Dresden, 1945

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sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: Dresden, 1945

#181

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 25 Feb 2017, 04:36

wm wrote:Genocide is forbidden, the one with paperwork, and the one without it.
Reprisals need paperwork. Without paperwork it's a war crime.............
Good.. so now we are in agreement that the Dresden carnage was a war crime since there was no "paperwork"?

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Sandeep

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#182

Post by David Thompson » 25 Feb 2017, 07:10

sandeepmukherjee196 -- You asked:
so now we are in agreement that the Dresden carnage was a war crime since there was no "paperwork"?
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sandeepmukherjee196
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Re: Dresden, 1945

#183

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 25 Feb 2017, 09:03

Thanks David...in view of your pointing out the above, let me rephrase my query for wm.

Dresden wasn't reprisal since it wasn't documented along those lines. You say that carnages like this where the non military motives are not documented, can qualify as war crimes.

So by that logic will it be right to consider Dresden as an instance of war crime. Since historians and bodies like Genocide Watch seem to hold that view?

Cheers
Sandeep

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#184

Post by wm » 25 Feb 2017, 12:30

Please, you don't need "papers" for war, you need them if you want something more than mere war - like reprisals.
Reprisals are justified war crimes - you have to justify them.
You don't have to justify war - you just wage it.

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#185

Post by wm » 26 Feb 2017, 14:55

Remembering Dresden

A nerve centre for the Reich
Its industry made complex systems,
Its intelligence served insanity.

We went through the Florence-on-the-Elbe,
Five months before the bombing,
Past their last great

Railway-engine repair works
Working furiously.
To us, It was already the trainworks of hell.

They said we were going a bit north.
To Riesa's steelworks as slave labourers.
We were in three trains,

Sixty to a boxcar,
Fifty boxcars to a train.
Our train was repaired there.

We stayed in the cattle-cars.
They did not show us the museums.
From Dresden we went east to Auschwitz.

Van K. Brock

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#186

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 26 Feb 2017, 20:26

Jolly good poetry I must say ! Like what comes below :

( Before that I must apologise in advance for this seemingly off topic content. But if poetic agitprop is going to pass muster, then this too draws a parallel with the doings of those who wrote off Dresden as a necessary evil kind of thing.)

El Hombre trepo a sus motores, se hicieron terribles
las obras de arte, los cuadros de plomo, las tristes estatuas de hilo,
los libros que se dedicaron a falsificar el relampago
los grandes negocios se hicieron con manchas de sangre en el barro de los arrozales,
y de la esperanza de muchos quedo un esqueleto imprevisto;
el fin de este siglo pagaba en el cielo quenos debia,
y mientras llegaba a la luna y dejaba caer herramientas de oro,
no supimos nosotros, los hijos del lento crepusculo,
si se descubria otra forma de muerte o teniamos un nuevo planeta
.

( Man turned to his mechanisms and made hideous
his works of art, his lead paintings, his wistful statues of wire,
his books which were aimed at falsifying the lightning;
business deals were made with stains of blood in the mud of the rice fields,
and of the hopes of many only a faint skeleton remained -
in the sky, the end of the century was paying what it owed us,
And while they arrived on the moon and dropped tools of gold there,
we never knew, children of the slow half-light,
if what was discovered was a new planet or a new form of death.
)

From : The Watersong Ends, Pablo Neruda.

He wrote this after the US send astronauts to the moon while the killing fields in Vietnam danced in an orgy of Napalm and My Lai !

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#187

Post by wm » 27 Feb 2017, 00:27

Or in other words, Americans landed on the Moon and at the same time other Americans defended a small country from brutal aggression by its totalitarian neighbour, supported by two other totalitarian powers, and a known communist Pablo Neruda.
Did he mention in his poems the tens of millions of people murdered by the two powers he so fervently supported?
That war is hell has been known since the time immemorial. We don't need Neruda to tell us that. People with a better grasp of history and politics than Neruda sometimes say: "It is well that war is so terrible, otherwise we should grow too fond of it".

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#188

Post by wm » 27 Feb 2017, 00:37

Mr Brock is not a propagandist, and actually he writes better poems and with greater insight than Neruda.
Remembering Dresden is a multi part poem, here are the other parts:

Remembering Dresden
British reconnaissance planes
Dropped flares called 'Christmas trees'
To mark the target.

At ten o'clock the first bombers
Dropped explosive bombs.
People evacuated the downtown.

Our street was filled.
At two, the firebombs caught them
Sleeping, some in tents, in the open.

St Valentine's day and the next,
American bombers pounded the ruins.

Blackened bodies shrunken to babies
Lay at the doors of churches and cellars
Or at curbs had clawed with fingernails
For shelter in the hollows of gutters.

The Frauenkirche, the Semper Galerie,
The Zwinger Museum - gutted.
A hundred major monuments smouldering.

The structure of time torn.

Forty hospitals in the eye of the firestorm.

Eight nights.
Glowing columns of smoke three miles high.
A valentine for Stalin.


Remembering Dresden
It was like an oven,
The sidewalks were unbearable,
Asphalt popped in the street.

Unable to make it with both children,
She had to choose between them.
Afterwards her feet were amputated.

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#189

Post by histan » 27 Feb 2017, 02:46

It is worthwhile looking in more detail at the summary of the conference mentioned above:

'Towards the end of the tenth and final contribution to this collection of essays, derived initially from a colloquium hosted by Edinburgh University in May 2003, co-editor Paul Addison notes that "the debate over Dresden is likely to end in a stalemate" (p. 217). By this he means that some will always defend the actions of the Allied air commanders who ordered the Dresden raids in February 1945, just as some will always condemn them.'

'In his contribution to the present volume, Donald Bloxham succinctly fleshes out this state of affairs, writing of the other essays collected here: "Besides revealing the deliberate targeting of civilians, they have pinpointed Churchill's leading role, showing that the campaign was not just a question of Arthur "Bomber" Harris getting carried away. On the other side of the ledger they have shown that, in the light of the Ardennes offensive, the Allies were far from complacent that the war was already won in early 1945; that in terms of its industries and transport links Dresden contained legitimate military-related targets, if they were not of the front rank; and that the mixture of high explosive and incendiary used in the Dresden bombing was not unusual. Overall, they have illustrated that from the side of the bombing powers, there was little unique about the Dresden attack within the renewed bombing campaign of 1944-5, and that the city was selected as one target among many for rather mundane military and political reasons" (p. 183). [my emphasis]

'Cox's view, that the raids "however awful, did have a strategic purpose and rationale and were not merely wanton" (p. 61), is generally accepted by all contributors, with only minor reservations.'

"The debate as to the actual number of casualties is repeated three times, each time with a similar conclusion: Cox is of the opinion that it is "highly unlikely that the final death toll exceeded 35,000 to 40,000" (p. 51); Neitzel tends toward the lower end, but ultimately accepts Taylor's "compromise" of "25,000-40,000 deaths" (p. 75); Overy tells us that "latest estimates suggest a figure of 25,000 in total" (p. 137)."

Regards

John

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#190

Post by histan » 27 Feb 2017, 03:31

It's also worth looking at some extracts from the RAF website created for the 60th anniversary of Bomber Command which contains a detailed operational diary of Bomber Command operations in the Second World War.

13/14 February 1945

Operation Thunderclap

The Air Ministry had, for several months, been considering a series of particularly heavy area raids on German cities with a view to causing such confusion and consternation that the hard-stretched German war machine and civil administration would break down and the war would end. The general name given to this plan was Operation Thunderclap, but it had been decided not to implement it until the military situation in Germany was critical. That moment appeared to be at hand. Russian forces had made a rapid advance across Poland in the second half of January and crossed the eastern frontier of Germany. The Germans were thus fighting hard inside their own territory on two fronts, with the situation in the East being particularly critical. It was considered that Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and Chemnitz - all just behind the German lines on the Eastern Front now - would be suitable targets. They were all vital communications and supply centres for the Eastern Front and were already packed with German refugees and wounded from the areas recently captured by the Russians. As well as the morale aspect of the attacks, there was the intention of preventing the Germans from moving reinforcements from the West to face the successful Russian advance. The Air Ministry issued a directive to Bomber Command , at the end of January. The Official History. describes how Winston Churchill took a direct hand in the final planning of Operation Thunderclap - although Churchill tried to distance himself from the Dresden raid afterwards. On 4 February, at the Yalta Conference, the Russians asked for attacks of this kind to take place, but their involvement in the process only came after the plans had been issued. So, Bomber Command was specifically requested by the Air Ministry, with Churchill's encouragement to carry out heavy raids on Dresden, Chemnitz and Leipzig. The Americans were also asked to help and agreed to do so. The campaign should have begun with an American raid on Dresden on 13 February but bad weather over Europe prevented any American operations. It thus fell to Bomber Command to carry out the first raid.

Dresden: 796 Lancasters and 9 Mosquitos were dispatched in two separate raids and dropped 1,478 tons of high explosive and 1,182 tons of incendiary bombs. The first attack was carried out entirely by No 5 Group, using their own low-level marking methods. A band of cloud still remained in the area and this raid, in which 244 Lancasters dropped more than 800 tons of bombs, was only moderately successful. The second raid, 3 hours later, was an all-Lancaster attack by aircraft of Nos 1, 3, 6 and 8 Groups, with No 8 Group providing standard Pathfinder marking. The weather was now clear and 529 Lancasters dropped more than 1,800 tons of bombs with great accuracy. Much has been written about the fearful effects of this raid. Suffice it to say here that a firestorm, similar to the one experienced in Hamburg in July 1943, was created and large areas of the city were burnt out. No one has ever been able to discover how many people died but it is accepted that the number was greater than the 40,000 who died in the Hamburg firestorm and the Dresden figure may have exceeded 50,000.Bomber Command casualties were 6 Lancasters lost, with 2 more crashed in France and 1 in England.

311 American B-17s dropped 771 tons of bombs on Dresden the next day, with the railway yards as their aiming point. Part of the American Mustang-fighter escort was ordered to strafe traffic on the roads around Dresden to increase the chaos. The Americans bombed Dresden again on the 15th and on 2 March but it is generally accepted that it was the RAF night raid which caused the most serious damage.

Böhlen: 368 aircraft - 326 Halifaxes, 34 Lancasters, 8 Mosquitos - of Nos 4, 6 and 8 Groups attempted to attack the Braunkohle-Benzin synthetic-oil plant at Bohlen, near Leipzig. Bad weather - 10/10ths cloud to 15,000ft with icing - was encountered and the marking and bombing were scattered. No post-raid photographic reconnaissance was carried out. 1 Halifax was lost.

71 Mosquitos to Magdeburg, 16 to Bonn, 8 each to Misburg and Nuremberg and 6 to Dortmund, 65 RCM sorties, 59 Mosquito patrols. No aircraft lost.

Total effort for the night: 1,406 sorties, 9 aircraft (0.6 per cent) lost.

14/15 February 1945

Operation Thunderclap

Chemnitz: 499 Lancasters and 218 Halifaxes of Nos 1, 3,4,6 and 8 Groups to continue Operation Thunderclap. 8 Lancasters and 5 Halifaxes lost. This raid took place in two phases, 3 hours apart. A very elaborate diversion plan succeeded in keeping bomber casualties down but Chemnitz - now called Karl-Marx-Stadt - was also spared from the worst effects of its first major RAF raid. Both parts of the bomber force found the target area covered by cloud and only skymarking could be employed. Post-raid reconnaissance showed that many parts of the city were hit but that most of the bombing was in open country.

224 Lancasters and 8 Mosquitos of No 5 Group attacked the oil refinery in Rositz near Leipzig. 4 Lancasters were lost. Damage was caused to the southern part of the oil plant.

Diversionary and 95 aircraft of No 3 Group and of Heavy Conversion Units on a sweep into the Heligoland Bight, 46 Mosquitos to Berlin, 19 to Mainz, 14 to Dessau, 12 to Duisburg, 11 to Nuremberg and 8 to Frankfurt, 21 RCM sorties, 87 Mosquito patrols, 30 Lancasters and 24 Halifaxes minelaying in the Kadet Channel. 5 Halifaxes and 1 Lancaster lost from the minelaying force.

Total effort for the night: 1,316 sorties, 23 aircraft (1.7 per cent) lost.

These extracts seem to be word for word the same as in the book by Martin Middlebrook - Bomber Command War Diaries.

The entry on the current RAF website contains no estimate of casualties in Dresden.

Note the difference between the raid on Dresden and the raid on Chemnitz.

Regards

John

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#191

Post by histan » 27 Feb 2017, 03:33

Finally, this:

The briefing that day is remembered by 75 (NZ) Squadron’s Bombing Leader, Flight Lieutenant Alan “Russ” Russell, DFC, in his book, “Dying For Democracy”.

“The participating air crews were briefed by the Squadron Commander, the Navigation Leader, the Gunnery Leader, the Wireless Leader, and the Intelligence Officer, who always made interesting remarks about each target. On this occasion he mentioned that Dresden was the central base for the whole of Germany’s very extensive variety of communication systems, especially the telephone. This included both telegraphy and radio, none of which had so far been damaged. Consequently Hitler’s leaders in all of his war fronts were being kept fully informed of what was daily required of them.

The weather man for the Squadron advised the crews about the weather we would have to confront and pass through.

Finally, as Bombing Leader, I gave the crews the details of their bomb loads. Always at briefings there would be a large area map illustrating the intended target. Dresden was a very big German city, only a few miles from the Russian border.

Six hours before our briefing, an unarmed, lively, Mosquito twin-engined reconnaissance aircraft flew over the target area and obtained many photographs which, during the briefing, were projected onto a large screen for the bomber crews to see. The wide expanse of the city included extensive railway marshalling yards, with many railway wagons already connected into long trains.

One particularly clear shot was of a very long line of flat-topped railway wagons with each wagon supporting a military tank. Many of the long lines were of closed freight wagons. We could see no railway coaches suitable for troop movement. Intelligence however, stated that there were masses of armed troops billeted both within and near the city.

The railway marshalling yards at Dresden were laid out like a huge letter’ Y ‘ and the junction of the members of the letter Y was given as our aiming point. The black and purple night target map which each bomb aimer carried to the target area, showed the railway yards very clearly. It also showed that the railway yards would make a good broad target. I always found those maps of the target area very useful. High over the target it was too dark inside the aircraft to be able to read the target map, so I always committed it to memory and that was easy as it covered solely the target area.”

Not only did Russell brief the crews before they left, he actually flew on the Dresden op’, as a fill-in Bomb Aimer for his old 218 Squadron Skipper, F/L Don Thomson, who had since been posted to 75 (NZ) Squadron.

All about attacking a military target.

Regards

John

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#192

Post by sandeepmukherjee196 » 27 Feb 2017, 09:09

John..

No military targets got hit substantially. The prime targets (legitimately) of this communications hub, the bridges, road network et al, weren't hit at all. Military accommodations weren't hit.

Even before Bloxham, Leo Kuper, the former 8th Army Intelligence officer in WW II, who later specialised in the study of genocides and war crimes, held the view that Dresden was an instance of a war crime of genocidal proportions in his : " Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century ".

Helen Fein, historical sociologist, specialized in genocide and human rights, also subscribes to the Dresden is a war crime paradigm, even while not agreeing to the genocide label : ".....Leo Kuper, who, despite the fact that he claimed to rely on the UNGC definition, asserted that the bombings of Dresden, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II and US bombings in Vietnam were instances of genocide. Although I consider many of these acts war crimes and acts of terror, I do not agree that they were genocide intended to eliminate a defenseless group..."

Churchill's double speak on Dresden isn't really of any decisive consequence. He isn't known to be too particular about how many innocents die where directly consequential to the pursuit of his ambitions.

Cheers

Sandeep

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#193

Post by wm » 27 Feb 2017, 16:32

A badly executed military operation isn't a war crime. Failures, mistakes are just failures and mistakes - in war they are to be expected.

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#194

Post by histan » 28 Feb 2017, 13:34

Hi Sandeep

I am not questioning the outcome of the attack on Dresden.

What I am pointing out is that the bomber crews were briefed on the military nature of the target they were attacking and believed that they were attacking a valid target.

At no point did anyone say "Our objective tonight is to kill as many German civilians as we possibly can"

I think that how Dresden came about is subtle and complex and was not simply the result of a desire by Winston Churchill and Bert Harris to kill as many Germans as possible.

I also think that Dresden was not "special" with regard to its selection as a target and the desired "ends" nor in the "ways and means" used by Bomber Command to carry out the attack and achieve the desired "ends" Indeed, the outcome at Dresden was partly a result of the fact that Bomber Command used the same "ways and means" that it had used previously in attacking German industrial targets.

Regards

John

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Re: Dresden, 1945

#195

Post by histan » 28 Feb 2017, 21:03

Some comments on the "Genocide" issue:

Is it an act of "genocide" to bomb a city whose inhabitants are active participants in another bigger act of genocide, particularly if the bombing brings the bigger act of genocide in that city to a halt?

See the following:
"During February 1945, several hundred remaining Jews still resident in Dresden were destined to be sent to their deaths in concentration camps. The chaos following the bombing provided many a chance to escape, while others were put to work in rebuilding the city, thus the bombing may have saved several hundred potential Holocaust victims.
An account in the diary of Victor Klemperer supports this. On February 12, 1945, the order was given to deliver call-up letters to virtually all of the remaining handful of Jews in Dresden to be deported, but the bombing the next night destroyed much of the train station and threw much of the city into chaos. Victor Klemperer and his wife, Eva, fled amid the chaos. He removed the "J" and yellow Star of David from his jacket and they began heading south. By walking, riding on carts, trucks and trains they eventually reached Bavaria. They had picked up temporary identification papers, which did not show his Jewish origins.[37]
Today, a placard at the Dresden Main Station memorializes the Jewish citizens of Dresden who were sent from there to the concentration camps."
Taken from: http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/ent ... rld_War_II

And this from Klemperer's diary:
"We sat down for coffee at about half past nine on Tuesday evening, very weary and depressed because during the day, after all, I had been running around as the bringer of bad tidings, and in the evening Waldmann has assured me with very great certainty (from experience and remarks he had recently picked up) that those to be deported on Thursday were being sent to their deaths ("pushed on to a siding"), and that we who were left behind would be done away with in just the same way in a week's time -- then a full-scale warning sounded. "If only they would smash everything up!" said Frau Stuehler bitterly, who had chased around all day, evidently in vain, to get her boy freed from the work duty."

I have looked carefully at the definition of genocide given in the Genocide Watch website and find it difficult to see how it applies to Dresden. One key failure is the inability to show intent. There was no deliberate intent to kill civilians. Civilian deaths would almost certainly occur but that was not the deliberate intention - the attack would have been a success if no civilians had died.

The fact that Dresden was just another target for Bomber Command supports this contention.

The rationale behind the area bombing campaign was to target the morale of the civilian population in an attempt to get them to force the government to surrender. One of the ways of achieving this would be the physical destruction of their housing by fires. The means of creating the fires was by a mixture of high explosive and incendiary bombs.

One definition of Genocide [Martin Shaw 2007] is:
"Genocide is a form of violent social conflict or war, between armed power organizations that aim to destroy civilian social groups and those groups and other actors who resist this destruction. Genocidal action is action in which armed power organizations treat civilian social groups as enemies and aim to destroy their real or putative social power, by means of killing, violence and coercion against individuals whom they regard as members of the groups"

By this definition, the strategic bombing campaign was the opposite of Genocide since the intention was not to destroy the power of the German civilians in the cities but to encourage them to exercise the power that they had in order to force a change in government policy!

Regards

John

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