The motivation to start this thread was to attempt to uncover the identity of the Officer who appears to have been instrumental in the deaths of 35 Canadian POWs who were being escorted from the II Btln/26th HQ to the rear on the evening of the 8th of June. The hope was that by posting previously unpublished descriptions of this Officer from the POWs who escaped, it might throw up a new clue that would definitively put a name to this mysterious man.
The submitting of KM’s name as a suspect was not unreasonable, his dubious reputation and culpability in the fates of Canadian POWs are well known from his post-war trial. However he was not the only Officer of the 12th HJ division to be accused of crimes against POWs in these first days of fighting (as posted) . Therefore, to definitively prove that KM was our man, would necessitate showing that he was in this area at that time or that there was a credible accusation made against him. Stating that he could look older than his years to fit one of the POWs description doesn’t rule him (or Mohnke) in or out. Nor does the height estimation as that is also subjective and can’t be relied upon.
There were statements made in different posts that KM had command over Siebken or that he would have had reason to be in the 26th‘s zone of activity due to meeting with other Regimental Commanders , but when asked to supply actual evidence for both of these assertions, none was submitted. The only evidence posted showed that KM was seen in his own area of command, where he was supposed to be. There were also posts about the 26th’s Btln HQs being in different locations in different published accounts, this as previously stated is a moot point as the POWs were brought back to the scene in 1945 and personally identified the HQ locations where they had been held (as posted). If there was an aberration in relation to shadowy fudging of HQ locations, it has no significance to our case.
Although posted to back up a completely different point, the evidence about the Bretteville engagement on the night of June 8th was actually the first real evidence that could have backed up two of the aforementioned assertions against KM. Firstly, there is evidence that he had an official reason to be in the 26ths area at that time and secondly that he was given command over units of the 26th Regiment on this occasion. On the 8th of June, KM and Divisional Commander Fritz Witt, toured the 25th Regiments zone to assess their position. They also called into the I Btln/26th Reg. HQ which adjoined this sector, KM stating that he was worried that this area in particular was vulnerable to imminent attack. This places KM out of his zone and more significantly in our general area of interest on the day in question. This is the hard evidence at last – also of significance is that when Witt and Meyer returned to the Abbey Ardenne that afternoon, Witt made the decision that Meyer would lead the battle group that night against Bretteville and he placed Mohnke’s I Btln/26th under Meyers command for this attack as their location was just south of this area. (Grenadiers p228)
Meyer contends that he spent the rest of the afternoon/evening organising this attack – this is a reasonable assertion – he would have needed to talk to each of his own Btln Commanders and with Witt and Wunsche to work out the plan in detail and make sure everyone knew what they were doing and where they should be. The battle group included his own 15th Recon Company and Panthers from the I/12th Panzer Reg. The attack was set to start at dusk to avoid Allied air attack and the proposed route would take them from Franqeville along the road between Villeneuve and Rots and finally to Bretteville.
It has been questioned whether Kurt Meyer’s account of his location that night could be taken as truthful. This is not an unreasonable remark as KM has been known to be less than honest in some of his statements regarding the fate of Canadian POWs. To verify this account, it has been stated that one needs to look at the battle from Canadian source also, again, not an unreasonable comment.
The following is an excerpt from Canadian Military History Volume 16/Issue 4:
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cgi/viewcontent. ... ontext=cmh
The Guns of Bretteville: 13th Field Regiment, RCA, and the defence of Bretteville-l’Orgueilleuse, 7–10 June 1944
...
..‘Late on 8 June the second major attack on Bretteville was launched from the east. This consisted of two companies of the 12th SS Panzer Regiment’s 1st Panzer Battalion (I. Panzerabteilung) (about 30 Panther tanks), a company of motorcycle infantry from the division reconnaissance regiment, and a battery of self-propelled guns. The Canadians were well aware of the concentration of tanks to the east, and “B” Company’s FOO, Lieutenant O’Brennan, had called down fire on them during the day. The German Kampfgruppe was drawn together by Standartenfuhrer Kurt Meyer, commander of the 25th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, who led the attack on a motorcycle. It was timed for dusk (about 2300 hours) to avoid interference from Allied aircraft. The Panthers crossed the bridge over the Mue at la Villeneuve, which the Regina’s had not destroyed, and then shook open and moved directly towards “B” Company on the eastern edge of Bretteville. Although weak in infantry, Meyer expected the companies of the I/26 dug-in south of Norrey to join the attack. Only a handful of German infantry made it to the village. Most were stripped away by Canadian artillery, mortars and machine gun fire, while the 79th Medium Regiment, RA, which joined the battle from its positions around Thaon that afternoon,32 prevented the participation of the companies of the I/26th dug in around Norrey. Few of the 12th SS Panthers made it into Bretteville either. The 3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, RCA, destroyed three on the outskirts, forcing most of the rest to withdraw and join the SP battery as a fire-base east of the village....... “Panzer” Meyer’s attack late on 8 June spilled over to the gun area around Bray...
(Cite 32:
The War Diary, 79th Medium RA, for 8 June 1944 records being “in action” at 1730 hours, and later “engaged tanks to the front.” TNA PRO WO 171/1065. )
This obviously corroborates KMs account as posted above . The crucial factor here being that this offensive was timed to start as darkness fell – (approx. 23.00 hrs.). When the POWs were questioned about what time the shooting started in the field (which was 5 miles west of Meyers Battle group set-off point), they could not state the exact time but they all agreed that darkness was just falling. Mc Lean also stated that the field of execution was a quarter of a mile approx. south from where they had met the ‘Angry Officer’, there were no stops from when they left him to when they arrived at their destination. Margolian further adds that the shooting started within minutes of that arrival. This would mean that these two events were happening almost simultaneously.
From the map below which shows the route that Meyer’s battle group took that night, it is clear that it did not take them near the area where the POWs were travelling. Could KM have slipped away before this battle commenced and be seen on the track south of le Mesnil Patry? Yes, it is possible of course. But how credible is that scenario, keeping in mind that he was in overall command of this major action? IMO the only credible reason to put him near there at this time was that he went personally to meet with the Commander of the I Btln/26th Reg, but if that was the case, he would have already passed their HQ and been too far west for this scenario.
My personal assessment is that at the crucial time, KM was totally consumed by the planning of this action back at the set-off point– meeting each of the officers and issuing orders. He himself stated that before the group set off that he had ‘
moved from vehicle to vehicle, saying a few words of encouragement to the young soldiers’ later as they moved out, he rode beside the convoy on a motorcycle and observed ’
the grenadiers had mounted up, they were taking cover behind their turrets. The young soldiers were waving to me’ (page 229)
Those that still think there is credible evidence that KM was the ‘Angry Officer’ are well within their rights to do so, no posts have been suppressed, all opinions are there for all to read and comment on. But I will not shirk from rebutting points that I disagree on – it’s not a personal attack on a poster, it’s a rebuttal to the evidence presented. To shy away from doing this would be a disservice to uncovering the truth in this matter. If that is considered a ‘witch hunt’, then so be it. In this spirit, the personalisation of negative comments has been disappointing, I have no wish to see this investigation become bogged down by a battle of egos, uncovering the evidence has to remain the core of this thread. If I have overlooked or dismissed a vital piece of evidence from a primary source, one that actually adds to this case, it was done in error and I would like to know what that was. IMO this new evidence finally rules Kurt Meyer out as a suspect. I appeal to anyone interested in this case to add their own thoughts but more importantly to add to the evidence if possible
At this moment, I am still in agreement with Hubert Meyer’s (posted by PB) assessment that this Officer was more than likely Wilhelm Mohnke. But not so much that I cannot be persuaded by new credible evidence uncovered that may point the blame elsewhere.
http://forum.axishistory.com/download/f ... &id=335962
(I intended to attach the relevant post no's for some of the assertions above, but they seem to be missing for the moment)
