Gen. Öhquist study about Soviet demands in 1939

[fenriz]

Hello,
I found very short info in William Trotter's "A Frozen Hell..." that Gen. Öhquist analalized Soviet demands during Moscov negotiations form a military point of view. Unfortunately Trotter doesn't use notes. I think it's in gen. Öhquist book "Talvisota minun näkökulmastani". I would like to know his full analize form a military point of view as an historical source (Trotter mentioned one sentence). So if you have that book in your home or local library please if it will be possible make a high quality pics of pages with that thread.
Here, most important sources of Winter War (especially in finnish) are very rare.
Thanks in advance

[Mangrove]

Öhquist writes a little about the Soviet territory demands during the Moscow negotiations on the first edition of his book Vinterkriget 1939-40 ur min synvinkel (1949). He has reproduced some parts his personal diary on the book, of which the following excerpt has been extracted (pg. 76, translation by me):

4 November [...] Österman arrived at 10 o'clock. I explained to him my understanding of the Soviet offer of [exchange of] territory. If they truly fear that some great power will attack Leningrad through our territory, then they should take account the development of modern military technology - bombers, armoured divisions! - and demand that the border should very least be moved to the Kymi River or preferably to the Gulf of Bothnia.

No modern military scholar can take quite seriously their justification for the demands they put on us. Promptly, that what they now demand from us, is only an introduction to new, much more far-reaching claims that are produced as soon as we have agreed to the earlier ones and thereby severely impaired our defense capabilities.

Österman, in principle, shares the same opinion with me that our morally and legally unassailable position had justified us to refuse all concessions and that the Russians likely interpret any further concessions as a sign of fear, but he still believes that by bargaining we might win a few months, which for us are extremely valuable.

4.11. [...] Österman anlände kl. 10. Jag utlade för honom min uppfattning om våra territoriella erbjudanden åt ryssarna. Om de verkligen fruktar, att någon stormakt skall anfalla Leningrad över vårt territorium, så borde med hänsyn till vapensteknikens nuvarande utveckling - bombflyget, pansardivisionerna! - fordra, att gränsen allra minst flyttas till Kymmene älv, helst till Bottniska viken. Deras motivering för de krav de ställt på oss kan alltså ingen modernt skolad militär ta på fullt allvar. Snarast utgör väl det, som de nu begär, endast en inledning till nya, mycket längre gående fordringar, som framställs, så snart vi har gått med på de nu framförda och därigenom kännbart försämrat våra försvarsmöjligheter. Österman år i princip av samma åsikt som jag i det avseendet, att vår moraliskt och juridiskt oantastliga ställning hade berättigat oss att avböja alla medgivanden och att ryssarna sannolikt tolkar varje eftergift som utslag av rädsla, men han tror ändå, att vi genom att köpslå kanske kan vinna några månader, vilka för oss år oerhört värdefulla.

[durb]

If I remember correctly, Mannerheim advised Finnish governement to accept some Soviet territorial claims (for example the islands of Finnish Gulf, which could not been held in the case of war). He wanted to win time to equip better Finnish Defence Forces. The main problem was Hanko and a Soviet military base in Finnish territory, which was unacceptable for Finns. In other territorial claims it probably could have been able to reach some (time-winning) compromise.

There were also some characteristics in Finnish-Soviet negotiations different compared to Soviet treatment of Baltic states (with which Soviets did not practically negotiate and just forced them to surrender). Finns were offered some territory compensation in northern Karelia in exchange of Soviet claims in Karelian Isthmus. Also Stalin personally participated in negotiations with Finns in autumn 1939, which shows that he at that point was ready to accept some kind of compromise with Finns. It might be that Soviets were thinking to annex Finland to Soviet Union anyway, but by the late autumn 1939 this was probably not yet in the agenda. Only when the war broke out and the infamous Kuusinen puppet governement was formed, it was clear that Soviets were after 100 % conquest of Finland.

[Karelia]

For me it is obvious that Stalin wanted to annex Finland in any case. The preparations have been started already in 1938. The "negotiations" were only theatre for the World.

For Stalin the best option would have been Finland yielding to his demands little by little, until the situation would have been totally hopeless and Finland would have given up - without war - like the Baltics. The second best option was Finland not yielding, the USSR marching across the borders and Finland surrendering - or so he believed anyway.

[Mangrove]

It might be that Soviets were thinking to annex Finland to Soviet Union anyway, but by the late autumn 1939 this was probably not yet in the agenda. Only when the war broke out and the infamous Kuusinen puppet governement was formed, it was clear that Soviets were after 100 % conquest of Finland.

Do notice that according to Ohto Manninen on his book "Miten Suomi valloitetaan", the Soviet Union had plans to invade Åland and the islands on the Gulf of Finland without asking permission or declaring war against Finland from March 1939 onwards. This was in case Finland would not remain neutral in a crisis or simply because the need of the Soviet Union would require the ownership of the islands.