Historical Accuracy & the IMT Aggressive War Judgment

[wm]

Hitler's suspicions were not unjustified. Non-governmental anti-German organisations within Poland were openly calling for war against Germany for the purpose of achieving the Piast goal of westward expansion by seizing German eastern territory; for that purpose they had been disseminating propagandistic material such as that which has been posted earlier on this thread.

There were no "calls for war against Germany for the purpose of achieving the Piast goal" whatsoever.
But there were political actions at the beginning of 1939 in the face of the Polish Government inactivity, usually of people from the autonomous Silesia Province trying to do something for defense of their country.
And the only cause of those actions was the Nazi antics in Europe: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Slovakia, Memel, Spain and a rather justified conviction of those people that Poland would be next.
No to mention that the main Polish political parties were generally distrustful of the Nazi Germany - be they Socialists, Christian Democrats or Nationalists because they saw on their own eyes what had happened to their brethren in Germany, and remembered well the pre 1934 German customs wars and boycotts of Poland and claims that Poland was a temporary political entity.
They didn't advocate war they were saying that in case of a renew German aggression, Germany had to be punished. Tempers were so hot in April 1939 that people on their own accord were patrolling the German border, roads leading to it, watching the houses of suspicious people. Their calls should be viewed on this background. It was acute fear of a new German war not an insatiable desire for new Polish conquests.

For the information of readers, that post referred to a claim that General Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the Supreme Leader (Naczelny wódz), around whom a cult of personality was blossoming, in the summer of 1939 had himself painted, oil on canvas, on horseback overseeing a Polish victory parade before the Brandenburg Gate of Berlin, and that the painting is displayed in Warsaw, in a National Museum.

It was a joke referring to the unfortunately obscure fact that Rydz-Śmigły was a good painter and poet himself and graduated with ease from the Kraków Academy of Fine Arts, so at least on paper he was better than the Vienna Academy of Fine Arts two-time reject.
Certainly it wasn't reference to this propaganda fantasy.

[michael mills]

Tempers were so hot in April 1939 that people on their own accord were patrolling the German border, roads leading to it, watching the houses of suspicious people. Their calls should be viewed on this background. It was acute fear of a new German war not an insatiable desire for new Polish conquests.

In April 1939?

At last wm is admitting that in April 1939, 4-5 months before the actual German invasion, there was a war psychosis in Poland, with Polish civilians taking the law into their own hands.

But why as early as April?

Had Germany made threats to Poland at that early date? Had it given any indications of preparing to invade?

No it had not.

But on 26 March, the Polish Government had responded to the repeated German proposals for a settlement of the Danzig and other issues with a threat to make war on Germany if any attempt were made to reunite Danzig with that country.

Then on 31 March came the public announcement of the British blank cheque to Poland, which allowed the latter to create a state of war between Britain and Germany by taking action against anything at all that it claimed to be an "indirect threat" to its independence.

Finally on 6 April came the Anglo-Polish Agreement on Mutual Military Aid, which confirmed British support for Polish action against an alleged "indirect threat" to Polish independence.

Thus, after Poland's receipt of unconditional British support for war against Germany, various extreme nationalist elements in Poland began to whip up a war psychosis by such actions as "watching the houses of suspicious people" (read: harassing ethnic Germans) and "patrolling the borders" (read: shooting at, and sometimes wounding and killing, ethnic Germans trying to flee across the border to escape the harassment by Polish chauvinist activists).

And wm is quite wrong when he claims this war psychosis was entirely defensive. Chauvinist activists, in particular members of Endecja militias and of former insurgent formations, were openly calling for the Polish Government to take the initiative and invade Danzig and East Prussia.

Propagandists for war were spreading the idea that National Socialist Germany was in crisis and on the point of collapse, that as soon as the Polish army invaded the German forces would simply fall apart, there would be uprisings in Germany, The National Socialist Government would be overthrown, and Marshal Smigly-Rydz would ride in triumph into Berlin, after which Poland could annex East Prussia, Pomerania and Silesia in fulfilment of the Piast dream.

Thus it is apparent that the eventual German invasion was a reaction to Polish threats of war backed up by Britain, and the war psychosis in Poland calling for a war of territorial expansion, justified as "punishment".

[wm]

The cause of this so called "psychosis" were the "Germany will never break the peace of Europe [...] We have no territorial demands to make in Europe" and then in quick succession the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia, and occupation of the Memel Territory.
In March and April anyone living near the Nazi Germany and feeling safe should have his head examined.
But the main cause was the rampant among the Germans rumor that "something big will happen on Hitler's 50th birthday" (in April 1939) and fears that it means another occupation or war.

[wm]

Of course war scares were rampant all around the world at that time, one example is the March 27th "The Mad Dog of Europe" story in the Life Magazine:

md.jpg

[Sid Guttridge]

Hi Michael,

You ask whether, by April 1939, "Had Germany made threats to Poland at that early date? Had it given any indications of preparing to invade?"

The answer to both these questions is yes, as you well know.

1) In defiance of previous agreements, in late 1938 Germany had proposed an extra-territorial highway across the so-called "Corridor" that cut across Polish access to the sea and involved sovereignty concessions by Poland alone. This was undoubtedly threatening to the Polish state.

2) Germany had already in late 1938 prepared military plans to occupy the Free City of Danzig, which had similar implications for the Polish state.

Thus Germany was already threatening and making military preparations inimicable to the Polish state.

Thus Polish insticts in these matters were entirely sound.

Cheers,

Sid.

[michael mills]

Sid,

It appears you do not know what a threat is.

"Give me what I want or I will shoot you": that is a threat.

"Give me something I want and I will give you something you want": that is a proposal, not a threat.

Germany had made any threats at all in connection with its request for an extraterritorial link to East Prussia. Rather it had offered inducements, for example a final recognition of the existing German-Polish frontier, something that Poland had been wanting ever since Germany recognised its borders with France and Belgium in 1926, and also extension of the non-aggression declaration from 10 to 25 years.

As for the November 1938 order to prepare a plan for a military occupation of Danzig, that did not represent any sort of aggression against Polish territory. Obviously any movement of German troops into the Free City of Danzig would have been carried out with the full consent of the Danzig Government, and would not have been an act of aggression.

As is well known, Germany offered Poland various means of preserving its legitimate economic interest in Danzig following the proposed reunification of the Free State with the Reich, ie a free port in the harbour and an extraterritorial access from that free port to Gdynia.

It is noteworthy that even though Germany achieved the return of Memel by threatening Lithuania, it nevertheless preserved Lithuania's legitimate interest in the port as a conduit for its overseas trade by granting a free port with customs-free access. That was because Lithuania was not intransigent, but agreed to a deal that gave it what it needed, unencumbered access to a port.

It is simply a perversion of historical truth to maintain that the German proposals to Poland for a compromise settlement of all outstanding issues represented any sort of existential threat. Poland's access to the sea was in no way threatened by the German proposals, since it would have retained its own sovereign port in Gdynia, plus continued access to the port of Danzig.

[wm]

Thus Polish insticts in these matters were entirely sound.

Not to mention the repeated assurance given by Göring to Rydz-Śmigły during his famous hunting trips to Poland, that Germany had no claims in Poland and in Danzig.
This broken promise was one of the main causes of his anti-Ribbentrop feelings I suppose...

[Michael Kenny]

Poland's access to the sea was in no way threatened by the German proposals, since it would have retained its own sovereign port in Gdynia, plus continued access to the port of Danzig.

Just like Czechoslovakia was assured Germany only wanted a small part of her territory.

[Peter K]

Just like Czechoslovakia was assured Germany only wanted a small part of her territory.

Immediately after annexing Sudetenland Germans started military exercises with use of Czech fortifications. Maybe a small part but annexation of Sudetenland handed over large portion of fortifications into German hands.

Annexing Sudetenland was the first step of undermining Czechoslovakian defensive capability.

"Give me something I want and I will give you something you want": that is a proposal, not a threat.

But that was not the German "proposal". The German "proposal" was like this:

"Give me something I don't have which is yours and I will give you something that already belongs to you"

You claim that Germany wanted to give Poland access to the sea. But Poland already had it...

So in fact the German "proposal" was:

"Give me part of what is yours and I will let you retain (at least for some time) the other part"

Germany wasn't "giving" to Poland anything that wasn't already Polish.

You can't "give" to somone anything which already belongs to them.

This is not what is called "giving" / "gift"...

[David Thompson]

"Give me part of what is yours and I will let you retain (at least for some time) the other part"

Which also sounds very much like the proposition made to Czechoslovakia and its allies in Sept 1938, shortly before Germany declared a "protectorate" over what was left in Mar 1939.

[michael mills]

Here is an excerpt from a report of 15 August 1939 by the French Ambassador in Berlin, Coulondre, to the French Foreign Minister, Bonnet, on a meeting with the German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Weizsaecker, from this source:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/fyb/part_5c.html#188

To those who know the covert way in which the State Secretary expresses himself, the language which he used to me is distinctly pessimistic. Ten days ago he still gave my English colleague a less gloomy view. There are, he told him, four possible risks of an armed conflict: (1) An English preventive war; (2) German refusal to believe that England would fight for Danzig; (3) Things might go so far that a retreat would no longer be possible; (4) A serious Polish incident.

He eliminated Nos. 1 and 2 automatically. As regards No. 3 Herr Hitler, he said, would know how to stop in time. He only retained No. 4, the serious Polish incident, and this was what he had told me.

[267]

Today, Herr von Weizsäcker is no longer willing even to limit the risk of war to No. 4, and two or three times, I had the feeling that he wanted to give me to understand that events might move rapidly.

Is his attitude a maneuver intended to impress the French Government? This is possible, and I hope in that case that my reactions showed him that it was labour lost. In any case, while I was making my statement he took numerous notes, which is contrary to his habit.

Does his attitude on the contrary mean that, without having detailed information of what is his master's secret, he knows that important decisions have been made or discussed? That is also possible.

Perhaps also he combined tactics and truthfulness. In life things are seldom entirely black or white. It is not unlikely that the same may also be true of Herr Hitler. The latter, in all probability, does not want a general war because he knows that he would have many chances of losing everything by it, and because he is convinced that he can hold out longer than the democracies in the present bloodless war. It may therefore be anticipated that he will strive to the last to achieve his plan without a general conflict. For none of my colleagues here doubts any more than I do, that he has a plan, and that as regards Poland, it comprises, in addition to Danzig, the reincorporation of the Corridor and Polish Silesia at the very least, that is to say the return to the old frontiers, and the German Press, moreover, does not hesitate to formulate such claims from time to time.

But it is equally likely that the Führer, while he is anxious to avoid a general war, may become irritated and his anger gradually increasing against this neighbour who dares to defy him, in his desire to bring matters to a conclusion with Poland, he may be led to wage war against the latter, minimizing, more or less consciously, the risk of an extension of the conflict.

It is interesting that Coulondre, speaking on behalf of a State that had adopted an anti-German position and together with Britain was assiduously constructing a coalition designed to encircle Germany, a coalition that as of 15 August was still expected to include the Soviet Union and its massive armed forces, believed that the German State under the leadership of Hitler did not desire a general war.

No doubt Coulondre was correct in his estimation of Hitler's intentions.

It is also noteworthy that Coulondre did not ascribe to Hitler any definite desire to destroy the Polish State and people. Rather, he saw Hitler's ambitions as the restoration to Germany of the territories taken from it by force and given to Poland after the First World War.

Such a restoration to Germany of its former territories would in no way have prevented the continued existence of an independent Polish State. Coulondre, representing the anti-German point of view of his government, neglects to mention tthat all the German proposals had included the retention by Poland of its port at Gdynia with full access to Polish sovereign territory.

[Michael Kenny]

It is interesting that Coulondre............................... believed that the German State under the leadership of Hitler did not desire a general war.

No doubt Coulondre was correct in his estimation of Hitler's intentions.

Just like Chamberlain believed Hitler had no further territorial demands in Europe after the Munich agreement.

History has shown both Chamberlain and Coulondre were wrong.

[michael mills]

From the second report of 15 August 1939 from Coulondre to Bonnet, on the general situation in Germany:

Up to the present, if we except the assembling of troops in many places in Upper Silesia and in East Prussia, no important concentrations constituting an immediate threat to Poland have yet been observed. Technical experts, however, are of opinion that in the present state of German mobilization such concentrations could be effected in a few days.

(2) If, at the time of the Polish ultimatum of August 5, some surprise and some wavering was noticeable in the attitude of the Nazis in Danzig and in the Reich, Germany was, nevertheless, not slow in regaining her self possession.

After the Senate climbed down in the matter of the Polish Customs officers, the leaders of the Reich, tried, as we had for several days been given to understand from the German side they would, to take over the diplomatic representation of the interests of Danzig. This was the meaning of the verbal note handed by the German Government

[270]

to Warsaw on August 9. The Polish reply of the 11th in which the Warsaw Government declared that it would consider any fresh German intervention in the differences between Danzig and Poland as an act of aggression, cut short this attempt. This reply appears to have profoundly irritated the Nazi leaders and the Führer himself.

It is noteworthy that Coulondre admits that the Polish Government presented an ultimatum to Danzig on 5 August (actually 4 August). Under the terms of the Anglo-Polish Agreement on Mutual Military Assistance, that ultimatum could have triggered war between Germany and Britain, which may well have been the Polish intention.

Coulondre also reveals that Poland was not simply reacting defensively to real German aggression. As he confirms, when Germany tried to protect Danzig against Polish thuggery, in the form of the ultimatum of 4 August, the Polish Government reacted in an extremely aggressive manner, stating that it would regard German diplomatic intervention on the side of Danzig as an act of aggression against Poland.

It is clear that the Polish reply to Germany of 11 August was tantamount to a threat of war. Under the terms of the Anglo-Polish Agreement on Mutual Military Assistance of 6 April, if Poland declared a German diplomatic intervention on behalf of Danzig to be an act of aggression against Poland, and responded to it by mobilising its forces, Britain was obliged to go to war with Germany if called upon to do so by Poland.

That shows that Poland was fully prepared to plunge Britain and Germany into war over something as minor as a German diplomatic intervention on behalf of Danzig. It was by no means waiting to be an innocent victim of a German attack.

The only reason war between Germany and Polanmd, with Britain joining in against Germany, did not erupt over the Polish ultimatum to Danzig and the subsequent German diplomatic intervention is that Germany hastily backed down.

It also shows that the eventual German invasion on 1 September was a final, last-option response to Polish threats of war connived at by the British and French Governments (or at least by the "hawks" in those governments).

The principal dangers of war may, therefore, be reduced to these two:

(a) Illusion as to the attitude of France and Great Britain.

(b) The hope of being able to destroy the Polish Army before the Western Powers have been able to give effective assistance, and of having by this means created a "war map" which would set London and Paris thinking.

(a) There is no doubt that certain of the Nazi leaders and, in particular, Herr von Ribbentrop, still hope to give some sort of satisfaction to the Western Powers by restricting the German claims to Danzig, setting aside, provisionally, the question of the Corridor and other claims against Poland.

(b) The idea that the German Army could crush the Polish Army and take Warsaw in a few weeks, or even a few days, before France and England had time to intervene, or even to come to a decision, is fairly widespread among the public and in certain official circles. The Führer himself is said to consider the undertaking as not impossible. It is said that certain officers in his circle encourage him in that view.

What is most likely at the present time, is that Germany, while endeavouring to carry through the first solution (a) is continuing to push on her preparations with a view to being able if necessary to attempt the second solution (b).

Here Coulondre confirms that Germany's preferred option was to achieve an agreement with Britain and France on the future of Danzig, and that a military intervention against Poland was only its second option, to be resorted to only if the preferred option could not be achieved due to Polish obduracy backed up by Britain and France.

Coulondre also shows himself to be fully aware of the purpose of a German military intervention against Poland. Such an intervention would not have the purpose of destroying the Polish State and people, but rather of eliminating Polish military force as a factor in the encirclement of Germany, thereby "setting London and Paris thinking", to use Coulondre's words, ie to present the British and French Governments with a fait accompli that might in the most hopeful scenario deter them from proceeding to make war on Germany, but rather be prepared to negotiate a settlement.

[wm]

Coulondre also reveals that Poland was not simply reacting defensively to real German aggression. As he confirms, when Germany tried to protect Danzig against Polish thuggery

So in other words the Nazi Germany was meddling in internal affairs of another countries. Poland had certain rights and obligations in the Free City of Danzig. Germany was a completely foreign entity there, without any rights or obligations.

, in the form of the ultimatum of 4 August, the Polish Government reacted in an extremely aggressive manner, stating that it would regard German diplomatic intervention on the side of Danzig as an act of aggression against Poland.

Cite needed.
The Polish Government reacted to the post-crisis German diplomatic note of August 9, which was seen as insulting and warned that it would consider further German intervention against Polish interests as an act of aggression.

[David Thompson]

The French view of the 4 Aug 1939 Polish "ultimatum" (part 1) from Diplomatic Documents ("the French Yellow Book"), available online at:

http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/fyb/fyb-preface.html
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/ylbkmenu.asp

No. 180
M. DE SAINT-HARDOUIN, French Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin,
to M. GEORGES BONNET, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Berlin, August 3, 1939.

IN the course of the last week a very definite change in the political atmosphere has been observed in Berlin. Whereas after the middle of July there appeared to be a certain détente, towards the end of the month there were signs of a fresh stiffening of attitude. The period of embarrassment, hesitation, inclination to temporization or even to appeasement which had been observable among the Nazi leaders, has been succeeded by a new phase: today the actions of the leaders of the Third Reich and the language of their Press reveal two dominating purposes:

To convince the German people that it is threatened, as in 1914, and that its very existence is imperiled.

To convince public opinion at home and abroad that the Third Reich is invincible and that neither threats nor any human power can arrest it in the pursuit of its vital interests.

Nothing is neglected which may give the German people such confidence in its own might as to allow it to await the future with calmness, to resist attacks of all kinds and to break through any obstacles which may impede its path.

I will try to show elsewhere how this propaganda is conducted. It is not without interest to ask oneself what motives have inspired it. It is probable that the rulers of the Reich are endeavouring to allay the

[244]

fears which spread through the population when military preparations are, as at the present moment, greatly intensified.
On every side I am informed of what amounts to a recrudescence of the war psychosis which had manifested itself last September. The anxiety to allay the general alarm is particularly shown by the persistence of the efforts to convince the people that there is no danger of air-raids.

On the other hand, at a time when the German military preparations are being intensified and accelerated, when clashes between the Poles and the members of the German minority seem to multiply, when polemics regarding Danzig are being resumed, the Nazi leaders are doubtless anxious to impress foreign opinion with the conviction that Germany is now once again prepared to go to any lengths, if necessary, in order to obtain satisfaction and show that the Reich would not give way, even if faced by the coalition the crowning-piece of which would be a Franco-Anglo-Russian agreement.

At the same time the possibility must not be ignored that the leaders of the Third Reich may have wished to stimulate the somewhat failing enthusiasm of their people and to convince them that, their existence being threatened, they must defend themselves and that it is not so much a question of the Germans "dying for Danzig" as of their fighting for the life of the German people itself.

The military activity displayed by the Third Reich since June has all the time called for the greatest vigilance on our part. The tone now adopted by its Press must make us more vigilant still and as resolute as ever.

SAINT-HARDOUIN.