Soviet formations 1944

[Vaeltaja]

Something i was looking about couple of days back... I seem to recall quite often repeated statement that Soviet troops would have been rushed out from the front in order to get them to participate or provide support to the operation Bagration. However, when i compiled these tables that does not seem to be the case, that is troops were moved only after Bagration ended, so should be made out of it?

org_kar.pdf

Soviet formations in East Karelia

(26.4 KiB) Downloaded 139 times

Values for 7th and 32nd Armies, no front level units taken into account - not that Karelian front kept much for itself

org_isth.pdf

Soviet formations on Karelian Isthmus

(25.2 KiB) Downloaded 119 times

Values initially just for 23rd Army, later on also for 21st and 59th Armies. Solitary values are units assigned to armies actually at the front as are the numbers preceding the '+' sign. Numbers after the '+' are ones held under front level command, regardless of actual knowledge where the units were. However for June-August those were primarily used against Finns (according to unit designations when comparing those against ones known to have operated on Isthmus).

Note translations are mine so they may (and likely do) contain errors, data collated from, also original data contains some errors:
БОЕВОЙ СОСТАВ СОВЕТСКОЙ АРМИИ - ЧАСТЬ IV - (Январь – декабрь 1944 г.) printed in МОСКВА at ВОЕННОЕ ИЗДАТЕЛЬСТВО on 1988 (as for whom: ИНСТИТУТ ВОЕННОЙ ИСТОРИИ МИНИСТЕРСТВА ОБОРОНЫ СССР - ИСТОРИКО-АРХИВНЫЙ ОТДЕЛ ГЕНЕРАЛЬНОГО ШТАБА ВООРУЖЕННЫХ СИЛ СССР - ЦЕНТРАЛЬНЫЙ АРХИВ МИНИСТЕРСТВА ОБОРОНЫ СССР)

[steverodgers801]

A key part of Bagration was convincing the Germans that the main attack was to come out of the Ukraine towards Lvov, so there units that were not moved into the center fronts until the last week so the German would not detect them. I would have to go to my books to give you details. A second major issue was a two day delay due to the need to fill the supply requirements

[Vaeltaja]

No doubt about that but what i was more after was that for example for Karelian Front, even on listing from 1 September 1944, well over a month after main fighting had died down and over two weeks after even the sideshow at Ilomantsi had come to its conclusion, there are several armored formations distributed to 7th and 32rd Army. Including 7th Guards Tank Brigade, 29th Tank Brigade, 89th & 90th & 92nd Tank Regiments, 338th & 339th Guards Heavy Self-Propelled Gun Regiments. Which is more than a bit odd if - as so often claimed in Soviet literature - the offensive was called off since the formations (especially the armored ones) were intended to be used in operation Bagration. As it appears that does not appear to have been the case.

Similar comparison is much harder to do on Leningrad front since the Front HQ hoarded bulk of the armored formations under its direct command instead of spreading them amongst its armies and also due the fact that 21st and 59th Armies were moved a lot. Still if you note that offensive started to end at early July and was finally terminated by min July especially the number of armored formations still assigned there was high. Again if remembering the traditional Soviet story that offensive ended because formations were moved out.

[St.George]

I think you are on something!

BTW what does the plus "+" stands for?

Example in May Karelian Isthmus rifle corps was 5+1

[Art]

Which is more than a bit odd if - as so often claimed in Soviet literature - the offensive was called off since the formations (especially the armored ones) were intended to be used in operation Bagration. As it appears that does not appear to have been the case.

Where exactly was it claimed?

[Vaeltaja]

Which is more than a bit odd if - as so often claimed in Soviet literature - the offensive was called off since the formations (especially the armored ones) were intended to be used in operation Bagration. As it appears that does not appear to have been the case.

Where exactly was it claimed?

It's a claim that has come occasionally when people are discussing the reason why Soviets did not push further.

BTW what does the plus "+" stands for?

Example in May Karelian Isthmus rifle corps was 5+1

Values before the '+' stands for the formation under the armies in the isthmus while after '+' it remarks formations under direct command of the front. In the example you mentioned 5 would be the number of rifle corps in 21st and 23rd armies while the front had just 1 rifle corps under its direct command. Some of the units under front level command were committed against Finns however, but those must be judged case by case basis. Note that forces under front level command were not 'reserves'.

[Esa K]

Hi!

As I have got it, the main bulk of the Soviet troops that was redeployed after the battles at Carelian Isthmus was not sent to reinforce the Bagration operation but to the Narva front in June/August 1944.


Best regards

Esa K

[Art]

It's a claim that has come occasionally when people are discussing the reason why Soviets did not push further.

People that make claims are not Soviet literature unless they have certain references to published books, to my knowledge mainstream historiogrpahy (12-volumes history of the WW2, for example) didn't support this thesis in any way. So I believe we are dealing with a more modern legend.

[Art]

In particular the IX Volume of the aforementioned history of the WW2 said:

.....
Meanwhile, enemy resistance in the Karelian Isthmus was becoming stronger and stronger. By mid-July up to 3/4 of the Finnish Army operated there. Its troops occupied the line 90% of which went along water obstacles with a width from 300 m to 3 km. That allowed the enemy to create a firm defense in narrow defiles and have strong tactical and operative reserves. A further continuation of the offensive of the Soviet forces in the Karelian Isthmus in that conditions could lead to unjustified losses. Therefore the Stavka ordered the Leningrad Front from 12 July 1944 to switch to defense along the line achieved.

Then about the Karelian Front:

....
After carrying out in general their task in the offensive operation forces of the Karelian Front on 9 August 1944 reached the line Kudamguba, Kuolismaa, Pitkäranta, thus ending the Vyborg-Petrozavodsk operation.

There are no references to operations in Belorussia as one can see.
Paltonov ("Battle for Leningrad") has a more detailed account but he doesn't mention Belorussia either as far as I remember.

[Vaeltaja]

Thank you, Art.

[Philip S. Walker]

Thanks Art, but please remember to include the exact page numbers when you present quotes.

[Vaeltaja]

It seems at least Glantz & House are of the opinion that "By mid-July, the Soviets had replaced most of their frontline troops with defensive units and fortified regions, and went over to the defense as the priority shifted to offensives farther south" (When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler), as a reference to the Soviet offensive against Finns in 1944.

Which according to the document i used as a source (and by other sources) does not appear to have been the case, not only did the offensive continue (by Karelian Front) until mid August but neither did Leningrad Front replace its forces with defensive units until much later than mid-July. Also it should not be forgotten that even attempts to expand bridgehead at Vuosalmi continued until 17 July.

Of course the book is not centered on the Finnish-Russian conflict so inaccuracies should not be that surprising. Wonder if the (mis)information could be from there?

[Art]

Thanks Art, but please remember to include the exact page numbers when you present quotes.

Sure, pages 32 and 34 of the IX volume "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voiny 1939-1945" (official Soviet history of the World War II)

It seems at least Glantz & House are of the opinion that "By mid-July, the Soviets had replaced most of their frontline troops with defensive units and fortified regions, and went over to the defense as the priority shifted to offensives farther south" (When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler), as a reference to the Soviet offensive against Finns in 1944.

That must be based on Earl Ziemke ("Stalingrad to Berlin"), who writes that

By 15 July the Finns had detected signs--confirmed several days later--that, although the Soviet strength on the isthmus had risen to 26 rifle divisions and 12 to 14 tank brigades, the better units were being relieved and replaced with garrison troops. The tempo of the offensive could be expected to diminish.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/USA ... at-14.html
The reference leads to the KTB OKW, the ultimate source must Finnish intelligence info. It seems that Glantz and House subjected this phrase to some inaccurate editing, to "best troops" became "most troops" and "Isthmus" disappeared altogether. It is worth to mention "The battle for Leningrad" Glantz simply quotes this part from Ziemke.
If you are interested in the chain of events in mid-July 1944, then it was as follows:
On the night of 11 July Govorov attended a conference in Moscow with Stalin, Molotov, Zhdanov and chief of the General Staff Antonov present. There he apparently received instruction to shift his main effort to the Narva direction. On the evening of 13 July the staff of the Leningrad Front issued directives to the 21 and 23 Army to switch to defense. On the next day another directive was sent to 8 and 2 Shock Armies to prepare an offensive operation at Narva. Also on 14-15 July a series of orders on transfer of various units from the Isthmus to the Narva direction was issued. Finally, the 23 Army also received an order to break offensive operations and switch to defense. The greatest problem here is that we will never know exactly what Stalin and Govorov talked about on that meeting in Kremlin.

[Vaeltaja]

Thank you again.

And yes, i was aware that Govorov had discussions with Soviet leadership at the time. There are some sort of deductions mentioned in Raunio's & Kilin's book of the 1944 campaign. They offer an explanation that rest of the Leningrad Front's offensive efforts were given up as a 'lost causes' but forces would have been allocated for the one final attempt to break through at Vuosalmi. However that is based solely on the actions taken and not on any actual knowledge.

[Art]

They offer an explanation that rest of the Leningrad Front's offensive efforts were given up as a 'lost causes' but forces would have been allocated for the one final attempt to break through at Vuosalmi.

Directives of the Leningrad Front spoke about halting offensive operations as temporary "in connection with the necessity of more thorough study of the enemy defense and training for future operation". So resuming offensive at some point in the future was considered possible, at least so it follows from the letter. O.Manninen in the "Finnish defense studies" No.16 has a description of these orders, from what I remember.