Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

This thread has so fixated on the outbreak of war with Poland that it has lost sight of the wider picture.

The attack on Poland was only one of a large number of aggressive war charges brought against Nazi Germany by the IMT.

When David Thompson began putting up excerpts from the IMT on this thread, it led me to buy a couple of volumes of the IMT proceedings (I and VI) that were going cheaply on e-bay and I began adding up the aggressive war charges.

By my calculations, Germany was variously accused of breaches of 13 Assurances, 8 Treaties, 6 Conventions, 3 Solemn Assurances, 2 Agreements and one Declaration against 12 different countries up to 11 December 1941.

In many cases these breaches included multiple contraventions of the terms and do not include any German breaches of Assurances (Solemn or otherwise), Treaties, Conventions, Agreements or Declarations contracted between the Axis powers, their unrecognized satellites or puppet regimes before or after that date.

As there were no claims by any of these powers on Germany at the time it attacked them and there was only one temporary foray by one of them onto German soil before late 1944, one is forced to conclude that either Nazi Germany was obliged to engage in the most extended sequence of unavoidable pre-emptive wars in history (including against several countries with which it had no common border and against such unthreatening entities as Luxembourg), or it was determined to expand by war at its neighbours’ expense.

The IMT, unsurprisingly, took the latter view.

60+ years later there seems no good reason to question its findings.

Cheers,

Sid.

[wm]

What he forbade Ribbentrop to do was to hand over the copy from which he was reading, because, as A J P Taylor explained, it contained his handwritten amendments which he did not want the British Ambassador to see.

The proposal was ready two days earlier. They had sufficient time to chisel it in granite. Hitler and Ribbentrop simply didn't care at this point of time anymore. They wanted this war. From Goebbels' diary:

He sets out the situation. The British are still hanging tough. Not a peep out of Poland yet. The Führer thinks there will be war. Italy’s defection is not all that bad for us, as Italy is the most vulnerable to attack by the Entente powers. The Führer has drafted a Memorandum: Danzig to be German, a plebiscite in the Corridor in twelve months’ time on the basis of 1918; fifty-one percent of the vote to be decisive. Loser to get a one kilometer wide corridor across the Corridor. Minorities problems to be examined by an international commission. When the time is ripe the Führer will toss this document to the world community.
August 29, 1939

Göring is supposed to have disobeyed a direct order from Hitler on a crucial matter, invloving peace or war, yet his career did not appear to suffer any major setback. He did not need to seek political asylum in the Ecuadorian Embassy for the crime of revealing State secrets.

This was not a hanging offence, not even close. He was the second most important person in the country after Hitler, designated as his successor and an indispensable helper. He had a large degree of freedom in what he was doing.
In 1939 people like Göring or the military leaders couldn't be ordered, they had to be manipulated to feel it was the right action to take.

[wm]

More quotes from Goebbels:

June 20, 1939
Poland will offer resistance at first, but upon the first reverse she will pitifully collapse. The Czechs are more realistic. The Poles are quite hysterical and unpredictable. London will leave Warsaw in the lurch. They’re just bluffing. Got too many other worries… The Führer says, and he’s right, that Britain now has the most rotten government imaginable. There’s no question of their helping Warsaw. They led Prague up the garden path as well. This is proved by the files we have captured in the Czech foreign ministry. If it comes to an armed conflict, then the Führer believes the Polish business will be over and done with in fourteen days.

August 23,
The Führer greets me very cordially. He wants me to be with him over the next few days. In the afternoon he gives me a broad overview of the situation: Poland’s plight is desperate. We shall attack her at the first possible opportunity. The Polish state must be smashed just like the Czech. It won’t take much effort.

from David Irving's "Goebbels. Mastermind of the Third Reich"

[danielt]

leaving Germany no concessionary middle ground--i.e. a sensible resolution to Danzig and the Corridor--between leaving empty-handed and war

The only option offered by Hitler was for Poland to submit to his demands. Hitler offered no 'middle ground' option for consideration. A perfectly sensible resolution was for Hitler to accept the status quo and continue to administer the Germany he already controlled, making no further territorial demands on other states. After all, he had said at Munich that he had no further demands of this nature.

The only options offered to Hitler were to over-run Poland or fail to challenge the British encirclement and thereby cause Germany's downfall, with no middle ground in-between, as envisaged by British policy.

Normal negotiations ended with the Entente guarantee, even though Hitler hoped to lob in mutually favourable terms to the Poles thus removing the Allied eastern front on the cheap. The war was about Danzig and, as Hitler spoke in May, thereby about more than Danzig, as through the guarantee Danzig became the focal point of encirclement and restriction of German vital space. This should be fairly easy to comprehend by now.

The Munich crisis, manufactured by Chamberlain and Halifax to begin with, ended with a British victory and a huge own-goal for Hitler who was never a great bargainer. Hitler thought he would be refused when in fact he was outplayed--he got what he asked for but not what he wanted. The other half of the Czechoslovakian equation, the encirclement, still loomed large and had to be dealt with in the near term. As soon as the ink was dry, the self-serving tune went: "We've appeased the madman, he won't be bothering us again." At any next such conference, Hitler would have have his head handed to him--and Germany.

danielt -- You wroteL

Ambassador Henderson comported himself snarkily, rudely and uselessly. The "simulatenous" introduction and withdrawal of the proposal was due to missing attendees and his frustrating behaviour. Ditto the refusal to offer notes amended for Polish consideration.

Well, our readers can make up their own minds on this point, since we have accounts from all three persons present:

Ambassador Henderson (1939)
viewtopic.php?p=1716403#p1716403

Dr. Schmidt (1939)
viewtopic.php?p=1721083#p1721083
Dr. Schmidt (1946)
viewtopic.php?p=1720953#p1720953

Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop (1946)
viewtopic.php?p=1720981#p1720981
viewtopic.php?p=1720985#p1720985

Henderson's apologetic account in his 1940 book titled Failure of a Mission, which I have read, certainly conveys the message that the rudeness was all Ribbentrop's adding to the other inaccuracies in his book. Schmidt's account in his own book makes it clear that both were confrontational.

Since the purpose of the meeting for the German side was an eleventh hour scramble at direct negotiation with the Polish Government, Henderson's nonchalant postponement of his arrival to the German Foreign Office to get the latest letter from London deciphered was viewed disfavourably, as was the entire gormless act of showing up Pole-less.

That Henderson elected to play the clown is revealed in Paul Schmidt's account. After being impatiently asked whether he has anything more to add to his recommendation that troop movements should cease, Henderson went off-script, making a verbal addition to the British Note, noting that the British Government knew that the Germans were committing acts of sabotage in Poland.

Schmidt recounted that von Ribbentrop leapt to his feet and furiously shouted: "That's a damned lie of the Polish Government's. I can tell you, Herr Henderson, that the situation is damned serious." Henderson retorted, waving a finger in admonition, "You have even said 'damned'! That is not the language of a statesman in so serious a situation."

Obviously Henderson's reprimanding von Ribbentrop like a teacher would a schoolboy did not go very well. After both recovered their self-control, von Ribbentrop produced the German side's 16-points document, which he read in a normal manner, adding further explanation as he went along. Henderson, maybe still too flustered, failed to listen attentively.

I have read somewhere, though I cannot recall where at the moment, that the amendments (not emendments, which means slight corrections) made by Hitler were meant exclusively for negotiation with Poles, and not British eyes. I took that to mean that the sixteen points were maybe not as inelastic as on-paper, once the Poles were at the table--whatever that entailed.

I find signs of von Ribbentrop's frustration in the failure to produce a Polish side and thereby the possibility to score a favourable settlement and none for your "dangle".

[Terry Duncan]

The only options offered to Hitler were to over-run Poland or fail to challenge the British encirclement and thereby cause Germany's downfall, with no middle ground in-between, as envisaged by British policy.

I was not aware this was a counter-factual forum. Would you care to support such claims with documentary evidence?

The war was about Danzig and, as Hitler spoke in May, thereby about more than Danzig, as through the guarantee Danzig became the focal point of encirclement and restriction of German vital space.

Germany today has more people and less land than in 1939, Hitler's claim that it was vital for the Germans to expand was absurd as the population density in Germany was nowhere near what it was in other nations.

The Munich crisis, manufactured by Chamberlain and Halifax to begin with

You mean they somehow forced Hitler to demand a neighbouring nations lands be handed to him?

At any next such conference, Hitler would have have his head handed to him--and Germany.

Hitler stated at the time that he had no more territorial demands to make, so when he put forward new demands for other nations lands he could hardly be expected to get further concessions.

That Henderson elected to play the clown is revealed in Paul Schmidt's account. After being impatiently asked whether he has anything more to add to his recommendation that troop movements should cease, Henderson went off-script, making a verbal addition to the British Note, noting that the British Government knew that the Germans were committing acts of sabotage in Poland.

Schmidt recounted that von Ribbentrop leapt to his feet and furiously shouted: "That's a damned lie of the Polish Government's. I can tell you, Herr Henderson, that the situation is damned serious." Henderson retorted, waving a finger in admonition, "You have even said 'damned'! That is not the language of a statesman in so serious a situation."

Its a shame for your case that we now know Henderson was correct and German agents had been acting inside Poland during the last week of August;

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jab%C5%82o ... w_Incident

[Gorque]

I thought that one of the purposes for the pact with the Soviets was to assist in breaking the perceived encirclement and/or possible future naval blockade.

[wm]

Hitler didn't believe in this so called encirclement. Goebbels' diary says:

June 20, 1939: London will leave Warsaw in the lurch. They’re just bluffing.
August 23: at present Britain probably doesn’t want war.
August 24: the purpose of this pact is to enable Germany and Russia alone to settle all outstanding problems in the Lebensraum between them, i.e., in eastern Europe.
September 1: the Führer still does not believe Britain will intervene.
David Irving's "Goebbels. Mastermind of the Third Reich"

[danielt]

The only options offered to Hitler were to over-run Poland or fail to challenge the British encirclement and thereby cause Germany's downfall, with no middle ground in-between, as envisaged by British policy.

I was not aware this was a counter-factual forum. Would you care to support such claims with documentary evidence?

I have already noted sources in the previous posts, namely the early Cabinet minutes for which I have offered at least one date. If you want me to post their text, ask (nicely would be nice) and I will do so as time permits.

The war was about Danzig and, as Hitler spoke in May, thereby about more than Danzig, as through the guarantee Danzig became the focal point of encirclement and restriction of German vital space.

Germany today has more people and less land than in 1939, Hitler's claim that it was vital for the Germans to expand was absurd as the population density in Germany was nowhere near what it was in other nations.

A rather bizarre point to make. Germany's current carrying capacity is leveraged entirely on access to foreign resources in the medium and long term, which at the time did not exist (the access). Whether the current configuration constitutes an increase in vital space is another matter, as the current German Government bestowing it is not sovereign nor serves Germans, but the aliens it pines to replace Germans with.

The Munich crisis, manufactured by Chamberlain and Halifax to begin with

You mean they somehow forced Hitler to demand a neighbouring nations lands be handed to him?

At any next such conference, Hitler would have have his head handed to him--and Germany.

Hitler stated at the time that he had no more territorial demands to make, so when he put forward new demands for other nations lands he could hardly be expected to get further concessions.

Hitler blundered at Munich vis-à-vis his end-goals; he tried to rectify that blunder despite resultant promises.

Its a shame for your case that we now know Henderson was correct and German agents had been acting inside Poland during the last week of August;

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jab%C5%82o ... w_Incident

Something I never argued/denied and a non-point. Obviously von Ribbentrop would not acknowledge such things to an enemy Government. My case was his production of snark, rudeness and uselessness, and my case stands.

[David Thompson]

danielt – You wrote:

The only options offered to Hitler were to over-run Poland or fail to challenge the British encirclement and thereby cause Germany's downfall, with no middle ground in-between, as envisaged by British policy.

I was not aware this was a counter-factual forum. Would you care to support such claims with documentary evidence?

I have already noted sources in the previous posts, namely the early Cabinet minutes for which I have offered at least one date. If you want me to post their text, ask (nicely would be nice) and I will do so as time permits.

Sourcing here is a requirement, not a courtesy:

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viewtopic.php?f=6&t=53962

[Terry Duncan]

A rather bizarre point to make. Germany's current carrying capacity is leveraged entirely on access to foreign resources in the medium and long term, which at the time did not exist (the access). Whether the current configuration constitutes an increase in vital space is another matter, as the current German Government bestowing it is not sovereign nor serves Germans, but the aliens it pines to replace Germans with.

I do not propose to discuss what you consider to be the policy of the modern German government. The important point is that Germany could flourish without expansion into lands held by other nations, so Hitler's obsession with Lebensraum had nothing to do with German vital interests. Access to foreign markets did exist prior to WWII, so I would be interested to know why or where you consider Germany was unable to follow such a policy?

Hitler blundered at Munich vis-à-vis his end-goals; he tried to rectify that blunder despite resultant promises.

Hitler claimed later in the war that his blunder had been to not go to war in 1938, I am unaware he ever claimed he should have added further demands for areas such as Danzig or Memel to the powers at the Munich conference?

Something I never argued/denied and a non-point. Obviously von Ribbentrop would not acknowledge such things to an enemy Government. My case was his production of snark, rudeness and uselessness, and my case stands.

So your point is not that Ribbentrop lied to Henderson or failed in the basic duties of a Foreign Secretary, but that Henderson told him off for using what was considered at the time to be undiplomatic language? The moment Ribbentrop started shouting he was acting in a manner that was so undiplomatic that Henderson could have walked out at that point. The job of the diplomatic corps is to remain calm and provide detailed information that their governments can act on. David has provided links to various documents concerning these proposals, and it is clear that there were serious failings on the German side if they had ever intended their proposals to be taken seriously.

Germany was already committed to acts of war inside Poland, such as the Jablonkow Incident, and had already signed an agreement with the USSR to divide Poland between them. Do you propose that Hitler had come to an agreement with Stalin over Poland simply to annoy him a week or so later by invalidating it? It would appear the last minute German proposals for a settlement involved them being less than honest.

[David Thompson]

Terry -- You wrote:

Hitler claimed later in the war that his blunder had been to not go to war in 1938 . . . .

Source(s), please.

[Terry Duncan]

David,

Sadly I am unable to provide a book reference for this at present, I had thought it was covered in Hitler's Table Talk but was unable to find it there. It might be in Shirer or Bullock, I will dig the books out and have a look tomorrow. However I did find a brief mention in an article on History.com by Gerhard Weinburg that mentions it;

In 1938 Hitler drew back from war over Czechoslovakia at the last minute but came to look upon agreeing to a peaceful settlement at Munich as his worst mistake.

http://www.history.com/topics/adolf-hitler

It is also covered on another site which gives Weinburg p463 as a source and states the following (spellings corrected);

Hitler came to regret his compromise. After Munich despite his stunning success, he came to feel that he had been cheated of his war. One historian writes, "Hitler complained later that he had been thwarted from having a war in 1938 because 'the British and the French accepted all my demands at Munich'. In the spring of 1939 he explained his impatience to the Romanian foreign minister, 'I am now fit,' he said. 'I would rather have the war now than when I am fifty-five or sixty.' Hitler thus revealed that he intended to achieve his goal of European domination during a single lifetime, which he expected to be short. With his obsessive vanity, he could not trust anyone else to carry on his mission. He regarded himself as literally irreplaceable and told his generals that the fate of the Reich depended on him alone." [Beevor] He convinced himself to not make the same mistake he made with the Czechs in his dealings with his next victim--the Poles. This time he insisted on dealing directly with the Polish Government without even attempting to involve Britain and France. Later in the final years of the War as the NAZIs faced defeat, Hitler expressed the opinion that his mistake was not to go to war in 1938. As the Russians closed in, he wrote in his bunker under Berlin, "We ought to have gone to war in 1938." [Weinberg, p. 463.] . He may well have been correct although this is a topic that military historians continue to debate to this day.

http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/camp/e ... g-mun.html

I believe the timing of the remark was in 1945, and may have been noted by Traudl Junge too?

[David Thompson]

The references may be to Gerhard Ludwig Weinberg, The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany. Back in the 1960s there was quite a battle, tracking the arguments raised in this thread, between Hugh Trevor-Roper, Isaac Deutscher, Louis Morton, Barbara Tuchman, Ian Morrow, Gerhard Weinberg, G.F. Hudson, Elizabeth Wiskemann, W.N. Medlicott, Tim Mason, John Lukacs, Karl Dietrich Bracher, Frank Freidel, Harry Hinsley, John Wheeler-Bennett, Golo Mann, Lucy Dawidowicz, Gordon A. Craig, A. L. Rowse, Raymond Sontag, Andreas Hillgruber and Yehuda Bauer, on the one hand, and A. J. P. Taylor and David Hoggan on the other, on just this subject (war over Poland). I still remember it from my college days.

[michael mills]

Terry Duncan wrote:

Germany was already committed to acts of war inside Poland, such as the Jablonkow Incident, and had already signed an agreement with the USSR to divide Poland between them. Do you propose that Hitler had come to an agreement with Stalin over Poland simply to annoy him a week or so later by invalidating it? It would appear the last minute German proposals for a settlement involved them being less than honest.

The secret appendix to the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 23 August 1939, dividing much of Eastern Europe into German and Soviet spheres of influence, was Stalin's price for not joining Britain and France in making war of Germany, and instead adopting a position of friendly neutrality.

The provisions of the secret appendix were to become operative upon a change in the political situation in the region between Germany and the Soviet Union, meaning the overthrow of the Polish state. If war between Poland and Germany did not eventuate, the Polish state would remain in being, and the secret protocol would remain a dead letter.

If at any time after the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact the Polish Government had agreed to the German terms enumerated in the Marienwerder Proposals, there would have been no German invasion on 1 September, since the German Government would have obtained everything it wanted without fighting.

What would have happened then is a matter for speculation. If Poland had accepted the Marienwerder Proposals, agreeing to the reunification of Danzig with Germany and a pleiscite after one year in the Corridor north of the Marienwerder-Konitz Line, Germany and Hitler as its leader would have gained an enormous increase in power and prestige, the very opposite of what was desired by the British and French Governments.

It is possible that Britain and France would have accepted such an increase in German power and prestige, but it is equally possible cthat they would have sought some other reason for an action to cut Germany down to size. If Britain and France chose the latter course, it is entirely possible that Stalin, cheated of the westward expansion provided for under the secret protocol to the Non-Aggression Pact, would have changed course one again and joined those two countries in making war on Germany on the same conditions as it had originally proposed in the Soviet-Allied military disacussions in early August, ie British and French acquiescence in a Soviet advance into Poland and Romania.

Given the increase in German power and prestige in this counterfactual situation, Britian and France might well have been far more ready to accept a Soviet westward advance in order to achieve the aim of negating that power and prestige.

As I have said, the above scenario is entirely speculative. Nevertheless, the reality is that the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in no way precluded Germany's coming to an arrangement with Poland based on the latter's acceptance of the Marienwerder Proposals. Obviously, it would have been more advantageous for Germany to obtain its very modest goals, reunification with Danzig and reconnection with East Prussia, either by the retun of part of the Corridor or the grant of an access across it, without having to fight Poland; such an outcome would have retained Poland as a buffer against the Soviet Union and obviated the unwanted Soviet advance to the west, which was the very real downside of the pact with the Soviet Union.

The preserved evidence suggests that Hitler was always skeptical about the possibility of Polish acceptance of the Marienwerder Proposals, given Polish intransigence after the recipt of the British guarantee, and from 4 August at the latest (the date of the Polish ultimatum to Danzig) believed that an armed clash with Poland was inevitable. Events proved his belief correct; the Polish Government adamantly refused to receive the German proposals, or even look at them.

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Guys,

The source may be the following quote, in which Hitler is talking of himself in the Third Person. It is from notes purportedly dictated to Martin Bormann by Hitler in early 1945 for his political testament:

"When that grand bourgeois and capitalist Chamberlain with his lying umbrella took the trouble to come to Berghof in order to negotiate with Hitler, that plebeian who had become a celebrity, he already knew that he would wage a merciless war against us. He was ready to say anything to me in order to put me to sleep. His only objective in that trip was to gain time. Our interest, however, was to strike immediately. We should have declared war in 1938. That was our last chance to localize the war."

However, many, such as Michael, contend that these notes are an early post-war forgery.

Cheers,

Sid.