Hi Thom!,
Thanks for your opinions on this book and especially for link to Gniazdowski's work! I'll read it.
When it comes to your question:
Could you please provide the source for this report? Thanks in advance.
This report was originally issued by
Gräberzentrale für die ermordeten Volksdeutschen. It was published in "Documenta occupationis Teutonicae" volume VII, Instytut Zachodni. You will find it also in Archiwum II wojny światowej i Biblioteki Instytutu Zachodniego (Archive of WW2 and the Library of Institute for Western Affairs).
When it comes to German minority repealing from the duty of military service and escaping to Germany:
The article quoted above says:
Otóż III Rzesza w dwojaki sposób odnosiła się do służby Niemców w Wojsku Polskim. Początkowo zachęcała ich, by nie unikali poboru, gdyż dzięki niemu mogą zdobyć przeszkolenie wojskowe za polskie pieniądze. Z obecności rodaków w Wojsku Polskim zadowolona była również Abwehra. W 1939 roku organizacje niemieckie w Polsce zaczęły jednak wzywać do dezercji. Wielu z tych, którzy posłuchali, było później przewodnikami i doradcami w niemieckich jednostkach liniowych, atakujących Rzeczpospolitą. „To właśnie oni byli w grupie dywersyjnej, która sfingowała polski napad na niemiecką radiostację w Gliwicach”, twierdzi profesor Rezmer.
Which translates:
The III Reich had twofold attitute toward Germans in the Polish Army. At first it was encouraging them to not avoid recruitment, because thanks to it they could get military training for Polish money. Also Abwehra was satisfied with the presence of countrymen in the Polish Army. However in 1939 German organizations started to call for desertion. Many of those, who obeyed, were later guides and advisers in German first line units attacking Poland. "It is they who were in the sabotage group, which simulated the Polish attack on Gleiwitz radio station", professor Rezmer says.
And this fragment from the thread "Germans in Poland and in the Polish Army":
http://www.dws.org.pl/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=125448
Według MSW do 16 sierpnia 1939 r. władze wojewódzkie wystąpiły o pozbawienie obywatelstwa polskiego 6375 osób uchylających się od obowiązku służby w WP. Z woj. poznańskiego zbiegło w okresie styczeń-czerwiec 1939 r. - 2628 osób, z woj. śląskiego w okresie maj-lipiec 1939 r. - 5506 osób.
Which translates:
According to MSW (Ministry of Internal Affairs) until 16 August 1939 voivodeship authorities concluded for deprivation of citizenship of 6375 persons repealing from the duty of service in WP (Polish Army). In period January-June 1939 from the poznanskie voivodeship 2628 persons escaped [to Germany], from the silesian voivodeship in period May-July 1939 - 5506 persons [escaped to Germany].
Also Janusz Ryt in his book "Bitwa Pszczyńska 1939" ("Battle of Pszczyna 1939") writes about this:
Pages 45 - 46:
In the Summer Polish borderland was flooded by a wave of "tourists" from Germany acquainting themselves with the area of future combats. Units were increasing their strength and were being moved toward the Polish border under the pretext of maneuveres and alleged threat of Polish attack. (...) Also demand for guides appeared, young people who knew the terrain. At first they were being searched among emigrants from the Polish side after the division of Upper Silesia. However, the number of proper candidates, that is young men after military training, was in this circle too low. That's why an action of obtaining candidates also on the other side of the border started, from members of the German minority in Upper Silesia. At the beginning those were departures of civilians - reservists of the Polish Army, however soon also escapes of active service soldiers started. Using candidates who completed military training in the Polish Army allowed to conscript them into units of the Wehrmacht just after short adjustment training. This action was being conducted throughout entire Summer and ended suddenly in the middle of August, 2 weeks before the planned war [115].
[115] Unique speed of reaction and precision of the Wehrmacht is usually explained by the presence of local guides recruited from local population, attached to entering forces. This is only part of the truth, because sources indicate that units entering the Polish Upper Silesia most probably already had trained guides in their own ranks. Alongside with quite rigid and precise plan of operations such thing is possible. Unusual precision of tank movements near Rybnik cannot be explained by maps or plans. Only someone who lived there and knew the terrain could move so precisely through mined hurdles. In case of three villages this is documented. According to inhabitants of Jankowice, among German tank crews that entered this village, were 3 young local inhabitants. One of them escaped to the Reich in July (as a curiosity I will add that the description of combats in Jankowice written by the local ZBOWID* veteran organization is written from the perspective of... an attacking Tanker). Also in the forefront of German units attacking Kobiór was son of a local forester from Kobiór. And photos of the Pszczyna Landmannschaft reveal that also among units capturing Pszczyna one young inhabitant of Pszczyna was serving. I don't know how situation looked like in other localities, but in my opinion it is not coincidence but element of intentional action.
*ZBOWID = Związek Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację (Association of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy).
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Coming back to Volksdeutche casualties and alleged crimes on Volksdeutsche:
Conservative German version of events in Bydgoszcz is based almost entirely on accounts and memoirs gathered in 1950s and 1960s
by Landsmannschaft of Western Pomerania. These accounts are gathered in the Federal Archive in Bayreuth - these are practically the only "primary sources" (if accounts written 10 - 20 years after facts can be even considered "primary sources") which say about crimes on Volksdeutsche in Bydgoszcz. But even among these accounts we can find 4 accounts which confirm the Polish version of events (that is - that German saboteurs opened fire to Polish military forces).
These are accounts of Kurt Eichstädt, Johannes Katrynski, Hubert Hill and Walter Graff. Many other accounts also confirm that Polish regular units were under fire, but they don't explicitly say that German saboteurs were responsible, they rather claim Polish civilians fired on their own military
(sic!).
