Stalin's assessment of the Winter War

[Igorn]

Stalin had a habit to make conclusions of all main state events: economical, political, military. In the same manner in the secret conference of the High Command of RKKA taking place 14-17th April 1940 Stalin gave an assessment of the Winter WAR. Archival materials and typed records of this conference was only recently published.

From the typed record of the Stalin’s key note speech of April 17th, 1940

Participants: Marshals: Shapashnikov, Timoshenko, Voroshilov, Kulik, Generals: Meretskov, Khrulev, Proskurov, Mekhlis, Shtern.

Marshal Kulik: “ The word is given to Comrade Stalin.”

Stalin: “…I would like to bring up some matters, which have not been touched in other reports or were touched but were not properly highlighted.
First Matter about war with Finland, whether the Government and Party took a correct decision to declare a war to Finland? This matter is especially related to the Red Army. Couldn’t we manage to avoid the war? I reckon we couldn’t. The war was necessary because peace negotiations with Finland didn’t bring results and we had to take care about security of Leningrad for sure, since security of Leningrad is the security of our Fatherland. This is not only because Leningrad accounts for 30=35% of our military industry but also because Leningrad is our second capital. A breakthrough to Leningrad, its occupation and establishment there let say Bourgeois White Guards Government means to create a rather serious base for the civil war inside the country against the Soviet Power. Here is a defense and political significance of Leningrad as an industrial center and as the second capital of our country. That is why security of Leningrad is the security of our country. It is clear that if peace negotiations with Finland didn’t bring results we had to declare a war in order to organize, assert and strengthen security of Leningrad and security of our country by means of military power.
Second Matter: Didn’t our Government, our Party to declare a war at the end of November-beginning of December? Couldn’t we had delayed this matter and wait for two, three or four months, build up power and then inflict a strike? No. The Party and the Government took an absolutely correct decision not to postpone this matter and, being aware that we are not fully ready to the war in the condition of Finnish terrain, started active military actions particularly at the end of November-beginning of December (1939). All these depended not only on us but mostly on international situation. There on the West, three largest states clutched to each other. When we had to solve the matter of Leningrad’s security if not under conditions when hands (of largest western counties) were tied up and we had a favorable situation to inflict a blow at that moment. That would be big stupidity and political short-sight to miss such a moment and not to try to set and solve a matter of Leningrad security while the war on the west was going on. To delay this matter for a month or two meant to delay this matter for 20 or more years because one could not foresee everything in the politics. They were fighting there but the war was rather weak. One could not make out whether they fight or play cards. One could not had ruled out they could make peace and we could have missed a favorable moment to set a matter of the Leningrad defense. That would be a great blunder. Here is why our Government and our Party did a right thing not to decline this business and opening military actions immediately after a break in talks with Finland.
Third Matter: Well, the war is declared, military actions broke out. Did our military command place our troops on the front correctly? As we know, the troops were placed on the front in the form of five main columns. One the most serious column of our troops was on the Karelian Isthmus. Another column of our troops was on the northern bank of Ladoga Lake with the main direction to Serdobol. Third Column (lesser) was near Uleaborg. The fourth column was directed to Tornio and the fifth column from the north to south to Petsamo.
Did the placement of troops on the front was correct? I think it was correct. What we wanted to achieve by that placement (configuration) of our troops on the front? If we take a Karelian Isthmus then the first task was the following: At the war one has to count not only for the good but also on the bad and better to foresee the worst. The biggest column of our troops was placed on the Karelian Isthmus to rule out any threats from Finns against Leningrad. We knew that France, England, secretly Germans, Sweden, Norway, America, Canada supported Finns. We knew that well. One has to consider all possibilities in the war, especially adverse possibilities. Based on that, we had to create a big column on the Karelian Isthmus to safeguard Leningrad from any possible threats. Secondly, that column was necessary to feel Finnish defense and conditions on the Karelian Isthmus. Thirdly, to establish a bridgehead so that when we build up more troops we would have a bridgehead for a subsequent leap forward. And fourthly, to capture Vyborg, if possible.
In any event troops’ configuration on the Karelian Isthmus pursued three targets: establish a strong shield against any threats to Leningrad; Secondly, to arrange a reconnaissance of the Finnish territory that was necessary for us; and thirdly, to create a bridgehead for a leap (jump) when troops would be shifted.
Next area, to the north of the Ladoga Lake. Our troops pursued two objectives: also reconnaissance. Here I am talking about combat reconnaissance, which is very serious and the most reliable from all types of reconnaissance and intelligence services. Set up a bridgehead so that when we build up troops to inflict a strike to the rear of the Mannerheim Line. The second objective is the creation of a bridgehead and strike to the rear if possible.
The third group had the same objective: terrain reconnaissance, set up a bridgehead and under a favorable conditions to make a passage to Oulu. This is a possible task but not a quite realistic one.
The fourth group has to move to the direction to Tornio… The Fifth group is the Petsamo one: reconnaissance, set up bridgeheads, inflict a strike to the city (Petsamo). All these groups pursued one real target: to force Finns to melt their forces. Our reserves were larger than theirs. To weaken a direction to the Karelian Isthmus and finally to breakthrough the Karelian Isthmus and reach the Finnish Bay from the north. The group to the north of Ladoga set a target to capture Serdobol and reach the rear. Ulebovskaya Group set a target to capture Ulebovo. Kandopozhskaya Group to head for Tornio. Petsamo Group had to unite with Kandopozhskaya Group.
We didn’t open cards that we had a different objective rather then to set up a bridgehead and carry out a reconnaissance. If we had opened all cards then we would have cooled down (relaxed) our combat troops. Why we so carefully and with some hidden agenda approached this matter? Why we didn’t inflict blows from all five directions and suppress Finland? We didn’t set such a serious target because the war in Finland is very difficult. We know from the history of our army and our country that Finland was captured four times. We tried to shake it up in the fifth time. We were aware that it took twenty one years for the Peter the Great to beat off Finland from Sweden. Finland was a Swedish province then, exactly the same area which we got now: Kalojarvi and Petsamo. These were not counted. (He got) all Karelian Isthmus till Vyborg including Vyborg Bay. Peter the Great didn’t get Hanko but he fought for twenty one years. We were aware that after the Peter the Great, Elisaveta Petrovna, his daughter, lead two years war to expand Russian influence in Finland. She achieved some progress, expanded (territory) but Gelsingfors (Helsinki) remained in Finnish hands. We were aware that Ekaterina the Great conducted a war for two years but didn’t achieve anything outstanding. We knew that, eventually, Alexander the First lead a war for two years and invaded the Finland and fought out all areas. The same stories happened with the Russian troops at that time as now: envelopment, captivity, staff shift, Finns encircled, captured POW etc. All these we knew and reckoned that the war with Finland would last till August or September of 1940. That’s why we just in case took into account not only favorable but also adverse and worst (scenario). And from the very beginning were engaged in setting up of bridgeheads in five directions. If the war would had lasted longer and if any neighbor state interfered with, we intended to engage sixty two rifle divisions at the directions where we established bridgeheads. In addition we had ten divisions in reserve. In total seventy two divisions. (That would be enough) to beat off temptation (of other countries) to interfere with in our business. But that didn’t happen.
We had in total fifty divisions. Reserve remained as a reserve: ten divisions. But that because our troops worked well, defeated Finns and suppressed them. From the very beginning we set two questions for Finns: chose one from two options: either you accept great territorial concessions or we crush you and you would get a government of Kuusinen, which will disembowel your government. That was what we had said to the Finnish Bourgeoisie. They preferred to make (territorial) concessions to avoid a folk government. You are welcome! We accepted these conditions because we got rather serious concessions, which fully secure Leningrad from north, south and west and which endanger all vital centers of Finland. Now Gelsingfors (Helsinki) is threatening from two sides: Vyborg and Hanko. That means that a plan of the great war was not carried out and the war ended in three months and twelve days only because our army worked well and our political pressure on Finland was correct: Either you Sirs, Finnish Bourgeois make concessions or we give you the Government of Kuusinen, which will tear you off. They preferred the first.
Some more points: You know that after first successes in part of advancement of our troops when war broke out we discovered problems in all sectors. That happened because our troops and generals failed to adapt to the condition of a war in the Finnish terrain. Question. What in particular hindered our troops to adapt to the condition of the war in Finland? I guess that a psychology of the easy win (to bombard with caps) created in troops and generals by the previous (Polish) campaign (is the main reason). Polish Campaign (1939) did us bad. It spoiled us. The whole articles were written and speeches were pronounced that our Red Army was unbeatable, that there was no match to it, that it didn’t have any shortages and would not have any, that our army is unbeatable. But history didn’t know unbeatable armies. The best in the world armies, which won here and there, suffered defeats. Some comrades boasted that our army is unbeatable that we can easily win (bombard with caps) everybody and we don’t have any shortages. In practice, such army does not exist and will not exist anywhere.
This hindered our army to understand their deficiencies and reshuffle (rebuild) in accordance with the conditions of Finland. Our army didn’t realize (or to say exactly) realize not quickly that war in Poland was a military walk and not a war. It didn’t understand and made clear that in Finland there wouldn’t be a walk but a real war. It took time for our army to understand and feel it (in hard way) so that to adapt to the conditions of the war in Finland and our army started re-building (reorganization). These mostly hindered our troops from the very beginning to adjust to the main conditions of a war in Finland, to realize that it went not for a walk (to capture cities for Hurrah) but for a war. And with this psychology that our army is unbeatable, with boasting which was developed we have to put an end with. We have to eradicate this boasting once and forever. We have to drill out to our people that there is no unbeatable armies. We have to drill out to them the words of Lenin that defeated fight well afterwards. We have to drill out to our people starting from the supreme command and ending to a private that a war is a game with some unknowns that at the war could be defeats. That’s why we have to learn not only offensive but also how to retreat… What hindered our army to rebuild and lead the war not by old (rules) but the new ones. You have to take into consideration that for the whole duration of the Soviets existence we didn’t lead the modern war. Small episodes in Manchzuria at Khassan Lake or at Khalkin Gol in Mongolia were rubbish. That was not a war but stand alone episodes on the limited terrain. Japan was worried to break out a war. We also didn’t want that and some trial of forces showed that Japan failed. They had two-three divisions and we had two three divisions in Mongolia and the same quantity at the Khasan Lake. Our army didn’t conduct the real serious war. The civil war was not a real war because that was a war without artillery, aviation, tanks, without mortars etc. How one can call after that the Civil war as a serious war? That was a special sort of war not a modern one. We had a weak armament, poor uniform, poor rations but managed to defeat the enemy who was better armed mostly because of our spirit. Well, what hindered our generals to conduct a modern war in Finland and not one like the Civil war right from the start? In my opinion worship of the Civil War traditions. How our officers and generals are assessed: Did you participate in the Civil war? No I didn’t. Go to hell! And this one participated? Yes, participated. Give him to me here. He has great experience etc. I must say that, of course, experience of the Civil War was valuable; the traditions of the Civil War were valuable but not sufficient. Worship and cult of the traditions and heritage of the Civil war hindered our generals and officers to rebuild to the conditions of the modern war. .. A commander with significant Civil war experience could not rebuild himself so far. He does not understand that one can not lead an attack without artillery barrages. He sometimes leads regiments with the Hurrah! If one leads a war in such way that means to screw up the business, irrespective if he has a first sort personnel or not. In any event he will screw up and ruin everything. If enemy sits in trenches, possesses artillery, tanks he, for sure, will defeat (commander with Civil war experience). The same deficiencies were observed in the 7th Army: lack of understanding that artillery is a decisive factor. All these talks that shells must be spared, whether we need automatic rifles and that they consume many bullets, whether we need submachine guns which consume many bullets, all these talks that one has shoot only against targets all these talks are old heritage and traditions of the civil war. This does not contain anything modern. From where all these talks come from? Talks were lead not only there but here as well. Civil persons, me, Molotov found something in part of military matters. Non-military people argued with leaders and managers of the military departments and forced them to accept that we were leading a modern war with Finns, who were taught the modern war by three states: taught by Germany, France and England have been teaching. If one takes a modern war with existence of fortified districts and then insists that we have to shoot only against targets that means unimaginable wisdom. Talks about why production of Degtyarev submachine gun was terminated. It had only 25 bullets cartridge. Silly, but it was terminated. Why? I can’t say. Why there is no mortars? This is not a new thing. During the Imperialistic war (World War I) in 1915 Germans were relieving from western and eastern troops, mostly ours and French by means of mines. Less personnel more mines. Twenty four years passed and why you don’t have mortars so far? There is no answer. How it is explained? Because everybody had in mind traditions of the Civil war: we did without mines, without submachine guns, what is yours artillery when our people are heroes etc. , we will press and rush along. These speeches remind me speeches of the Redgolders in America who marched with cudgel against rifles and wanted to defeat Americans with cudgels, to defeat a rifle with cudgels. And all of them were eliminated. That worship and cult of traditions and heritage of the Civil War developed in our people and deprived psychological possibility to rebuild quickly to the new methods of the modern war. I must say that in two-three-four weeks we started to rebuild: first… then 13th Army. Stern also managed to rebuild, though not without problems. Comrade Frolov (14th Army) did well. Comrade Kovalev was the worst. Since he is a good soldier and Civil war hero and achieved a glory during the Civil War it is very difficult for him to get rid of the experience of the Civil War, which is not sufficient. Traditions and experience of the Civil War is absolutely not sufficient. Those who find them sufficient will die for sure. A commander who reckons that he can fight and win based only on the experience of the Civil War will die as a commander. He must compliment this experience and value of the Civil War by the experience of the modern war. And what is the modern war? Interesting question. And what modern war requires? It requires mass artillery. In the modern war artillery is the God. Those who wants to rebuild to the new (methods of warfare) must realize that artillery solves destiny of the war, mass artillery. Therefore talks that one has to shoot against targets ant not against areas and spare shells are great stupidity which can screw the business. If one needs 400-500 shells to crush enemy’s rear, enemy’s front line, to deprive enemy from sleep and tranquility one has spend shells and bullets and not spare them. As Finnish soldiers are writing they could not sleep well during four month and only at the day of truce managed to sleep well. This is meaning of artillery. Artillery is the first thing.
Secondly, aviation, mass aviation. Not hundreds but thousands of aircrafts. And those who want to lead a modern war can not talk about sparing of bombs. This is rubbish, comrades. More bombs have to be dropped on the enemy in order to deafen him and turn upside down his cities. Then we would achieve a win. More shells, more bullets spent less people will be lost. If you spare bullets and shells you would have greater casualties. One has to chose. Spend more shells and bullets, spare own army and save forces and have minimum casualties or spare bombs and shells.
Next -Tanks. Third, and also decisive, we need mass tanks, not hundreds but thousands tanks. Tanks protected by anti-shell armor are everything. If tanks are thick skinned they would make wonders covered by our artillery and infantry. One has to shoot more shells and bullets at enemy, spare own people and save forces of the army.
Mortars are the fourth. There is no modern war without mortars, mass mortars. All corps, all companies, regiments must have 6 inch and 8 inch mortars. This is deadly required for the modern war. Effective mortars are the very cheap artillery. Mortar is the excellent stuff. Not to spare mines! Here is the slogan. Spare our own people! If one spares bombs and shells and waste people we would have less people. If one wants to conduct a war with less blood we should not spare mines.
Next - automatic rifles. Discussions whether we need automatic rifles with 10 bullets cartridges are going on so far. People who live according to the traditions of the Civil War are fools when they say why we need an automatic rifle? , though they are good people. You can take our old manual rifle and automatic rifle with ten bullets cartridge. A soldier with automatic rifle will shoot faster and will spend three times bullets more then a man with our old rifle. A soldier with a new automatic rifle is equal to three soldiers. And how not to shift to automatic rifle? This is almost a half of a submachine gun. This is deadly necessary, the war showed that. For reconnaissance, for night combats, for strikes in rear, to raise such a noise to create a horror and panic in the enemy rear at the night, (the automatic rifle is very good). My respect. Our soldiers are not cowards but they ran away from submachine guns. How come not to use such an effective weapon? That means automatic rifle and submachine gun is necessary.
Next- creation of the educated and skillful generals and officers. We don’t have such commanders or have them very little. We are talking about combat commander, e.g. to lead aviation, artillery, tanks, tank brigade, mortars. But if he does not have a vague idea about this branch of weapon, what instructions he can give? Contemporary combat commander is not a commander of the Civil War times: three inch gun, machine-gun. Now a commander must know aviation, tanks, artillery of different calibers, mortars. Then he could give knowledge. That means that we need educated and skillful officers.
Next –we require well established and working staffs. They were saying till recently that such a commander failed and has to be moved to staff. Or for example, they caught a talented man in staff who can lead. They say that there is no place for him in the staff he has to be moved to the command post. If we would look at Staffs in such way then we will not have a staff. And what means lack of Staff? That means lack of the Body, which devise and execute an order. This is very serious matter. We have to establish cultural and well operated Staffs. Modern war requires that as well as it requires mass artillery and mass aviation.
Then, modern war requires well trained, disciplined, initiative soldiers. Our soldier has a lack of initiative. Individually, he is not well developed. He is not well trained and when a man does not know business how come he can demonstrate initiative therefore he is not disciplined. We have to create new soldiers and not those fools who went to the Civil War. We need a new kind of a soldier: initiative, individually developed, disciplined.
Modern war requires politically firm politruks (commissars) who know the military science. It is not sufficient if politruk will repeatedly say “Lenin-Stalin Party” like Aliluya-Aliluya. This is not enough. He must be politically firm, politically educated, know military science.
Without all these we will not get a good soldier, well arranged supplies, and well organized replenishment (refit) for army. These are all conditions, which are required for us Soviet people to lead a modern war in order to win in this war.
What do you think, did we have such an army when we entered into war with Finland? Not, we didn’t. Partially we had. But taking into account these conditions (our army) had a lack of many things. Why? Because our army, despite all your praise, and I love it not less then you, is a new army. It has a lot of machines, it has a lot of beliefs in its power, even more then required. It attempts to boast, considering itself as an unbeatable but in any event it is a new army.
First of all, our modern Red Army was under fire on the battlefields of Finland- here is its first combat experience. What turned up? That our people are new people and despite all deficiencies they very rapidly learnt just in 1,5 months and transformed. Our army exited Finland as a quite modern army. But still we have a lack of something. Some “tails” remained from old times. Our army has developed and grew strong as a modern army. In this point is a main advantage of our experience, which we gained in Finland, which allowed our army to get combat experience. It is very good that our army got this experience not from German aviation but in Finland. But there is no doubt that our army is not the same as of Novemver last year (1939) and generals/officers and soldiers are quite different from.
After all these it is interesting to ask yourselves what Finnish Army is all about? Many of you observed its agility, discipline and saw how it applied some tricks and some envy was noticed to the Finnish army. Question: Can we call it a quite modern army? In my opinion, not. In terms of defense, fortified lines, Finnish Army is more or less satisfactory but not modern. Because it is very passive in defense and looks at the fortified district lines as Muslims at Allah. Some fools are seating in concrete protected fox holes, drinking tea there and consider that nobody can cope with their fox holes. This is not an attitude to the defense line which is require by the modern war. Modern army can not passively treat defense line.
This passiveness in defense and this passive attitude to defense line characterize the Finnish Army as not a quite modern when they sit under stones. Finnish army showed itself as not quite modern because it is too religiously consider their fortified districts as unbreakable.
Finns’ offensive cost nothing. Three months of combats. Do you remember any single case of the massive offensive of the Finnish army? It didn’t happen. They didn’t have guts even to undertake a counter-attack while seated in their fortified strongholds, where all space was measured as on polygon and where they can close eyes and shoot since all space (territory) is measured, drawn and despite that very rarely they undertook a counter-attack. And I don’t know a single case when they didn’t fail in counter-attack. As far as any serious offensive or our front breakthrough is concerned you will not see any single fact of these. Finnish army is not capable for offensive actions. The main drawback of this army that it (Finnish Army) is not capable for large offensive actions, passive in defense and very stingy for a counter-attack. It organizes a counter-attack in extremely clumsy way and always suffered losses in counter-attack.
These are the main drawbacks (deficiencies) of the Finnish army. It is created and grown up not for offensive but for defense, and not active defense but passive defense. Defense with deep, blind belief in invulnerable fortifications. I can not call such an army as modern. What are their capabilities and what some Comrades envied for? Small envelopments and entering from the rear? Or blocking and piling up in forest? They just know their terrain conditions. All these blockages (in forest) can be considered as tricks. A trick is a good thing: cunning, quick wits etc. But one can not survive on tricks. Once deceived by entering from rear, second time deceived by entering from rear but third time failed to deceive. Army can not be built based on tricks if it wants to be a real army. If it does not have it then it is not valuable. Here is my assessment of the Finnish army. I take tactical sides not touching that Finnish army is weak and has lack of artillery. And not because that they are pure. Nothing like this. Only now they started to understand that without artillery a war will be lost. I am not talking about their other drawback – lack of aviation. And not due to lack of money for aviation. They have a lot of capitals. They have advanced Pulp and Paper factories, which manufacture gun powder, and gun power is quite costly. They have twice more Pulp and Paper factories then we have. We produce 500 thousand tons of cellulose per year and now got factories from them, which will manufacture 400 thousand tons of cellulose more but twice more (manufacturing capacity) remained in Finland. This is the rich country. And if they don’t have aviation this is because they didn’t understand the power and significance of aviation. Here is another deficiency.
An army, which is not grown up for offensive but for a passive defense. An army, which does not have a serious artillery. An army, which does not have a serious aviation, though has all capabilities for that. An army, which leads skillfully partisan warfare: entering to rear, blocking up and piling up (in forest) etc.
I can not call such an army as an army.
Final Conclusion: What is significance of our victory and whom we defeated? We were fighting for 3 months and twelve days, then Finns kneeled, we did them a favor and war ended. I ask you: Whom we have defeated? They say Finns. Of course, we defeated Finns. But this is not the main thing in this war. To beat Finns is not a big deal. Of course, we had to beat Finns. We have defeated not only Finns, we defeated their European teachers: German defense (fortifications), English defense (fortifications), French defense (fortifications). (We) defeated not only Finns but the defense of the advanced European states. (We defeated) not only defense of advanced European states but defeated their tactics and strategy. All defense of Finland was conducted as per advice and indications of England and France. Earlier Germans helped them a lot and their defense fortification line was built by half in accordance to their advice. This is conclusion.
We have defeated not only Finns, this task is not that great. The main significance of our win that we have defeated machines, tactics and strategy of the advanced European states, whose representatives were teachers (instructors) of Finns. In this point is our main victory.

Joseph Stalin – April 17th, 1940

Best Regards from Russia,

[Hanski]

I believe it was early 2005 when I browsed this English translation of Stalin's speech in the Academic Bookstore of Helsinki, it has been available for Finnish readers for some time.

Do you buy at face value what Stalin presents here?

"Finnish army is not capable for offensive actions" -- after 1941 Stalin may have had reasons to revise this belief.

And in 1944 or 1945, after the war, Stalin met with Finnish high political and military leaders. It is also well documented by eyewitness accounts, how Stalin then stated that a country without an army is worth nothing. He then went on to praise the Finnish Army, and to propose a toast to it.

Cheers,
Hanski

[Sami_K]

"Finnish army is not capable for offensive actions" -- after 1941 Stalin may have had reasons to revise this belief.

Well, the Boss isn't addressing his own mistakes and shortcomings, and apparently forgets that;
it was in fact Finnish counterattacks that:
1. in mid-December the Detachment Pajari counterattacked and routed the 139th division at Tolvajarvi, driving it and the newly arrived 75th division 30 kms backwards.
2. in late December the only Finnish large-scale counterattack in the Karelian Isthmus, that failed to achieve the set objectives, but nevertheless lead Stalin to cancel the planned (new) general offensive except on its eastern flank that culminated at Kelja, which was repulsed with heavy losses.
3. in late December the Finnish 9th division entrapped first the Soviet 163rd division at Suomussalmi and then the 44th division at Raate road. Both were pretty much destroyed as a fighting force. Then the 9th division moved in, counterattacked (in late January) and encircled the 54th division at Kuhmo.
4. the January counterattack of the Finnish 4th Corps that sliced through the 18th division and the 34th Tank Brigade, decimating them, and left the 168th division surrounded.

two Soviet divisions routed at Tolvajärvi
So lets see... one counterattack managed to cancel a planned Soviet general offensive in the Karelian Isthmus
two Soviet divisions decimated by the Finnish 9th division and a third Soviet division encircled only to be saved from starvation by the peace
the Finnish 4th Corps destroyed one division and one tank brigade and encircled a second division at the shores of Ladoga.

So what was the "passive thing" Stalin talked about?!?!

Cheers,
Sami

[Harri]

How many wrong ideas Stalin had! He seemingly lived in a distant "ivory tower" and was not very well informed.

The problem in Stalin's thinking lays in the different tactics of the Red and Finnish Armies. Red Army was created only for the attack while Finnish Army was created for the defence. Finnish defence tactics could be althought called as "offensive defence" or "active defence" in which counter attacks, flanking, encircling and guerrilla warfare are an essential part. In the final part Stalin believes that Red Army bet the "instructors" of the Finnish Army. Actually Finns had self created ingenious tactics well suitable for the Finnish terrain and for the Finnish troops not too well equipped during the Winter War. Finnish artillery tactics was especially advanced but due to lack of ammunition in certain calibres and the lack of long-range guns. Finnish Air Force fighter tactics was way ahead of the Soviet opponent.

Red Army self failed in their "Blitzkrieg" attempt and after the Winter War its organizations and tactics were largely revised based on the lessons learned in the Winter War. Finnish Army in turn had showed its capability and there were no reasons for bigger changes except in fire power of field artillery (heavy artillery battalion) and mortars (three 120 mm mortar platoons, later companies, to each division and 81 mm mortar platoons to all infantry battalions) and in anti-tank capabilities (four [AT] gun companies to each divisions and the introduction of the new L-39 AT rifle). And thanks to Red Army several new Finnish divisions could be now partly equipped with war booty.

"The war was necessary because peace negotiations with Finland didn’t bring results and we had to take care about security of Leningrad for sure, since security of Leningrad is the security of our Fatherland."

I don't know on what peace negotiations Stalin talks about in this?

It's ironical that the threat against Leningrad eventually came from the south and not from the north. This once again proved that working relationships with neighbouring countries are much more important for the security than any buffer zones or defensive lines...

"Our army didn’t realize (or to say exactly) realize not quickly that war in Poland was a military walk and not a war. It didn’t understand and made clear that in Finland there wouldn’t be a walk but a real war. It took time for our army to understand and feel it (in hard way) so that to adapt to the conditions of the war in Finland and our army started re-building (reorganization)."

Note that Stalin talks about war, not a conflict, with Finland.

[Tero]

By Harri

Note that Stalin talks about war, not a conflict, with Finland.

I think the official Soviet term was/is (minor) border dispute.

[Juha Tompuri]

I believe it was early 2005 when I browsed this English translation of Stalin's speech in the Academic Bookstore of Helsinki, it has been available for Finnish readers for some time.

From 1997 in Finnish: Puna-armeija Stalinin tentissä the edition made by Ohto Manninen and Oleg A. Ržeševski.
At least from 2002 in English: http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/020210.shtml :

By blaming the allegedly poor performance of military intelligence, Stalin and the campaign commanders engaged in a conspiracy to deflect criticism from themselves and, above all, the political leadership, personified by Stalin and Voroshilov. The General Staff's chief of intelligence himself, Proskurov, was the only participant at the meeting to stand up and attempt to expose the fraud, and would soon pay for his lack of tact with his life.

Regards, Juha

[Sami_K]

I believe it was early 2005 when I browsed this English translation of Stalin's speech in the Academic Bookstore of Helsinki, it has been available for Finnish readers for some time.

From 1997 in Finnish: Puna-armeija Stalinin tentissä the edition made by Ohto Manninen and Oleg A. Ržeševski.
At least from 2002 in English: http://www.sonic.net/~bstone/archives/020210.shtml :

By blaming the allegedly poor performance of military intelligence, Stalin and the campaign commanders engaged in a conspiracy to deflect criticism from themselves and, above all, the political leadership, personified by Stalin and Voroshilov. The General Staff's chief of intelligence himself, Proskurov, was the only participant at the meeting to stand up and attempt to expose the fraud, and would soon pay for his lack of tact with his life.

Regards, Juha

From the same link "His assistant, V. Novobranets—in memoirs that were not published until 1990, six years after his death in 1984—claimed (without documentary proof ) that all the facts of Finnish preparations had been compiled in a 'black album', containing detailed photographs, copies of which had been distributed to all Red Army commanders in Karelia. It is therefore clear that Stalin and Voroshilov assumed that, all the contrary evidence not withstanding, the Red Army would succeed as easily against the Finns as it had against the Poles; and also that the Kremlin meeting had the dual purpose of both exposing the shortcomings of the armed forces, and of laying much of the blame for their failure on the intelligence services."

Antero Kautto made a small book titled "Talvisota puna-armeijan silmin" (Karisto, Hämeenlinna 1999) "The Winter War through the eyes of the Red Army", where he publishes the contents of the booklet Novobranets probably talked about. Published in 1938, with 22 pages of photos and maps. The preface was written by Major Jevstignejev, dated 31 December 1937. Very detailed and accurate maps with lots of photos of the Finnish defensive works in the Karelian Isthmus. By a quick glance, pretty much all Finnish concrete fortifications are placed correctly with their fields of fire drawn into the map too.

Of course, the Russians could deny that this booklet ever existed, except for the fact that at least one can be found in Finland in Antero Kautto's collection.

Cheers,
Sami

[Gespenst]

I find Stalin's analysis of the situation quite good.
Identifying the shortcomings of his army by 1940 was a better deal for him than it happening in 1941, although his rebuilding was still incomplete by then.
And the scarcity of major Finnish counterattacks is also explained in his statements: lack of proper artillery and aviation may be the things that make successful offensive impossible. That is something the Finns also found out, and to Stalin's assumed disappointment the problem was dealt with to some extent by 1941.

[Hanski]

It does not of course take "rocket science" to find out that if a country is unprepared for war, its army can hardly fight effectively.

Considering the circumstances, it was a miracle (and contrary to the expectations of both the U.S.S.R and the rest of the world) that Finland was able to put up an effective defence at all in the first place.

It had been a matter of political wishful thinking, and of complete misjudgement of the imperialist nature of the Soviet State that led Finnish politicians to neglect funding of national defence during the 1930's, despite the severe warnings of the military lead. The nation having barely survived the first round, the politicians then finally got it across into their thick skulls that all resources available must then be used in preparation for the inevitable second round, but the hardware wasn't freely available from the market any more, and only one main supplier was left for Finland...

[Igorn]

I believe it was early 2005 when I browsed this English translation of Stalin's speech in the Academic Bookstore of Helsinki, it has been available for Finnish readers for some time.

Do you buy at face value what Stalin presents here?

"Finnish army is not capable for offensive actions" -- after 1941 Stalin may have had reasons to revise this belief.
Hanski

Do I buy at face value what Stalin presented? Quoted by me Stalin's words were recorded on the absolutely closed and secret conference in Moscow in narrow circle of the Highest Military leadership of USSR related to the 3 months Soviet-Finland (Winter)War. Stalin presented his analysis and assessment of the Winter War not for the media and historians but for the management of the General Staff and Red Army. Errors were analysed not for the reasons of the finding scape goats but in order to take them into account in the subsequent and unavoidable war with Germany.

And in 1944 or 1945, after the war, Stalin met with Finnish high political and military leaders. It is also well documented by eyewitness accounts, how Stalin then stated that a country without an army is worth nothing. He then went on to praise the Finnish Army, and to propose a toast to it.

Hanski

After war statements of the Comrade Stalin on the official meetings and receptions were made in the spirit of the diplomatic norms of hospitality, in the spirit of the new friendly period of the Soviet relationships with Finland. One has to to distinguish the content and tone of Stalin's statements on the the on the official meetings & receptions and closed secret conferences of the High Command of RKKA and General Staff.

Best Regards from Russia,

[Igorn]

"Finnish army is not capable for offensive actions" -- after 1941 Stalin may have had reasons to revise this belief.

Well, the Boss isn't addressing his own mistakes and shortcomings, and apparently forgets that;
it was in fact Finnish counterattacks that:
1. in mid-December the Detachment Pajari counterattacked and routed the 139th division at Tolvajarvi, driving it and the newly arrived 75th division 30 kms backwards.
2. in late December the only Finnish large-scale counterattack in the Karelian Isthmus, that failed to achieve the set objectives, but nevertheless lead Stalin to cancel the planned (new) general offensive except on its eastern flank that culminated at Kelja, which was repulsed with heavy losses.
3. in late December the Finnish 9th division entrapped first the Soviet 163rd division at Suomussalmi and then the 44th division at Raate road. Both were pretty much destroyed as a fighting force. Then the 9th division moved in, counterattacked (in late January) and encircled the 54th division at Kuhmo.
4. the January counterattack of the Finnish 4th Corps that sliced through the 18th division and the 34th Tank Brigade, decimating them, and left the 168th division surrounded.

two Soviet divisions routed at Tolvajärvi
So lets see... one counterattack managed to cancel a planned Soviet general offensive in the Karelian Isthmus
two Soviet divisions decimated by the Finnish 9th division and a third Soviet division encircled only to be saved from starvation by the peace
the Finnish 4th Corps destroyed one division and one tank brigade and encircled a second division at the shores of Ladoga.

So what was the "passive thing" Stalin talked about?!?!

Cheers,
Sami

"Finnish army is not capable for offensive actions" -- after 1941 Stalin may have had reasons to revise this belief.

Well, the Boss isn't addressing his own mistakes and shortcomings, and apparently forgets that;
it was in fact Finnish counterattacks that:
1. in mid-December the Detachment Pajari counterattacked and routed the 139th division at Tolvajarvi, driving it and the newly arrived 75th division 30 kms backwards.
2. in late December the only Finnish large-scale counterattack in the Karelian Isthmus, that failed to achieve the set objectives, but nevertheless lead Stalin to cancel the planned (new) general offensive except on its eastern flank that culminated at Kelja, which was repulsed with heavy losses.
3. in late December the Finnish 9th division entrapped first the Soviet 163rd division at Suomussalmi and then the 44th division at Raate road. Both were pretty much destroyed as a fighting force. Then the 9th division moved in, counterattacked (in late January) and encircled the 54th division at Kuhmo.
4. the January counterattack of the Finnish 4th Corps that sliced through the 18th division and the 34th Tank Brigade, decimating them, and left the 168th division surrounded.

two Soviet divisions routed at Tolvajärvi
So lets see... one counterattack managed to cancel a planned Soviet general offensive in the Karelian Isthmus
two Soviet divisions decimated by the Finnish 9th division and a third Soviet division encircled only to be saved from starvation by the peace
the Finnish 4th Corps destroyed one division and one tank brigade and encircled a second division at the shores of Ladoga.

So what was the "passive thing" Stalin talked about?!?!

Cheers,
Sami

As to the question of Mr. Sami concerning "passive thing" Stalin talked about, I want to note the following. Let me remind you the Stalin's words to this effect as a subject of our discussion:

"What are their capabilities... Small envelopments and entering from the rear? Or blocking and piling up in forest? They just know their terrain conditions. All these blockages (in forest) can be considered as tricks. A trick is a good thing: cunning, quick wits etc. But one can not survive on tricks. Once deceived by entering from rear, second time deceived by entering from rear but third time failed to deceive. Army can not be built based on tricks if it wants to be a real army. If it does not have it then it is not valuable. Here is my assessment of the Finnish army... An army, which is not grown up for offensive but for a passive defense. An army, which does not have a serious artillery. An army, which does not have a serious aviation, though has all capabilities for that. An army, which leads skillfully partisan warfare: entering to rear, blocking up and piling up (in forest) etc...I can not call such an army as an army. "

Hence, Stalin was talking not so much about successes in separate episodes of the defended side, based on the partisan and guerrilla methods of warfare. He was talking about the main thing: about impossibility of leading modern warfare while lacking serious artillery, aviation, tank formations and fleet.

Best Regards from Russia,

[Tero]

By Igorn

Do I buy at face value what Stalin presented? Quoted by me Stalin's words were recorded on the absolutely closed and secret conference in Moscow in narrow circle of the Highest Military leadership of USSR related to the 3 months Soviet-Finland (Winter)War. Stalin presented his analysis and assessment of the Winter War not for the media and historians but for the management of the General Staff and Red Army. Errors were analysed not for the reasons of the finding scape goats but in order to take them into account in the subsequent and unavoidable war with Germany.

Except he goes on to say:

The main significance of our win that we have defeated machines, tactics and strategy of the advanced European states, whose representatives were teachers (instructors) of Finns. In this point is our main victory.

Which is totally inaccurate, selfcongratulatory and downright hypocritical, given the poor state of equipment the Finnish army was in and which did not escape the attention of the Red Army analysts.

After war statements of the Comrade Stalin on the official meetings and receptions were made in the spirit of the diplomatic norms of hospitality, in the spirit of the new friendly period of the Soviet relationships with Finland. One has to to distinguish the content and tone of Stalin's statements on the the on the official meetings & receptions and closed secret conferences of the High Command of RKKA and General Staff.

True. By the same token the statment referred to was made in 1945, not in 1940. And by 1945 the Finnish army had fought the Red Army to a standstill twice.

[Tero]

By Igorn

Hence, Stalin was talking not so much about successes in separate episodes of the defended side, based on the partisan and guerrilla methods of warfare. He was talking about the main thing: about impossibility of leading modern warfare while lacking serious artillery, aviation, tank formations and fleet.

This is true only insofar as the RKKA is concerned. The Finnish army was tasked with a defensive mission in close conjunction with the diplomatic effort. That meant that there was no need to offensive preparations before the war.

The lack of artillery and munitions were the only deadly serious drawbacks during Winter War.

The lack of aviation was a non-sequitur since Finland could never have competed in any field with the Soviet air effort. Which was deficient in and of itself so the meager FAF effort against the huge (but largely inefficient) Soviet air effort were not very critical.

The lack of armour in the Finnish army was corrected when hundreds of ex-RKKA tanks captured during Winter War were pressed into Finnish service. They worked well enough until ~1943 in the framework set up by Finnish tactics and doctrine and the prevailing terrain. And after that the German Stugs and captured T-34's and other heavy models were enough for the Finnish purposes.

The fleet issue was mute since the Gulf of Finland was not navigable for ~6 months of the year. And the tiny Finnish fleet and Finnish coastal defenses were able to keep the Baltic Fleet at bay during Winter War. And during Continuation War the Baltic fleet was bottled up in Leningrad.

As for the static defenses being unsuitable for modern warfare: Winter War was not a modern war because both sides used WWI era tactics.

[Igorn]

How many wrong ideas Stalin had! He seemingly lived in a distant "ivory tower" and was not very well informed.

This statement of Mr. Harri is laughable. One has to know the state system of USSR of that time, in order not to have any doubts that Comrade Stalin was always and the only one the first addressee of all secret and the most important economical, political and military information.

The problem in Stalin's thinking lays in the different tactics of the Red and Finnish Armies. Red Army was created only for the attack while Finnish Army was created for the defence. Finnish defence tactics could be althought called as "offensive defence" or "active defence" in which counter attacks, flanking, encircling and guerrilla warfare are an essential part.

"offensive defense" or "active defense" can not be implemented without modern artillery, modern tank formations, modern aviation. See my response to Mr. Sami.

In the final part Stalin believes that Red Army bet the "instructors" of the Finnish Army. Actually Finns had self created ingenious tactics well suitable for the Finnish terrain and for the Finnish troops not too well equipped during the Winter War. Finnish artillery tactics was especially advanced but due to lack of ammunition in certain calibres and the lack of long-range guns. Finnish Air Force fighter tactics was way ahead of the Soviet opponent.

These statements about superiority of Finnish artillery and Air Force tactics are ridiculous. The results of this "superiority" were demonstrated by the results of the three months Winter War, "Continuation War" and WW2.

Red Army self failed in their "Blitzkrieg" attempt...

As far as "Blitzkrieg is concerned, three months and 12 days can not be considered as a long time to breakthrough the "unbreakable" Mannerheim Line, on reliability of which Finns counted as Muslims at Allah, according to Stalin.

"The war was necessary because peace negotiations with Finland didn’t bring results and we had to take care about security of Leningrad for sure, since security of Leningrad is the security of our Fatherland."

I don't know on what peace negotiations Stalin talks about in this?

We will continue a dialogue after you get acquainted with the book of the former Finnish Prime Minister and politician Mr. Väinö Tanner, who personally took part in these negotiations along with Mr. Paasikivi. Especially I recommend Chapter 1: Clouds are thicken, Chapter 2: The first trip to Moscow, Chapter 3: The second trip to Moscow, Chapter 4: The third trip to Moscow, Chapter 5: Conflict is sharpen. Talks are broken.
For instance, Mr. Tanner started his book by saying: “Forerunner of the Winter War was the series of negotiations, which started in 1938 and lasted till first half of 1939…”

Väinö Tanner, Winter War, Moscow 2003, PP.9.

It's ironical that the threat against Leningrad eventually came from the south and not from the north. This once again proved that working relationships with neighbouring countries are much more important for the security than any buffer zones or defensive lines...).

WW2 and Finnish offensive along with Hitler in 1941 showed whether Stalin's concerned about security of Leningrad (old border was just in 32 kilometers from Leningrad) was the real. Finns contributed to 900 days siege of Leningrad and starvation to death of hundred thousands of Leningrad civilians and for my country it was so ironical like for Mr. Harri

"Our army didn’t realize (or to say exactly) realize not quickly that war in Poland was a military walk and not a war. It didn’t understand and made clear that in Finland there wouldn’t be a walk but a real war. It took time for our army to understand and feel it (in hard way) so that to adapt to the conditions of the war in Finland and our army started re-building (reorganization)."

Note that Stalin talks about war, not a conflict, with Finland.

Where did I say that he was talking about conflict and not about war?

Best Regards from Russia,

[Igorn]

By Harri

Note that Stalin talks about war, not a conflict, with Finland.

I think the official Soviet term was/is (minor) border dispute.

Mr. Terro,

Where did you get that official Soviet term was/is (minor border dispute? Did you read any Soviet or Russian book? I refer you to the official Large Soviet Encyclopedy, volume 24, which was published in USSR in 1976 and reflected the official Soviet point of view and you will find there that the "Winter War" there was referred as the Soviet-Finland War of 1939-1940. New Russian Encyclopedy also published in 2003 also referred to the Winter War as the Soviet-Finland War.

All books published in USSR or Russia I read including Memoires of Meretskov, Voronov referred to this war either Soviet-Finland War or Winter War. Soviet or Russian authors never called Winter war as a "border dispute". If you have different sources, pls. give it to me. Period.

Best Regards from Russia,

Best Regards from Russia,