Critical voices against the Finnish conduct in WWII

[Anne G,]

I believe that depends on how overall you make the angle. But if Finland would have preferred total annihilation to the kind of situation the Poles, the Czechs, the Belgians, the Dutch, the French, the Norwegians and the Danes felt forced to accept, then I am indeed completely wrong. Personally, I think they would have acted pretty much the same way. And I think it is also fair to say on behalf of these countries that though they may look covered in eternal shame from a Finnish point of view, at least they never sent a leading general representing their nation to Berlin with a big smile offering to help the Nazis win the Second World War, with all that entailed.

Instead, they sent their own Jewsish citizens to gas chambers.

How about Churchill and Roosevelt's smiles with Stalin?

[Philip S. Walker]

Instead, they sent their own Jewish citizens to gas chambers.

I do believe there is a slight misunderstanding here. It was only Germans that sent people to gas chambers. However, they did try to make local police forces in occupied countries round up Jews and hand them over. What happened to them after that was largely unknown until after the War, but of course it was realised not to be anything nice, and that is why various measures were set up to transport Jews out of the danger zone. In Scandinavia this attempt was almost 100 pct. successful due to the proximity and neutrality of Sweden.

Now let's get back on track. If there are no more comments on Jacobson's description of the Finnish reaction to the Munich agreement I suggest we find some other critical sources to look as, since that is the purpose of this thread.

Regards, Vely

[Anne G,]

Now let's get back on track. If there are no more comments on Jacobson's description of the Finnish reaction to the Munich agreement

I think you, by stressing on only sentiments, miss the basic points. The faith in the League of the Nations had been lost already, now the faith in the promises of the Western powers got a serious blow. Instead, the faith in neutrality was strenghtened.

During the Czech crisis, there had been a great worry in Finland about the sailing of the Soviet navy in the Baltic sea. This lead common plans to defend Ahvenanmaa (Aland) with Sweden.

On the other hand, the negotations with Jartsev showed only that according to the USSR, Finland could be neutral only in peace, but in case of war it had to be pro-Soviet. This of course was no neutrality at all.

Finally, Mannerheim seems to be the only prominent person in Finland (and in Scandinavia) who made the right conclusions about Munich. But his demands to speed armament program wasn't accepted.

PS. You didn't say, which of Jacobson's books you are reading.

[JariL]

Max Jacobson, "The Diplomacy of the Winter War", p. 46-48

[Philip S. Walker]

@Anne G.

Finally, Mannerheim seems to be the only prominent person in Finland (and in Scandinavia) who made the right conclusions about Munich. But his demands to speed armament program wasn't accepted.

Yes, it's a shame the old man wasn't listened to much more around this time. I believe he remained bitter about it to his dying day.

In any case, Jacobson isn't really critical towards the Finnish reaction to the Munich agreement. Okay, he doesn't like it, but he does make apologies for the Finns. Their reaction is "not unnatural" seen in the light of the Soviet threat. Still, I found it interesting because at least it doesn't try to glorify the Finns and make them look better than everyone else in this world, it just portrays them as human beings worrying about themselves more than others. It doesn't matter that the Czechs go down the drain if it has advantages for Finland.

Regards, Vely

[Anne G,]

Finally, Mannerheim seems to be the only prominent person in Finland (and in Scandinavia) who made the right conclusions about Munich. But his demands to speed armament program wasn't accepted.

Yes, it's a shame the old man wasn't listened to much more around this time.

Well, that's how democracy is. Mannerheim wanted also more influence and the politicans were wary of that.

On the other hand, it was because Stalin believed that conquesring Finland was an easy job, he abandoned Shaposnikov's realistic plans.

Also, by putting money on think the common Finns valued, the government made Finland a country worth defending for.

[JAK]

@Anne G.

Finally, Mannerheim seems to be the only prominent person in Finland (and in Scandinavia) who made the right conclusions about Munich. But his demands to speed armament program wasn't accepted.

Yes, it's a shame the old man wasn't listened to much more around this time. I believe he remained bitter about it to his dying day.

Regards, Vely

By Munich crisis it was far too late make any really significant armament purchases. And perhaps there was some small blessing in that as Soviets went to war ill prepared. Had the Finnish army been better equipped, Soviets might have prepare their actions and plans more thoroughly which would have been bad news for Finns...

-Jari

[JariL]

Let's have an open and objective look at these factors, but also discuss them in a friendly and respectful atmosphere. There will be views that many will not sympathise with, but then there is a chance here to point out where they might be going wrong.

The above is from your opening post. I am more than willing to discuss critcal opinions but currently your comments in this thread come very close the following: the war was hopeless thus Finnish leaders must have made big mistakes, please tell me what they were.This does not sound like wanting to learn/discuss the issue, more like a desire to strengthen an attitude.

If we cannot understand the framework in which decisions were made, it is going to be very difficulty to discuss critical opinions and point out where they might be going wrong or why they are correct. If we accept the view that you expressed earlier on about winning wars, discussing critical opinions is pretty worthless. Finland was at the end of the day prepared to fight a war that could not be won and it was known from the beginning. So we can just state that it was all a colossal mistake, end of critique. If on the other hand we accept the idea that the basis of decision making was something else than winning, situation changes considerably.

Critical voices were expressed already before the war. Mannerheim was certain that the policy Finnish government had adopted would lead to war with Soviet Union, a war which Finland could not win. So he saw winning in the same manner as you do. Still his strategy was not based on winning. Interesting contradiction, wouldn't you say?

Paasikivi called Winter War "Erkko's war" and thought already before the war that the mandate he got for the Moscow negotiations was unrealistic. This he also told to Erkko and got some support from Mannerheim. Both Paasikivi and Mannerheim were willing to give the Soviets what they wanted. Paasikivi in the name of "real politik" and Mannerhein in order to buy time to build up the army and getting allies. But was their thinking correct? President Kallio, of whom you pointed out that he was out of touch of foreign policy issues, stressed right and wrong as basis of decision making. But did he read the situation better than those who knew more about foreign policy?

[Anne G,]

President Kallio, of whom you pointed out that he was out of touch of foreign policy issues, stressed right and wrong as basis of decision making. But did he read the situation better than those who knew more about foreign policy?

Kallio certainly read the mood of the Finnish people right. And that was, like Jakobson says, a fact, too.

Further, Lauri Haataja stresses in Kun kansa kokosi itsensä that Kallio had already in 1918 learned that the worst calamity that can happen to people is a Civil War. Therefore, his mission was to unite people so that it could endure even a war from outside.

[Philip S. Walker]

@Jaril

Fine post, I enjoyed that.

But what you see as a conflict of views and interest may not be so. I suppose that to wage war you need leaders that know the basic rules, such as the one about never fighting a war you don't have a chance of winning, and you need soldiers who are prepared to sacrifice their lives and fight in hopeless situations and a population that are prepared to accept that. Where you might get a conflict is if the leaders can spot a hopeless war and don't want to fight it (at least not until a situation is created that makes winning possible), but the population demand the war. Mannerheim's stance here wold be akin to the Danish King Christian IX in 1863 if not for the fact that nothing in Finnish history can in any way be compared to any other country, as we have all learned by now from sad experience and the feeling of being pelted with rotten tomatoes .

Moving away from the sandpit, there are many aspects in war that the classic dogmas surrounding the issue don't take into consideration, mainly psychological aspects. After all Clausewitz lived at a certain time and in a certain country, and though his scope was impressive he probably couldn't take into consideration some aspects that are relevant to a more modern society.

Regards, Vely

[Vaeltaja]

But what you see as a conflict of views and interest may not be so. I suppose that to wage war you need leaders that know the basic rules, such as the one about never fighting a war you don't have a chance of winning, and you need soldiers who are prepared to sacrifice their lives and fight in hopeless situations and a population that are prepared to accept that.

As it happens Finns were preparing (and it happened through the Cold War still were) preparing for the very same event of fighting a war which they did not have a chance of winning. Just because you can not win does not mean that the war would not be worth fighting or even dying for. Just because you refuse to accept does not mean that Finns would (have) refuse(d) to accept it too.

[Anne G,]

By Munich crisis it was far too late make any really significant armament purchases.

How could it be, as Finland during the Middle Peace, could purchase arms for 16 divisions instead of 9? Not to speak of the artillery.

[Anne G,]

In any case, Jacobson isn't really critical towards the Finnish reaction to the Munich agreement. Okay, he doesn't like it, but he does make apologies for the Finns. Their reaction is "not unnatural" seen in the light of the Soviet threat. Still, I found it interesting because at least it doesn't try to glorify the Finns and make them look better than everyone else in this world, it just portrays them as human beings worrying about themselves more than others. It doesn't matter that the Czechs go down the drain if it has advantages for Finland.

Not really advantegous. f.ex. the influential weekly magazine Suomen kuvalehti concluded in March 1939: Hitler had abandoned the national principle and that was bad to all small nations.

More generally, Finland belonged to the European states that were quite content with the status ques and had nothing to gain in the general war.

[Philip S. Walker]

Interesting point are made here, but they belong on other threads. Yes, I know it's partly my fault, but let us please get back to the main issue again.

Critical voices against the Finnish conduct in WWII! Who has read "Finland's ödelsår"? I will get a copy myself, but there won't be time to read it before after Christmas. I actually have a ton of books to read about Finland, including one that costs the neat sum of 177 Euros! See, that's how much I truly love you guys despite all your attempts to overdo your little innocence act. I'm told there's a Feminist contributor in there somewhere, so perhaps she has something critical to say. That wouldn't be too unrealistic to expect, would it? . And in fact those who aren't even Feminists aren't too please either. A recent survey shows that 68 pct. of them think we are unhygenic, we watch too much sport on TV, and we can't multitask. I suppose they could have fought the Winter War better than us too, if they'd had the chance.

Regards, Vely

[Vaeltaja]

How could it be, as Finland during the Middle Peace, could purchase arms for 16 divisions instead of 9? Not to speak of the artillery.

Willing seller with ample (captured/looted/stolen) surplus to sell? Something which did not exist in the time leading to the Winter War.