Soviet Armored Sleds in Practice

[Aleksander P]

I was wondering how this tactic used by the Soviets performed when trying to break trough the Mannerheim Line. Was it a deathtrap or did it actually work?

[Esa Muikku]

I think the Soviet sources will tell the truth.

[Juha Tompuri]

Something slightly related:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1296&hilit
https://fotki.yandex.ru/next/users/foto ... iew/476585

Regards, Juha

[Lotvonen]

Here is a personal account from the "Kansa Taisteli" journal which features armoured sleds. Rather long but very interesting, I think.

A Rifle Company in defensive battle in Muolaa Church Isthmus 14 to 16 February 1940 - A Battle of the Winter War
By Matti Iivari (Iivo) Riikonen (1906-1992)
(Mr Riikonen was an agronomist and Reserve officer. He fought in the Winter war as Platoon and Company commander. He was wounded in 1940.
1941-1944 he fought as infantry Company and Battalion commander attaining the rank of Captain. For map sketches kindly refer to the online journals indicated below.)

A Rifle Company in defensive battle in Muolaa Church Isthmus 14 to 16 February 1940
(Journal Kansa taisteli - miehet kertovat 1 - 3 1962)

1. Background and 14th to 15th February 1940.

5th Co. of Infantry Regiment JR4 was made up of men from Ruokolahti parish. In the Winter War they had been initially positioned on the shore of lake Muolaanjärvi at Oinaala. It was in their positions that the enemy managed to drive a wedge after tremendous artillery strafe supported by tanks on 18 Dec. 1939. The Company lost 60% of their men as casualties, including every officer.

Eliminating the breach would have taken an unreasonable toll due to lack of artillery ammunition, so it was just contained.

At the end of December the II Battalion of JR 4, including the 5th Co., was pulled back for recovery and replacements. I became the Commander of the 5th Co. at this stage.

The enemy launched their offensive in the Carelian Isthmus on Feb. 10, 1940 which also affected our sector. My 5th Co. was subordinated to the III Battalion of JR4, that was defending the isthmus between lakes Yskjärvi and Kirkkojärvi. The stronghold at the Muolaa church was lost on the 13. Feb morning, and due to this the Company had to dig a new trench the next night North of the church.

[The men had to dig the trench in the night because it was impossible in the daytime due to the enemy superior firepower. The fact that they managed to dig at all in the middle of the winter, when the ground is in most places frozen solid up to 2m deep, is due to the dry sandy soil of the isthmus. Also the existing positions were built before the war for delaying the enemy instead of solidly. Tr. rem.]

In the small hours of 14. Feb my Company was ordered to the front line in this same isthmus. The positions were handed over to us by the 9th Co, that was made up of men from Joutseno led by Res. Lt. Matti Lahti.

The commander of JR 4 was Col.Lt. L.Leander, the commander of the III Battalion was Maj. Y.Hanste. I received my orders from Capt. Lauri Kettunen, who was the assistant to the commander of the III Battalion. He was my schoolmate from Joensuu Lyceum and Boy Scout friend. We trusted each other fully which is absolutely needed in difficult situations.

In the Winter War Finnish Army tactics was "repelling" which means that positions were not to be given up without command. If for some reason positions had been abandoned they had to be retaken with a counterstrike. The orders given by Capt. Kettunen stated that our company was to keep the postiitions, whatever might happen.

5th Co. of JR4 comprised three platoons with a battle strength of totally 110 men. At Muolaa Church Isthmus on the left was the I Platoon, to the right the II Platoon. There was a half platoon dugout housing a command post with a telephone connection to the Battalion HQ. The distance from the trench to the dugout was 50 m and there was no trench to connect them, which was to have serious consequences later. The trench held by the I and II platoons was dug in an open field. The positions of the III Platoon were situated in rocky forest, comprising instead of a decent trench of small stretches only. Their section included a well made and spacious half platoon dugout.

The section of the I and II Platoons was equipped with two machine guns (Maxim type, Tr.rem) and the III Platoon also two machine guns from the 5th Machine Gun Company of JR4. A mortar Fire Control team was placed in the command dugout and an Artillery Fire Control group at the edge of the forest. Despite my repeated requests I did not get any support from artillery or mortars due to lack of ammunition. Artillery and Mortars did not have any role in the battle and are therefore not mentioned.

To our left, North of the church ruin was the 6th Company and to our right 2nd Company, but I did not know it as we were fighting. Having enquired about my flanks in the morning of 14th Feb from Capt Kettunen I was told that I knew enough already: the task of Company which was: to stay in our positions - whatever would happen - until eventual order to withdraw, and the Battalion would take care of everything else.

Our positions had been built during the "Refresher training” period and they were quite uncompleted. The trench where the I and II Platoons fought was dug in sandy soil, so the trench sides constantly slid down filling the trench and sand was raining upon the defenders during shelling. There was an enemy field gun battery next to the church ruin firing along our trench and its rear at point blank range in addition to constant indirect artillery fire at us. Consequently all resupplying had to take place in the night. In front of our trench there were remains of wire and anti tank hindrances, by now totally useless for defenders.

[Anti-tank guns were not available and anyway they would have been wiped out by the enemy artillery as soon as spotted in the open terrain. Tr. rem.]

My command post was situated in the dugout on the right flank of the II Platoon with telephone wire to the Battalion commander, I had to act as the commander of both I and II Platoons and personally lead the fighting .

The enemy action started 0600 hrs on 14 Feb 1940 with tremendous infantry fire. Due to the long range the bullets hit on the section of the III Platoon the trees with a constant "splatter". At 0700 hrs 25 tanks [T-26 and T-28 types] rolled toward the "seam" between the I and II Platoons which was in the lowest spot of the terrain. There were four flame thrower tanks in the lead , two of them engaged the I platoon trench and the other two the II Platoon trench. The flame thrower tanks were big tanks with a 4 to 5 m long tube in the front. It was used to spray liquid fuel that was lit with a pilot flame at the muzzle of the tube. This created a wall of fire 15 to 20 m long and up to 4m high, reaching the ground and the bottom of our trench. These flame thrower tanks were armed also with two machine guns in front and one in the rear, I recollect.

The purpose of the flame throwers was to create panic in our positions and so create a gap in the defences that would enable the tanks to roll through to our rear and the infantry to easily occupy the "abandoned" trench.

The enemy succeeded in sending their tanks in our rear but as we stuck to our positions we were able to control the infantry with our infantry weapons fire. The enemy tried to approach our trench on the tanks and behind armour plates mounted on skis. After spending one to two hours in our rear the tanks returned. They repeated their attempt on the 14th and the 15th at 1200 hrs and 1600 hrs so that now the flame thrower tanks were covered by other tanks as they scorched our positions, and the other tanks fired their guns at our trench. Immediately the following tanks advanced into our rear and the enemy infantry tried to get into our trench using various methods, but without success. As soon as the tanks had disappeared from the vicinity of our positions the enemy artillery opened up indirect fire as well as point blank fire so that we did not get one moment of rest.

We, the defenders, had made ourselves clear two important facts:
- We are not going to leave our positions whatever would happen
- We are not going to let enemy infantry in our positions.

Already the 14th Feb. tanks flattened the machine gun on the section of the I Platoon and damaged the MG nest on the section of the II Platoon in into useless condition, it could only be used as shelter for the men.

Our LMGs and rifles were constantly jamming due to the sand rain. Yet we were able to cope somehow at this stage of the battle. We had petrol bombs and satchel charges to fight the tanks.

We were used to tanks already in Oinaala where they surrounded us, burning or functioning. But flame throwers were something new, and I must admit it felt uncomfortable as the first wall of fire flashed in front of a man. Suppressing the panic called for strict discipline. But the fact is that after we had found out the peculiarities of flame throwers and the dead angles of the tank machine guns, we did not make any major errors. It is true that we had to run through a wall of fire every now and then, but as long as a man covered his face well nothing worse happened, sometimes one's snow overall was scorched or soaked with naphta. One single flame thrower in action had in my opinion only moral effect but if there were several of them pumping fire in one spot and as tank guns joined in with their shells, it was a hellish situation and any man began to tremble. The safest spot in this kind of situation was near the tank, under the fire tube where the tank machine guns could not shoot.

Res.Lt. I. Iso-Kuusela, the Commander of the II Platoon, was eager to hurt the enemy in every possible manner. He was particularly worried about the enemies who were sniping behind the armour plates that had been pushed in front of the positions of his platoon. So he was occupied in firing at the attackers, who believed to be safe, from their flank with his rifle. On the morning of the 15th Feb. in his zeal he had followed the tank track on the No man's land and fired at the attackers from shell holes. But at 0700 hrs the enemy launched another tank attack and the lad did not make it back in the trench. He had to stay in a shallowish shell hole as the tanks approached. A tank drove on the shell hole, then backed and advanced again a few times, intending to crush him. But the Lieutenant returned, although his buttocks were badly bruised by the tank tracks.

It was with him that we tried to destroy the flame thrower tanks. We were many times between the tracks of these tanks with our satchel charges, steel bars and other implements. Once we managed to blow a 2kg charge under a flame thrower. The enemy towed their tank away and gave us an angry artillery strafe. Another time we managed to place a 5kg charge under one track but we noticed we had not put in the detonator, and we did not have any with us. Our hard work was wasted, but we made the "beast" limp by pushing a steel bar in the caterpillar track system.

Res.Lt. I. Iso-Kuusela, the fearless Commander of the II Platoon, was scored by a bullet on his right thigh afternoon the 15.Feb as he was firing at the enemy from the top of the MG bunker, behind a captured armour plate. He had the previous night evacuated from the No man's land thirty to forty of these armour plates, which were to be crucial for our survival. As Platoon commander he was replaced by Sgt Eino Luukkonen, with whom I had to undergo many a tough experiences during the coming days and weeks.

As to the action on the left and right flank it can be told that Res. Lt. Sorvali, the commander of I Platoon, was occupied in keeping the collapsing trench in usable condition. The front at the III Platoon was relatively quiet on the 14. to 15. Feb. Tanks left them alone due to the forest covered difficult terrain. In general the enemy tanks always avoided forest. The Commander of I Platoon. Res. Lt. Lehikoinen had gained experience in the battle of Oinola. Their position was not free from risk because the enemy approached them by digging approaches in the snow. Our sharpshooters did a good work against them, one Corporal claimed 30 certain cases when ambushing the enemy snow diggers on the 14th to 15th Feb.

At nightfall the 15th Feb the positions of I Platoon and II Platoon were shelled so that the trench was turned into a series of shell holes. Consequently we had to work as hard as we could the next night to repair our positions. After persistent requests we got in our hands our material that had been left to the North of Muolaa church in the positions we had held on the 13th. We received also more petrol bombs, satchel charges, 5kg TNT charges, hand grenades, cartridges etc. From dusk to dawn the men were working in shifts, digging the trench or laying mines led alternately by Lt. Sorvali or Sgt. Luukkonen. More armour plates were evacuated from the No man's land, finally every foxhole was equipped with one. Finally another telephone wire was taken from the command post past the shelled area to the switchboard of the Battalion. In my opinion the Company was prepared to meet the next day as well prepared as it was possible. Ever increasing sounds of engines from the South did not bode well but I believe every man of the Company had prepared themselves each in their way to be ready to face the worst.

Since the enemy battery at the Muolaa church was a nuisance to us and since we did not get any artillery support to destroy it, we thought up a plan to eliminate it ourselves during the night between the 15th and 16th Feb. A skiing strike force made up of volunteers would do it. As I had asked for material from the Battalion for our raid the plan was exposed and it was immediately strictly forbidden. I also asked the Battalion to get us a light field gun to be placed in our trench so that we could even a little disturb enemy tanks. Another request denied. We did think that the first shot from our cannon would have been its last one. Also if we had somehow damaged the enemy battery next to the church, the enemy would have brought in an Artillery Battalion instead. Our life would have been even more miserable. The next day proved that our attempts would have been futile.

2. 16th February until 1400 hrs

16th February at 0600 hrs the enemy opened fire with infantry weapons and at 0645 hrs tanks attacked the positions of the 5.Co. We stood at the flattened dugout of the II Platoon and counted the approaching tanks, we estimated the number was forty five (45) and more were coming. We thought that it will be a tough time in our rear. But it was us that the enemy had decided to concentrate on, and wipe out our trench that hindered their free movement. We were fortunate not to know that the Red Army 97th Division was rushing at us supported by 55 tanks which were around our positions by 0700 hrs.

The tanks arrived following their old route along the depression in the terrain. They were led by six flame thrower tanks three of which headed for the positions of the I Platoon and another three at the II Platoon, spewing fire. These tanks were covered by others that spread on both sides of our trench, each having a dedicated stretch. Those tanks fired their cannons at our trench before and after each flame thrower attack. Tanks and flame throwers that had been attacking us yesterday were there to guide the new tanks. Some tanks were acting as artillery spotters a little aside in front of and behind our trench, because every now and then an artillery barrage hit the terrain behind our command post to the North, obviously to prevent any reinforcements and resupplying.

A considerable number of the tanks were in action in the sector of the I Platoon, it appeared the enemy had decided to destroy their positions. Soon a gap emerged between the two Platoons, and it was carefully guarded by the tanks. Also our command post was shot in flames.

The purpose of the flame throwers was to burn the defenders or make them panic while the tanks fired along every stretch of the trench with their cannons and machine guns. Only on the bottom of the trench or in the foxholes we were covered from the shells and jets of machine gun fire. (Most of the tanks were T-28s with one 3" gun and four machine guns in the front, one in the rear.) The co-operation of flame throwers and tanks was to clear the way to the infantry that was approaching in endless quadruple columns between and behind the tanks. The infantrymen did not take cover until in the vicinity of our trench. They trusted the tanks and appeared to be in their first battle, inexperienced men. Anyway the mass of infantry approached our positions slowly and inexorably.

It is next to impossible to describe the feelings that took over the mind of the Company Commander, and only those who have personally experienced a similar situation are fully able to understand what it was like.

Our task was made simpler by the fact that we had no other choice than to stay put and prevent the enemy infantry from breaking in into our positions. We fired at them while they were still marching in columns. By and by our firepower decreased as during the forenoon our LMGs, our sole MG, even our rifles were several times jammed due to the constant sand rain. Due to the action of the flame throwers and fire from the tanks the enemy infantry was not repelled until the enemy indicated by yelling that they were close enough to charge. Yet we were able to intercept them every time.

At this stage we had no time to spare for the tanks because all our attention was concentrated in covering us and repelling the infantry. A couple of tanks were burning because they had hit the mines we had laid the previous night. Our only weapon against them was our own fists; but as one man shook his fist at the enemy he took a bullet through his hand.

In the forenoon I proceeded to inspect the right wing of the II Platoon, and at the same time saw at a distance of 20m an enemy officer stand up and start charging at us while beckoning his men. I grabbed a rifle from the ground and fired, with the result that the rifle bolt flew past my ear with a whistle, powder gases hit my face and I was half dazed. This accident was due to sand in the rifle barrel. Fortunately another shot felled the enemy officer and the attack dried up. I was bandaged and I lied on the bottom of the trench for half an hour until my head was clear again.

The situation in the sector of the I Platoon on our left wing had been very serious from the very beginning. The boys fulfilled their duty in a legendary manner. Since the flame throwers and tanks could not make the men leave their positions the tanks found out a new method to flatten our sandy positions. Two tanks rolled side by side over the trench squeezing the defenders ever tighter , and repeated this action time and again. Of course some of our men were buried in their positions. We saw this with tears in our eyes, unable to help them in any manner, being surrounded by steel monsters everywhere. Screens of fire and shell explosions in our positions were horrible to watch.

Of course the Company Commander received requests from every direction. As his chances of assisting were limited the best thing to do was to ignore them and find one's way to the spot where one was most urgent needed. Even though we were all equally helpless I had the feeling that the presence of the Company Commander had the more calming and invigorating effect on the boys the more difficult the situation was. This was clearly notable in the forenoon but in the course of the afternoon ever more of the men had reached the limit of their endurance that could not be remedied even by the excellent example provided by some individuals. On top of desperation, exhaustion, helplessness, fear there was the most painful sandy dust billowing in the air that penetrated in every crevice of our bodies and caused a feeling of cold when mixing with sweat.

I had orders to call the Battalion Commander at 10.30 hrs and report. We had a line open to the battalion and it was monitored by my messenger, Pfc. Suikkanen. The telephone was situated in the command post even though the dugout was partly burnt down. Somehow I forced my way to the dugout from the trench of the II Platoon - as mentioned these two were not connected by any communication trench. I ordered the Platoon commanders to meet me there to be better able to give them the orders received from the battalion as well as mine. From the dugout that was in a little elevated spot of terrain we had a view of the terrible scene of our trench enveloped in constant pall of fire and sand dust. I explained our situation and emphasized that we would not abandon our positions. We also agreed that if our situation becomes insufferable we would neither surrender nor commit suicide but would fight to the very end.

We had been lying on the bottom of the dugout and so immersed in the worries of our duty for a few minutes that we neglected to notice what was going on in the outside. As soon as the enemy had detected movement at the dugout they had sent a flame thrower tank escorted by four tanks aiming to destroy the men inside. Even though being subject to blown fire in the trench was something we were used to, this new experience was a most unpleasant one. We managed to survive by foiling the tanks to shoot at false targets that we showed at different spots of the dugout corridor. One by one we dashed out and crept to the trench making use of the terrain while a hail of bullets whined over us. Men in the trench were watching in tension how we returned. The movements of the tank gun and machine gun barrels determined our actions.

The Company commander had to be constantly in the move in the trench and he was always exposed to danger because there was no time to watch out. Every man took it as a habit to watch my movements with one eye and, when necessary, command "Down!" which had to be immediately obeyed if one wanted to survive. In that day the Company commander was ordered to get down often and quickly. My alert men saved my life many a time.

Since the telephone was left in the burning dugout , Sgt. Luukkonen managed to fetch it in the trench. However the tank tracks cut the wire between the trench and the command post, so the telephone had to be returned in the dugout and Pfc. Suikkanen was left to his solitary duty.

At 1100 hours the situation in the positions of the I and II Platoons was getting ever worse. The gap between the Platoons was widening slowly and the tanks were moving around us at will. The enemy infantry failed to break in our trench despite several attempts, even though the sand jammed our weapons every now and then. So the enemy tried a new trick. Four armoured sleds, pulled by tanks and mounting a platoon of men, approached the gap in our defences. This was a new experience for us that made our blood run cold. By now we were surrounded by more than sixty (60) tanks. Flamethrowers and tanks were roaming about constantly forcing us to keep our heads low. Three of our four LMGs had been crushed by tanks and the fourth was jammed. The surviving MG was full of dirt and sand.

At first it seemed certain that the tanks with their armoured sleds are going to cross our trench and unload behind us which would mean a certain and speedy death to all of us. Yet the first sled stopped 50m ahead of our trench and men carrying special equipment disembarked. Despite the tremendous flame thrower and tank fire at us we managed to shoot at the men being unloaded, and as our surviving LMG was usable again the first sledful of men were eliminated. The LMG was hit very soon and totally wrecked. I must add that almost every rifleman had an armour plate, evacuated from the No man's land, for cover in their foxholes. They fired in flank direction only and killed first the storming men and their leaders.

Scared by the fate of the first armoured sled the three others turned back to unload a little farther off. The sled nearest to us exposed its unprotected rear, and as our MG was functional again, I supported the gun on the back of a Sergeant and sent an angry burst at it. Another sledful had been quickly eliminated accompanied by tremendous howling.

As we tried to get another exposed sled under fire the MG took a square hit and the Sergeant was wounded. Our last MG was lost, but the armoured sled attack that had seemed so dangerous had been repulsed.

Even though our situation at the Muolaa church was difficult and on the 16th Feb 1940 actually hopeless, nothing prevented us from shouting with joy at every little success. We did it many times, and again now as the armoured sleds were repelled. I am sure the enemy heard and remembered our yelling.

Now it was about 1300 hrs. The positions of the I Platoon were practically filled with earth, only in the middle of their trench there were some men led by Sgt. T Mäkinen in their foxholes. In the far end to the left there were another four men who stuck there until the moment we disengaged. Some of the I Platoon men were buried in their positions, some of them managed to get in the positions of the II Platoon either wounded or sound. I saw Sgt Mäkinen during his last moments, silhouetted against sun, between tanks throwing TNT charges. Before getting killed he managed to destroy two heavy enemy tanks. This aged sergeant, who had volunteered for first line duty, fulfilled his duty showing exceptional bravery.

One badly wounded man screamed for help among the tanks. The leader of the paramedics, Pfc Suikkanen and one of his men managed to get to the wounded man and load him on a light sled. They managed to bring him in the positions of the II Platoon after hiding and running a race with the tanks.

Then they tried to evacuate the wounded man from the trench, but the surrounding tanks forced the paramedics to return. A shell cut the harness ropes of the sled and a tank tried to crush the sled. A tank had parked across our trench, the paramedic leader used the tank cannon barrel as support and slipped under the tank , then pushed the wounded in his sled in the trench. The man died in our hands, like many others, as we could not get him in proper care.

About one hour later we saw that two men were playing hide and seek with the tanks in the positions of the I Platoon. They tried to get out of the reach of the tanks in the rear, making brief dashes, creeping and by any other means. Tanks fired at them as fast as they could. Their race with death seemed merciless. They were the last of Sgt. Mäkinen's men, except the four that obstinately stuck to their foxholes. Otherwise the I Platoon trench was unoccupied.

3. 16th February 1400 hrs to 1900 hrs

(Onslaught of numerically superior Red Army infantry and tanks at Muolaa church had continued from the early morning on. By noon the positions of the Ist Platoon on the left wing were filled up and now the positions of the II Platoon were next. We were waiting in tension what would happen.)

At 1400 hrs most of the tanks were around our stretch of trench. Four flame throwers were scorching us and tanks were firing along the straight stretches of the trench with all weapons. We could see that the tanks were placed in a semi-circle around the trench of the II Platoon. (Ref. ill.) Enemy infantry rallied behind this encirclement. Immediately the leftmost stretch of our trench became useless as a big tank fired its main gun along it, only 70cm high "corridor” above its bottom was passable. (The tank gun could not be depressed enough. Tr. rem.)

In our trench there were also all the dead and wounded men, so it was quite crowded. We had only rifles, which kept jamming due to the constant sand rain. They had to be cleaned constantly.

While the enemy formed the blockade around us under constant fire of flamethrowers and tank guns from our front and rear, slight panicking occurred. Some of our men rallied into small groups that kept moving about. This was dangerous and it had to be stopped at once. A tall Sergeant, who had supported the MG for me had been wounded in the forenoon. He was still able to use his right hand, he grabbed men by the collar and scattered the clusters and pushed the men down on the bottom of the trench. This Sergeant was one of my irreplaceable assistants, he kept his nerve to the very end. He acted at my slightest sign at once. I myself had to pull my pistol to prevent a panicking group from climbing out of the trench, because they would have been killed immediately.

This was our situation as the enemy tanks started their co-ordinated attack. First the flame thrower tanks entered inside the ring of tanks from the direction of the church . They drove on both sides of our trench spraying fire and shooting with machine guns at us until they reached the other end of our trench. Then they turned back and repeated their attack from the right to the left. After the flame thrower tanks had completed their attack, the surrounding tanks opened an intensive fire at us which lasted quite long. This was repeated several times during the afternoon, the purpose was obviously to sap our capacity to defend ourselves so that the infantry could occupy our positions.

"The air was full of iron" - and our situation, hopelessly bad since the very morning, turned even worse.
Fortunately the enemy infantry stayed a little farther off. Despite that we shot at them whenever it was possible because we knew what would settle our fate.

As I mentioned I believe everyone prepared mentally for this day during the previous night. I remember specially two cases.

As we heard the enemy shout "URAA" I ran along the trench to check that every man was in his position. I saw a tall blonde man on his knees on the bottom of the trench, his hands crossed, in deep prayer, oblivious of the tremendous noise surrounding us, comprising buzzing of shells and enemy charge yells. I did wrong, I think, as I disturbed his prayer by telling him to go to his foxhole and start repelling the attackers. As born again this brother in arms of mine did his duty with courage and determination.

A little later I saw an older man kneeling on the bottom of the trench with his hands crossed and his eyes turned up. I did not need to disturb him, he was one of the very best. Both men fought in their positions calmly, disregarding their surroundings. Before they both were killed they were the pillars of our defence positions.

After the enemy "ring of tanks" had been formed at 1530 hrs or thereabouts I was told that the Battalion Commander was on the phone. I do not recall how I managed to get in the command post dugout under the fire of the tanks. Because my mouth, eyes, nostrils and eyes were full of sand, and my body covered with it, I could not hear at once in the tremendous noise what I was being told. Finally I understood that we were to pull back at 1800 hrs next night. It was a stunning piece of news, because the situation of the II Platoon implied that we would meet our destruction before that. The enemy infantry was grouped for attack and they approached our positions slowly while the tanks were firing at full rate.

Since we could anticipate the order to disengage and pull back I instructed Lt. Lehikoinen to send two messengers to inform the III Platoon. He did this but as soon as we tried to leave the dugout both messengers were wounded, one in the arm and the other one in the leg. (Both men now wear prosthetic members) and I also got small splinters in my skin. We must have been so stunned that we were not careful enough. I felt lonely as there were no men to take the information about pulling back to the III Platoon, while the situation in the positions of the II Platoon seemed to be ever worse.

Fortunately another messenger sent by Lt Lehikoinen came crawling . He told me that part of the III Platoon trench was in the hands of the enemy and more men, hand grenades and ammunition was needed fast. Several men had been killed. Of course I did not have neither men nor hand grenades, the II Platoon would have needed them as well. Even the telephone connection was now cut off so we could not request any help from the Battalion. So the messenger could only relay my message about the hour of disengaging and order to keep the positions until 1800 hrs.

My return to the trench was the most difficult ever. It was a wonder that I survived the hail of shells and bullets.

Even though informing the defenders the hour of disengaging in our hard situation might cause panic, I did it because our lifetime was counted in seconds and withholding the information could also have destructive consequences. Some rushing about did ensue and only by taking harsh action I was able to calm the minds. This rushing made the incapacitated wounded men to fear that they would be abandoned in the hands of the enemy. I told each of them personally that when we disengage they will be the first ones to leave, otherwise we shall all be left there. This calmed them and they withstood without complaints to the very end, although a couple of them died during the next few hours.

Enemy tanks were constantly patrolling our positions and the infantry approached menacingly. We had been compelled to use our ammunition copiously , now we found we were facing a shortage. All ammunition was removed from the MG belts and from the pouches of the dead and wounded. It was impossible to get any supplies from the rear. Then the enemy seemed to proceed to the final phase in taking our trench - the tanks on the enemy side of the ring approached our trench, firing and followed by infantry in dense formations. Our ammunition was used up and our destruction seemed to be inevitable.

Someone remembered that there was some ammunition in the foxholes at the leftmost end of our trench which was under constant tank gun fire. I asked for volunteers among the men at the left wing. There were none, because the 25 m stretch of trench was under the fire of a big tank , only 70cm from the bottom of the trench was passable. Since there was no time to waste I set off myself but Sgt Luukkonen intervened and as a thin and resourceful man he jumped ahead of me, followed by the blonde "praying man". The boys were at our destination ahead of me. Our reward was two boxes of ammunition. We retuned successfully, although in the confined trench the 3" shells sweeping over us made us feel naked. The tour that took some minutes made us drenching wet with sweat. Having found cover, if there was any in our situation, we were dead tired.

As mentioned our trench was filled with dead and wounded lying on the bottom. We did not have time in the emergency we were experiencing to watch our steps. We often tread our dead or wounded men. As the tanks fired along the trench one had to drop flat every now and then. There being no chance of selecting the spot which could be the cold body of our killed man. One might found oneself cheek to cheek with a dead man when trying to avoid one's face getting burnt by the flamethrower fire. One felt keenly that soon one could join the ranks of the cold men. Our lives were not worth much as we, like rats, tried to hide and avoid the blows dealt at us by a giant.

As this "blocking stage" started we had about 25 irregularly functional rifles. At the time as we found some more ammunition more men had been killed or wounded and rifles damaged, only 8 to 10 were usable. Riflemen did accurate work despite the tank's fire. The wounded filled the cartridge ties sitting on the bottom of the trench and helped the riflemen to adjust the armour plates as needed. I had two plates to cover me, and the lightly wounded men kept adjusting tem without any orders.

As we had found these two boxes of ammunition the tanks on the enemy side of our trench had approached to a distance of 50 meters, and the infantry kept yelling "URAA". The last phase of our destruction appeared to be starting. Now we had to bet everything on our "last card " and do with our diminished strength everything possible.

At this stage, facing secure destruction, no man fit to fight was hardly fearing for his life anymore. The idea that painless death might free a man from this conundrum could have lurked in one's mind. The Company Commander was heavily weighted by the responsibilities of keeping the positions and the men's lives. Remembering one's home and family and thinking of the consequences of one's impending death to them was an unspeakable burden. Our only hope was to fight our final battle honourably to the very end.

Although I was the Company Commander I abandoned my duties and started repelling the enemy infantry with my rifle. Our 8 to 10 rifles kept firing as fast as possible, the wooden parts were smoking. The blonde "praying man" took a bullet in his brow and soundlessly dropped in the trench, the other prayer was pierced by a shell splinter and died next to me.

Many of us had reached the limit of their endurance. Constant action for several days without rest or sleep on top of the hard pressure of this day had discouraged the strongest of the men. It seemed to me that our boys were now indifferent to anything.

Finally, as all we had left were five rifles and a few cartridges - a miracle happened .

The tanks nearest to our trench withdrew, as did the infantry. The tanks rolled over their own dead and wounded on their way, even we, their enemies, felt bad when hearing the screams of agony. We had so few cartridges left that we did not waste any on the retreating infantry. I think every man sent a grateful thought in the direction of Heaven.

If the enemy had continued their attack for a few more minutes, our defence would have been weakened due to lack of men, arms and ammunitions so that they could have buried us in the dirt of the Muolaa isthmus.

Another enemy infantry attack had been repelled. It was about 1730 hrs. The fire of the tanks abated somewhat, and the tanks began to move away. The hope of surviving began to flicker in our minds, although the tanks were still there preventing any movement. The tanks scattered around our trench , now several could be seen near the command post. As the danger of enemy infantry had dissipated even the flame thrower tanks were familiar to us, to such an extent that we were apathetic for a moment.

- Enemy behind, someone shouted at that very moment, shaking us from our torpor. Indeed, two men approached from the rear, dashing, creeping, crawling between the tanks. These two fellows had at 1400 hrs raced with death ahead of the tanks in the rear and saved themselves. Now they were coming to "help" us, escorted by the fire of the tanks up to the trench. The boys had nearly been buried in their foxhole by two tanks, they had jumped up and played hide and seek with the tanks, dodging the tracks and sometimes even climbing on a tank. One had his clothing torn down to skin in his back, the other had his trouser leg torn up. They had lost their rifles, caps, leather mitts, haversacks, belts in the heat of the battle. These shocked looking boys had penetrated the tank blockade which was a deed. I could not help smiling when looking at these bearded, dirty and tattered fellows. We exchanged some rough but the more beautiful words. I sent them as sentries to the right flank in the direction of the III Platoon.

The tanks weakened their grip and several tanks returned to their own side. It was then, at 18.30hrs, as the men of the I Platoon who had tenaciously stuck to their positions, managed to dash between the tanks to our positions. They were earnestly happy as we had not abandoned them. One of the I Platoon men had volunteered to fetch them at my request. Our paramedic Pfc who had been away while the tanks blockaded us had organised sleds at the edge of the forest next to us. Soon he and his men arrived in our trench having dodged the tanks. (Under the cover of deepening darkness, tr. rem.). Two volunteers tried at my request to evacuate the body of the vice I Platoon leader whose location was known exactly. They did manage to find the body and load him in their sled but unfortunately they had to abandon the body of the Sergeant due to firing from the tanks.

A little earlier it was informed that enemies were seen in the rear of the III Platoon. It was about 1900 hrs and dusk was setting. I sent the I Platoon remains and part of the II Platoon led by Lt. Sorvali to secure at the right wing where the positions of the III Platoon had been. They also took our dead with them. They left two at a time because twenty tanks remained preying on us and five tanks were still in flames about our trench..(Ref. figure). Then we evacuated the seriously wounded, one at a time in sleds pulled by men. Finally the rest of the II Platoon disengaged. I and Sgt. Luukkonen paid a visit to our burning command post where we added some petrol in the flames.

Lt. Sorvali may have thought we had lingered in our positions because we saw a pair of men approach in the usual manner of dashing and creeping. They were messengers who had orders to ask for the reason of my delay, they also informed that the enemy infantry is slowly advancing in the rear of the III Platoon trench. The III Platoon had retreated already between 1700 and 1800 hrs to avoid being outflanked.

Even though we had suffered heavily in these positions, I felt our work was not accomplished as we evacuated the trench.

We had gained at least a preemptive victory and the Company had fulfilled the task ordered to it. Our losses were heavy. When we took the positions our strength was 110 men, as we left there were 55 men. The I an II Platoons suffered most, their casualty rate was 65%.

The battle we had fought was not a special one, just one like hundreds of others. Yet for my surviving brothers in arms, who were fighting in the Muolaa church isthmus on 14th to 16th February 1940, the story that I recounted includes sacred memories. They never told about it to boast.

The event I have described constitute one link in the chain that enabled the miracle of the Winter War. It also demonstrates that the Miracle was paid for by the blood and lives of front line men.

[Red Army 151st IR losses during the three day battle at the Muolaa (renamed: Pravdino) church isthmus were about 500 casualties. It was a great surprise for the Red Army men that they did not find a single concrete bunker. [Source: Bair Irinchev]]

(7686 words)

[karjala]

Hi!

https://fotki.yandex.ru/next/users/foto ... iew/476585

In the photo armor for 76 mm fortress guns L-17 (74K27K). The gun was set INT with the transport frame (the frame can be a tool see the Artillery Museum in the town of Hameenlinna).
They are made in autumn 1941. In the summer of 1944 a lot of armored structures transported to Porkala udd. The subsequent fate is unknown.

[Juha Tompuri]

Thanks for the details karjala

the frame can be a tool see the Artillery Museum in the town of Hameenlinna

This type?
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... t#p1850022

Regards, Juha

[karjala]

Thanks for the details karjala

the frame can be a tool see the Artillery Museum in the town of Hameenlinna

This type?

Yes.

Juha, thanks for photos!

[Aleksander P]

Here is a personal account from the "Kansa Taisteli" journal which features armoured sleds. Rather long but very interesting, I think.

A Rifle Company in defensive battle in Muolaa Church Isthmus 14 to 16 February 1940 - A Battle of the Winter War
By Matti Iivari (Iivo) Riikonen (1906-1992)
(Mr Riikonen was an agronomist and Reserve officer. He fought in the Winter war as Platoon and Company commander. He was wounded in 1940.
1941-1944 he fought as infantry Company and Battalion commander attaining the rank of Captain. For map sketches kindly refer to the online journals indicated below.)

A Rifle Company in defensive battle in Muolaa Church Isthmus 14 to 16 February 1940
(Journal Kansa taisteli - miehet kertovat 1 - 3 1962)

1. Background and 14th to 15th February 1940.

5th Co. of Infantry Regiment JR4 was made up of men from Ruokolahti parish. In the Winter War they had been initially positioned on the shore of lake Muolaanjärvi at Oinaala. It was in their positions that the enemy managed to drive a wedge after tremendous artillery strafe supported by tanks on 18 Dec. 1939. The Company lost 60% of their men as casualties, including every officer.

Eliminating the breach would have taken an unreasonable toll due to lack of artillery ammunition, so it was just contained.

At the end of December the II Battalion of JR 4, including the 5th Co., was pulled back for recovery and replacements. I became the Commander of the 5th Co. at this stage.

The enemy launched their offensive in the Carelian Isthmus on Feb. 10, 1940 which also affected our sector. My 5th Co. was subordinated to the III Battalion of JR4, that was defending the isthmus between lakes Yskjärvi and Kirkkojärvi. The stronghold at the Muolaa church was lost on the 13. Feb morning, and due to this the Company had to dig a new trench the next night North of the church.

[The men had to dig the trench in the night because it was impossible in the daytime due to the enemy superior firepower. The fact that they managed to dig at all in the middle of the winter, when the ground is in most places frozen solid up to 2m deep, is due to the dry sandy soil of the isthmus. Also the existing positions were built before the war for delaying the enemy instead of solidly. Tr. rem.]

In the small hours of 14. Feb my Company was ordered to the front line in this same isthmus. The positions were handed over to us by the 9th Co, that was made up of men from Joutseno led by Res. Lt. Matti Lahti.

The commander of JR 4 was Col.Lt. L.Leander, the commander of the III Battalion was Maj. Y.Hanste. I received my orders from Capt. Lauri Kettunen, who was the assistant to the commander of the III Battalion. He was my schoolmate from Joensuu Lyceum and Boy Scout friend. We trusted each other fully which is absolutely needed in difficult situations.

In the Winter War Finnish Army tactics was "repelling" which means that positions were not to be given up without command. If for some reason positions had been abandoned they had to be retaken with a counterstrike. The orders given by Capt. Kettunen stated that our company was to keep the postiitions, whatever might happen.

5th Co. of JR4 comprised three platoons with a battle strength of totally 110 men. At Muolaa Church Isthmus on the left was the I Platoon, to the right the II Platoon. There was a half platoon dugout housing a command post with a telephone connection to the Battalion HQ. The distance from the trench to the dugout was 50 m and there was no trench to connect them, which was to have serious consequences later. The trench held by the I and II platoons was dug in an open field. The positions of the III Platoon were situated in rocky forest, comprising instead of a decent trench of small stretches only. Their section included a well made and spacious half platoon dugout.

The section of the I and II Platoons was equipped with two machine guns (Maxim type, Tr.rem) and the III Platoon also two machine guns from the 5th Machine Gun Company of JR4. A mortar Fire Control team was placed in the command dugout and an Artillery Fire Control group at the edge of the forest. Despite my repeated requests I did not get any support from artillery or mortars due to lack of ammunition. Artillery and Mortars did not have any role in the battle and are therefore not mentioned.

To our left, North of the church ruin was the 6th Company and to our right 2nd Company, but I did not know it as we were fighting. Having enquired about my flanks in the morning of 14th Feb from Capt Kettunen I was told that I knew enough already: the task of Company which was: to stay in our positions - whatever would happen - until eventual order to withdraw, and the Battalion would take care of everything else.

Our positions had been built during the "Refresher training” period and they were quite uncompleted. The trench where the I and II Platoons fought was dug in sandy soil, so the trench sides constantly slid down filling the trench and sand was raining upon the defenders during shelling. There was an enemy field gun battery next to the church ruin firing along our trench and its rear at point blank range in addition to constant indirect artillery fire at us. Consequently all resupplying had to take place in the night. In front of our trench there were remains of wire and anti tank hindrances, by now totally useless for defenders.

[Anti-tank guns were not available and anyway they would have been wiped out by the enemy artillery as soon as spotted in the open terrain. Tr. rem.]

My command post was situated in the dugout on the right flank of the II Platoon with telephone wire to the Battalion commander, I had to act as the commander of both I and II Platoons and personally lead the fighting .

The enemy action started 0600 hrs on 14 Feb 1940 with tremendous infantry fire. Due to the long range the bullets hit on the section of the III Platoon the trees with a constant "splatter". At 0700 hrs 25 tanks [T-26 and T-28 types] rolled toward the "seam" between the I and II Platoons which was in the lowest spot of the terrain. There were four flame thrower tanks in the lead , two of them engaged the I platoon trench and the other two the II Platoon trench. The flame thrower tanks were big tanks with a 4 to 5 m long tube in the front. It was used to spray liquid fuel that was lit with a pilot flame at the muzzle of the tube. This created a wall of fire 15 to 20 m long and up to 4m high, reaching the ground and the bottom of our trench. These flame thrower tanks were armed also with two machine guns in front and one in the rear, I recollect.

The purpose of the flame throwers was to create panic in our positions and so create a gap in the defences that would enable the tanks to roll through to our rear and the infantry to easily occupy the "abandoned" trench.

The enemy succeeded in sending their tanks in our rear but as we stuck to our positions we were able to control the infantry with our infantry weapons fire. The enemy tried to approach our trench on the tanks and behind armour plates mounted on skis. After spending one to two hours in our rear the tanks returned. They repeated their attempt on the 14th and the 15th at 1200 hrs and 1600 hrs so that now the flame thrower tanks were covered by other tanks as they scorched our positions, and the other tanks fired their guns at our trench. Immediately the following tanks advanced into our rear and the enemy infantry tried to get into our trench using various methods, but without success. As soon as the tanks had disappeared from the vicinity of our positions the enemy artillery opened up indirect fire as well as point blank fire so that we did not get one moment of rest.

We, the defenders, had made ourselves clear two important facts:
- We are not going to leave our positions whatever would happen
- We are not going to let enemy infantry in our positions.

Already the 14th Feb. tanks flattened the machine gun on the section of the I Platoon and damaged the MG nest on the section of the II Platoon in into useless condition, it could only be used as shelter for the men.

Our LMGs and rifles were constantly jamming due to the sand rain. Yet we were able to cope somehow at this stage of the battle. We had petrol bombs and satchel charges to fight the tanks.

We were used to tanks already in Oinaala where they surrounded us, burning or functioning. But flame throwers were something new, and I must admit it felt uncomfortable as the first wall of fire flashed in front of a man. Suppressing the panic called for strict discipline. But the fact is that after we had found out the peculiarities of flame throwers and the dead angles of the tank machine guns, we did not make any major errors. It is true that we had to run through a wall of fire every now and then, but as long as a man covered his face well nothing worse happened, sometimes one's snow overall was scorched or soaked with naphta. One single flame thrower in action had in my opinion only moral effect but if there were several of them pumping fire in one spot and as tank guns joined in with their shells, it was a hellish situation and any man began to tremble. The safest spot in this kind of situation was near the tank, under the fire tube where the tank machine guns could not shoot.

Res.Lt. I. Iso-Kuusela, the Commander of the II Platoon, was eager to hurt the enemy in every possible manner. He was particularly worried about the enemies who were sniping behind the armour plates that had been pushed in front of the positions of his platoon. So he was occupied in firing at the attackers, who believed to be safe, from their flank with his rifle. On the morning of the 15th Feb. in his zeal he had followed the tank track on the No man's land and fired at the attackers from shell holes. But at 0700 hrs the enemy launched another tank attack and the lad did not make it back in the trench. He had to stay in a shallowish shell hole as the tanks approached. A tank drove on the shell hole, then backed and advanced again a few times, intending to crush him. But the Lieutenant returned, although his buttocks were badly bruised by the tank tracks.

It was with him that we tried to destroy the flame thrower tanks. We were many times between the tracks of these tanks with our satchel charges, steel bars and other implements. Once we managed to blow a 2kg charge under a flame thrower. The enemy towed their tank away and gave us an angry artillery strafe. Another time we managed to place a 5kg charge under one track but we noticed we had not put in the detonator, and we did not have any with us. Our hard work was wasted, but we made the "beast" limp by pushing a steel bar in the caterpillar track system.

Res.Lt. I. Iso-Kuusela, the fearless Commander of the II Platoon, was scored by a bullet on his right thigh afternoon the 15.Feb as he was firing at the enemy from the top of the MG bunker, behind a captured armour plate. He had the previous night evacuated from the No man's land thirty to forty of these armour plates, which were to be crucial for our survival. As Platoon commander he was replaced by Sgt Eino Luukkonen, with whom I had to undergo many a tough experiences during the coming days and weeks.

As to the action on the left and right flank it can be told that Res. Lt. Sorvali, the commander of I Platoon, was occupied in keeping the collapsing trench in usable condition. The front at the III Platoon was relatively quiet on the 14. to 15. Feb. Tanks left them alone due to the forest covered difficult terrain. In general the enemy tanks always avoided forest. The Commander of I Platoon. Res. Lt. Lehikoinen had gained experience in the battle of Oinola. Their position was not free from risk because the enemy approached them by digging approaches in the snow. Our sharpshooters did a good work against them, one Corporal claimed 30 certain cases when ambushing the enemy snow diggers on the 14th to 15th Feb.

At nightfall the 15th Feb the positions of I Platoon and II Platoon were shelled so that the trench was turned into a series of shell holes. Consequently we had to work as hard as we could the next night to repair our positions. After persistent requests we got in our hands our material that had been left to the North of Muolaa church in the positions we had held on the 13th. We received also more petrol bombs, satchel charges, 5kg TNT charges, hand grenades, cartridges etc. From dusk to dawn the men were working in shifts, digging the trench or laying mines led alternately by Lt. Sorvali or Sgt. Luukkonen. More armour plates were evacuated from the No man's land, finally every foxhole was equipped with one. Finally another telephone wire was taken from the command post past the shelled area to the switchboard of the Battalion. In my opinion the Company was prepared to meet the next day as well prepared as it was possible. Ever increasing sounds of engines from the South did not bode well but I believe every man of the Company had prepared themselves each in their way to be ready to face the worst.

Since the enemy battery at the Muolaa church was a nuisance to us and since we did not get any artillery support to destroy it, we thought up a plan to eliminate it ourselves during the night between the 15th and 16th Feb. A skiing strike force made up of volunteers would do it. As I had asked for material from the Battalion for our raid the plan was exposed and it was immediately strictly forbidden. I also asked the Battalion to get us a light field gun to be placed in our trench so that we could even a little disturb enemy tanks. Another request denied. We did think that the first shot from our cannon would have been its last one. Also if we had somehow damaged the enemy battery next to the church, the enemy would have brought in an Artillery Battalion instead. Our life would have been even more miserable. The next day proved that our attempts would have been futile.

2. 16th February until 1400 hrs

16th February at 0600 hrs the enemy opened fire with infantry weapons and at 0645 hrs tanks attacked the positions of the 5.Co. We stood at the flattened dugout of the II Platoon and counted the approaching tanks, we estimated the number was forty five (45) and more were coming. We thought that it will be a tough time in our rear. But it was us that the enemy had decided to concentrate on, and wipe out our trench that hindered their free movement. We were fortunate not to know that the Red Army 97th Division was rushing at us supported by 55 tanks which were around our positions by 0700 hrs.

The tanks arrived following their old route along the depression in the terrain. They were led by six flame thrower tanks three of which headed for the positions of the I Platoon and another three at the II Platoon, spewing fire. These tanks were covered by others that spread on both sides of our trench, each having a dedicated stretch. Those tanks fired their cannons at our trench before and after each flame thrower attack. Tanks and flame throwers that had been attacking us yesterday were there to guide the new tanks. Some tanks were acting as artillery spotters a little aside in front of and behind our trench, because every now and then an artillery barrage hit the terrain behind our command post to the North, obviously to prevent any reinforcements and resupplying.

A considerable number of the tanks were in action in the sector of the I Platoon, it appeared the enemy had decided to destroy their positions. Soon a gap emerged between the two Platoons, and it was carefully guarded by the tanks. Also our command post was shot in flames.

The purpose of the flame throwers was to burn the defenders or make them panic while the tanks fired along every stretch of the trench with their cannons and machine guns. Only on the bottom of the trench or in the foxholes we were covered from the shells and jets of machine gun fire. (Most of the tanks were T-28s with one 3" gun and four machine guns in the front, one in the rear.) The co-operation of flame throwers and tanks was to clear the way to the infantry that was approaching in endless quadruple columns between and behind the tanks. The infantrymen did not take cover until in the vicinity of our trench. They trusted the tanks and appeared to be in their first battle, inexperienced men. Anyway the mass of infantry approached our positions slowly and inexorably.

It is next to impossible to describe the feelings that took over the mind of the Company Commander, and only those who have personally experienced a similar situation are fully able to understand what it was like.

Our task was made simpler by the fact that we had no other choice than to stay put and prevent the enemy infantry from breaking in into our positions. We fired at them while they were still marching in columns. By and by our firepower decreased as during the forenoon our LMGs, our sole MG, even our rifles were several times jammed due to the constant sand rain. Due to the action of the flame throwers and fire from the tanks the enemy infantry was not repelled until the enemy indicated by yelling that they were close enough to charge. Yet we were able to intercept them every time.

At this stage we had no time to spare for the tanks because all our attention was concentrated in covering us and repelling the infantry. A couple of tanks were burning because they had hit the mines we had laid the previous night. Our only weapon against them was our own fists; but as one man shook his fist at the enemy he took a bullet through his hand.

In the forenoon I proceeded to inspect the right wing of the II Platoon, and at the same time saw at a distance of 20m an enemy officer stand up and start charging at us while beckoning his men. I grabbed a rifle from the ground and fired, with the result that the rifle bolt flew past my ear with a whistle, powder gases hit my face and I was half dazed. This accident was due to sand in the rifle barrel. Fortunately another shot felled the enemy officer and the attack dried up. I was bandaged and I lied on the bottom of the trench for half an hour until my head was clear again.

The situation in the sector of the I Platoon on our left wing had been very serious from the very beginning. The boys fulfilled their duty in a legendary manner. Since the flame throwers and tanks could not make the men leave their positions the tanks found out a new method to flatten our sandy positions. Two tanks rolled side by side over the trench squeezing the defenders ever tighter , and repeated this action time and again. Of course some of our men were buried in their positions. We saw this with tears in our eyes, unable to help them in any manner, being surrounded by steel monsters everywhere. Screens of fire and shell explosions in our positions were horrible to watch.

Of course the Company Commander received requests from every direction. As his chances of assisting were limited the best thing to do was to ignore them and find one's way to the spot where one was most urgent needed. Even though we were all equally helpless I had the feeling that the presence of the Company Commander had the more calming and invigorating effect on the boys the more difficult the situation was. This was clearly notable in the forenoon but in the course of the afternoon ever more of the men had reached the limit of their endurance that could not be remedied even by the excellent example provided by some individuals. On top of desperation, exhaustion, helplessness, fear there was the most painful sandy dust billowing in the air that penetrated in every crevice of our bodies and caused a feeling of cold when mixing with sweat.

I had orders to call the Battalion Commander at 10.30 hrs and report. We had a line open to the battalion and it was monitored by my messenger, Pfc. Suikkanen. The telephone was situated in the command post even though the dugout was partly burnt down. Somehow I forced my way to the dugout from the trench of the II Platoon - as mentioned these two were not connected by any communication trench. I ordered the Platoon commanders to meet me there to be better able to give them the orders received from the battalion as well as mine. From the dugout that was in a little elevated spot of terrain we had a view of the terrible scene of our trench enveloped in constant pall of fire and sand dust. I explained our situation and emphasized that we would not abandon our positions. We also agreed that if our situation becomes insufferable we would neither surrender nor commit suicide but would fight to the very end.

We had been lying on the bottom of the dugout and so immersed in the worries of our duty for a few minutes that we neglected to notice what was going on in the outside. As soon as the enemy had detected movement at the dugout they had sent a flame thrower tank escorted by four tanks aiming to destroy the men inside. Even though being subject to blown fire in the trench was something we were used to, this new experience was a most unpleasant one. We managed to survive by foiling the tanks to shoot at false targets that we showed at different spots of the dugout corridor. One by one we dashed out and crept to the trench making use of the terrain while a hail of bullets whined over us. Men in the trench were watching in tension how we returned. The movements of the tank gun and machine gun barrels determined our actions.

The Company commander had to be constantly in the move in the trench and he was always exposed to danger because there was no time to watch out. Every man took it as a habit to watch my movements with one eye and, when necessary, command "Down!" which had to be immediately obeyed if one wanted to survive. In that day the Company commander was ordered to get down often and quickly. My alert men saved my life many a time.

Since the telephone was left in the burning dugout , Sgt. Luukkonen managed to fetch it in the trench. However the tank tracks cut the wire between the trench and the command post, so the telephone had to be returned in the dugout and Pfc. Suikkanen was left to his solitary duty.

At 1100 hours the situation in the positions of the I and II Platoons was getting ever worse. The gap between the Platoons was widening slowly and the tanks were moving around us at will. The enemy infantry failed to break in our trench despite several attempts, even though the sand jammed our weapons every now and then. So the enemy tried a new trick. Four armoured sleds, pulled by tanks and mounting a platoon of men, approached the gap in our defences. This was a new experience for us that made our blood run cold. By now we were surrounded by more than sixty (60) tanks. Flamethrowers and tanks were roaming about constantly forcing us to keep our heads low. Three of our four LMGs had been crushed by tanks and the fourth was jammed. The surviving MG was full of dirt and sand.

At first it seemed certain that the tanks with their armoured sleds are going to cross our trench and unload behind us which would mean a certain and speedy death to all of us. Yet the first sled stopped 50m ahead of our trench and men carrying special equipment disembarked. Despite the tremendous flame thrower and tank fire at us we managed to shoot at the men being unloaded, and as our surviving LMG was usable again the first sledful of men were eliminated. The LMG was hit very soon and totally wrecked. I must add that almost every rifleman had an armour plate, evacuated from the No man's land, for cover in their foxholes. They fired in flank direction only and killed first the storming men and their leaders.

Scared by the fate of the first armoured sled the three others turned back to unload a little farther off. The sled nearest to us exposed its unprotected rear, and as our MG was functional again, I supported the gun on the back of a Sergeant and sent an angry burst at it. Another sledful had been quickly eliminated accompanied by tremendous howling.

As we tried to get another exposed sled under fire the MG took a square hit and the Sergeant was wounded. Our last MG was lost, but the armoured sled attack that had seemed so dangerous had been repulsed.

Even though our situation at the Muolaa church was difficult and on the 16th Feb 1940 actually hopeless, nothing prevented us from shouting with joy at every little success. We did it many times, and again now as the armoured sleds were repelled. I am sure the enemy heard and remembered our yelling.

Now it was about 1300 hrs. The positions of the I Platoon were practically filled with earth, only in the middle of their trench there were some men led by Sgt. T Mäkinen in their foxholes. In the far end to the left there were another four men who stuck there until the moment we disengaged. Some of the I Platoon men were buried in their positions, some of them managed to get in the positions of the II Platoon either wounded or sound. I saw Sgt Mäkinen during his last moments, silhouetted against sun, between tanks throwing TNT charges. Before getting killed he managed to destroy two heavy enemy tanks. This aged sergeant, who had volunteered for first line duty, fulfilled his duty showing exceptional bravery.

One badly wounded man screamed for help among the tanks. The leader of the paramedics, Pfc Suikkanen and one of his men managed to get to the wounded man and load him on a light sled. They managed to bring him in the positions of the II Platoon after hiding and running a race with the tanks.

Then they tried to evacuate the wounded man from the trench, but the surrounding tanks forced the paramedics to return. A shell cut the harness ropes of the sled and a tank tried to crush the sled. A tank had parked across our trench, the paramedic leader used the tank cannon barrel as support and slipped under the tank , then pushed the wounded in his sled in the trench. The man died in our hands, like many others, as we could not get him in proper care.

About one hour later we saw that two men were playing hide and seek with the tanks in the positions of the I Platoon. They tried to get out of the reach of the tanks in the rear, making brief dashes, creeping and by any other means. Tanks fired at them as fast as they could. Their race with death seemed merciless. They were the last of Sgt. Mäkinen's men, except the four that obstinately stuck to their foxholes. Otherwise the I Platoon trench was unoccupied.

3. 16th February 1400 hrs to 1900 hrs

(Onslaught of numerically superior Red Army infantry and tanks at Muolaa church had continued from the early morning on. By noon the positions of the Ist Platoon on the left wing were filled up and now the positions of the II Platoon were next. We were waiting in tension what would happen.)

At 1400 hrs most of the tanks were around our stretch of trench. Four flame throwers were scorching us and tanks were firing along the straight stretches of the trench with all weapons. We could see that the tanks were placed in a semi-circle around the trench of the II Platoon. (Ref. ill.) Enemy infantry rallied behind this encirclement. Immediately the leftmost stretch of our trench became useless as a big tank fired its main gun along it, only 70cm high "corridor” above its bottom was passable. (The tank gun could not be depressed enough. Tr. rem.)

In our trench there were also all the dead and wounded men, so it was quite crowded. We had only rifles, which kept jamming due to the constant sand rain. They had to be cleaned constantly.

While the enemy formed the blockade around us under constant fire of flamethrowers and tank guns from our front and rear, slight panicking occurred. Some of our men rallied into small groups that kept moving about. This was dangerous and it had to be stopped at once. A tall Sergeant, who had supported the MG for me had been wounded in the forenoon. He was still able to use his right hand, he grabbed men by the collar and scattered the clusters and pushed the men down on the bottom of the trench. This Sergeant was one of my irreplaceable assistants, he kept his nerve to the very end. He acted at my slightest sign at once. I myself had to pull my pistol to prevent a panicking group from climbing out of the trench, because they would have been killed immediately.

This was our situation as the enemy tanks started their co-ordinated attack. First the flame thrower tanks entered inside the ring of tanks from the direction of the church . They drove on both sides of our trench spraying fire and shooting with machine guns at us until they reached the other end of our trench. Then they turned back and repeated their attack from the right to the left. After the flame thrower tanks had completed their attack, the surrounding tanks opened an intensive fire at us which lasted quite long. This was repeated several times during the afternoon, the purpose was obviously to sap our capacity to defend ourselves so that the infantry could occupy our positions.

"The air was full of iron" - and our situation, hopelessly bad since the very morning, turned even worse.
Fortunately the enemy infantry stayed a little farther off. Despite that we shot at them whenever it was possible because we knew what would settle our fate.

As I mentioned I believe everyone prepared mentally for this day during the previous night. I remember specially two cases.

As we heard the enemy shout "URAA" I ran along the trench to check that every man was in his position. I saw a tall blonde man on his knees on the bottom of the trench, his hands crossed, in deep prayer, oblivious of the tremendous noise surrounding us, comprising buzzing of shells and enemy charge yells. I did wrong, I think, as I disturbed his prayer by telling him to go to his foxhole and start repelling the attackers. As born again this brother in arms of mine did his duty with courage and determination.

A little later I saw an older man kneeling on the bottom of the trench with his hands crossed and his eyes turned up. I did not need to disturb him, he was one of the very best. Both men fought in their positions calmly, disregarding their surroundings. Before they both were killed they were the pillars of our defence positions.

After the enemy "ring of tanks" had been formed at 1530 hrs or thereabouts I was told that the Battalion Commander was on the phone. I do not recall how I managed to get in the command post dugout under the fire of the tanks. Because my mouth, eyes, nostrils and eyes were full of sand, and my body covered with it, I could not hear at once in the tremendous noise what I was being told. Finally I understood that we were to pull back at 1800 hrs next night. It was a stunning piece of news, because the situation of the II Platoon implied that we would meet our destruction before that. The enemy infantry was grouped for attack and they approached our positions slowly while the tanks were firing at full rate.

Since we could anticipate the order to disengage and pull back I instructed Lt. Lehikoinen to send two messengers to inform the III Platoon. He did this but as soon as we tried to leave the dugout both messengers were wounded, one in the arm and the other one in the leg. (Both men now wear prosthetic members) and I also got small splinters in my skin. We must have been so stunned that we were not careful enough. I felt lonely as there were no men to take the information about pulling back to the III Platoon, while the situation in the positions of the II Platoon seemed to be ever worse.

Fortunately another messenger sent by Lt Lehikoinen came crawling . He told me that part of the III Platoon trench was in the hands of the enemy and more men, hand grenades and ammunition was needed fast. Several men had been killed. Of course I did not have neither men nor hand grenades, the II Platoon would have needed them as well. Even the telephone connection was now cut off so we could not request any help from the Battalion. So the messenger could only relay my message about the hour of disengaging and order to keep the positions until 1800 hrs.

My return to the trench was the most difficult ever. It was a wonder that I survived the hail of shells and bullets.

Even though informing the defenders the hour of disengaging in our hard situation might cause panic, I did it because our lifetime was counted in seconds and withholding the information could also have destructive consequences. Some rushing about did ensue and only by taking harsh action I was able to calm the minds. This rushing made the incapacitated wounded men to fear that they would be abandoned in the hands of the enemy. I told each of them personally that when we disengage they will be the first ones to leave, otherwise we shall all be left there. This calmed them and they withstood without complaints to the very end, although a couple of them died during the next few hours.

Enemy tanks were constantly patrolling our positions and the infantry approached menacingly. We had been compelled to use our ammunition copiously , now we found we were facing a shortage. All ammunition was removed from the MG belts and from the pouches of the dead and wounded. It was impossible to get any supplies from the rear. Then the enemy seemed to proceed to the final phase in taking our trench - the tanks on the enemy side of the ring approached our trench, firing and followed by infantry in dense formations. Our ammunition was used up and our destruction seemed to be inevitable.

Someone remembered that there was some ammunition in the foxholes at the leftmost end of our trench which was under constant tank gun fire. I asked for volunteers among the men at the left wing. There were none, because the 25 m stretch of trench was under the fire of a big tank , only 70cm from the bottom of the trench was passable. Since there was no time to waste I set off myself but Sgt Luukkonen intervened and as a thin and resourceful man he jumped ahead of me, followed by the blonde "praying man". The boys were at our destination ahead of me. Our reward was two boxes of ammunition. We retuned successfully, although in the confined trench the 3" shells sweeping over us made us feel naked. The tour that took some minutes made us drenching wet with sweat. Having found cover, if there was any in our situation, we were dead tired.

As mentioned our trench was filled with dead and wounded lying on the bottom. We did not have time in the emergency we were experiencing to watch our steps. We often tread our dead or wounded men. As the tanks fired along the trench one had to drop flat every now and then. There being no chance of selecting the spot which could be the cold body of our killed man. One might found oneself cheek to cheek with a dead man when trying to avoid one's face getting burnt by the flamethrower fire. One felt keenly that soon one could join the ranks of the cold men. Our lives were not worth much as we, like rats, tried to hide and avoid the blows dealt at us by a giant.

As this "blocking stage" started we had about 25 irregularly functional rifles. At the time as we found some more ammunition more men had been killed or wounded and rifles damaged, only 8 to 10 were usable. Riflemen did accurate work despite the tank's fire. The wounded filled the cartridge ties sitting on the bottom of the trench and helped the riflemen to adjust the armour plates as needed. I had two plates to cover me, and the lightly wounded men kept adjusting tem without any orders.

As we had found these two boxes of ammunition the tanks on the enemy side of our trench had approached to a distance of 50 meters, and the infantry kept yelling "URAA". The last phase of our destruction appeared to be starting. Now we had to bet everything on our "last card " and do with our diminished strength everything possible.

At this stage, facing secure destruction, no man fit to fight was hardly fearing for his life anymore. The idea that painless death might free a man from this conundrum could have lurked in one's mind. The Company Commander was heavily weighted by the responsibilities of keeping the positions and the men's lives. Remembering one's home and family and thinking of the consequences of one's impending death to them was an unspeakable burden. Our only hope was to fight our final battle honourably to the very end.

Although I was the Company Commander I abandoned my duties and started repelling the enemy infantry with my rifle. Our 8 to 10 rifles kept firing as fast as possible, the wooden parts were smoking. The blonde "praying man" took a bullet in his brow and soundlessly dropped in the trench, the other prayer was pierced by a shell splinter and died next to me.

Many of us had reached the limit of their endurance. Constant action for several days without rest or sleep on top of the hard pressure of this day had discouraged the strongest of the men. It seemed to me that our boys were now indifferent to anything.

Finally, as all we had left were five rifles and a few cartridges - a miracle happened .

The tanks nearest to our trench withdrew, as did the infantry. The tanks rolled over their own dead and wounded on their way, even we, their enemies, felt bad when hearing the screams of agony. We had so few cartridges left that we did not waste any on the retreating infantry. I think every man sent a grateful thought in the direction of Heaven.

If the enemy had continued their attack for a few more minutes, our defence would have been weakened due to lack of men, arms and ammunitions so that they could have buried us in the dirt of the Muolaa isthmus.

Another enemy infantry attack had been repelled. It was about 1730 hrs. The fire of the tanks abated somewhat, and the tanks began to move away. The hope of surviving began to flicker in our minds, although the tanks were still there preventing any movement. The tanks scattered around our trench , now several could be seen near the command post. As the danger of enemy infantry had dissipated even the flame thrower tanks were familiar to us, to such an extent that we were apathetic for a moment.

- Enemy behind, someone shouted at that very moment, shaking us from our torpor. Indeed, two men approached from the rear, dashing, creeping, crawling between the tanks. These two fellows had at 1400 hrs raced with death ahead of the tanks in the rear and saved themselves. Now they were coming to "help" us, escorted by the fire of the tanks up to the trench. The boys had nearly been buried in their foxhole by two tanks, they had jumped up and played hide and seek with the tanks, dodging the tracks and sometimes even climbing on a tank. One had his clothing torn down to skin in his back, the other had his trouser leg torn up. They had lost their rifles, caps, leather mitts, haversacks, belts in the heat of the battle. These shocked looking boys had penetrated the tank blockade which was a deed. I could not help smiling when looking at these bearded, dirty and tattered fellows. We exchanged some rough but the more beautiful words. I sent them as sentries to the right flank in the direction of the III Platoon.

The tanks weakened their grip and several tanks returned to their own side. It was then, at 18.30hrs, as the men of the I Platoon who had tenaciously stuck to their positions, managed to dash between the tanks to our positions. They were earnestly happy as we had not abandoned them. One of the I Platoon men had volunteered to fetch them at my request. Our paramedic Pfc who had been away while the tanks blockaded us had organised sleds at the edge of the forest next to us. Soon he and his men arrived in our trench having dodged the tanks. (Under the cover of deepening darkness, tr. rem.). Two volunteers tried at my request to evacuate the body of the vice I Platoon leader whose location was known exactly. They did manage to find the body and load him in their sled but unfortunately they had to abandon the body of the Sergeant due to firing from the tanks.

A little earlier it was informed that enemies were seen in the rear of the III Platoon. It was about 1900 hrs and dusk was setting. I sent the I Platoon remains and part of the II Platoon led by Lt. Sorvali to secure at the right wing where the positions of the III Platoon had been. They also took our dead with them. They left two at a time because twenty tanks remained preying on us and five tanks were still in flames about our trench..(Ref. figure). Then we evacuated the seriously wounded, one at a time in sleds pulled by men. Finally the rest of the II Platoon disengaged. I and Sgt. Luukkonen paid a visit to our burning command post where we added some petrol in the flames.

Lt. Sorvali may have thought we had lingered in our positions because we saw a pair of men approach in the usual manner of dashing and creeping. They were messengers who had orders to ask for the reason of my delay, they also informed that the enemy infantry is slowly advancing in the rear of the III Platoon trench. The III Platoon had retreated already between 1700 and 1800 hrs to avoid being outflanked.

Even though we had suffered heavily in these positions, I felt our work was not accomplished as we evacuated the trench.

We had gained at least a preemptive victory and the Company had fulfilled the task ordered to it. Our losses were heavy. When we took the positions our strength was 110 men, as we left there were 55 men. The I an II Platoons suffered most, their casualty rate was 65%.

The battle we had fought was not a special one, just one like hundreds of others. Yet for my surviving brothers in arms, who were fighting in the Muolaa church isthmus on 14th to 16th February 1940, the story that I recounted includes sacred memories. They never told about it to boast.

The event I have described constitute one link in the chain that enabled the miracle of the Winter War. It also demonstrates that the Miracle was paid for by the blood and lives of front line men.

[Red Army 151st IR losses during the three day battle at the Muolaa (renamed: Pravdino) church isthmus were about 500 casualties. It was a great surprise for the Red Army men that they did not find a single concrete bunker. [Source: Bair Irinchev]]

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A very compelling story, seems like this particular sled attack was poorly coordinated. Thanks for sharing and translating it for the forum! I'll have to see if the writer published more stories in the magazine.