Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

[michael mills]

[This thread was split off from the "Fair or Unfair in Nuremberg Trial" thread at viewtopic.php?f=6&t=29274, and re-captioned by this moderator - DT.]

It is not my intention to discuss the Streicher question here.

Nor is it my intention to discuss the issue of the IMT judgement in relation to the charge of crimes against humanity, since it is indisputable that the German Government did commit such crimes.

However, the post by Terry Duncan demonstrates precisely the disservice to historical truth performed by the IMT in its judgement on the charge of crimes against peace, which I said grossly oversimplified the very complex process that ended in the outbreak of European war in September 1939.

The prosecution claimed that the German Government had conspired to start a war in Europe wantonly, recklessly and without any just cause, purely for the purpose of conquering and annexing territory, subjecting all of Europe to its domination, and eventually attempting to conquer the entire world. The judgement of the IMT essentially accepted that claim, although it reduced the conspiracy charge.

However, an analysis of all the available evidence clearly indicates that the precipitating factor that engendered the British and French declarations of war on Germany on 3 September, the German invasion of Poland, was in no way the product of a German Government intent to subjugate that country and annex its territory, as the first step in a plan to subjugate all of Europe and eventually the world.

Rather, it was the result of a crisis situation between Germany and Poland over Danzig, which had been brought about by the British Government through its encouragement of Polish intransigence.

Any dispassionate reading of the evidence shows quite clearly that the German Government under Hitler had no pre-existing intention of making war on Poland and seizing its territory. Rather, its intention was to achieve a final settlement of all remaining issues between Germany and Poland under which the Free City of Danzig would be reunited with Germany with provision for Poland's economic interests there, but the existing German-Polish border would be recognised as permanent. Hitler's clear intention was that Poland would become Germany's ally and partner in bringing about a political and economic reordering of Central and Eastern Europe that would remove the last vestiges of the Versailles system.

Britain could have helped to achieve that settlement by encouraging the Polish Government to stand up to the more chauvinist elements in its country and to be flexible. However, it chose the opposite course of doing everything in its power to create a confrontation between Germany and Poland, because it feared that a German-Polish alliance would make Germany strong enough to challenge Britain's economic supremacy.

Britain created a situation where Germany had to choose between a resort to military force to overcome Polish resistance over the Danzig issue, which would provide Britain with a casus belli, or a humiliating backdown.

Of course Germany could have chosen to back down and abandon its claims to Danzig rather than risk war with Britain and France, but that would simply have encouraged further Polish intransigence, almost certainly leading to a Polish military occupation of Danzig late in 1939, after the end of the campaigning season. If Germany had attempted to resist such a Polish military takeover, it would have triggered war with Britain anyway under the terms of the Anglo-Polish agreement on mutual military assistance of 6 April.

So yes, Germany did by invading Poland trigger the tripwire for war that Britain had set up, but it had been left with little acceptable alternative. Once Britain and France had declared war on Germany, all the following German actions were a more-or-less unavoidable consequence of that state of war. For example, the German invasion of Denmark and Norway was not triggered by a desire to subjugate those countries and seize their territory, but rather by the need to defend itself against Allied attempts to cut off its supply of iron ore.

The IMT judgement on crimes against peace endorsed the Allied version of history, which was its essential political purpose. The crimes that the German Government committed in the course of the war were a result of the war itself, in particular of Germany's weaker and more desperate strategic situation, and were in no way connected with the factors that actually caused the outbreak of war.

[LWD]

... The prosecution claimed that the German Government had conspired to start a war in Europe wantonly, recklessly and without any just cause, purely for the purpose of conquering and annexing territory, subjecting all of Europe to its domination, and eventually attempting to conquer the entire world. The judgement of the IMT essentially accepted that claim, although it reduced the conspiracy charge.

Do you have the exact quote? It's pretty clearly true up to the point about attempting to conquer the entire world.

However, an analysis of all the available evidence clearly indicates that the precipitating factor that engendered the British and French declarations of war on Germany on 3 September, the German invasion of Poland, was in no way the product of a German Government intent to subjugate that country and annex its territory, as the first step in a plan to subjugate all of Europe and eventually the world.

It was clearly an attempt to subjugate and annex Poland. Just as clearly it was a step along the way toward further conquests and the domination if not the subjugation of Europe.

Rather, it was the result of a crisis situation between Germany and Poland over Danzig, which had been brought about by the British Government through its encouragement of Polish intransigence.

Danzig was only part of the "problem" and more of an excuse that an out right cause.

Any dispassionate reading of the evidence shows quite clearly that the German Government under Hitler had no pre-existing intention of making war on Poland and seizing its territory. Rather, its intention was to achieve a final settlement of all remaining issues between Germany and Poland under which the Free City of Danzig would be reunited with Germany with provision for Poland's economic interests there, but the existing German-Polish border would be recognised as permanent. Hitler's clear intention was that Poland would become Germany's ally and partner in bringing about a political and economic reordering of Central and Eastern Europe that would remove the last vestiges of the Versailles system.

True .... if one believes Nazi propaganda. Otherwise the inverse is clearly the case.

[Terry Duncan]

However, the post by Terry Duncan demonstrates precisely the disservice to historical truth performed by the IMT in its judgement on the charge of crimes against peace, which I said grossly oversimplified the very complex process that ended in the outbreak of European war in September 1939.

You mean a disservice to what you wish was the truth.

The prosecution claimed that the German Government had conspired to start a war in Europe wantonly, recklessly and without any just cause, purely for the purpose of conquering and annexing territory,

Completely true.

subjecting all of Europe to its domination

This certainly became a goal as time went on.

eventually attempting to conquer the entire world.

I cannot recall this being one of the charges levelled at the Nazi regime, though it is easy to see how such a belief could arise.

The judgement of the IMT essentially accepted that claim, although it reduced the conspiracy charge.

Then the verdict was essentially correct.

However, an analysis of all the available evidence clearly indicates that the precipitating factor that engendered the British and French declarations of war on Germany on 3 September, the German invasion of Poland, was in no way the product of a German Government intent to subjugate that country and annex its territory

It was an attempt to annex the Polish Corridor and the city of Danzig, territory that was not German after the Versailles Treaty. Germany was once again using force or the threat of it to alter the international situation, other nations were happy to keep the status quo.

Rather, it was the result of a crisis situation between Germany and Poland over Danzig, which had been brought about by the British Government through its encouragement of Polish intransigence.

Poland did not need to cede what had been given to her by treaty. Germany had no unique right to overthrow treaties she did not agree with, and no right to expect other nations to agree to this.

Any dispassionate reading of the evidence shows quite clearly that the German Government under Hitler had no pre-existing intention of making war on Poland and seizing its territory.

Hitler wished to seize the Polish Corridor and Danzig and was perfectly willing to wage war in order to get this.

Hitler's clear intention was that Poland would become Germany's ally and partner in bringing about a political and economic reordering of Central and Eastern Europe that would remove the last vestiges of the Versailles system.

The Slovak lands had never been German, so grabbing them was pure agrandizement of Germany even if a puppet state was set up. The 'Versailles system' had altered the borders of many nations, and all of the Central Powers nations had a 'sole guilt' clause in their particular treaty ending WWI, yet only Germany claimed a right to alter this settlement, or claimed the 'sole guilt' singled out Germany in some unique manner.

Britain could have helped to achieve that settlement by encouraging the Polish Government to stand up to the more chauvinist elements in its country and to be flexible.

Would this be like the British help to get Hitler the Sudetenland, when he simply ignored the agreement and then annexed all the Czech lands as soon as it suited him to do so? Why should Britain ever come to agreement again with such a dishonest bully and warmonger?

However, it chose the opposite course of doing everything in its power to create a confrontation between Germany and Poland, because it feared that a German-Polish alliance would make Germany strong enough to challenge Britain's economic supremacy.

How about Britain chose to make a stand after Hitler renaged of every agreement he had made and looked likely to continue with his policy of annexations as long as other powers stood back and allowed him to do so?

Britain created a situation where Germany had to choose between a resort to military force to overcome Polish resistance over the Danzig issue, which would provide Britain with a casus belli, or a humiliating backdown.

This is the same Hitler 'peaceful' who said he wished he had gone to war over Czechoslovakia in 1938 and was once again adding another 'last adjustment' to his borders. At some point he had to be forced to cease his policy of threatening war in order to get his own way.

Of course Germany could have chosen to back down and abandon its claims to Danzig rather than risk war with Britain and France

Not that Hitler would have ever agreed to such a policy.

that would simply have encouraged further Polish intransigence, almost certainly leading to a Polish military occupation of Danzig late in 1939

Can only be speculation. Poland had not acted in such a way from 1919-1938 so it is far from certain Poland would do so knowing it would provoke a war with Germany.

If Germany had attempted to resist such a Polish military takeover, it would have triggered war with Britain anyway under the terms of the Anglo-Polish agreement on mutual military assistance of 6 April.

Unless Britain and France threatened to walk away if Poland did such a thing. We cannot know because a peaceful settlement was not what Hitler wanted.

So yes, Germany did by invading Poland trigger the tripwire for war that Britain had set up, but it had been left with little acceptable alternative.

Really? Why not? Why is not taking territory not assigned to Germany unacceptable? Almost every nation could claim one treaty or another is 'unacceptable' and demand lost lands back, Germany is hardly unique in this matter. Maybe Versailles was harsh in some respects, but threatening war to change its effects was also wrong.

For example, the German invasion of Denmark and Norway was not triggered by a desire to subjugate those countries and seize their territory, but rather by the need to defend itself against Allied attempts to cut off its supply of iron ore.

Germany managed to fight WWI without seizing either nation, yet still got her iron ore.

The greatest injustice and unfairness of the Nuremberg Trial would had been the London Charter that was issued in a decree in August 1945 that stipulated that only European Axis Powers war crimes could be tried, severely reducing the capability of the defendents' counsel to mount an effective defense based on "tu quoque" principles.

This is undoubtedly correct, but the prosecution of Raeder and Dönitz certainly took into account the way the allies had prosecuted the war. Victors always tend to excuse their own excesses, but that does not lessen the crimes committed by the losers.

Worse of all, the Western Allies acquiesed with Soviet involvement in the Katyn Massacre in one of the world's greatest crimes against humanity which has gone unpunished even until today.

I would agree, but there was no ability to do very much about it.

And not forgetting the Britain and France were the ones who declared against Germany for invading Poland in 1939 but not against Soviet Union for doing the exact same thing proved that the justice were only applicable if you're the victors.

Fighting one war at a time is a sensible way to procede. There was no need to add the USSR as a hostile nation until Germany had been dealt with, nor was there any really sensible method to fight the USSR whilst still fighting Germany.

[michael mills]

Terry Duncan wrote this,

Can only be speculation. Poland had not acted in such a way from 1919-1938 so it is far from certain Poland would do so knowing it would provoke a war with Germany.

in response to my statement that a German backdown in August 1939 "would simply have encouraged further Polish intransigence, almost certainly leading to a Polish military occupation of Danzig late in 1939".

I respectfully suggest to Terry Duncan that he do a bit more study of German-Polish relations in the period 1918-1933.

If he does he will find that on a number of occasions in that period, when Polish military strength was much greater than Germany's, Poland did threaten to invade Germany, and actually did so.

In 1923, at the time of the French invasion of the Ruhr, Poland offered to invade from the east in support of France. France however declined the offer.

Between 1919 and 1921, Polish forces invaded Silesia on two occasions, attempting to pre-empt the plebiscite that was to take place.

There were other threats of invasion in the early 1930s, during the Brüning chancellorship. Furthermore, there were theats to invade Danzig.

I suggest Terry Duncan consult this book by Josef Korbel:

"Poland between East and West: Soviet and German diplomacy toward Poland, 1919-1933" (Princeton U.P., 1963)

Korbel is sympathetic to Poland and in no way pro-German. Nevertheless, his book details the various Polish threats to invade either Germany or Danzig.

Polish threats to invade Germany or Danzig only ceased after Hitler introduced a policy of detente, leading to the Polish-German Declaration of Non-Aggression of January 1934. German rearmament also deterred Polish aggressiveness after Pilsudski's death in May 1935.

Given Poland's past record of threatened aggression against Germany and Danzig before 1933, there was good reason for the German Government to assume that it would resume a policy of aggression one it had received unconditional backing from Britain, which offset Germany's military deterrent. After March 1939, Poland became extremely aggressive toward Danzig, threatening to invade it if its elected government made any attempt to reunite with Germany, culminating in the ultimatum of 4 August, and threatening Germany with war if it accepted a declaration of reunification.

[michael mills]

Terry Duncan wrote:

The Slovak lands had never been German, so grabbing them was pure agrandizement of Germany even if a puppet state was set up.

In fact, in March 1939 Germany assisted Slovakia to gain its independence from Czech rule, albeit under German hegemony.

Terry Duncan appears to be unaware that both Poland and Hungary wanted to detach Slovakia from Czechia and either annex it or partition it between them. Germany preserved Slovakia's existence as a formally independent state. The situation brought about by German action was the one preferred by the Slovak national leaders, and saved their country from being swallowed up by either Poland or Hungary.

On the other hand, Hitler did make a partial concession to Polish demands by allowing Hungary to annex Ruthenia, thereby establishing a Polish-Hungarian border, one of Poland's main aims.

An earlier concession made by Hitler to Poland in October 1938 was to agree to its occupation of the city of Oderberg/Bohumin in the Teschen district, even though it was inhabited largely by Sudeten Germans.

So Hitler had bent over backwards to accommodate many of Poland's desires for territorial revision, and he expected Poland to reciprocate by agreeing to Germany's desires, which were very limited, covering only a very small part of the territory lost by Germany after 1918.

[waldzee]

Terry Duncan wrote this,

Can only be speculation. Poland had not acted in such a way from 1919-1938 so it is far from certain Poland would do so knowing it would provoke a war with Germany.

in response to my statement that a German backdown in August 1939 "would simply have encouraged further Polish intransigence, almost certainly leading to a Polish military occupation of Danzig late in 1939".

I respectfully suggest to Terry Duncan that he do a bit more study of German-Polish relations in the period 1918-1933.

If he does he will find that on a number of occasions in that period, when Polish military strength was much greater than Germany's, Poland did threaten to invade Germany, and actually did so.

In 1923, at the time of the French invasion of the Ruhr, Poland offered to invade from the east in support of France. France however declined the offer.

Between 1919 and 1921, Polish forces invaded Silesia on two occasions, attempting to pre-empt the plebiscite that was to take place.

There were other threats of invasion in the early 1930s, during the Brüning chancellorship. Furthermore, there were theats to invade Danzig.

I suggest Terry Duncan consult this book by Josef Korbel:

"Poland between East and West: Soviet and German diplomacy toward Poland, 1919-1933" (Princeton U.P., 1963)

Korbel is sympathetic to Poland and in no way pro-German. Nevertheless, his book details the various Polish threats to invade either Germany or Danzig.

Polish threats to invade Germany or Danzig only ceased after Hitler introduced a policy of detente, leading to the Polish-German Declaration of Non-Aggression of January 1934. German rearmament also deterred Polish aggressiveness after Pilsudski's death in May 1935.

Given Poland's past record of threatened aggression against Germany and Danzig before 1933, there was good reason for the German Government to assume that it would resume a policy of aggression one it had received unconditional backing from Britain, which offset Germany's military deterrent. After March 1939, Poland became extremely aggressive toward Danzig, threatening to invade it if its elected government made any attempt to reunite with Germany, culminating in the ultimatum of 4 August, and threatening Germany with war if it accepted a declaration of reunification.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
This is a really good point, M Mills,& marks your scholarship at its best.
Danzig was already a 'Nasdap' state, & had been running downhill as Poland transfered its trade to Glydia. Danzig was run down under Forster's 'management',& the Guilden ahd lost over 40 % of value in two years.
Walking away would have bought Poland, at the least , time to re- arm. At best,It may have triggered a stronger French response.

[David Thompson]

The subject of this thread is the IMT trial, gentlemen. Please stay on it.

For those who would like to continue on the subject of the pre-war relations between Germany and Poland, there are 331 posts by Michael Mills on or mentioning Danzig; you can see them listed at search.php?keywords=danzig&terms=all&author=Michael+Mills&sc=1&sf=all&sr=posts&sk=t&sd=d&st=0&ch=300&t=0&submit=Search
Interested readers can choose one of the threads and take the discussion up there. The most recent threads have been:

Was Churchill a good friend to Poland?
viewtopic.php?f=111&t=186299
Did Pilsudski plan an alliance with Hitler against Stalin?
viewtopic.php?f=111&t=173133
"Germany didn't have any annihilatory intention pre-1939"
viewtopic.php?f=6&t=184059

The problem is that the charges against the NS-regime for waging aggressive war (crimes against peace) are far more extensive than just those involving Poland and Danzig. The IMT indictment charged violations of these treaties, diplomatic pacts and exchanges in the crimes against peace count:

(1) Hague Convention for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899)
(2) Hague Convention (Hague I) for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1907)
(3) Hague Convention (Hague III) relative to the opening of hostilities (1907)
(4) Hague Convention (Hague V) respecting rights and duties of neutral powers and persons in war on land (1907)
(5) Versailles Treaty (1919)
(6) Treaty between the United States and Germany restoring friendly relations (1921)
(7) Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy (Locarno 1925)
(8) German-Belgian Arbitration Convention (Locarno 1925)
(9) German-Czech Arbitration Convention (Locarno 1925)
(10) Arbitration Convention between Germany and the Netherlands (Locarno 1925)
(11) Treaty of Arbitration and Conciliation between Germany and Denmark (Berlin 1926)
(12) Convention of Arbitration between Germany and the Netherlands (The Hague, 1926)
(13) Declaration of the League of Nations concerning wars of aggression (1927)
(14) Kellogg-Briand Pact (Paris 1929)
(15) Arbitration Convention between Germany and Luxemburg (Geneva 1929)
(16) German-Polish Declaration (1934)
(17) German Assurance to Austria (1935)
(18) Austrian-German Agreement (1936)
(19) German Assurance to Belgium and the Netherlands (1937)
(20) German Assurance to Czechoslovakia (1938)
(21) German Assurance to Yugoslavia (1938)
(22) Agreement between Germany, the UK, France and Italy (Munich Pact 1938)
(23) German Assurances to Belgium, Denmark, Luxemburg, and the Netherlands (1939)
(24) Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and Denmark (1939)
(25) Non-Agression Treaty between Germany and the USSR (1939)
(26) German Assurance to Yugoslavia (1939)
(27) German Assurances to Norway (1939)

Source: Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1946, vol. I, pp. 668-672; 758-759, 772-775, 790-793.

Source documents showing Hitler's intention to wage aggressive war can be seen in these threads:

The Hossbach Memorandum (Text)
viewtopic.php?t=55420
Indoctrination on the political situation and future aims, 23 May 1939
viewtopic.php?p=620869#620869
Fuehrer Memorandum and Directives for Conduct of the War in the West, 19 October 1939
viewtopic.php?p=620178#620178
Hitler's intent to wage aggressive war
viewtopic.php?t=63711

[Terry Duncan]

I respectfully suggest to Terry Duncan that he do a bit more study of German-Polish relations in the period 1918-1933.

Given you have no idea what I know about this subject it would be best if you refrained from making such comments and stuck to the subject of the thread.

In 1923, at the time of the French invasion of the Ruhr, Poland offered to invade from the east in support of France. France however declined the offer.

So Poland did not commit any war crime or unwarrented act of aggression towards Germany.

There were other threats of invasion in the early 1930s, during the Brüning chancellorship. Furthermore, there were theats to invade Danzig.

That amounted to nothing. Nobody has claimed the Poles were perfect neighbours, but they did not invade Danzig and therefore committed no criminal act against international treaties.

After March 1939, Poland became extremely aggressive toward Danzig, threatening to invade it if its elected government made any attempt to reunite with Germany, culminating in the ultimatum of 4 August, and threatening Germany with war if it accepted a declaration of reunification.

Are you in someway unaware of the status of Danzig at this time, or the Nazis working to get Danzig to declare itself part of Germany again, although this was against the treaty that had created Danzig as a seperate entity not part of Poland or Germany? Or is it that you simply ignore all parts of the Versailles treaty?

In fact, in March 1939 Germany assisted Slovakia to gain its independence from Czech rule, albeit under German hegemony.

So as I said, Germany took the Czech and Slovak lands which had not been German, and created a puppet state in Slovakia. Once again in violation of treaties that had recognized the existence of Czechoslovakia after WWI, although you seem to think Germany was within her rights to ignore any treaty that did not suit it. For some reason you seem to be trying to make the claim that something you think the Poles may have done at some point we can never be sure of, that excuses Nazi Germany for her actual criminal acts against international treaties? Poland 'could' have gone on to break international treaties, but Germany actively did so and indeed had been doing so from the 1920's onwards.

[michael mills]

The problem is that the charges against the NS-regime for waging aggressive war (crimes against peace) are far more extensive than just those involving Poland and Danzig. The IMT indictment charged violations of these treaties, diplomatic pacts and exchanges in the crimes against peace count:

The IMT indictment alleged that the German Government conspired to violate all the listed treaties and pacts wantonly and without any just cause, and its judgement essentially accepted and endorsed the indictment.

Thge problem with the judgement is that it ignored the very complex factors that led to those violations. It also ignores the fact that almost all the violations were not planned in advance by the German Government, but were driven by a developing situation that was notbrought about only by Germany but also by other states.

For example, Germany's violation of the treaties and conventions constituting the Locarno Pact of 1925 arose out of the British and French declarations of war on Germany of 3 September 1939. Without those declarations of war, there would have been no German invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium or France, and therefore no violation of the parts of the Locarno pact relating to those countries.

To be sure, the British and French declarations of war arose out of the German invasion of Poland, but that invasion had resulted from British intervention in a dispute between Germany and Poland over Danzig, which encouraged Poland to return to its former intransigent and aggressive policy in regard to that city, the population of which clearly wished for reunification with Germany.

The one German action that can be justly said to constitute an unprovoked violation of national sovereignty was the occupation of Czechia on 15 March 1939; although it was agreed to by the Czech Government, that agreement had been obtained by intimidation and threats of force. Nevertheless, it was a situation that could have been rectified if Britain had not turned the Danzig issue into a war-inducing crisis by drawing Poland into a confrontation with Germany. Indeed, in the months following March 1939, the German Government had offered to negotiate greater autonomy for Czechia, provided that it did not adopt an anti-German stance, and provided that Britain ceased its attempt to create an alliance confronting Germany on the East.

While it is true that it had been the aim of the German Government to dismember Czechoslovakia, that aim accorded with the desire for self-determination on the part of half the population of that state, the Slovaks, Ruthenians, ethnic Germans and ethnic Hungarians. Furthermore, it was an aim shared by Poland and Hungary. The only act of injustice perpetrated by Germany in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia was extinguishing the national sovereignty of Czechia; the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, of the southern border areas of Slovakia to Hungary, and of the separation of Slovakia from Czechia were not acts of injustice but of justified national self-determination.

The annexation of Ruthenia by Hungary, which the German Government agreed to, was also an injustice to the Ruthenians, but one that Britain and France did not object to.

The historical fact is that the majority of German actions prior to the invasion of Poland on 1 September were entirely consistent with the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination. Those justified actions were:

1. The unification of Austria with Germany, a fulfilment of the clearly expressed wishes of the population of that territory in 1918;
2. The unification of the Sudetenland with Germany, again a fulfilment of the clearly expressed wishes of the population of that territory in 1918;
3. The unification of Memel with Germany, since Lithuania had illegally seized that territory in 1923, with French connivance;
4. Assisting Slovakia to achieve independence from Czech rule;
5. Awarding to Hungary border territries of Slovakia and Ruthenia inhabited by ethnic Hungarians.

Those actions essentially rectified injustices perpetrated by the Treaties of Versailles, St Germain and Trianon, and for that reason many of them were grudgingly accepted by Britain and France.

The German attempt to achieve by negotiation the reunification of Danzig with Germany, with provision for Poland's economic interests (as was done in the case of Memel), was also entirely consistent with the principle of national self-determination and was therefore just. It was the British action to exploit the Polish resistance to the German claim in order to draw Poland into an anti-German alliance, rather than encouraging compromise, which created the confrontation that eventually led to war.

The Tilea hoax of 17 March 1939, in which parts of the British Foreign Office were complicit (certainly Vansittart), also indicated a desire on the part of elements in Britain to create a crisis situation.

Thus the series of events that led to the German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 was in part a result of German malfeasance, namely the occupation of Czechia on 15 March, but was also a result of actions by other states, Britain, France and Poland. The resulting declarations of war by Britain and France led to the various German invasions that would not otherwise have occurred.

Because the IMT only took into account the immediate actions of Germany, and ignored those of other states that did so much to create the situation in which Germany was induced to take those actions, its judgement in relation to the main count of crimes against peace was flawed and unbalanced.

The historical fact is that the German Government had no pre-existing intention of invading Poland and annexing its territory, only of seeking agreement to the reunification of Danzig with the Reich. It was the action of Britain in giving Poland a blank cheque to go to war over Danzig that prevented a peaceful settlement of the Danzig question in accordance with the wishes of that city's population.

Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that Germany had any pre-existing intention to invade Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Yugoslavia and Greece. It was only the British and French declarations of war and the warlike actions undertaken by them that precipitated the German invasions of those countries.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote:

The IMT indictment alleged that the German Government conspired to violate all the listed treaties and pacts wantonly and without any just cause, and its judgement essentially accepted and endorsed the indictment.

Thge problem with the judgement is that it ignored the very complex factors that led to those violations. It also ignores the fact that almost all the violations were not planned in advance by the German Government, but were driven by a developing situation that was notbrought about only by Germany but also by other states.

The gist of the crime of waging aggressive war, as alleged in the IMT judgment, seems to me to be the perfidious breaking of treaties and diplomatic assurances by the NS-regime to gain the advantage of surprise after first lulling the victimized nations. Germany didn't have to sign any of those treaties, nor was it compelled to reassure its neighbors that they wouldn't be attacked. Most of those treaties and assurances could have been legally renounced after giving due notice, but the NS-regime didn't bother to do that.

If there had only been one, or two, or even three examples, the international community might have been willing to overlook the "lapse(s)." But that wasn't the way the NS-regime did things in 1933-41. After Germany annexed Austria and established a protectorate over Bohemia and Moravia in early 1939, many other nations didn't trust its government or its intentions, and to that extent, the "developing situation" you refer to was only a self-created series of exigencies brought on by the NS-regime's own perfidious acts.

[michael mills]

Perhaps a solution is to move the posts regarding Danzig to a separate Thread ,& allow Mr. Mills to 'defend his views'.
I disagree with Michael on a lot of points, but I do beleive that he has a point on Danzig's right to self determination.

Waldzee,

The reason I referred a number of times to Danzig is that the dispute between Germany and Poland over that city-state provided the trigger that bought about war between Germany and the Anglo-Franco-Polish alliance.

My contention is that the IMT, in judging that Germany deliberately and wantonly unleashed a general European war without any just cause, in pursuit of a criminal conspiracy to subjugate by force all European states, failed to take into account the complex process that turned the dispute over Danzig into a trigger for war.

The claim that it was only as a result of the German imposition of a protectorate on Czechia in March 1939 that the British Government conceived the idea of using the Danzig issue as the basis for a casus belli against Germany does not correspond to historical fact.

The possibility of using Danzig as a trigger for a military confrontation of Germany first arose in August 1938, before Germany began to make demands on Czechoslovakia. At a conference in that month on the Hela Peninsula held to discuss maritime matters, the Polish Foreign Minister Beck raised with Duff Cooper, then the First Lord of the British Admiralty, the issue of whether Britain would help Poland to resist any German attempt to reunite Danzig with the Reich. Although Duff Cooper, as the British Government representative at the conference, did not give any undertaking at the time, as one of the leading proponents of a confrontation with Germany he realised that the Danzig issue could be a trigger for such a confrontation if Britain changed its existing neutral position to one of giving full backing to Polish instransigence.

David Thompson wrote:

The gist of the crime of waging aggressive war, as alleged in the IMT judgment, seems to me to be the perfidious breaking of treaties and diplomatic assurances by the NS-regime to gain the advantage of surprise after first lulling the victimized nations. Germany didn't have to sign any of those treaties, nor was it compelled to reassure its neighbors that they wouldn't be attacked. Most of those treaties and assurances could have been legally renounced after giving due notice, but the NS-regime didn't bother to do that.

The concept of Germany's "lulling the victims" does not correspond to historical reality.

In the period from 1933 to the outbreak of war, the National Socialist Government of Germany openly proclaimed its intention to dismantle the Versailles system in Central and Eastern Europe, the territorial structure brought into being by the treaties of Versailles, St Germain and Trianon, for the purposes of rectifying what it saw as injustices that infringed the Wilsonian principle of national self-determination.

In all the actions it undertook to bring out about that dismantling, it intially sought to achieve that result by negotiation, and resorted to the threat of force only when negotiation was resisted.

Furthermore, most of those actions were entirely justified by the principle of national self-determination, which meant that Germany's resort to the threat of force in the face of resistance to negotiation was not entirely wanton or unprovoked. The only exception was the forcing of a protectorate on Czechia, which was not justified by national self-determination and was clearly in violation of the will of the Czech people.

In fact, Britain, France and the Soviet Union had a justified casus belli against Germany in March 1938 over the latter's occupation of Czechia, since the Czech Government's agreement to accept a German protectorate had clearly been coerced, but they chose not to exercise it. Having made that choice, the best option for Britain and France would have been to negotiate a better deal for the Czechs, which was not impossible, rather than seek an alternative casus belli.

The Danzig issue, which eventually brought war, was not a case of Germany's "lulling" Poland. It extended over almost a year, from October 1938 until the end of August 1939, during which period Germany repeatedly offered a package deal for the resolution of all-outstanding issues between Germany and Poland, a deal that did not involve placing Polish populations under German rule. During that period the Polish Government responded with increasing intransigence, and it was the first to introduce into the issue the threat of the use of force to maintain its hegemony over a territory with an overwhelmingly ethnic German population.

Furthermore, the Polish Government itself rendered the January 1934 German-Polish Declaration of Non-Aggression null and void in spirit through its conclusion on 6 April 1939 of an agreement with Britain under which both countries would make war against Germany if the Polish Government decided to resort to force to prevent the reunification of Danzig to Germany. The German formal denunciation of the Declaration on 28 April was simply a recognition of the fact that Poland had abandoned it in favour of joining Britain in confronting Germany.

It cannot be maintained that Germany struck Poland without warning, after "lulling" it.

Once Britain and France had declared war, Germany was in a situation where it needed to strike hard in order to bring the war to a conclusion, since it did not have the ability to endure a long war of attrition. Accordingly, it did then on a number of occasions resort to sudden invasions without prior warning or negotiation, eg the invasions of Denmark and Norway, or of the Netherlands and Belgium. But there is no good reason to believe that it would have invaded those countries if the Danzig issue had not led to war.

[Terry Duncan]

For example, Germany's violation of the treaties and conventions constituting the Locarno Pact of 1925 arose out of the British and French declarations of war on Germany of 3 September 1939. Without those declarations of war, there would have been no German invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium or France, and therefore no violation of the parts of the Locarno pact relating to those countries.

There was no compulsion on Germany to violate these nations simply because Britain and France declared war on Germany, they were perfectly happy to remain neutral and Germany is not excused from her treaty obligations when actions such as war that do not in any way affect these other nations. The Netherlands, and Belgium had every right to expect Germany to respect their neutrality, especially as Germany could fight Britain and France without involving them if the will to respect international treaties existed. If the Germans lost the war the government could expect to be tried for the violation of these nations neutrality.

Because the IMT only took into account the immediate actions of Germany, and ignored those of other states that did so much to create the situation in which Germany was induced to take those actions, its judgement in relation to the main count of crimes against peace was flawed and unbalanced.

The Germans had decided to undertake acts that were under the definitions the IMT operated within were crimes against peace. That other nations had not given way to Hitler's wish to overthrow all aspects of Versailles does not excuse Germany for her actions, there was no obligation for anyone to agree to such actions and Germany had no more right to re-write a previous treaty than any other nation. Germany did plan to commit acts that would constitute crimes against peace and therefore seeking a judgement on these charges was not unfair.

In the period from 1933 to the outbreak of war, the National Socialist Government of Germany openly proclaimed its intention to dismantle the Versailles system in Central and Eastern Europe

Germany had an obligation to recognize the boundaries set by Versailles, and had previously been happy to see treaties respected that benefited Germany, such as Versailles and Franfurt in 1871. Openly proclaiming you intend to violate a treaty does not automatically mean other states agree and will not oppose such a move. Versailles had force of law behind it, and if Germany wished to challenge the provisions of the treaty she could expect to face the consequences if the challenge ended in a war where Germany was defeated.

Furthermore, most of those actions were entirely justified by the principle of national self-determination, which meant that Germany's resort to the threat of force in the face of resistance to negotiation was not entirely wanton or unprovoked.

Threat of force because you cannot get your way is not justified and is certainly unprovoked. Even the 'principle of self-determination' was not really accepted by all, all of the great powers occupied lands that would have been seperate independant states if given free choice both before and after WWI. Having a racial or political majority in an area does not give the people in that area an automatic right to decide which nation it belongs to. For example, if California had a 52% Hispanic population that all decided they wished California to leave the US and become part of Mexico does not mean the US has to agree to such an idea, and nor does it excuse Mexico if she decided to go to war to achieve such a seccession.

The only exception was the forcing of a protectorate on Czechia, which was not justified by national self-determination and was clearly in violation of the will of the Czech people.

So the Nazi's were perfectly happy to claim a revision of previous treaty or 'self-determination' when it benefitted them to do so, but were just as happy to annex lands where these circumstances did not apply at all. The Polish people also had no wish to become part of Germany, though the Germans showed no sign of setting up even a puppet Polish state after overrunning that nation - was that ownership by revising Versailles or by conquest? Effectively the Nazi position was one of 'heads we win, tails you lose', willing to claim anything that beneffitted them and refusing to accept anything that didnt. The Nazi's may well have felt justified in taking this attitude, but other nations cannot be blamed for not having the same feelings about this policy.

The reason I referred a number of times to Danzig is that the dispute between Germany and Poland over that city-state provided the trigger that bought about war between Germany and the Anglo-Franco-Polish alliance.

Why do you feel Germany has some sort of divine right to overturn the status of Danzig as stipulated under international treaty, and how does the Nazi's not getting their way on the matter somehow excuse them from the charge of crimes against peace? Nothing compelled Germany to go to war over this issue, she could have accepted the status quo if she had wished peace.

The Nazi's undertook a policy almost certain to end in confrontation with other nations. Suggesting it is somehow the other nations fault for not giving way to Nazi demands seems to be ignoring that the first step in the chain of events was taken by Germany in full knowledge of the possible outcome.

[michael mills]

Why do you feel Germany has some sort of divine right to overturn the status of Danzig as stipulated under international treaty.....

I do not claim any such divine right for any country.

I do however consider that Germany had the right to seek the revision of the status of Danzig in accordance with the clearly expressed wishes of its population.

The international treaty stipulating the existing status of Danzig was not a pact between nations freely arrived at by negotiation, as the Wilsonian principles required, but a coerced settlement enforced by military power. Furthermore, that status had been imposed upon the people of Danzig contrary to their wishes, so it lacked moral legitimacy. In that respect the treaty was no better than the coerced German-Czech agreement of 15 March 1939 whereby Czechia accepted a German protectorate.

It should be noted that Germany did not seek to change the status of Danzig by force. Rather, it asked Poland to agree to the change in status, under an arrangement whereby Poland would relinquish its control over the lives of the Danzig population while retaining its legitimate economic interest, access to a free port.

It was only the British intervention in March that rendered a negotiated settlement impossible by providing Poland with the military support enabling it to be more intransigent and threaten a violent response to any attempt by the people of Danzig to unite with Germany.

Before Germany rearmed after 1933 its military power was greatly inferior to that of Poland, and the latter country threatened aggression on a number of occasions. For example, this excerpt from thebook "Nazi Foreign Policy 1933-41" by Christian Leitz:

Page 64:

It must be assumed that Poland's occupation of the Westerplatte, in violation of the Treaty of Versailles and seven days prior to the memorandum [on German foreign policy of 13 March 1933], had reinforced Bülow's anti-Polish position. Widespread rumours about a preventive war agaist Germany by Poland's stronger armed forces caused Polish-German relations to reach a low point.

End-note to above, page 161:
20.These rumours were fuelled by comments such as those made by Alfred Wysocki, Poland's envoy in Berlin, in February 1933. Wysocki told the German Foreign Ministry that filling the vacant Consul General post at Königsberg might be unnecessary 'since after all we were on the eve of a war between Germany and Poland'; DGFP, C, I, 17 February 1933, doc 22, p. 46.

While Germany was weak, Poland was on occasion quite prepared to threaten war. Once Germany had rearmed and become stronger, Poland was no longer in a position to issue threats. However, with unconditional backing from Britain received in March 1939, Poland felt itself to be once again in a position where it could threaten Germany with war over Danzig.

If Germany had backed down in the face of the Anglo-Polish confrontation, it would have encouraged Poland to become more aggressive, imposing its own solution by occupying and annexing Danzig and perhaps expelling its ethnic German population, on the grounds that they presented a threat to its independence under the terms of the Anglo-Polish agreement on mutual military aid.

[michael mills]

Nothing compelled Germany to go to war over this issue, she could have accepted the status quo if she had wished peace.

If Britain had wished peace, it could have supported the package deal offered by Germany to Poland in October 1938 and on a number of occasions subsequently.

That package deal offered a definitive German recognition of the existing German-Polish border after the reunification of Danzig with Germany, plus an extension of the Declaration of Non-Aggression for a further 25 years. It was an entirely adequate basis for a lasting peace between Germany and Poland.

However, Britain instead encouraged Poland to resist the German offers, thereby preventing the establishment of a basis for peace and making war more likely. The reason it did so was that it did not want a co-operative relationship between Germany and Poland, fearing that that would lead to an increase in German power and influence in Eastern Europe.

[michael mills]

The Polish people also had no wish to become part of Germany, though the Germans showed no sign of setting up even a puppet Polish state after overrunning that nation

Germany did not initially have any intention of forcing the Polish people to become part of Germany, as is clearly shown by the package deal offered by Germany to Poland in October 1938. Under that package deal, no part of the Polish people would have come under German rule.

It was only Poland's joining a military alliance confronting Germany, in which it constituted the eastern front, and under which it had the power to trigger war between Germany and Britain by claiming the existence of an indirect threat to its independence, that caused Germany to conclude that it needed to knock out Poland's military power with a sudden blow, presenting Britain and France with a fait accompli that might deter them from going to war.

But even then, the German plan was to allow the existence of a Polish residual state under a compliant government, after it had taken back the originally German territories (West Prussia, Posen, East Upper Silesia). It was Stalin who insisted that no Polish state of any sort could be allowed to exist, and that Poland should be fully partitioned between Germany and the Soviet Union. The division of Eastern Europe laid down in the secret appendix to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was entirely dictated by the Soviet side; Germany merely accepted it because it had no real choice under the circumstances.