This topic clearly deserves a thread of its own, instead of being referred to in various discussions about the Winter War.
Please post here on the developments that took place between the peace of the Winter War on 13 March 1940 and the outbreak of the Finnish-Soviet Continuation War.
The events that led to the outbreak of the Continuation War
Topspeed wrote under another thread:
Of course, this is already the outbreak of the war, rather than the events leading to it. But it seems that the Finnish goverment would have preferred to stay neutral, remain on the defensive, and let Hitler and Stalin fight it out between themselves, as far as possible. But in the prevailing circumstances, it was no option any more.
The History of the Continuation War (Jatkosodan historia 1) states as follows:This is all true. I read that 26.6.1941 the war was decleared on 25.6.1941 the finnish cities were bombed ( possibly hubs were a target, but all bombs missed them some 500-1000 meters ).
Troops were mobilized in good time since we knew when Germany was about to attack.
Would the prime minister had decleared a war if Soviets not had started bombing ? Was there a 5% change left that Finland would not have engaged the war ?
--------------At once in the morning of 22 June the Soviets opened artillery fire on the Hanko front. Due to these barrages the Commander of the Naval Forces requested and received permission to return the fire already on 22 June at 8.15 hours. In the emerging situation the transit traffic to Hanko was cut in the same evening.
On 22 June and the subsequent days Soviet troops violated the land border in a few locations. On 23 and 24 June the Soviet Air Force flew also into Finnish air space, but despite the German proposals Finland did not give up her adopted attitude of neutrality.
On 25 June the Soviet Air Force bombed 15 Finnish cities and towns, among others Helsinki, Kotka and its surroundings, Loviisa, Forsby, Porvoo surroundings, and Turku. On the Hanko front artillery battle was going on between the Soviets and the Finns. Prime Minister Rangell had prepared a situation report for the Parliament for that day, with the intention of informing on the measures taken by the authorities, and announcing that the purpose of the Cabinet is to do everything within its power to protect the integrity of the country and to preserve neutrality. Due to the Soviet air raids of the same day the Prime Minister however changed his proposal and stated that the Soviet Union had proved with her actions, what was her relating towards Finland: "It is war."
The Germans were granted permission to begin full scale reconnaissance on 25 June, and operate flights from Finnish territory. Late in the evening the IV Army Corps, responsible for the defence of the southernmost sector of the Eastern border, was granted permission to fire on available artillery targets, but the crossing of the border was not allowed for the time being.
On 22 June the Supreme Commander subdued the 15 Division to the II Army Corps, and granted permission to the VII Army Corps to approach the border. On the same day the 1 Infantry Brigade received an order to prepare for moving to the region of Huutokoski-Varkaus. The point of balance of the troops was slowly moving to the Northern Karelia region, and on all front sectors closer to the border, to avoid large scale evacuations of the border zone among other things.
While the German offensive proceeded quickly at this stage, a decision had to be made on further action. As long as Finland was not fully engaged in war and her joining it was not resolved, no major decisions could be made. As long as this was the case, defence remained the basic solution.
After the large scale Soviet air raids had fallen on Finland on 25 June, and the government of the country had stated Finland being at war with the Soviet Union, the Supreme Commander had to make the decision, how to launch the military operations. After the outbreak of the war, at no stage was the choice made any more between the alternatives of offensive and defensive. The common opinion was that what had been taken from Finland by force in the Moscow peace, now had to be taken back. In aiming the attack the Supreme Commander considered between two alternatives. Either the attack had to be directed from the sector of the II Army Corps to the coast of Lake Ladoga, and the mentioned Army Corps had to proceed in co-operation with the IV Army Corps to the Isthmus, or then the attack had to be made on the sector of the VII Army Corps to the North-Easten side of Lake Ladoga. The Supreme Commander knew that the attack to the Karelian Isthmus was in accordance with the popular opinion of the nation, but on the other hand he knew that the Germans wanted an attack on the North-Eastern side of Ladoga.
Of course, this is already the outbreak of the war, rather than the events leading to it. But it seems that the Finnish goverment would have preferred to stay neutral, remain on the defensive, and let Hitler and Stalin fight it out between themselves, as far as possible. But in the prevailing circumstances, it was no option any more.
Given that since at least January 1941 Germans had been asking Finns what shall they do in event of war breaking out between Germany and the USSR, in June 1941 Finns weren't just waiting to see if they can be neutral. Finns had agreed well before to join the German attack, by early June 1941 the Fenno-German negotiations had reached a point where there was no doubt that Germany will invade the Soviet Union in near future. The Finnish leadership was anxious to make the new war look like defensive battle, and in this the Soviet bombings of 25 June 1941 were heaven-sent. Had they not taken place, Finns would have had to come up with an excuse to start the war.Of course, this is already the outbreak of the war, rather than the events leading to it. But it seems that the Finnish goverment would have preferred to stay neutral, remain on the defensive, and let Hitler and Stalin fight it out between themselves, as far as possible. But in the prevailing circumstances, it was no option any more.
Of course one has to remember exactly why Finns were so enthusiastic to join in the offensive. Winter War alone explains a lot, and the Soviet threats and bullying, together with the take-over of the Baltic states, explains the rest.
All I can say is that the above is probably the most hotly debated issue of the Finnish WWII history, and I am not necessarily disagreeing with you. The problem is AFAIK that history research still lacks conclusive evidence on the details of the level of the joined planning and commitment to Finnish-German joint operations, or on the other hand things that were left open.Mikko H wrote: Given that since at least January 1941 Germans had been asking Finns what shall they do in event of war breaking out between Germany and the USSR, in June 1941 Finns weren't just waiting to see if they can be neutral. Finns had agreed well before to join the German attack, by early June 1941 the Fenno-German negotiations had reached a point where there was no doubt that Germany will invade the Soviet Union in near future. The Finnish leadership was anxious to make the new war look like defensive battle, and in this the Soviet bombings of 25 June 1941 were heaven-sent. Had they not taken place, Finns would have had to come up with an excuse to start the war.
The "three day neutrality" 22-25 June was certainly not pre-planned, neither could the Finns predict Hitler's speech with reference to Finland right after he had launched Operation Barbarossa (which the Soviets took as justification to their artillery firing at Finns etc.), and I am not aware how well the Finnish High Command knew the planned exact timing of the German attack, as it was one of the greatest secrets in world history.
But maybe we should first scrutinize in detail everything we know about significant events from the period of the "interim peace", from 13 March 1940 to 25 June 1941...
I don't think it's the most hotly debated issue of the Finnish history anymore (it certainly used to be), at least among the professional historians who now accept Jokipii's Jatkosodan synty as the most thoroughgoing study of the subject. (Just to make things clear: I'm not a professional historian myself, even though I graduated with contemporary history as my major.) I'm aware that some of Jokipii's interpretations have been challenged, but his facts are, IMHO, unassailable.
Jokipii's conclusion is that Finnish leadership, namely Mannerheim, decided in or about February 1941 to join Germany, because Germany was the only power that could offer protection against the Soviet Union. German hints that they might be involved in a war with the USSR were greeted with cautious enthusiasm. In fact, from late winter until 22 June 1941 the Finnish leadership were afraid that Hitler might choose to strike a bargain with the USSR after all and 'sell' Finland to Stalin once more!
One has to note the timing: Winter War ended in March 1940, USSR annexed the Baltic states in June 1940, the first hints of German interest in Finland were received in late August 1940, the first military negotiations took place in December 1940. Looking for German help wasn't the first Finnish option after the Winter War. In fact, immediately after the Winter War Finland looked to Great Britain and France, the same powers who had been ready to give military help, no matter how little. But the German invasion of Denmark and Norway only weeks after the end of the Winter War effectively closed this option. Next Finns tried to ensure their neutrality together with Sweden. There were serious plans of a Swedish-Finnish union of states: foreign and defense policies would be common, the Swedish King would be the head of the state and Mannerheim the C-in-C of the united Defence Forces. Both Finns and Swedes seriously pursued this plan and it had good chanches of being realized. But the Soviet Union stated that such a union would be regarded as a hostile act, and Germay also voiced its displeasure. The union was abandoned. Finally Finland jumped to German bandwagon, the only other option was to take whatever Stalin was going to offer.
The most interesting question of the period between the Winter and Continuation Wars, IMHO, is what were Stalin's exact plans regarding Finland? Was Finland to be annexed, created a 'people's republic' or to be preserved as a special case of the sort Finland became post-1944? AFAIK there hasn't been published material that would give us the definitive answer. Annexation of the Baltic countries and intervening with the Finnish-Swedish plans for a union point to a certain conclusion, however.
In Kimmo Rentola's brilliant study of Finnish communism during the war Kenen joukossa seisot there are certain very interesting observations. Before and during the Winter War the Soviet instructions to Finnish communists spoke of Finland's future as a 'people's democracy' (i.e. Kuusinen's 'Government of Terijoki'). But after the Winter War ended on 13 March 1940, the tone changed: Finnish communists were told to agitate for Finland's annexation as a socialist republic into the Soviet Union. Now, that should tell us something of what Stalin intended! Ironically, as soon as the Continuation War started on 25 June 1941 the Soviet instructions again changed. No more mention of a Soviet Finland in any form, but demands to expel the 'fascists' from an independent Finland. In a curious sort of way it can be said that the Continuation War forced the Soviet leadership to accept Finland's independence in one way or another...
Jokipii's conclusion is that Finnish leadership, namely Mannerheim, decided in or about February 1941 to join Germany, because Germany was the only power that could offer protection against the Soviet Union. German hints that they might be involved in a war with the USSR were greeted with cautious enthusiasm. In fact, from late winter until 22 June 1941 the Finnish leadership were afraid that Hitler might choose to strike a bargain with the USSR after all and 'sell' Finland to Stalin once more!
One has to note the timing: Winter War ended in March 1940, USSR annexed the Baltic states in June 1940, the first hints of German interest in Finland were received in late August 1940, the first military negotiations took place in December 1940. Looking for German help wasn't the first Finnish option after the Winter War. In fact, immediately after the Winter War Finland looked to Great Britain and France, the same powers who had been ready to give military help, no matter how little. But the German invasion of Denmark and Norway only weeks after the end of the Winter War effectively closed this option. Next Finns tried to ensure their neutrality together with Sweden. There were serious plans of a Swedish-Finnish union of states: foreign and defense policies would be common, the Swedish King would be the head of the state and Mannerheim the C-in-C of the united Defence Forces. Both Finns and Swedes seriously pursued this plan and it had good chanches of being realized. But the Soviet Union stated that such a union would be regarded as a hostile act, and Germay also voiced its displeasure. The union was abandoned. Finally Finland jumped to German bandwagon, the only other option was to take whatever Stalin was going to offer.
The most interesting question of the period between the Winter and Continuation Wars, IMHO, is what were Stalin's exact plans regarding Finland? Was Finland to be annexed, created a 'people's republic' or to be preserved as a special case of the sort Finland became post-1944? AFAIK there hasn't been published material that would give us the definitive answer. Annexation of the Baltic countries and intervening with the Finnish-Swedish plans for a union point to a certain conclusion, however.
In Kimmo Rentola's brilliant study of Finnish communism during the war Kenen joukossa seisot there are certain very interesting observations. Before and during the Winter War the Soviet instructions to Finnish communists spoke of Finland's future as a 'people's democracy' (i.e. Kuusinen's 'Government of Terijoki'). But after the Winter War ended on 13 March 1940, the tone changed: Finnish communists were told to agitate for Finland's annexation as a socialist republic into the Soviet Union. Now, that should tell us something of what Stalin intended! Ironically, as soon as the Continuation War started on 25 June 1941 the Soviet instructions again changed. No more mention of a Soviet Finland in any form, but demands to expel the 'fascists' from an independent Finland. In a curious sort of way it can be said that the Continuation War forced the Soviet leadership to accept Finland's independence in one way or another...
Mikko H., thank you for your excellent summary! I have had reading Jokipii's study on my agenda, but unfortunately I have not found the time yet.
Thereafter, and after the huge losses the USSR had suffered in the war against Germany, Stalin had a concrete understanding on what to expect from the Finns if he had actually occupied their country -- an endlessly bleeding wound, at disproportionate political and other expenses, compared to the gains he could achieve in peaceful co-existence with an independent Finland (with all his security needs satisfied in the FCMA Treaty since 1948, and the Socialist revolution left to the Finnish Communists themselves to carry out).
The above is the Finnish dilemma after the Winter War in a nutshell. This is what finally came to lead the British Empire et al. to declare war on Finland, from this outset the Finnish leaders were later found "guilty" to the Continuation War! And yet, I have never heard from anyone how else our leaders could have secured the independence and sovereignty of Finland in those circumstances.Mikko H. wrote:
One has to note the timing: Winter War ended in March 1940, USSR annexed the Baltic states in June 1940, the first hints of German interest in Finland were received in late August 1940, the first military negotiations took place in December 1940. Looking for German help wasn't the first Finnish option after the Winter War. In fact, immediately after the Winter War Finland looked to Great Britain and France, the same powers who had been ready to give military help, no matter how little. But the German invasion of Denmark and Norway only weeks after the end of the Winter War effectively closed this option. Next Finns tried to ensure their neutrality together with Sweden. There were serious plans of a Swedish-Finnish union of states: foreign and defense policies would be common, the Swedish King would be the head of the state and Mannerheim the C-in-C of the united Defence Forces. Both Finns and Swedes seriously pursued this plan and it had good chanches of being realized. But the Soviet Union stated that such a union would be regarded as a hostile act, and Germay also voiced its displeasure. The union was abandoned. Finally Finland jumped to German bandwagon, the only other option was to take whatever Stalin was going to offer.
IMHO Stalin planned to complete what was left incomplete in the Winter War by Finnish resistance and his then perceived threat of Western intervention: he was going to annex Finland to the USSR as one of the Soviet Republics (= to achieve the aim of the Winter War), like the Baltic countries. The Finns had only one way to change his mind: to fight also the Continuation War, just like it was fought.Mikko H. wrote:
The most interesting question of the period between the Winter and Continuation Wars, IMHO, is what were Stalin's exact plans regarding Finland? Was Finland to be annexed, created a 'people's republic' or to be preserved as a special case of the sort Finland became post-1944? AFAIK there hasn't been published material that would give us the definitive answer. Annexation of the Baltic countries and intervening with the Finnish-Swedish plans for a union point to a certain conclusion, however.
In Kimmo Rentola's brilliant study of Finnish communism during the war Kenen joukossa seisot there are certain very interesting observations. Before and during the Winter War the Soviet instructions to Finnish communists spoke of Finland's future as a 'people's democracy' (i.e. Kuusinen's 'Government of Terijoki'). But after the Winter War ended on 13 March 1940, the tone changed: Finnish communists were told to agitate for Finland's annexation as a socialist republic into the Soviet Union. Now, that should tell us something of what Stalin intended! Ironically, as soon as the Continuation War started on 25 June 1941 the Soviet instructions again changed. No more mention of a Soviet Finland in any form, but demands to expel the 'fascists' from an independent Finland. In a curious sort of way it can be said that the Continuation War forced the Soviet leadership to accept Finland's independence in one way or another...
Thereafter, and after the huge losses the USSR had suffered in the war against Germany, Stalin had a concrete understanding on what to expect from the Finns if he had actually occupied their country -- an endlessly bleeding wound, at disproportionate political and other expenses, compared to the gains he could achieve in peaceful co-existence with an independent Finland (with all his security needs satisfied in the FCMA Treaty since 1948, and the Socialist revolution left to the Finnish Communists themselves to carry out).
Molotov, on 30 June 1940, met with the Latvian Foreign Minister Kreve, and told him: "You must take a good look at reality and understand that in the future small nations will have to disappear. Your Lithuania along with the other Baltic nations, including Finland, will have to join the glorious family of the Soviet Union."Hanski wrote:IMHO Stalin planned to complete what was left incomplete in the Winter War by Finnish resistance and his then perceived threat of Western intervention: he was going to annex Finland to the USSR as one of the Soviet Republics (= to achieve the aim of the Winter War), like the Baltic countries. The Finns had only one way to change his mind: to fight also the Continuation War, just like it was fought.
Hard to imagine that Molotov would've said anything like that unless hearing it from Stalin.
Cheers,
Sami
Why is it hard to believe that Molotov said that ? Why does anyone after reading this would hesitate to try to get ammo and guns from Germany even if they were bad nazis ?Sami_K wrote: Molotov, on 30 June 1940, met with the Latvian Foreign Minister Kreve, and told him: "You must take a good look at reality and understand that in the future small nations will have to disappear. Your Lithuania along with the other Baltic nations, including Finland, will have to join the glorious family of the Soviet Union."
Hard to imagine that Molotov would've said anything like that unless hearing it from Stalin.
JT
You've misunderstood me. Molotov did say that, no question about that.Topspeed wrote: Why is it hard to believe that Molotov said that ? Why does anyone after reading this would hesitate to try to get ammo and guns from Germany even if they were bad nazis ?
JT
What is hard to believe is that he would've said that to a foreign diplomat if not first hearing such thing from Stalin.
Cheers,
Sami
Dear all,
Great thread
Just before Paasikivi left Moscow (He was ambassador to Moscow after Winter War) he met with Stalin, and Stalin promised some grain deliveries that were supposed to be delivered, but were not delivered by then. At least one sign of good will from Stalin it seems. Paasikivi obviously had no effect on what was happening, he was pretty much isolated in Moscow and wasn't let in on all the details where Finland was heading.
I tend to believe Winter War gave signs to Stalin that military force to subdue and "rule" Finland might not work especially without support of a large part of Finnish society, and Continuation war reinforced that too. Finns although stubborn, they relied and believed in the Order of Law and had faith in politics and diplomacy. Stalin was a politician after all, he must've noticed this side of Finland. He was already willing to recognize Finnish elected parliament and establish diplomatic relations after the first free post-war elections (probably one reason being that Communists got rather many seats in the parliament).
Regards,
-Pete
Great thread
Just before Paasikivi left Moscow (He was ambassador to Moscow after Winter War) he met with Stalin, and Stalin promised some grain deliveries that were supposed to be delivered, but were not delivered by then. At least one sign of good will from Stalin it seems. Paasikivi obviously had no effect on what was happening, he was pretty much isolated in Moscow and wasn't let in on all the details where Finland was heading.
I tend to believe Winter War gave signs to Stalin that military force to subdue and "rule" Finland might not work especially without support of a large part of Finnish society, and Continuation war reinforced that too. Finns although stubborn, they relied and believed in the Order of Law and had faith in politics and diplomacy. Stalin was a politician after all, he must've noticed this side of Finland. He was already willing to recognize Finnish elected parliament and establish diplomatic relations after the first free post-war elections (probably one reason being that Communists got rather many seats in the parliament).
Regards,
-Pete
Yes, in the Spring of 1941 Stalin showed signs of moderating his line towards Finland, probably this was one of his attempts to placate Germans as far as possible. But by this time it was too late, Finland had already chosen her side.Just before Paasikivi left Moscow (He was ambassador to Moscow after Winter War) he met with Stalin, and Stalin promised some grain deliveries that were supposed to be delivered, but were not delivered by then. At least one sign of good will from Stalin it seems.
One thing is forgotten: in late May or early June 1941 Lt.Gen. Erik Heinrichs announced to Germans that Finland is not going to enter war just like that automatically or without a good reason for war. I think that proves that Finland tried to stay out of the conflict as long as possible and just wait and see what Soviets are going to do. There were many things which Finns didn't know at all (most of the Germans' plans and also some of those concerning Finland) or thought were currently undergoing (negotiations between USSR and Germany). That misinformation came both from Germany and from Western newspapers, especially from Sweden and Britain. Some kind of uncertainty is seen in most Finnish acts because Germans were not fully trusted.
If Finns had liked to attack, it would have been better to do at once simultaneously with Germans. But on 25.6.1941 Finnish troops were in defensive positions. It sounds very odd if all that would have been done only because of "concealing" our later coming attack. That theory does not sound sensible. The only reasonable explanation must be that there was no ready attack plan.
What Germans had promised to Finns? To defend Finland if it is attacked by USSR if the war between USSR and Germany starts. Although there were lots of German troops in Finland they didn't have permission to cross the Finnish - Soviet border. That happened a few days after Finns had decraled war on USSR (after Soviets had bombed Finland). After that Finns had free hands to start preparing attack. That decision was done on 29.6.1941 (I hope I remembered the date correctly?) at Huutokoski railway station (near Savonlinna) where the highest Finnish leaders had a negotiation on the future direction of the war. Karelian Army was formed on 30.6.1941 and Finnish major attack started on 10.7.1941 after changes in grouping of troops.
If Finns had liked to attack, it would have been better to do at once simultaneously with Germans. But on 25.6.1941 Finnish troops were in defensive positions. It sounds very odd if all that would have been done only because of "concealing" our later coming attack. That theory does not sound sensible. The only reasonable explanation must be that there was no ready attack plan.
What Germans had promised to Finns? To defend Finland if it is attacked by USSR if the war between USSR and Germany starts. Although there were lots of German troops in Finland they didn't have permission to cross the Finnish - Soviet border. That happened a few days after Finns had decraled war on USSR (after Soviets had bombed Finland). After that Finns had free hands to start preparing attack. That decision was done on 29.6.1941 (I hope I remembered the date correctly?) at Huutokoski railway station (near Savonlinna) where the highest Finnish leaders had a negotiation on the future direction of the war. Karelian Army was formed on 30.6.1941 and Finnish major attack started on 10.7.1941 after changes in grouping of troops.