Did Soviet Deep Tactics Return to Break the Mannerheim Line?

[Zorak16]

Hey all got an interesting question...

I just learned of the basic concept of the Soviet military theory, Deep Battle. I understand that was for all intensive purposes lost when Stalin had his purges. My question is goes as follows.

When Timoshenko is given charge to carry out his plan, which was to focus on the Mannerheim Line as opposed to what they were unsuccessfully doing before (basically attacking everywhere), did the first break occur in the line occur because of Soviet Deep Tactics, or was it a command at the ground level that led to this result? Specifically when the Soviets breakthrough at the Ladhe sector, they pierce the line, then reinforce their push with additional fresh troops.

Thanks

[Paul_Atreides]

I understand that was for all intensive purposes lost when Stalin had his purges.

Why lost? The deep battle was part of PU-36.

[John T]

Hey all got an interesting question...

I just learned of the basic concept of the Soviet military theory, Deep Battle. I understand that was for all intensive purposes lost when Stalin had his purges. My question is goes as follows.

When Timoshenko is given charge to carry out his plan, which was to focus on the Mannerheim Line as opposed to what they were unsuccessfully doing before (basically attacking everywhere), did the first break occur in the line occur because of Soviet Deep Tactics, or was it a command at the ground level that led to this result? Specifically when the Soviets breakthrough at the Ladhe sector, they pierce the line, then reinforce their push with additional fresh troops.

Thanks

If I may give some general comments.

I think the problem up north where the opposite,
the Soviets initially played by the doctrine until surrounded, and then where stuck on the forest road.

And the Finns had also read the book and prepared accordingly.


And when we talk about Mannerheim line, I think you can say that it was Trench warfare, by and large an example of implementing the lessons from WW1.

Concentration, coordination and resources to maintaining the pressure.


a good read:
Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940: getting the doctrine right.
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... &p=1462430

Cheers
/John

[Zorak16]

I am unfamiliar with what you mean by PU-36 (still learning the details of the war). To be perfectly honest, this topic sounded more profound in my head as I typed this post (after a couple of scotches ).


In regards to John T's comment, I agree that this resembles the trench warfare in WW1. It was about "Concentration, coordination and resources to maintaining the pressure." or as I like to say, pushing till a gap opens up and then reinforcing success.

Thank you for the recommendation, I will definitely check it out.

I just finished Frozen Hell: by William Trotter and am about to start on The Hundred Day Winter War: Finland's Gallant Stand against the Soviet Army by Gordon Sanders. Once I have a firm grasp on the war, I will begin to dive into the details.

I traditionally am a huge fan of political history and its relation with military history (in a broad sense), but as I grow older I have become fascinated with the more detailed aspects of military history and military knowledge in general.

[steverodgers801]

Deep battle is a post war development, the original idea came from Tuhkachevsky, but when he was executed his theories were out of favor. The first stage of deep penetration came with the Bagration operation. For Finland it was simply a matter of brute force, the level of penetration was still operation and not strategic for Finland

[Paul_Atreides]

I am unfamiliar with what you mean by PU-36 (still learning the details of the war).

PU-36 - Временный полевой устав РККА 1936 года (RKKA Provisional Field Service Regulations 1936).

[Paul_Atreides]

Deep battle is a post war development, the original idea came from Tuhkachevsky, but when he was executed his theories were out of favor.

It's not true. Deep battle/operation was still main option. A study of the military press of the period clearly shows that. A pair of examples:

"The experience of the war in Spain shows that only a deep offensive operation with sufficient forces and means to shake in the short term all the tactical and operational depth of the defense on a broad front, can count on a great operational success". (Любарский С. Некоторые выводы из опыта войны в Испании // Военная мысль. 1938. № 10. С. 29)

"Modern development of the operational art of the Red Army a prerequisite to conduct an offensive operation is not linear forms, but at the same time on the entire depth; to carry the deep operation on the main axes, surround and destroy the enemy in the area of operations of the shock army, restricting it in the secondary directions and isolating the area of operation from rapid influx of fresh forces from other areas and from the depths of the country". (Шиловский Е. Подготовка и ведение оперативного прорыва // Военная мысль. 1939. № 8. С. 18).

[steverodgers801]

I said the idea came prewar, but the development of it was post war, because the means to carry out such an operation took time and practice. The number one issue was the ability to transport supplies and support with the troops. The Russian civil war had many examples of deep operations by cavalry, but they were not able to sustain operations.

[Art]

It's not true. Deep battle/operation was still main option. A study of the military press of the period clearly shows that. A pair of examples:

Formally speaking deep battle and deep operation were different things. Concerning deep battle at least the ideas about long-range tank groups which were one of its cornerstones apparently gone extinct by 1941.

[Paul_Atreides]

Formally speaking deep battle and deep operation were different things.

Of 'cos, tactical and operational levels.

Concerning deep battle at least the ideas about long-range tank groups which were one of its cornerstones apparently gone extinct by 1941.

Tasks of the DD tank groups were assigned to VVS and artillery. The main condition of deep battle - the simultaneous suppression of tactical defense to the full depth - remained unchanged.

[steverodgers801]

Paul I said the ideas were prewar, but the practical development came after the war. ITs one thing to think about doing it, but its another to learn how to implement the idea

[steverodgers801]

sorry Paul I mis read and thought you made an additional comment

[Paul_Atreides]

Paul I said the ideas were prewar, but the practical development came after the war.

What? First practical application of deep operation (battle) is Khalhin-Gol (Nomonhan) in august 1939. As wrote in Soviet Military Encyclopedia (vol. 2, article "Deep operation (battle)"):

"For the Soviet army was very useful and necessary development of the theory of deep operation on the eve of the Second World War. The vitality of its main provisions evident in offensive operations and battles of the Great Patriotic War. During the war, this theory has continuously improved in accordance with equipping becoming more efficient equipment and weapons of the Soviet troops, changing their organizational structure and the nature of the enemy's defenses".

[steverodgers801]

Kholkin Gol was not deep battle as it became, it was operational at best. You state quite nicely "development" For deep battle, as thought of post war, I would say the invasion of Manchuria in 1945 could be considered the first true deep battle.

[Art]

Kholkin Gol was not deep battle as it became, it was operational at best.

You are confusing terms somewhat. In Soviet military terminology both during the war and after operational level of warfare was considered to be larger scale than tactics which deals employment of troops in battle/combat. So "deep battle" described tactical actions (up to a corps inclusively), "deep operation" - operational (from corps and larger).
As for "true deep battle" my impression is that Canadian operation Totalize was closer to the original concept than anything that the Soviet Army demonstrated in WW2.