Lebensraum

[Futurist]

Indeed, does all of what I wrote above sound realistic to you, Michael?

It would certainly have been theoretically possible.

The main grievance of ethnic Estonians and Latvians was against the so-called "Baltic Barons" who owned most of the farmland; their political aim was to gain ownership of the land on which they were tenants.

If a Germany that was victorious in the First World War were prepared to agree to a land reform in Estonia, Livonia and Courland, with part of the land owned by the Baltic Barons being transferred to the tenants, then it is quite possible that Estonian and Latvian states that owed Germany their independence from Russia might have agreed to their coastal areas becoming part of Germany and settled by Germans

OK; good.

What happened in historical reality is that the newly independent Estonia and Latvia confiscated most of the estates of the Baltic Barons and distributed the land to the former tenants.

OK.

Both Estonia and Latvia were very thinly populated in the early 20th Century, so it would have been theoretically possible to settle large numbers of ethnic Germans in those countries and at the same time give adequate land to the native Latvians and Estonians. After all, both countries were able to absorb a large influx of Russians settlers after 1945, such that the ethnic Estonians and Latvians came close to being reduced to the status of minorities in their own countries.

Yes; correct!

Also, though, out of curiosity--do you have any idea as to what exactly the (population) carrying capacity of the Baltic states is? After all, if the carrying capacity of the Baltic states would be sufficiently large, then a victorious Imperial Germany could have encouraged not only ethnic Germans, but also ethnic Jews (well, ethnic Jews who aren't Bolsheviks/Communists) to settle in the Baltic states in order to strengthen Germany's presence, control, and rule in parts of the Baltic states even further.

[Futurist]

The only area that could realistically have been thoroughly germanised would have been the annexed areas of Western Poland. That could have been achieved by concentrating the ethnic German minority of Poland in that area, together with ethnic Germans brought from other parts of Eastern Europe, eg from the Baltic States, Ukraine or Romania, and germanising part of the native Polish population. But the process of concentrating ethnic Germans in Western Poland would have meant by definition reducing the ethnic German population in other parts of Eastern Europe.

The upshot is that German colonisation of the whole of Poland and the conquered Soviet territories could never have been achieved, even if Germany had won the war. In evaluating the wilder fantasies of Hitler, Himmler and others, it is necessary to determine, on the basis of observable criteria such as normal socio-economic and demographic dynamics, whether they culd ever have been achieved in reality; the answer is that they could not.

Out of curiosity--how much additional territory in Eastern Europe could a victorious Nazi Germany have successfully Germanized if it would have used Jews to help settle its Eastern European Lebensraum instead of deporting or killing them?

Indeed, such a scenario might actually not be completely implausible if Adolf Hitler would have come to the conclusion (starting from the early or mid-1920s) that not all Jews are bad (and that only a (small) minority of Jews is actually bad). Rather, just like for ethnic Germans, Hitler could have differentiated between Jews who weren't active in Communist and/or socialist movements and Jews who were active in such movements. In such a scenario, Hitler could have avoided passing anti-Semitic laws and committing genocide and instead could have used Jews (well, Jews who weren't active in socialist or Communist movements) to help settle Germany's desired Eastern Lebensraum. Indeed, a more rational Hitler could have said that Jews who speak the Yiddish language are already partially Germanized and that settling these Jews in Germany (including in Germany's desired Eastern European Lebensraum--land which Nazi Germany presumably planned to eventually annex to Germany proper) should turn (as in, make) them and their descendants fully German (well, other than perhaps the religious differences*) within several generations.

*Religious differences should have been a non-issue to a more rational Nazi German leadership (including to a more rational Adolf Hitler). After all, a German Jew can certainly practice the Jewish faith and still be an utmost German patriot.

[wm]

But the Nazi German leadership was rational to the hilt. The Jews were "responsible" for all the calamities that had befallen on Germany; the economic hardship, austerity, the wars, the global anti-German coalition. After all never before a single country had to face all the major powers on this Earth alone.

So if not the Jews were responsible for this then who? The only remaining logical answer would be the Nazi leadership, and that was an unattractive proposition.

The German soldiers, the German people were told from the day one of the war, it was all the Jews fault. This resulted of a mass of pogroms as the German Army advanced through Poland. In each and every case it was "because you the Jews were responsible for this war" nothing else.
This blame fеst was going on till the very end, on a massive scale.

The Nazi needed the Jews badly, but not as settlers but as scapegoats.

[Futurist]

But the Nazi German leadership was rational to the hilt. The Jews were "responsible" for all the calamities that had befallen on Germany; the economic hardship, austerity, the wars, the global anti-German coalition.

That was only true in the Nazis' imagination, though. Indeed, in reality, the Jews certainly weren't anything like the global, ultra-evil, ultra-maleficent force that the Nazis believed them to be.

After all never before a single country had to face all the major powers on this Earth alone.

What about during World War I, though?

So if not the Jews were responsible for this then who? The only remaining logical answer would be the Nazi leadership, and that was an unattractive proposition.

Who was responsible for this? The decision-makers in France, Britain, et cetera, of course--not the Jews.

The German soldiers, the German people were told from the day one of the war, it was all the Jews fault. This resulted of a mass of pogroms as the German Army advanced through Poland. In each and every case it was "because you the Jews were responsible for this war" nothing else.
This blame fеst was going on till the very end, on a massive scale.

Yes, and the Nazis were certainly idiots for beginning this blame-fest in the first place.

The Nazi needed the Jews badly, but not as settlers but as scapegoats.

Actually, No, I certainly don't think so. After all, the Nazis could have used Communists, socialists, fat cats, et cetera as scapegoats without making false and inaccurate hasty generalizations about all Jews.

[Piotr Kapuscinski]

Out of curiosity--how much additional territory in Eastern Europe could a victorious Nazi Germany have successfully Germanized if it would have used Jews to help settle its Eastern European Lebensraum instead of deporting or killing them?

Not much because Jews didn't know how to farm, so they could only settle in towns, which don't cover much space. But it is becoming ridiculous - the "International Jewry" was the main enemy of the Nazis and you want some alternative scenario in which they are best friends? On the other hand, in Israel Jews learned how to farm, which have allowed them to colonize formerly Palestinian Arab lands.

By the way, Nazi Germany could Germanize as much territory as it wished, simply by removing its previous inhabitants. The only issue is how densely populated was that territory going to be. If they wanted sparsely populated wildernesss with beautiful nature, then they didn't need many settlers. If they wanted to achieve a high population density, then in such case they would need a lot of them.

If I remember correctly, Hitler wanted to demolish existing towns, and build everything from scratch.

So in such case he did not need many settlers, if he wanted to create nature reserves for wildlife.

[Futurist]

Out of curiosity--how much additional territory in Eastern Europe could a victorious Nazi Germany have successfully Germanized if it would have used Jews to help settle its Eastern European Lebensraum instead of deporting or killing them?

Not much because Jews didn't know how to farm, so they could only settle in towns, which don't cover much space.

What about settling in suburbs, though?

But it is becoming ridiculous - the "International Jewry" was the main enemy of the Nazis and you want some alternative scenario in which they are best friends?

Yes :

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 1&t=223781

On the other hand, in Israel Jews learned how to farm, which have allowed them to colonize formerly Palestinian Arab lands.

Yes; correct!

By the way, Nazi Germany could Germanize as much territory as it wished, simply by removing its previous inhabitants. The only issue is how densely populated was that territory going to be. If they wanted sparsely populated wildernesss with beautiful nature, then they didn't need many settlers. If they wanted to achieve a high population density, then in such case they would need a lot of them.

If I remember correctly, Hitler wanted to demolish existing towns, and build everything from scratch.

So in such case he did not need many settlers, if he wanted to create nature reserves for wildlife.

OK.

Also, though, didn't Hitler envy the U.S. for its large-scale settlement of large parts of North America?

[wm]

What about during World War I, though?

WW1 was different, for the reason it was an expected and perfectly understandable conflict. There were two hostile blocs, there were conflicting interests, and there was the straw that finally broke the camel's back. All perfectly clear even for a feeble-minded person.

Hitler escalated a small territorial dispute to ww2 in two years, attacking countries considered friendly like Poland, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the USSR. Maybe he had his reasons and goals, but they most likely they weren't regarded as worth dying for by the Germans. They actually weren't keen to die for Danzig too. This is why so many false flag operations were needed.

That the decision makers did it weren't believable, too many countries, too many different decision makers.

Actually, No, I certainly don't think so. After all, the Nazis could have used Communists, socialists, fat cats, et cetera as scapegoats without making false and inaccurate hasty generalizations about all Jews.

The communists wouldn't fit because of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact. Socialists were weak and weren't decision makers. And the Nazi actually were (national) socialists too.

[michael mills]

Hitler escalated a small territorial dispute to ww2 in two years, attacking countries considered friendly like Poland,

By the time Hitler attacked Poland on 1 September 1939, it was no longer a country friendly to Germany, but had chosen to become an enemy of Germany through its agreement with Britain on military co-operation against Germany of 6 April 1939. Under that agreement, Britain undertook to join Poland in making war on Germany as soon as Poland sent its forces into action against Germany in response to a claimed direct or indirect threat to its independence. The agreement encouraged the Polish Government to adopt a hostile attitude toward Germany, and even to threaten war against it if any move were made to reunite Danzig with it.

Norway, Denmark

The occupation of Norway was a pre-emptive move to prevent Anglo-French landings at Narvik to cut off the supply of iron ore to Germany from Sweden. Denmark was occupied purely as a route to Norway, and it was kept as light as possible, since it was not considered as an enemy by Hitler.

Belgium

The invasion of Belgium was a result of the Anglo-French declaration of war on Germany. If Britain and France had not decided to confront Germany militarily, there would have been no German invasion of Belgium.

the USSR

The friendship of the USSR was never real, and Stalin was never committed to Germany in the way that Roosevelt was committed to Britain. It was perfectly obvious that Stalin was leaving open the option of eventually joining Britain against Germany, and it was really only a matter of who would attack first, Hitler or Stalin. Of course, Hitler's main ideological and political aim had always been the destruction of "Jewish Bolshevism", but his decision to attack the Soviet Union in 1941, before the defeat of Britain, was made for strategic reasons, ie to eliminate Soviet military power before it would inevitably be turned against Germany.

[michael mills]

Further to my previous post, it needs to be borne in mind that Hitler had been persuaded to enter into the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union in part by the argument made by many right-wing nationalists that Stalin was not so much a Bolshevik as a traditional Russian nationalist who had overthrown "Judeo-Bolshevik" rule through his purges of 1937-38.

In Germany the main proponent of that view was Ribbentrop, who strongly pushed the view that Stalin's Russia was now a nationalist state with which Germany could make an alliance. There is a number of utterances by Hitler in the period between August 1939 and late 1940 which appear to endorse the view that under Stalin the "Jewish Bolshevik" leadership had been eliminated, although he also expressed the view that Jewish Bolsheviks were still present at the middle levels of the Soviet system, and were poised to take power once again if Stalin were overthrown or died.

There are also indications that he had abandoned his ambition of conquering "Lebensraum" in Russia and replaced it with the more limited aim of germanising the annexed western provinces of Poland, eg the withdrawal of ethnic Germans from the regions that had come under Stalin's rule (the Baltic States, eastern Poland, Bessarabia), which was incompatible with his original ideology of German colonisation in Russia.

Once Hitler made the decision in December 1940 to attack the Soviet Union, after Stalin had insisted on westward expansion in the Baltic and Balkan regions, ie for strategic reasons, he seems to have reverted to his original ideological premiss that the Soviet Union was a "Jewish Bolshevik" entity, and also to his Lebensraum concept, which between September 1939 and late 1940 had been limited to the German-occupied part of Poland.

[michael mills]

With regard to Hitler's changing view of the Soviet Union, I refer readers to my two initial posts on this thread:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... viet+union

[wm]

By the time Hitler attacked Poland on 1 September 1939, it was no longer a country friendly to Germany, but had chosen to become an enemy of Germany through its agreement with Britain on military co-operation against Germany of 6 April 1939. Under that agreement, Britain undertook to join Poland in making war on Germany as soon as Poland sent its forces into action against Germany in response to a claimed direct or indirect threat to its independence.

In other words the Poles felt threatened, they brought their friends and Hitler facing superior numbers, didn't disengage from the conflict as any sane politician or even an insane mugger in New York would do.
Even more he handed over the initiative entirely to his imagined enemies, because even he admitted Germany couldn't win that war with its own efforts alone. His enemies had to do something stupid like the British suing for peace, or the USSR self disintegrating.

The agreement encouraged the Polish Government to adopt a hostile attitude toward Germany, and even to threaten war against it if any move were made to reunite Danzig with it.

Actually the Poles always threaten war when this problem was mentioned, in the twenties and the thirties. There was lots of time to absorb the message. But seems some folks in Germany were slow learners...

[michael mills]

In other words the Poles felt threatened,

Why did they feel threatened?

Germany had not made any threats, ie it had not said it would take any action detrimental to Poland if the latter did not do something that Germany requested it to do. What Germany had done was to offer a package deal to resolve all outstanding issues. That deal included:

- Poland to agree to the reunification of Danzig with Germany, in return for customs-free access to the port;

- Poland to grant Germany an extraterritorial road and rail link across the Corridor to East Prussia, with Polish access routes across that link to its port at Gdynia;

- Germany to recognise the existing German-Polish border, and renounce all claims to former German territory.

The original offer made in October 1938 had included the proposal that Poland join the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan, but that proposal had been dropped in response to Polish opposition.

Germany had not made any explicit threats in relation to the package deal, it just kept repeating it. Unlike Poland itself, it did not issue any ultimatums to that country over Danzig.

[wm]

The Poles felt threatened by the sharp change of Hitler's attitude and by the 1939 conquest of Czechoslovakia. Earlier the were showered by Hitler and other leading Nazis with love, understanding, and promises everything would be all right, because the Chancellor had no territorial claims in Europe. This suddenly stopped at the beginning of 1939.
But still even in March it wasn't more the usual Polish efforts to find a better ally/allies and a better defensive agreement than the uninterested France and the unreliable 1926 Polish French agreement than fear.
The Poles always felt vulnerable, alone in their plight and were trying to do something about it.

The road, the reunification wouldn't be accepted by the Poles themselves. The Polish leaders wouldn't be able to sell it to them without destroying themselves and their party politically. It simply wasn't doable for internal political reasons.

It could be done for a good price, but recognition of the border and renouncing all claims weren't considered a good price at all, because the territories were a part of Poland anyway - it didn't matter the Germans liked or not.
If the had problem with it - well, it was their problem.

[michael mills]

The road, the reunification wouldn't be accepted by the Poles themselves. The Polish leaders wouldn't be able to sell it without destroying themselves and their party politically. It simply wasn't doable for internal political reasons.

I agree, that is largely true. Beck might have tried to agree to the German proposals, but there would have been a huge backlash by the opponents of the Sanacja regime, by Endecja, Front Morges, and others. There might even have been a revolt by elements of the army, eg those friendly to Sikorski.

Pilsudski had been strong enough to suppress the opposition to the 1934 détente with Germany, and was able to throw people like Korfanty into prison. But his successors were far weaker, and would not have been able to face down the opposition.

The German ambassador in Warsaw, Moltke, claimed that Beck's Chef de Cabinet had secretly informed him that Beck would acquiesce in a German coup d'état in Danzig, since that would relieve him of the odium of officially agreeing to the German request for the return of Danzig, and he would be able to plead force majeure. I do not know how reliable Moltke's claim was, but it sounds plausible in a macchiavellian sort of way; Beck was known as a rather devious character.

[michael mills]

It could be done for a good price, but recognition of the border and renouncing all claims weren't considered a good price at all, because the territories were a part of Poland anyway - it didn't matter the Germans liked or not.

Recognition by Germany of the German-Polish border and renunciation of its claims to former German territory were something that the Polish Government had been seeking in vain ever since 1920, so those things were valuable to Poland.

After all, Poland had been very disappointed that the Locarno Treaty had settled Germany's borders in the West but not those in the East. One of the major Polish foreign policy aims was to achieve an "Eastern Locarno".

It is interesting that when Pilsudski seized power in 1926, some Endecja politicians in Wielkopolska, the former Posen Province of Germany, for a time were considering secession from Poland because they feared that Pilsudski would give that territory back to Germany in order to achieve détente.

The Poles felt threatened by ......... the 1939 conquest of Czechoslovakia.

I doubt that the Polish Government was particularly concerned about Hitler's crushing of Czechoslovakia. After all, it had always been hostile to the Czech rulers, regarding them as too friendly to the Soviet Union.

What the Polish leaders did not like was the German guarantee of the independence of Slovakia, since they would have preferred a partitioning of that country with Hungary, or else Hungarian annexation, which would have established the Polish-Hungarian border that had long been a Polish aim. However, the Hungarian annexation of Ruthenia (Carpatho-Ukraine), with Hitler's consent, had established just such a border, albeit a short one.