The literature, that I read on the subject so far, does not lead me to believe, that the order by Göring (or lack there of )that is being discussed, had effect if any on the number of sexual assaults committed on EF. That, of course, can also mean, that my knowledge is lacking. Snyder refers to German scholars Maiwald and Mischler who are favoring the theory that “sexual debasement” was a policy pursued by Germans – although they cite Keitel rather than Göring. Snyder does not agree with them however:
In support of this position, the authors cite Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel's demand that all means should be employed in the east, "even against women and children." Maiwald and Mischler, however, do not document a single specific order instructing the troops to commit rape as part of the military strategy.' In fact, by calling the reader's attention to the Wehrmacht's extensive efforts to prevent sexually transmit¬ted diseases among the troops, the authors actually undermine their thesis.' In the First World War, "carnal flu" incapacitated hundreds of thousands of German soldiers. The Wehrmacht was determined to prevent any repetition. During the Second World War, it oper¬ated an extensive system of closely regulated and medically super¬vised brothels in order to reduce the spread of sexually transmitted diseases.° The Wehrmacht also introduced severe punishments for soldiers careless enough to contract a sexually transmitted disease." A strategy of "sexual debasement" in the east - that is, a strategy of sexual assaults as a means of repression—would have completely sabotaged these efforts.
Scholars also have suggested that the military judicial authorities did not perceive sexual assaults against Slavic women as "moral of¬fenses" and therefore pursued such crimes as "fraternization," "racial offenses," or even "collaboration with partisans."13 In the case files, however, it appears that the authorities did not equivocate and indeed classified sexual offenses perpetrated against Slavic women as sexual assaults. Exceptions to this rule occurred in the east, but many courts also chose to call sexual assaults against German women something other than what they were—for example, "libelous behavior."
The Central Documentation Agency's Eastern Collection contains a considerable number of case files for processes against soldiers who committed sexual assaults against inhabitants of the eastern occupied areas. However, the case files do not resolve the controversy surround¬ing the consequences of the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Decree." Instead, they only raise more questions. On the one hand, approximately 4o percent of the individuals convicted for rape crimes in the Eastern Collection case file sample had assaulted eastern inhabitants. Perhaps more importantly, the case files examined for this study contain only one specific reference to the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Decree." At first glance, this seems to suggest that the military judicial authorities ig¬nored the Jurisdiction Decree to a large extent.
On the other hand, the Eastern Collection fell into Soviet hands at war's end. Therefore, the case files in the Eastern Collection came from units operating in the east. One might expect that the collection would contain a higher number of case files for crimes committed against eastern inhabitants if indeed the military judicial authorities pursued them on a regular basis.
Another possibility should also be considered. The prewar provi¬sions required the military judicial authorities to prosecute sexual as¬saults, even if the victims had not filed complaints. In October 1940 the provisions were changed. Henceforth, a complaint had to he lodged before the military judicial authorities could initiate legal action." Soviet civilians might have chosen not to report crimes committed against them by German soldiers. In fact, experts estimate that, even in ideal victim-friendly (i.e., civilian peacetime) environments, the majority of rape crimes go unreported.18 It would not be surprising then if the war's nature in the east caused local indigenous personnel to perceive any attempt to obtain justice as futile. Or, by extension, Soviet civilians might have considered any contact with the occupa¬tion authorities to be dangerous and therefore might have chosen not to report crimes in general and sexual assaults in particular.
The case files nevertheless establish that the military judicial author¬ities did prosecute soldiers for sexual assault, even if the frequency of prosecution cannot be established." How many sexual assaults the authorities ignored (or how many assaults civilians chose not to re¬port) must remain a matter of speculation.
The case files also do not support Maiwald and Mischler's claim that the Wehrmacht promoted sexual assaults in the east through the "most extreme restraint" in prosecution. Contrary to the authors' conclusions, the case files also reveal that when the military judicial authorities chose to prosecute soldiers for assaulting eastern inhabit¬ants, the courts did not impose exceptionally light punishments. The punishments were well within the spectrum of severity seen for as¬saults committed against west Europeans.
I think here Snyder has lost sight of the forest for the trees (not sure if this Russian idiom makes a lot of sense to English speakers -basically lost sight of the larger picture).
Barbarossa decree stated that
2. In judging such deeds it is to be considered in any proceedings that the collapse in the year 1918, the later period of suffering of the German people, and the battle against National Socialism with the movement’s countless sacrifices of blood are incontestably to be attributed to Bolshevik influence, and that no German has forgotten that.
3. The chairman of the court must therefore examine whether a disciplinary reprimand is appropriate or whether it is necessary to institute judicial proceedings. The chairman only orders court-martial proceedings for acts against native inhabitants, when the maintenance of discipline or the protection of the troops demands it. That applies, for example, in the case of serious acts that result from the loss of sexual restraint, are derived from a criminal disposition, or are a sign that the troops are threatening to run wild. Criminal acts, by which lodgings or supplies or other plunder are senselessly destroyed to the detriment of our own troops, are not on the whole to be judged more leniently.
The cases that he analyzed actually seem to be very well in-line with these guidelines. As he himself points out - the damage to fighting power of German Army via erosion of discipline was the primary cause for prosecution and sentencing.
To illustrate - this is a quote from
The German Army and Genocide: Crimes Against War Prisoners, Jews, and other Civilians in the East, 1939-1944
IN IIb (Personal Office fro Enlisted Men] the first reports are going around about incidents involving the troops: A Jew was “separated” from his fur coat; while the Russian mayor was in the “office” soldiers emptied out his apartment; a Russian woman was locked in a cellar and raped by 6! Soldiers one after another
We turned over the city’s Military Administration Headquarter to the 57th Infantry Division. That will save us a lot of work. There were loads of reports coming in each day. Looting of the civilian population by soldiers, removal of food supplies, illegal confiscation of object, rape of women. The commanding General ordered that these incidents are not to be subject to prosecution, but rather to be dealt with as disciplinary cases by the Second General Staff Officer
The quote refers to the events that ensued after capture of Khrakov . I tried to find out – in vain – what kind of action could Second General Staff Officer undertake. Whatever they are ,they probably would not have gone through regular judicial channels and probably would not end up in the Eastern Collection.