Soviet Bombing June 25, 1941. A definite answer if possible

[Art]

There was a very short period in 1940 when possibility of war against Britain and France was seriously discussed, it was over for obvious reasons in June 1940. Then the starting point was the statement

It was also (fairly) seriously discusses or at least used as an excuse before the Winter War in 1939.

Not by military planners.

after that it reverted back to Britain and France at least for the duration of the Winter War and its immediate aftermath.

The period was short and there was an obvious problem with deployment of considerable allied contingents in Finland and their Navies could not enter the Baltic Sea, of course. Therefore as far as war against the Allies was concerned the Finnish Theater was of little importance. It looks that allied incursions in Caucasus and Black Sea were considered more likely. Again the discussion start with the words "Before Winter War". In any case it is hardly really important for this topic.

[Vaeltaja]

Point still stands that it was inconceivable at the time that Finns would allow Germans to use Finland as a staging area. Whole scenario of such event was a result of Soviet paranoia, reaction to which ironically resulted in the very scenario it had intended to erase.

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

Of course, that depended on position of the Finland itself. Again the idea that Finland was considered by definition hostile regardless of her own political position is wrong.

We'll go back to Winter War: no Germans in Finland, no military cooperation.

Finlands policy in the end 30's was cooperation with (almost pasifistic) Nordic countries.

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

As of April 1941 tasks of the Leningrad Military District in case of war were in the following way:

Firmly defending Vyborg and Kexholm directions to ensure a reliable defense of Leningrad ...to prevent enemy reaching Ladoga Lake ....covering the state border in North Karelia to ensure a normal operation of the Murmansk railroad.

http://vpk-news.ru/articles/9039
In other words operational objectives were defensive.

During no-war time every army has an defensive assignment. Change from defensive to aggressive takes just weeks depending the size of the operation.

There is a big different between political and military plans. Political plans are imperative and time scale is long. When examining Finnish-Russo relations at 1941, time scale starts from 1939 as told before. Political pressure against Finland after Winter War tells about aggressive plans and/or paranoia.

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

There was no German-Finnish cooperation to speak off because Finnish relations were not good with the Germany, quite the opposite. In fact they were poor enough for the Germans to remark so officially

...and sell Finland to Stalin at 1939.

[Art]

We'll go back to Winter War: no Germans in Finland, no military cooperation.

In autumn 1939. What would happen in a year or two was entirely dependent on Finnish good will. The point is that Sovpra didn't want to be dependent on good will, they wanted to secure such position that would guarantee their Baltic front in case of future war under any possible circumstances. So Finland's position wasn't considered by definition hostile but rather unstable and unreliable, which doesn't contradict to the Shaposhnikov's memorandum quoted above. Worth to mention that initially they wanted to satisfy their demands through negotiations, that Finns turned out to be that stubborn was a surprise somehow.

[Art]

During no-war time every army has an defensive assignment.

The important point that there are no signs of offensive assignment in the directive to the Leningrad Military District.

[Vaeltaja]

In autumn 1939. What would happen in a year or two was entirely dependent on Finnish good will. The point is that Sovpra didn't want to be dependent on good will, they wanted to secure such position that would guarantee their Baltic front in case of future war under any possible circumstances. So Finland's position wasn't considered by definition hostile but rather unstable and unreliable, which doesn't contradict to the Shaposhnikov's memorandum quoted above. Worth to mention that initially they wanted to satisfy their demands through negotiations, that Finns turned out to be that stubborn was a surprise somehow.

Actually that is something we do not know. Given that Soviets had puppet government ready for Finland, the extent of the Soviet marching guide to Finland (and the time that was required to make it), and what took place in the Baltic states after they had agreed to 'reasonable Soviet demands' it is impossible to state with any certainty that Soviets would have been satisfied with their demands. Also IIRC some historians stated that Stalin would have kept insisting on Hanko just because it was unacceptable for the Finns. In addition if Soviets aimed to improve their defenses then why did their demands include mutual dismantling of fortifications in Karelian Isthmus? As defensive line hardly constitutes an offensive threat.

Soviet leadership claimed that it was guarantee their Baltic front, which it didn't, it only placed it in further jeopardy.

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

We'll go back to Winter War: no Germans in Finland, no military cooperation.

In autumn 1939. What would happen in a year or two was entirely dependent on Finnish good will.

And if Finns had accepted Satalin's demans, the future of Finland had been depended on Stalin's good will...

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

During no-war time every army has an defensive assignment.

The important point that there are no signs of offensive assignment in the directive to the Leningrad Military District.

Very possible. But Red Air Force had the same situation until it got the order and 350 planes penetrated Finnish air space. - Normal procedure of every army is to make a defensive as well as offensive plan and an attack is a matter of an order from government.

[Seppo Jyrkinen]

Also IIRC some historians stated that Stalin would have kept insisting on Hanko just because it was unacceptable for the Finns.

What value Hanko had? Estonia and Latvia had accepted Stalins demands and Soviet Union had military bases several hundred kilometers avay from Leningrad.

In addition if Soviets aimed to improve their defenses then why did their demands include mutual dismantling of fortifications in Karelian Isthmus? As defensive line hardly constitutes an offensive threat.

And why Aland had to be non-military area? Before the Winter War Sweden and Finland planed to build fortifications on Aland but SU shoot down those plans at summer 1939. And one year later, at summer 1940, SU demanded Aland's demilitarization. - Stalin's policy was logical only, if he wanted to help someone to occupy Aland.

[Art]

Very possible. But Red Air Force had the same situation until it got the order and 350 planes penetrated Finnish air space. -

No. One of the tasks of the Leningrad Military District in pre-war documents was defined as "to gain air superiority by active operations of the aviation":
http://army.armor.kiev.ua/hist/stratplan-lenvo.shtml
Exactly the same phrase was repeated in the directive to other districts. Unlike West and Kiev Military districts the tasks on the ground were defensive though.

What value Hanko had?

Flank of the mine-artillery position at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland.

[Art]

Soviet leadership claimed that it was guarantee their Baltic front, which it didn't, it only placed it in further jeopardy.

It doesn't really appear from military planning documents. Apparently an opinion in 1941 was that the present border guarantees the firm defense of Leningrad and the Gulf of Finland, there was no such opinion in 1938.

[Juha Tompuri]

During no-war time every army has an defensive assignment.

The important point that there are no signs of offensive assignment in the directive to the Leningrad Military District.

A babelfish translation sign from Dimitry Hazanov article about the planning of Soviet air attack against Finland 25th June 1941:

It is unlikely that a single night can be prepared and to ensure that the fighting of several compounds. [184] Perhaps the plan (as well as several others, not disposed of later) developed in peacetime, and now he was accepted for execution.

http://militera.lib.ru/h/hazanov_db2/07.html

Regards, Juha

[Juha Tompuri]

What were they trying to achieve?

Destruction of enemy aviation and airfield network in Finland to prevent air attack on Soviet territory.

Not only that.

According to the The journal of Military History in Finland #20 from year 2001 by Geust and Hazanov, the order #01 of 2 SAD (Mixed Aviation Division) to attack Finland 2506-0107 1941 included attacking Imatra electric power station and the dam at the river.

Regards, Juha