Germans would do it) for ever.

But Ryti is well-known for having been a fatalist, so how does "chance" enter into the picture?

Mannerheim, on the other had was anti-Bolshevik and would have been happy to see Stalin's empire collapse but believed convinced that Russia will eventually rise again.

Let's hope the next time they'll get it right.

What about Väinö Linna? What did he feel it was all about? In my opinion "Unknown Soldier" isn't really about the Continuation War, since the plot and the main conflict doesn't deal with Finland versus the Soviet Union at all. The conflict lies in unsolved issues from the Civil War. It is the same thing Pipping says that the soldiers in his company felt. For them the Continuation War was "herrojen sota", a stunt meant to suppress the average population, cheating and forcing them into a campaign of conquest alongside the Nazis, carefully dressed up as a defensive war and an inevitable "continuation" of the Winter War where everyone had stood together.

(On a larger scale it is really the old story of nature versus civilisation, Kivi's seven brothers pitted against the school teacher. Looking at Finland today, it is obvious who won that battle. So perhaps the finno-fanatics are right when they claim that the Finnish Army won the Continuation War. That even includes killing lots of foreign people, only nowadays it is done by selling them unnecessary little gadgets that in years to come is suspected will give millions of people all over the world brain cancer. But of course, I'm digressing now.)

Now, when the Finnish leaders saw this one and only chance, they also wanted to have their share of bounty.

Yes, and don't tell me that the "share of the bounty" aspect was seen as acceptable to decent people back in those days.

As well as making sure of the German good will in the future, with couldn't be gained by part-time participation.

I assume you are now quoting the Finnish leaders' assumption, not your own (since you have a hindsight that tells you several other nations got away with giving the Germans considerably less than Finland did). However, I think there are noticeable differences in this area between the Finnish leaders. It seems there were crucial factors that the military knew but the others didn't. For instance, the fear you mention Ryti had that the Germans might not lauch Barbarossa would hardly have been shared by the military leaders, whose experience and close contact with the Germans would have left them in no doubt about what was going on. Even worse, they military leaders - for the same reasons - would have known that the Germans were so cocky from the start that they didn't feel they needed the Finns to help them out very much in the coming invasion. It seems these factors were hidden from the politicians, or at least not presented in a way so they carried the weight they should have. Which brings us back to the "stunt" aspect, a feature we have probably been paying far too little attention during our discussions here.

Regards, Vely