Lebensraum

[Futurist]

Would most of these ethnic Germans and their descendants have actually been willing to stay in the Baltic states, though? After all, couldn't the Ostflucht eventually affect these ethnic Germans as well, thus causing many, if not most, of these ethnic Germans and their descendants to leave the Baltic states and to move to the more industrialized western parts of Germany?

That is quite possible, and indeed likely. After all, the Baltic Germans who were repatriated from Estonia and Latvia in 1939-40 were very disappointed to find themselves settled in the annexed Polish provinces rather than in Germany proper, where they had wanted to go.

OK. Also, though, wouldn't the best thing for Germany to do in such a scenario be to forbid immigration of ethnic Germans from the Baltic states to Germany proper (at least for several decades)? After all, this will probably ensure that these ethnic Germans will settle in cities in the Baltic states rather than in Germany proper, which in turn might very well allow Germany to eventually annex Courland, Riga, and a strip of Baltic coastline stretching all of the way up to Parnu and Tallinn while rump Latvia and rump Estonia would be allowed to keep their nominal independence. Indeed, in such a scenario, tensions between Germany and Latvians/Estonians can probably be reduced by having Germany allow Latvia and Estonia use ports such as Riga, Parnu, and Tallinn.

Indeed, does all of what I wrote above sound realistic to you, Michael?

In addition to this, though, out of curiosity--were Hindenburg and Ludendorff planning to have Russia coerce its entire ethnic German population to settle in Latvia and Estonia? Or were they simply going to encourage Russia's entire ethnic German population to do this?

Of course, what might be the unpredictable factor here is this: Would Nazi Germany have been able to gradually Germanize millions or even tens of millions of "racially suitable" non-Germans?

I personally doubt it, since there was a lot of resistance to germanisation by Alsatians, Poles and Danes. Perhaps a million or so non-Germans might have been successfully germanised, but the historical reality is that when the modern German state ruled over non-Germans it failed to reconcile the majority of them to German rule, even German-speakers such as the Alsatians.

Wasn't Nazi Germany much more thuggish in its Germanization tactics (such as by taking children away from their parents) than Imperial Germany ever was, though?

Yes; correct! In turn, this shows that Adolf Hitler's belief that Germany lacked Lebensraum was more imaginary than real (as in, based on reality).

I think what most concerned Hitler was that although Germany had produced a large population surplus in the 19th Century, most of it, several millions, had been lost through emigration, mainly to the United States. He considered that the reason for that large-scale emigration was Germany's inability to provide living space for the increased population.

Frankly, this certainly raises an interesting question--let's say that Otto von Bismarck hit his head on something in late 1870 and had a personality change. Afterwards, Bismarck decides to annex resource-rich Briey and Longwy in addition to annexing Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. In turn, the loss of revenue that results from the loss of resource-rich Briey and Longwy cripples France for decades to come. Meanwhile, with the threat of France permanently eliminated, Bismarck (with German Kaiser Wilhelm I's and the German Reichstag's extremely reluctant approval) goes to war against Russia in 1877 with the excuse that he wants to help the Ottoman Empire preserve the balance-of-power in the Middle East. Learning from its experiences in Prussia's previous wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, Germany manages to defeat the less industrialized Russia and to acquire Poland and the Baltic states (all of which will become German puppet states right afterwards) from Russia. Afterwards, the German government encourages Germany's population to settle in the Baltic states (indeed, Poland is probably too densely populated for large-scale German settlement) instead of emigrating abroad.

Anyway, I have two questions for you about this scenario of mine, Michael:

1. Is this scenario of mine realistic?

2. How many Germans do you think would settle in the Baltic states in the several decades after 1878 in this scenario of mine?

Indeed, any thoughts on these two questions of mine, Michael?

[Futurist]

I think what most concerned Hitler was that although Germany had produced a large population surplus in the 19th Century, most of it, several millions, had been lost through emigration, mainly to the United States. He considered that the reason for that large-scale emigration was Germany's inability to provide living space for the increased population.

Frankly, this certainly raises an interesting question--let's say that Otto von Bismarck hit his head on something in late 1870 and had a personality change. Afterwards, Bismarck decides to annex resource-rich Briey and Longwy in addition to annexing Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. In turn, the loss of revenue that results from the loss of resource-rich Briey and Longwy cripples France for decades to come. Meanwhile, with the threat of France permanently eliminated, Bismarck (with German Kaiser Wilhelm I's and the German Reichstag's extremely reluctant approval) goes to war against Russia in 1877 with the excuse that he wants to help the Ottoman Empire preserve the balance-of-power in the Middle East. Learning from its experiences in Prussia's previous wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, Germany manages to defeat the less industrialized Russia and to acquire Poland and the Baltic states (all of which will become German puppet states right afterwards) from Russia. Afterwards, the German government encourages Germany's population to settle in the Baltic states (indeed, Poland is probably too densely populated for large-scale German settlement) instead of emigrating abroad.

Anyway, I have two questions for you about this scenario of mine, Michael:

1. Is this scenario of mine realistic?

2. How many Germans do you think would settle in the Baltic states in the several decades after 1878 in this scenario of mine?

Indeed, any thoughts on these two questions of mine, Michael?

Also, here is another interesting question for you, Michael:

How many ethnic Balts (ethnic Estonians, ethnic Latvians, and ethnic Lithuanians) would have moved to and permanently settled in Germany proper in the several decades after 1878 in this scenario of mine (and assuming that Germany would have allowed all ethnic Balts who didn't have a criminal record and who weren't radicals (anarchists, Communists, et cetera) to move to and to permanently settle in Germany proper)?

Indeed, any thoughts on this question of mine, Michael?

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Futurist - Estonians are actually Baltic Finns, not Balts. But obviously they are heavily mxied with Balts.

[Futurist]

Futurist - Estonians are actually Baltic Finns, not Balts. But obviously they are heavily mxied with Balts.

Yes, you are certainly correct in a technical sense, Peter. However, I was personally thinking of the dominant ethnic groups of the three Baltic states when I used the term "Balts" here. Indeed, saying "Balts" is certainly easier than saying "Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians."

[Futurist]

Also, one more thing:

@Michael Mills: Frankly, Adolf Hitler appears to have failed to understand that the German demographic realities which were true back in the 1800s (when millions of ethnic Germans immigrated to the U.S.) were no longer true in the 1930s and 1940s. Thus, if I was Hitler, I certainly wouldn't have expanded into any non-German areas, wouldn't have sought Lebensraum, and wouldn't have invaded Poland.

[michael mills]

Indeed, does all of what I wrote above sound realistic to you, Michael?

It would certainly have been theoretically possible.

The main grievance of ethnic Estonians and Latvians was against the so-called "Baltic Barons" who owned most of the farmland; their political aim was to gain ownership of the land on which they were tenants.

If a Germany that was victorious in the First World War were prepared to agree to a land reform in Estonia, Livonia and Courland, with part of the land owned by the Baltic Barons being transferred to the tenants, then it is quite possible that Estonian and Latvian states that owed Germany their independence from Russia might have agreed to their coastal areas becoming part of Germany and settled by Germans.

What happened in historical reality is that the newly independent Estonia and Latvia confiscated most of the estates of the Baltic Barons and distributed the land to the former tenants.

Both Estonia and Latvia were very thinly populated in the early 20th Century, so it would have been theoretically possible to settle large numbers of ethnic Germans in those countries and at the same time give adequate land to the native Latvians and Estonians. After all, both countries were able to absorb a large influx of Russians settlers after 1945, such that the ethnic Estonians and Latvians came close to being reduced to the status of minorities in their own countries.

[michael mills]

Also, can you please answer this question of mine, Michael? :

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=220518

Would you mind restating your question, Futurist. I read through the linked thread, but it dealt with a number of issues, and I am not sure exactly which of them your question was related to.

[michael mills]

In addition to this, though, out of curiosity--were Hindenburg and Ludendorff planning to have Russia coerce its entire ethnic German population to settle in Latvia and Estonia? Or were they simply going to encourage Russia's entire ethnic German population to do this?

The proposed concentration of the entire ethnic German population of the Russian Empire in the Baltic Provinces was more of a concept by Pan-German activists than a thoroughly thought-out plan.

Probably those activists considered that a peace settlement between Germany and Russia could include an agreement for the repatriation of the ethnic German population of Russia, similar to the one that was reached in 1939 between Hitler and Stalin.

Wasn't Nazi Germany much more thuggish in its Germanization tactics (such as by taking children away from their parents) than Imperial Germany ever was, though?

Indeed it was. It reached almost unprecedented heights of thuggery, probably matched only by the thuggery of the early Soviet Union.

But there is a limit to what can be achieved by thuggery, since it eventually provokes increasing resistance that may well defeat the purpose for which the thuggery is being exercised. A good example is provided by Globocnik's attempt to germanise the Zamosc region of the Generalgouvernement by expelling Poles and settling ethnic Germans in their place. That attempt generated a massive resistance on the part of the Polish peasantry, and also resulted in a drastic fall in food production, with the result that the germanisation attempt had to be abandoned.

The supreme act of thuggery on the part of the German Government, the huge massacre of the Jewish population of Eastern Europe, achieved a large degree of success primarily because the peoples among whom the Jews lived were unwilling to help them resist, due to the long history of conflict and mutual dislike between the Jews and those peoples. Indeed, some of the East European peoples, such as the Lithuanians, Latvians and Ukrainians, actively collaborated in the massacre, while others, such as the Poles, did not collaborate actively but did stand back and acquiesce passively, even though they were prepared to resist strongly when they themselves were threatened, as the example of the Zamosc region shows.

[michael mills]

Frankly, this certainly raises an interesting question--let's say that Otto von Bismarck hit his head on something in late 1870 and had a personality change. Afterwards, Bismarck decides to annex resource-rich Briey and Longwy in addition to annexing Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. In turn, the loss of revenue that results from the loss of resource-rich Briey and Longwy cripples France for decades to come. Meanwhile, with the threat of France permanently eliminated, Bismarck (with German Kaiser Wilhelm I's and the German Reichstag's extremely reluctant approval) goes to war against Russia in 1877 with the excuse that he wants to help the Ottoman Empire preserve the balance-of-power in the Middle East. Learning from its experiences in Prussia's previous wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, Germany manages to defeat the less industrialized Russia and to acquire Poland and the Baltic states (all of which will become German puppet states right afterwards) from Russia. Afterwards, the German government encourages Germany's population to settle in the Baltic states (indeed, Poland is probably too densely populated for large-scale German settlement) instead of emigrating abroad.

Anyway, I have two questions for you about this scenario of mine, Michael:

1. Is this scenario of mine realistic?

I consider it unrealistic, primarily because Bismarck never wanted a war with Russia, which he saw as one of the main pillars, together with Prussia and the Habsburg Monarchy, of the existing order in Eastern and Central Europe. His main aim was to preserve the Dreikaiserbund, and to end any potential for conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia by dividing the Balkans between them. In order to preserve peace with Russia, he was prepared to support it against Britain and France, its enemies in the Crimean War, although not to the extent of a British-Russian war.

Bismarck's prime achievement was the German-Russian Reinsurance Treaty, which had the purpose of preventing any conflict between the two countries. It was only after Bismarck's fall from power in 1890 that the Reinsurance Treaty was allowed to lapse and Russia turned to France, which in other circumstances it would not have done since the Russian Imperial Government deplored the Republican Government of France, which it regarded as revolutionary and dangerously unstable. The Franco-Russian Military Convention of 1892 signalled the beginning of the conflict between Germany and Russia; it was essentially a French initiative designed to create that conflict.

Furthermore, it is likely that Britain would have opposed a German annexation of the Longwy-Briey region in addition to Alsace-Lorraine. Although the Liberal Government of Gladstone blamed Napoleon III for the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, once Napoleon had been replaced by a Republican Government British sympathies shifted to France, and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in particular aroused anti-German feeling in Britain. Any further annexations by Germany might well have caused Britain to give active support to France. Bismarck himself was not keen on the annexation, and sought to limit its extent to the ethnically German areas; it was the German military leaders who insisted on the annexation of places such as Metz, for strategic reasons.

[wm]

The supreme act of thuggery on the part of the German Government, the huge massacre of the Jewish population of Eastern Europe, achieved a large degree of success primarily because the peoples among whom the Jews lived were unwilling to help them resist,

To resist? The Jews didn't resist in any meaningful way, actually Judenrats and Jewish policemen actively helped and collaborated in the "resettlement". In 42/43 no open resistance was possible anyway.

The people of the Zamość region defended themselves (the AK initially was against any resistance) somewhat successfully for some time because the were able to use tactically the nearby Solska Wilderness to their advantage, and because food production was more important to the Germans than Himmler's senseless resettlement projects.
In the end all the resistance forces were destroyed in the battle of Porytowe Wzgórze and in the battle of Osuchy - as the AK had predicted earlier.
Actually there was no example of a successful open resistance in Poland during occupation - including the Warsaw Uprising.

And actually the Holocaust was possible thanks to very efficient use of the limited forces available to the people responsible for the Operation Reinhard and their clever manipulative tactics, one might say crudely they manipulated the Jews to do it themselves.
The first step of this was always isolation of the Jews in ghettos. The isolation would be unnecessary if the people around had been supportive or even merely passive.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Medieval "Ostsiedlung" was nothing in its scale, when compared to the current European Migrant Crisis.

Just in 2014 and 2015 several times more people migrated, than during two centuries of Ostsiedlung:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_ ... Statistics

By comparison during the 12th century "Altdeutschland" ("Old Germany" - lands to the west of the Elbe), had ca. 10-12 million inhabitants. Of them, ca. 2,000 - 2,500 emigrated eastward annually to East-Central and Eastern Europe. In total, in years 1100-1200 ca. 200,000 - 250,000 people migrated. Another 200,000 - 250,000 migrated in years 1200-1300, for the total of 400,000 - 500,000 in the 12th and 13th centuries. On the other hand, during the 14th and 15th centuries settlers moving even farther East were recruited already from areas located to the east of the Elbe (quote: "die mittelalterliche Siedlung in ihrem späteren Verlauf grossenteils aus der Eigenvermehrung ihrer Menschen gespeist wurde und in fortlaufenden Ketten von Tochtersiedlungen erfolgte"). And yet, the Ostsiedlung changed the ethnic structure of a large territory.*

Sources:

- W. Kuhn "Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur mittelalterlichen Ostsiedlug: Die Siedlerzahlen der dt. Ostsiedlung" p. 229
- Ulrich Abraham, "Zur Frage nach der Abwanderung westdt. Bevölkerung in den ostelbischen Siedlungsraum" p. 706
- J. M. Piskorski, "Kolonizacja wiejska Pomorza Zach.: Kolonizacja a germanizacja..." pp. 54, 211
- H. Boockmann, "Die mittelalterliche dt. Ostsiedlung..." p. 138

*Conclusion? With current rates of immigration, Germany will no longer be ethnically German in a few centuries from now.

[Futurist]

Medieval "Ostsiedlung" was nothing in its scale, when compared to the current European Migrant Crisis.

Just in 2014 and 2015 several times more people migrated, than during two centuries of Ostsiedlung:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_ ... Statistics

By comparison during the 12th century "Altdeutschland" ("Old Germany" - lands to the west of the Elbe), had ca. 10-12 million inhabitants. Of them, ca. 2,000 - 2,500 emigrated eastward annually to East-Central and Eastern Europe. In total, in years 1100-1200 ca. 200,000 - 250,000 people migrated. Another 200,000 - 250,000 migrated in years 1200-1300, for the total of 400,000 - 500,000 in the 12th and 13th centuries. On the other hand, during the 14th and 15th centuries settlers moving even farther East were recruited already from areas located to the east of the Elbe (quote: "die mittelalterliche Siedlung in ihrem späteren Verlauf grossenteils aus der Eigenvermehrung ihrer Menschen gespeist wurde und in fortlaufenden Ketten von Tochtersiedlungen erfolgte"). And yet, the Ostsiedlung changed the ethnic structure of a large territory.*

Sources:

- W. Kuhn "Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur mittelalterlichen Ostsiedlug: Die Siedlerzahlen der dt. Ostsiedlung" p. 229
- Ulrich Abraham, "Zur Frage nach der Abwanderung westdt. Bevölkerung in den ostelbischen Siedlungsraum" p. 706
- J. M. Piskorski, "Kolonizacja wiejska Pomorza Zach.: Kolonizacja a germanizacja..." pp. 54, 211
- H. Boockmann, "Die mittelalterliche dt. Ostsiedlung..." p. 138

*Conclusion? With current rates of immigration, Germany will no longer be ethnically German in a few centuries from now.

Didn't people back in the Middle Ages have more babies than they have today, though?

[Futurist]

In addition to this, though, out of curiosity--were Hindenburg and Ludendorff planning to have Russia coerce its entire ethnic German population to settle in Latvia and Estonia? Or were they simply going to encourage Russia's entire ethnic German population to do this?

The proposed concentration of the entire ethnic German population of the Russian Empire in the Baltic Provinces was more of a concept by Pan-German activists than a thoroughly thought-out plan.

OK.

Probably those activists considered that a peace settlement between Germany and Russia could include an agreement for the repatriation of the ethnic German population of Russia, similar to the one that was reached in 1939 between Hitler and Stalin.

Several questions:

1. Would this transfer agreement have been similar to the transfer agreement that Greece and Turkey made in the early 1920s in real life?
2. Would most of the ethnic Germans in Russia have been willing to emigrate voluntarily or would force (including physical force) have had to be used to make them emigrate?
3. Could this transfer agreement have also realistically included most of Russia's Jewish population? After all, didn't most of Russia's Jewish population speak Yiddish (which, in its spoken form, is mutually intelligible with German)? If so, couldn't a philo-Semitic German government have tried arguing that Russia's Jewish population is culturally German and thus should be allowed and encouraged to immigrate to the Baltic states and to whatever other parts of Russia that Germany acquired after the end of World War I?

Wasn't Nazi Germany much more thuggish in its Germanization tactics (such as by taking children away from their parents) than Imperial Germany ever was, though?

Indeed it was. It reached almost unprecedented heights of thuggery, probably matched only by the thuggery of the early Soviet Union.

But there is a limit to what can be achieved by thuggery, since it eventually provokes increasing resistance that may well defeat the purpose for which the thuggery is being exercised. A good example is provided by Globocnik's attempt to germanise the Zamosc region of the Generalgouvernement by expelling Poles and settling ethnic Germans in their place. That attempt generated a massive resistance on the part of the Polish peasantry, and also resulted in a drastic fall in food production, with the result that the germanisation attempt had to be abandoned.

Understood and completely agreed.

The supreme act of thuggery on the part of the German Government, the huge massacre of the Jewish population of Eastern Europe, achieved a large degree of success primarily because the peoples among whom the Jews lived were unwilling to help them resist, due to the long history of conflict and mutual dislike between the Jews and those peoples. Indeed, some of the East European peoples, such as the Lithuanians, Latvians and Ukrainians, actively collaborated in the massacre, while others, such as the Poles, did not collaborate actively but did stand back and acquiesce passively, even though they were prepared to resist strongly when they themselves were threatened, as the example of the Zamosc region shows.

Wouldn't Jewish resistance have been futile, though? After all, look at the failure of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943!

Also, somewhat off-topic, but out of curiosity--wouldn't it have been more productive for Nazi Germany to tone down its racial rhetoric and to avoid passing anti-Semitic laws and launching anti-Semitic actions (such as genocide)? After all, couldn't many European Jews (especially Eastern European Jews) have been willing to support Nazi Germany and even help Nazi Germany populate some of its desired eastern Lebensraum (after all, as you have previously said, there certainly weren't enough ethnic Germans to populate this Lebensraum) if Nazi Germany wouldn't have been anti-Semitic and genocidal? Indeed, couldn't a different, more gentle, non-anti-Semitic Nazi German leadership have argued that Jews (well, other than the Jews in Bolshevik/Communist leadership positions, for obvious reasons) are culturally German due to the fact that they speak Yiddish (a language which is mutually intelligible with German in its spoken form) and that thus Jews (including Jews from outside of Germany proper but who will end up under German control as a result of Nazi Germany's expansionism) need to be assimilated into German society and need to help Germany settle its desired Eastern Lebensraum (as opposed to arguing that Jews should be discriminated against or killed)?

[Futurist]

Frankly, this certainly raises an interesting question--let's say that Otto von Bismarck hit his head on something in late 1870 and had a personality change. Afterwards, Bismarck decides to annex resource-rich Briey and Longwy in addition to annexing Alsace-Lorraine in 1871. In turn, the loss of revenue that results from the loss of resource-rich Briey and Longwy cripples France for decades to come. Meanwhile, with the threat of France permanently eliminated, Bismarck (with German Kaiser Wilhelm I's and the German Reichstag's extremely reluctant approval) goes to war against Russia in 1877 with the excuse that he wants to help the Ottoman Empire preserve the balance-of-power in the Middle East. Learning from its experiences in Prussia's previous wars against Denmark, Austria, and France, Germany manages to defeat the less industrialized Russia and to acquire Poland and the Baltic states (all of which will become German puppet states right afterwards) from Russia. Afterwards, the German government encourages Germany's population to settle in the Baltic states (indeed, Poland is probably too densely populated for large-scale German settlement) instead of emigrating abroad.

Anyway, I have two questions for you about this scenario of mine, Michael:

1. Is this scenario of mine realistic?

I consider it unrealistic, primarily because Bismarck never wanted a war with Russia, which he saw as one of the main pillars, together with Prussia and the Habsburg Monarchy, of the existing order in Eastern and Central Europe. His main aim was to preserve the Dreikaiserbund, and to end any potential for conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia by dividing the Balkans between them. In order to preserve peace with Russia, he was prepared to support it against Britain and France, its enemies in the Crimean War, although not to the extent of a British-Russian war.

That's why Bismarck needed to hit his head on something and thus to have a personality change (in my scenario above), though. After all, a severe head injury can probably result in a person having an extreme personality change.

Bismarck's prime achievement was the German-Russian Reinsurance Treaty, which had the purpose of preventing any conflict between the two countries. It was only after Bismarck's fall from power in 1890 that the Reinsurance Treaty was allowed to lapse and Russia turned to France, which in other circumstances it would not have done since the Russian Imperial Government deplored the Republican Government of France, which it regarded as revolutionary and dangerously unstable. The Franco-Russian Military Convention of 1892 signalled the beginning of the conflict between Germany and Russia; it was essentially a French initiative designed to create that conflict

Yes; correct!

However, in this scenario, Bismarck is going to have a different personality as a result of his head injury and will thus be tempted to go to war against Russia in order to acquire Lebensraum for Germany so that ethnic Germans who want to immigrate to the U.S. will have the choice of immigrating to Eastern Europe (such as to the Baltic states) instead.

Furthermore, it is likely that Britain would have opposed a German annexation of the Longwy-Briey region in addition to Alsace-Lorraine. Although the Liberal Government of Gladstone blamed Napoleon III for the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, once Napoleon had been replaced by a Republican Government British sympathies shifted to France, and the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in particular aroused anti-German feeling in Britain. Any further annexations by Germany might well have caused Britain to give active support to France. Bismarck himself was not keen on the annexation, and sought to limit its extent to the ethnically German areas; it was the German military leaders who insisted on the annexation of places such as Metz, for strategic reasons.

What about if Bismarck would have been willing to reduce the reparations that France would have to pay to Prussia/Germany in this scenario, though? After all, in this scenario, Prussia's/Germany's annexation of the Briey-Longwy area can be compensated by a lower reparations bill for France.

Indeed, would Britain have been likely to tolerate a Prussian/German annexation of the Briey-Longwy area if this would have meant a lower reparations bill for France?

Any thoughts on this, Michael?

[Futurist]

Also, can you please answer this question of mine, Michael? :

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=220518

Would you mind restating your question, Futurist. I read through the linked thread, but it dealt with a number of issues, and I am not sure exactly which of them your question was related to.

The topic above (indeed, here's another link to it: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1&t=220518 ) is an alternate history question about Lebensraum which I have previously asked.