Generaloberst Blaskowitz on the atrocities in Poland 1939

[Marcus]

I'm looking for the text of the memorandum written by Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz complaining about the atrocities of the SS Totenkopfverbände in Poland 1939, is it available online?
Thanks.

/Marcus

[David Thompson]

Marcus -- You asked:

I'm looking for the text of the memorandum written by Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz complaining about the atrocities of the SS Totenkopfverbände in Poland 1939, is it available online?

I don't have a copy of Generaloberst Blaskowitz's first (Nov 1939) memorandum, and I've never seen the whole text anywhere. Here's what I have of his second (Feb 1940) memorandum, from ed. J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945, vol. 3, Foreign Policy, War and Racial Extermination, University of Exeter Press, Exeter [UK]: 1995, pp. 938-941:

938 NAZISM—FOREIGN POLICY, WAR AND RACIAL EXTERMINATION

* * * * *

The Army leadership in Poland became increasingly concerned about this terror. The attitude of sections of the Army is apparent in the following excerpts from a memorandum, dated 6 February 1940, prepared by Colonel-General Blaskowitz, commander of the Ober-Ost military region for a visit by the Army C in C. It was the second such memorandum by Blaskowitz, a man who was not one of the leading opponents of Hitler among the generals, being a typical professional soldier of limited horizons. His protest cost him a Field-Marshal's baton and eventually his command.

========================
[Document No.] 655
========================

. . .

It is misguided to slaughter tens of thousands of Jews and Poles as is happening at present; because, in view of the huge population neither the concept of a Polish State nor the Jews will be eliminated by doing so. On the contrary, the way in which this slaughter is being carried out is causing great damage; it is complicating the problems and making them much more dangerous than they would have been with a considered and systematic approach. The consequences are:

(a) Enemy propaganda is provided with material which could nowhere have been more effectively devised. It is true that what the foreign radio stations have broad-

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF POLAND 939

cast so far is only a tiny fraction of what has happened in reality. But we must reckon that the clamour of the outside world will continually increase and cause great political damage, particularly since the atrocities have actually occurred and cannot be disproved.

(b) The acts of violence against the Jews which occur in full view of the public inspire among the religious Poles not only deep disgust but also great pity for the Jewish population, to which up to now the Poles were more or less hostile. In a very short time we shall reach the point at which our arch-enemies in the eastern sphere—the Pole and the Jew, who in addition will receive the particular support of the Catholic Church—will, in their hatred against their tormentors, combine against Germany right along the line.

(c) The role of the armed forces, who are compelled impotently to watch this crime and whose reputation, particularly with the Polish population, suffers irreparable harm, need not be referred to again.

(d) But the worst damage which will accrue to the German nation from the present situation is the brutalization and moral debasement which, in a very short time, will spread like a plague among valuable German manpower.

If high officials of the SS and police demand acts of violence and brutality and praise them publicly, then in a very short time we shall be faced with the rule of the thug. Like-minded people and those with warped characters will very soon come together so that, as is now the case in Poland, they can give full expression to their animal and pathological instincts. It is hardly possible to keep them any longer in check, since they can well believe themselves officially authorized and justified in committing any act of cruelty.

The only way of resisting this epidemic is to subordinate those who are guilty and their followers to the military leadership and courts as quickly as possible.

The C.-in-C. of the southern section of the front, General of the Infantry Ulex, expressed himself on 2 February 1940 as follows:

To the C.-in-C. East
Spala

The acts of violence by the police forces, which have increased recently, demonstrate a quite incredible lack of human and moral feeling, so that it can be called sheer brutalization. And even so I believe that my headquarters only hears of a small number of the acts of violence occurring.

It seems as if the superiors privately approve of this activity and do not wish to intervene.

I see the only way out of this ignoble situation, which besmirches the honour of the whole German nation, in the recall and disbanding at a stroke of all the police units, including all their superior officers and all those leaders in the departments of the 'General Government' who have witnessed these acts of violence for months, and their replacement by sound honourable units.
[signed] ULEX

The attitude of the troops to the SS and police alternates between abhorrence and hatred. Every soldier feels repelled and revolted by these crimes which are being perpetrated in Poland by nationals of the Reich and representatives of the State

940 NAZISM-FOREIGN POLICY. WAR AND RACIAL EXTERMINATION

authority. He does not understand how such things can happen with impunity, particularly since they occur, so to speak, under his protection.

Every police search and confiscation is accompanied by a tendency for those of the police involved to rob and plunder. It is clearly the normal custom for confiscated articles to be distributed among the police and SS units.

In a conference with the Governor-General on 23 January 1940, Major-General Ruhrmann reported to the representative of the Four-Year Plan that his skilful director of external departments, a certain Captain Schuh in the cavalry, had succeeded in getting the SS to give up large quantities of watches and gold objects.

Considering such a state of affairs it is naturally not surprising that the individual uses every opportunity to enrich himself. He can do this with no danger to himself, since if everybody steals the individual thief need fear no punishment. There is no doubt that the defenceless Polish population, who have to look on at these crimes and are driven to despair by them, will give fanatical support to any revolt or movement of vengeance. Many people who have never thought of revolt before will use every opportunity of organizing one and will flock to support it, determined to fight. The large peasant population particularly, which, if treated reasonably and objectively by the German administration, would have worked calmly and peacefully for us, is being driven by force, so to speak, into the enemy camp.

The resettlement programme is causing especial and growing discontent throughout the country. It is obvious that the starving population, which is fighting for its existence, can only observe with the greatest concern how the masses of those being resettled are left to find refuge with them completely penniless and, so to speak, naked and hungry.

It is only too understandable that these feelings reach a pitch of uncontrolled hatred at the numbers of children dying of starvation on every transport and the wagons of people frozen to death.

The idea that one can intimidate the Polish population by terrorism and rub their noses in the dirt will certainly prove to be false. This people's capacity for enduring suffering is too great for that .. .

Hitler was unimpressed by these arguments. On 18 November 1939, his adjutant, Major Engel, had recorded in his diary Hitler's reaction to Blaskowitz's first memorandum as follows:

Siewert asks me to come and see him and hands over to me a memorandum from General Blaskowitz concerning conditions in Poland: very great concern about illegal shootings, arrests, and confiscations, worries about the discipline of the troops who witness these things with their own eyes, local discussions with SD and Gestapo without success—they refer to instructions from the SS leadership. Request to reestablish conditions of legality, above all that executions should only be carried out after due process of law. Place the memorandum, which is very moderately phrased, before the Führer that very afternoon. At first, he reads it

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION OF POLAND 941

calmly, but then once again starts making serious criticisms of the 'childish attitudes' among the Army leadership; one can't fight a war with Salvation Army methods. This also confirms his long-held aversion to General BI. whom he had never trusted. He had also been opposed to his appointment to command an army and thinks that BI. should be relieved of his command since he is unsuitable. I inform C-in-C. Army and Sievert, also Oqu.IV .. .

[Simon K]

Excellent. Thanks for bringing that out to the open.
Some great quotes there.
Cheers
Simon K

[Marcus]

Thanks David, much appreciated.

/Marcus

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

Blaskowitz has fallen into obscurity as a result of the disfavour Hitler showed him after the above 1939 complaints.

However, prior to this he was very much in favour. It was his troops who had occupied both Prague and Warsaw earlier in 1939 and he was strongly tipped for a leading role on the Western Front in 1940.

It was probably also his complaints that led to the entire SS, including the Waffen-SS, being withdrawn from the jurisdiction of normal German military courts.

Cheers,

Sid.

[Benoit Douville]

Awesome info. We have to respect a guy like Blaskotwitz for saying the truth. By the way, what did he do the rest of the War?

Regards

[David Thompson]

Blaskowitz, Johannes (1883-5.2.1948) [Generaloberst] -- WWI service as officer; general staff officer, Military District V (Wehrkreiskommando V) 1919; general staff officer with the commander of Infantry (Infanterieführer) for Military District V 1921; commander, III Battalion of 13th Infantry Regiment 1924; chief of staff, 5th Division 1928; commander, 14th Infantry Regiment 1930; Inspector of Army Armaments Schools 1933; commander, Military District II (Wehrkreis II) 1935; commander, 3rd Army Group Command (Heeresgruppenkommando 3) Nov 1938-Aug 1939; commander, 8th Army 1 Sept-14 Oct 1939; commander, 2nd Army 14-20 Oct 1939; Commander-in-chief "East" (Oberbefehlshaber Ost) 20 Oct 1939-14 May 1940; commander, 9th Army 14-29 May 1940; military commander of northern France (Militaerbefehlshaber Nordfrankreich) 9-26 Jun 1940; commander, 1st Army in France 25 Oct 1940-1 May 1944; acting commander, Army Group G 10 May-21 Sept 1944; commander, Army Group G 24 Dec 1944-28 Jan 1945; commander, Army Group H 28 Jan-21 Mar or Apr 1945; commander, 25th Army and commander-in-chief of the Netherlands (Oberbefehlshaber Niederlande) Apr 1945 or 21 Mar-5 May 1945 [Knights Cross 1939; Oakleaves 1944; Swords 1945] {surrendered to Canadian troops 5 May 1945; arrested by Canadian authorities near Aurich 9 Jun 1945 (LT 10 Jun 1945:3:b); accused of war crimes; died at Nuremberg 5 Feb 1948 at start of war crimes proceedings by falling or jumping from a three story gangway on his way to court (NYT 6 Feb 1948:13:2; LT 6 Feb 1948:3e), or possibly murdered by SS men in the camp (Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals vol. X p. 50; Who's Who pps. 18-19; Encyclopedia of the Third Reich pps. 89-90; ABR-H; ABR-Croisier-H; Nazi Conspiracy & Aggression VI, pps. 624-634 [Document 3739-PS]).}

[little grey rabbit]

Does anyone know the archival reference for the original document of both the Feb. 1940 memo and the one (or two) memos of November 1939?

Christopher Browning's footnotes in the Origin of the Final Solution (page 451) gives just this

135. Groscurth, Tagebücher, pp. 426–27 (Doc. Nr. 43: Blaskowitz to okh, November 27,
1939).
136. Gerhard Engel, Heeresadjutant bei Hitler: 1938–43. Aufzeichungen des Majors Engel,
ed. von Kotze, p. 68. As the editor notes, Engel’s dating of November 18 for Hitler’s
dismissal of the report is possibly mistaken, since Engel apparently did not date these notes
until after the war. Richard Giziowski, The Enigma of General Blaskowitz, pp. 172–73,
assumes that there were two Blaskowitz memoranda in November, one of November 17 and
a second of November 27.

So it seems one of the November memos was reproduced as an appendix to a diary of an officer who died in Soviet custody. But that doesn't tell us anything about the whereabouts of the original document and its provenance

There is a Brief of an Interrogation of Blaskowitz that appears in the Donovan papers at Cornell Law Library (Vol XVII 53/004), of October 1945 before Blaskowitz fell or was pushed off a balcony at Nuremberg.

Blaskowitz was not ordered by his superior, von Brauchitsch, to avoid interference with the civilian government, but both he and Frank scrupulously maintained the separation. The witness was aware of the activities of the civilian government in deporting Jews into ghettos and the activities of the secret police. His soldiers, however, did not receive, and indeed they were forbidden to exercise any police power. The task of the witness was to maintain the security of Poland with a minimum of troops since soldiers were urgently needed on the western front.

The police measures which were undertaken seemed to the witness to make the execution of his mission more difficult and accordingly he prepared a report based on personal knowledge and the information transmitted to him by subordinate commanders concerning the activities of the police and the undesirability of the policy in effect regarding Jews and Poles. He never received a reply to this report except in the winter of the following year when Brauchitsch called a conference of high ranking Army officials to discuss general matters and during the course of the meeting Himmler spoke a few words in an attempt to justify the actions which were undertaken as a matter of necessity. The affair in Poland was not specifically mentioned at this meeting, but the witness has no doubt but that Himmler's remarks were based upon his report and that as a consequence his subsequent career in the Army was thereby prejudiced.

Blaskowitz was unable to say whether the police were subject to the control of Frank or whether Kroeger took his orders from Himmler and that Frank was unable to control their conduct. Blaskowitz had no specific recollection of pointing out to Frank the undesirability of the construction of ghettos and the use of vigorous polices, but he believes that his attitude in such affairs was well known and that is quite possible that in discussions which he had with Frank he pointed out this fact. The witness is extremely cooperative and gives the impression of being a soldier who did not concern himself with political activities or civilian adminstration.

I don't have an in-depth knowledge of military history or Hitler's circle etc. But could Keitel be obliquely referring to the Blaskowitz memo here in his memoirs?

Page 101-102 [1939. Brauchitsch presents his complaints]
The conference with Brauchitsch took place in my presence [It was on 5th November, 1939.] Von Brauchitsch and I silently listened to Hitler's very extensive discourse on the War Office's point of view as far as it was known. Brauchitsch followed him, giving two reasons why he could not agree:
1. During the Polish campaign the infantry had been shown to be over-cautious and insufficiently attack-minded; it also lacked training, it showed little command of the tactics of attack and its NCOs lacked proficiency.
2. Discipline had unfortunately become very lax and there were at present conditions reminiscent of those in 1917 - there had been drunken orgies and bad behaviour in troop trains and on railway stations. He had been sent reports on all this by the stationmasters, and there was a series of affidavits on hand which had led to reprimands for bad breaches of discipline.
He concluded that the Army needed intensive training before there was any possibility of unleashing it on a rested and well-prepared enemy in the west.
After the Commander-in-Chief had finished speaking, the Fuehrer jumped up in a rage and shouted that it was quite incomprehensible to him that just because of a little lack of discipline a Commander-in-Chief should condemn his own Army and run it down. None of his commanders had said anything to him about any lack of verve in the infantry when he had been at the front, but he had to listen to such criticisms now after the Army had won a unique victory in Poland. As Supreme commander he, personally, would have to reject out of hand such charges against his Army. He concluded by demanding to see all the legal papers concerned so that he could read them for himself. Then he left the room, slamming the door behind him, leaving all of us just standing there. ....Every day I was asked for the legal papers he had demanded; I only ever saw one that Hitler threw onto my desk.

I could be wildy off here, but this might connect the production of the Blaskowitz report with the unwillingness to immediately invade France by the military leadership?

[David Thompson]

little grey rabbit -- You asked:

I could be wildy off here, but this might connect the production of the Blaskowitz report with the unwillingness to immediately invade France by the military leadership?

The quotes from the Feb 1940 reports (from Gens. Blaskowitz and von Ulex) are directed at the behavior of the SS and police towards civilians; not the Army or its readiness.

[little grey rabbit]

My question as to the archival location and provenance applies to both or all three of Blaskowitz reports but my suggestion of a link between disagreements between Hitler and the Wehrmacht leadership and Blaskowitz's reports applies only to November 1939.

Blaskowitz and others appear to only remember one significant report - and I believe this is the November report - as this testimony from Gisevius (Blue Series Vol XII, page 305, 26 April 1945) suggests

GISEVIUS: I know of one report made by Generaloberst Blaskowitz during the first few months of the Polish campaign on the basis of information received by him and the military offices under him. Beyond that, as far as I know, such reports were compiled only by the group Canaris-Oster. But I should not care to assert that another report was not written by someone else somewhere.
DR. LATERNSER: What was the aim of the report which Generaloberst Blaskowitz submitted?
GISEVTUS: Generaloberst Blaskowitz intended . ..
THE PRESIDENT: The report which one particular general made does not tend to show that the group was either innocent or eriminal.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, it helps us to find out what the attitude of the group was.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal think that the report of one general is not evidence as to the criminality of the whole group.
DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, is that question approved? I asked about the aim of the report.
THE PRESIDENT: No; the Tribunal is of the opinion that what was contained in that report is not admissible.

[Boby]

25.10.1939, 27.11.1939: Nachlass Groscurth in BA-MA, N 104.

It is not known for certain if there was another memo before the one of 27 November. Engel notes mentioned the furious reaction of Hitler on the 18th. But Engel notes are a post-war construction, as correctly noted by Browning.

6.2.1940: Nbg.-Dok. NO-3011

Boby,

[David Thompson]

Thanks, Boby.

[little grey rabbit]

I add my thanks to David Thompson's

I had a quick search at the IFZ online catalogue and something additional came up

Signatur: MA 261
Art: Rolle
Bandnummer:1
Bestand:Reichswehrministerium
Titel: Heer
11) Korrespondenz und Bericht Oberbefehlshaber Ost/ Chef Generalstab (General Hollidt), General Blaskowitz und Generalgouverneur Frank, 29. März-25. April 1940: Protest gegen Aktion der Schutzstaffel gegen Partisanen im Generalgouvernement, Bl. 9410-9421;

This seems different from the Feb memo - but not reaching the highest leadership..

Do we know who the recipient of the February memo was?

November 1939 was also the point when Halder, Brauschtisch and Thomas debated launching a coup against Hitler. Perhaps this is also the context of Blaskowitz preparing material that focuses on the crimes of party associated organisations.

[David Thompson]

little grey rabbit -- You asked:

Do we know who the recipient of the February memo was?

Probably Gen. Walther von Brauchitsch, since Messrs. Noakes and Pridham describe the document as "a memorandum, dated 6 February 1940, prepared by Colonel-General Blaskowitz, commander of the Ober-Ost military region for a visit by the Army C in C."

[Sid Guttridge]

I have often referred to Blaskowitz's report in posts, but I rarely go back to read it. The resurrection of this thread has led me to revisit it.

I had previously rather overlooked its remarkable lack of moral condemnation of the killings and its purely pragmatic arguments against them.

In writing "It is misguided to slaughter tens of thousands of Jews and Poles as is happening at present; because, in view of the huge population neither the concept of a Polish State nor the Jews will be eliminated by doing so" he seems to be arguing against the current level of killings not because they are inherently wrong but because they are an unsatisfactory half measure that was proving counter productive to German Army morality and morale and the effectiveness of its occupation. It was driving Poles and Jews together and handing a propaganda tool to the Allies.

For Blaskowitz it was in Germany's self interest to be more benign to Poles and Jews because current murderous policies could not achieve their goals and therefore "neither the concept of a Polish State nor the Jews will be eliminated".

Blaskowitz was clearly no bleeding heart. For him "the Pole and the Jew" were still "our arch-enemies in the eastern sphere" and he apparently expresses no reservations about the the desireability, or otherwise, of eliminating the Polish state or the Jews.