Digitized National Defence University publications & theses

[Slon-76]

Slon, do you write the text in English or do you write it in Russian and then translate with something? Because at times it is very difficult to understand what you are trying to say.

I have written here, including you. I don't know how to write in English. Read in Finnish and English. Writing-can't. Sorry.
You can ask again. I'll try to answer a simple proposal. Sometimes I forget that the possibilities of electronic translators are not unlimited.

This is just from memory, IIRC in one of the documentaries describing the fighting at Suomussalmi and Raate road stated that no one checked all the Soviet casualties from the woods, not Finns and not Soviets.

Soviet commanders (I suppose as the Finnish commanders) believed the loss not bodies in the forest, and by the lack of people in a specific organizational unit. Conditionally. In one Division to the beginning of the war the 14 thousand man. On 15 January -12000. During this time received 2000 people. Calculate loss Division-elementary task. And the number of found dead is a conditional and difficult verifiable.

[Vaeltaja]

You read Finnish too? That is unusual, often the rather alien syntax of Finnish (as not being part of Indo-European languages) makes is rather rare for people to learn it outside of Finland. Then again there are quite a few loan words between Finnish and Russian which might make it easier.

Soviet commanders (I suppose as the Finnish commanders) believed the loss not bodies in the forest, and by the lack of people in a specific organizational unit. Conditionally. In one Division to the beginning of the war the 14 thousand man. On 15 January -12000. During this time received 2000 people. Calculate loss Division-elementary task. And the number of found dead is a conditional and difficult verifiable.

Well, that was the point i was after. At least according to the said documentary no one counted the bodies, neither Finns nor Soviets, so the claim that '5000 dead Soviet' would have been based on the number of actually identified Soviet casualties is unlikely to be true. Only real danger with the approach you mentioned is that it might not catch all the casualties either but its still better than anything else in absence of actual casualty reports.

[JAK]

According to this definition (and IIRC also acc. to the definition of the Finnish army) the soviet 163rd and 44th divisions at Suomussalmi were destroyed.

Based on this definition, the 44 Division destroyed, but 163 Division why is destroyed?

About 20% is generally some sort of nonsense. It turns out that H. Siilasvuo's 9 D. was also destroyed in the fighting with 54 Division?

If I remember correctly, the 20% casualties is referred to term "lyöty" or in English beaten or defeated which would mean that the unit in question is incapable of combat actions for short period of time(some days, maybe?). Don't remember what percentage was referred to "destroyed".

Jari

[Juha Tompuri]

If I remember correctly, the 20% casualties is referred to term "lyöty" or in English beaten or defeated which would mean that the unit in question is incapable of combat actions for short period of time(some days, maybe?). Don't remember what percentage was referred to "destroyed".

During my conscription service IIRC the artillery had their "calculation system" where 50% casualities to the enemy forces ment the enemy unit was destroyed (the surviving were not at condition to operate ), 30% casualities ment the unit was lamautettu, stunned.

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... it#p921606

Regards, Juha

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

Thanks. I've been hunting for those values. My recollection for 30 years back wasn't very precise.

[JariL]

There was no AA-guns.

I believe these were not cannons but machineguns equipped with AA-sights and pods.

[Mangrove]

- Tutkien käyttö pääkaupunkiseudun ilmatorjunnan osana jatkosodassa [The Use of Radars as the Part of the Anti-Aircraft Artillery defending the Capital during the Continuation War]
- Suomen ilmavalvonta talvisodassa: toiminta ja kokemukset [Finnish Air Surveillance during the Winter War]
- Joukkojen siirtäminen Maaselän kannakselta Karjalankannakselle 1944 [The Transfer of Troops from the Maaselkä Isthmus to the Karelian Isthmus in 1944]
- Eversti Hannuksela sotilasjohtajana jatkosodassa (Colonel Hannuksela as a Military Leader during the Continuation War]
- Merivoimien varautuminen Neuvostoliiton Hangon tukikohtaa vastaan välirauhan aikana [The Preparations Made by the Finnish Navy against the Soviet Base at Hanko during the Interim Peace]

- Panssarivaunujoukkojen koulutus Panssariprikaatissa 1942–1944 [The Training of Armoured Troops at the Panssariprikaati between 1942 and 1944]
- Päämajan ja merivoimien suhde rannikolla suoritettujen operaatioiden suunnittelussa ja toimeenpanossa jatkosodassa [The Relationship between the Päämaja and the Finnish Navy in Planning and Implementation of Operations in the Coastal Regions during the Continuation War]
- Rautatiekuljetusten toimeenpanosuunnitelmat ennen talvisotaa [The Pre-Winter War Plans for the Rail Transports]
- Sallan suunnan taistelut 1939-1940 [The Battle of Salla 1939-1940]

[Tom Houlihan]

I may be beating a dead horse, but is there anything in there about Salla 1941? Or reports/comments from units that had 6.SS-Nord sub-units assigned to them?

Hey, if I don't ask, I won't know!

[kuuskajaskari]

Thank you especially for this ...

- Joukkojen siirtäminen Maaselän kannakselta Karjalankannakselle 1944 [The Transfer of Troops from the Maaselkä Isthmus to the Karelian Isthmus in 1944]

[Mangrove]

Iskuja ilmaan (The selected history of the Finnish Air Force before and during WWII according to Colonel Richard Lorentz, the so called "father" of the Finnish fighter tactics.)

[Mangrove]

Hyökkäyksestä puolustukseen: taktiikan kehittymisen ensimmäiset vuosikymmenet Suomessa ["From Defence to Offence: The Development of Tactics during the First Decades of (Independent) Finland"]

This study deals with the development of military tactics in Finland from independence to the early 1950s. The research is divided into three periods: the time before the Winter and Continuation wars and the time after the wars. Based mainly on archive sources each period and subject is dealt with in chronological order. The objective was to study the development features in Finnish tactics and the foreign impact on its development.

Before the Winter War, offence was regarded as the only course of action that could redress the balance of power in a possible war against the Soviet Union. Defence lacked the depth considered essential in European thinking because the troops were few and the heavily forested terrain prevented the deployment of automatic weapons in echelon. Delaying action was most clearly based on Finnish concepts.
[...]

[Mangrove]

Räjähtävää tyhjyyttä: sissitoiminta suomalaisessa sotataidossa ["Exploding Wilderness - Guerrilla-type Activity in Finnish Military Theory and Art"]

[...] This doctoral thesis is basic research which analyses and creates a comprehensive picture of the evolution and development of national guerrilla-type activities and tactics as a part of Finnish military theory. The main research question is: ‘How have guerrilla-type activities and tactics evolved as a part of the Finnish military theory and art?’ The core of the frame of reference for this doctoral thesis is the historical development of the national military theory and art as well as guerrilla-type activity and the theories of guerrilla warfare as a part of the transformation of conventional warfare. [...]

Syvää vai pelkästään tiheää: neuvostoliittolaisen ja venäläisen sotataidollisen ajattelun lähtökohdat, kehittyminen, soveltaminen käytäntöön ja nykytilanne. Näkökulmana 1920- ja 1930-luvun syvän taistelun ja operaation opit.

[...] The aim of the Soviet military art was to develop a tactical and operational solution against the superiority of defence, which was due to the increase of firepower. Also British experience and research was exploited in this development process, although the Soviet tactics and operational art were not Eastern copies of British mechanized warfare or German Blitzkrieg, but an independent concept. The theory of deep battle and deep operations was tested in military exercises, and it was developed until Stalin’s Great purge of 1937. [...]

[Mangrove]

Previously published editions of the Tiede ja Ase periodical (1933-) have been digitised. Many of these articles were written by Generals who fought during the Winter, Continuation and Lapland War. I have marked these with red. Here are some of the articles published during the first two decades:

- Suomen puolustuskyky ja erityisesti taistelujoukkojen tila maaliskuussa v 1940 ["The Defence capacities of Finland and especially the state of her combat troops in March 1940"]
- Jäämeren rannikon sotatoimet toisen maailmansodan aikana ["Warfare in the coast of the Arctic Ocean during WWII"]
- Karhumäen operaatio v 1941 ["Karhumäki operation in 1941"]

- Talvisotaa edeltäneet neuvottelut Moskovassa ja Suomen puolustusvalmius ["Pre-Winter War negotiations in Moscow and the defence capacities of Finland"]
- Voimien suuntaaminen ja käyttö IV AK:n hyökkäyksessä v 1941 ["Directing and use of troops in the offensive by the 4th Corps in 1941"]
- Sota-ajan talouselämän johtaminen toisen maailmasodan kokemusten valossa ["Admistration of economy during a war in the light of the experiences gained during the WWII"]

- Eräitä viime sotiemme ja niitä edeltäneeltä ajalta saatuja sotataloudellisia kokemuksia ["Some of the experiences regarding war economy gained before and during the WWII"]
- Strategiset (keskityskuljetuksiin ja suuriin ryhmitysmuutoksiin liittyvät) joukkojen siirrot viime sodissamme ["Strategical troop movements during the Winter and Continuation War"]
- Kohtalokas syksy 1940 ["The Fateful Fall of 1940"]

[Mangrove]

- Itsenäisen Suomen ratsuväen varusteiden kehitys talvisotaan mennessä ["The Development of Cavalry Equipment in Independent Finland up to the Winter War"]

[Mangrove]

- Rautatiekuljetukset puolustussuunnittelun osana 1918 - 1940: kuljetusten kehittäminen, suunnittelu ja kouluttaminen ["Rail Transport as a part of the Defense Planning in 1918 - 1940: The Development, Planning and Training of the Transports"]
- Taistelutehon laskemiseen vaikuttaneet tekijät sodan 1941-44 aikana ja siitä tehtävät johtopäätökset ["The Factors Contributing to the Combat Efficiency during the War of 1941-44 and Conclusions"]

- The Soviet Plans for the North Western Theatre of Operations in 1939-1944