More information on Hitler's assessment of the Polish threat and the European situation three weeks before war began, from
, Series D, vol. 6 March-August 1939:
No. 784
F5/0103-113
Memorandum by the Minister in Hungary
RM 41
RECORD OF THE RECEPTION OF THE HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER BY THE FÜHRER AT THE OBERSALZBERG ON AUGUST 8, 1939, AT 3 P.M.
The Führer, who received the Hungarian Foreign Minister in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, Counsellor Hewel, Legation Secretary Ujpéteŕy and myself, opened the conversation by stating that we were shocked by the Hungarian Minister President's letter,[1] which said that Hungary could not participate in the event of a German-Polish conflict. He remarked that we had never expected military participation by Hungary in a conflict of that kind. The military aspect of the problem was moreover the exclusive concern of Germany. Support from other States was not even welcome.
Moreover Poland presented no military problem to us. The present behaviour of authoritative circles there must be described as sheer madness. The Führer stated emphatically that a repetition of the attempt to present a Polish ultimatum to Danzig would be appropriately answered by Germany. France and Britain would not be able to prevent us from doing this. Whether in the event of a general war in the West we would adopt a defensive or an offensive attitude was a question for later decision. The tone of the Polish press, and the way in which maps were circulating in Poland in which the territory of the Reich was partitioned, could only be described as a morbid degeneration
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[1] See document No. 712, enclosure 2.
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of reason. The Poles were evidently incapable of realistic thinking either in the military or in the political field. They were labouring under a dangerous delusion with regard to their own strength. Their illusions about the strength of the German Army were incomprehensible.
The Führer then emphasized again that Count Teleki's letter was impossible as it indicated an atmosphere which was incomprehensible in view of all the lost territory which Hungary had been able to recover during this and the previous year exclusively through German support. The Regent too had last August[2] expressed the opinion that Germany would collapse in the event of a conflict and had also conveyed this view to German military circles. The practical realization of Hungarian revision had only been made possible by great sacrifices on Germany's part (extension of our system of fortifications and the expenditure of seven thousand million gold marks for the Army). Further support for Hungarian revisionist desires was at present impossible in view of military factors, just as Hungary would not think of going to war on account of possible German claims to Alsace-Lorraine. The various problems were inseparable. If Germany were defeated in a war, Hungary's revisionist dreams would also be at an end. The Western Powers would then not only take care to restore Czecho-Slovakia but even to strengthen her. Mussolini and he, the Führer, clearly realized that they could only win together or lose together in all theatres of war. No enticements from the other side would succeed, therefore, in separating the Axis Powers from one another. In the event of a Mediterranean conflict Germany would support Italy with all her strength, and, conversely, Italy would support us in a struggle for Danzig as she had also done in the Austrian Anschluss and in the Czech crisis. Germany had no aspirations at Italy's expense. She required vital necessities in the North Sea and Baltic Sea areas, of mountains she had enough already. If Germany were to lose her position today, Hungary would automatically be smashed too. In this case, according to the plan of the Western Powers, Upper Austria, the Regensburg area and parts of Silesia were to be added to the new Czecho-Slovakia, which was to receive a common frontier with Yugoslavia, thus forming a Slav corridor through Central Europe. The new structure would naturally be made to serve the Western Powers.
If people in Hungary resented Germany's attitude towards Slovakia, he would say that we had no vital interests east of the Carpathians. From the military point of view too we did not want to burden ourselves with an appendix in the East. At present Slovakia was of military importance to us in respect of Poland. Otherwise the fate of Slovakia was a matter of indifference to him personally. With the
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[2] No record has been found; for Horthy's visit to Germany in August 1938, see vol. II of this series, document No. 383.
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well known proposal, he had made the most far-reaching offer to Poland that anyone could have made. Such an offer would not be made a second time. No other German could have been in a position voluntarily to offer Poland such a long-term understanding and at great sacrifices. The Poles had, however, brusquely rejected the offer and instead had concluded an alliance with Britain and begun a rabid press campaign. Had they gone mad in Warsaw ? If an encounter with Poland and the Western Powers were necessary, then he, the Führer, wished it would come soon while he was still alive and the movement was still young. His experiences of Britain gained in the World War had not inspired in him any deep respect for her. The war would have ended very differently if Germany had not been led so miserably. Even after 1918, without revolution, we could easily have held out on the defensive for at least a year.
Poland presented no military problem at all for Germany. The tension with Poland had brought him the fanatical 100 per cent support of the Army as well as that of the last remaining opposition, namely certain Prussian aristocratic families who had been unable to understand his previous accommodating attitude to Poland. He knew the Polish Army well, from the numerous Germans who were serving there. Poland possessed a few good divisions which were moderately equipped, then medium and poor divisions with very bad equipment. We had exact information on the Polish mobilization machinery and the tactical knowledge of the Polish leaders, and also on the munitioning of the Army and its degree of reliability. The face of the Polish Army already bore the signs of death. There would never be a Greater Hungarian Kingdom if Germany lost the war.
It was to be hoped that Poland would still see reason at the last minute. Nevertheless we were reckoning from the start with a war on two fronts, which, if it came, would be conducted with lightning speed. Not only the Polish Army but also the Polish State would then be destroyed. Slovakia was, for us, an important military-political springboard. It would be very regrettable if the idea prevailed in Hungary that Hungary had only a limited interest in Germany's success. As long as Slav Czechs, Slav Slovaks, and also Slav Serbs, Slav Croats and Slav Poles oppressed Slav Ukrainians, the Panslav idea had perhaps lost in significance, but it would revive. Opposed to it would be only Germans, Hungarians and to a certain extent also Italians. The West would identify itself with this spiritual uprising, finding it useful.
Count Csáky interjected that Vansittart had had him informed four days ago that Hungary would share Germany's fate.
The Führer remarked that the Western Powers had created Czecho-Slovakia, which was not viable. She had become their most compliant and submissive State.
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Count Csáky emphasized that on the whole in Hungary the general political situation was judged no differently from here. He regretted that the initiative taken by the Hungarian Government in the matter of the two letters had not had the desired result. The Hungarian Government had wanted to tell the Italians and us: "We stand by you. But our national honour does not allow us to fight against Poland."
The Führer added that the German people were now much more whole-heartedly anti-Polish than they had been anti-Czech, as the Poles had seized what had formerly been German territory and had behaved in the most bestial manner towards innocent Germans. So far he had not allowed publication of the fact that Germans had been castrated, as otherwise this would have caused an uproar. The Polish behaviour was impossible. The mood of the German Army, which had been derided by the Poles, was such that it would be a terrible disappointment for them if the Poles were, after all, to see reason at the last minute. The German people, who had not understood the policy of reconciliation hitherto adopted towards Poland, were of the same mind. The Führer repeated that if Poland again addressed to Danzig such a Note as the last,[3] Germany herself would immediately take it upon herself to answer it. It was a fallacy to assume that he was afraid of a reckoning with France and Britain. There would never be a more favourable moment than the present. No British ship would reach the North Sea, let alone the Baltic. A blockade of Germany would be possible only with fearful losses. We were also independent in the sphere of the most important raw materials. Between August 1 and September 1, the German Luftwaffe would be brought up to the enormous figure of 490,000 men, and next year to 600,000. We had the strongest air force in the world, twice as strong as that of France and Britain together.
Our types of aircraft, too, were superior. We had also the strongest anti-aircraft defence in the world, and in addition over six and a half thousand armoured vehicles of the most modern. construction. The German anti-tank defence was excellent. No Power in the world could penetrate Germany's western fortifications. Nobody in all his life had been able to frighten him, neither could Britain do so. Nor would he succumb to the oft predicted nervous breakdown. Perhaps Poland would still see reason, but recently his belief in this had vanished in consequence of the support given to the Poles by the British. If the Poles had accepted Germany's offer, they would have entered into the same friendly relations with us as Lithuania had done. It was our desire to gain good trading partners in the North Eastern States. As these countries had not been settled by Germans, their inhabitants could not, of course, become German.
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Count Csáky, in further explanation of the two Hungarian letters, said that the Hungarian Government had not wished to expose themselves afterwards to the reproach of shirking, if they kept silent now on their attitude in a possible conflict with Poland. The Hungarian military authorities too were pressing for a clarification of political issues between Germany and Hungary, so that certain military conversations could begin soon. He knew that talks had already begun between Ambassador Ritter and Minister Sztöjay[4] on the matter of cooperation in the field of war economy.
The Führer added that Britain was seeking mercenaries and had therefore given guarantees to the various countries. France was in mortal dread of isolation and thought she could gain courage by shouting. The Soviet Government apparently wished to bind themselves to no one, nor would they fight against us, as they were equally afraid of defeat or victory for their army. Furthermore their army was immobile. Their motorization was if anything a hindrance. Military leaders for the direction of operations did not exist. The Soviets would not repeat the Czar's mistake and bleed to death for Britain. They would, however, try to enrich themselves, possibly at the expense of the Baltic States or Poland, without engaging in military action themselves.
Germany's small western neighbours would try to remain neutral. Switzerland would fire on anyone who did not respect her neutrality. Yugoslavia was pursuing a policy of cautious, reserved neutrality, not from her own choice but at the dictates of necessity. In a crisis she would make every possible attempt to range herself against the Axis Powers, especially Italy. The occupation of Albania had brought to Italy an immeasurable improvement in the whole political situation. Greece would prefer to remain neutral but would regard British violation with mixed feeling, as at present she considers Britain to be the stronger and she needs British money. In theory, Rumania (Gafencu) was pursuing the policy of the honest broker, but in practice she was trying to mobilize as many as possible against us. Gafencu was, however, being cautious, knowing the poor condition of the Rumanian Army. Under cover of harmless journeys to England, the Prince Regent Paul and Gafencu were trying to attach themselves to Britain, without prematurely showing their hand. Turkey was dominated by the desire for British money. The Italian threat had been only a pretext for the change in her attitude. The Bulgarians were the only reliable nation in the Balkans and were not now quite so nervous since Italy's action in Albania and since we were supporting them in their rearmament. Bulgaria's army was not large but was well trained, and was a factor which at least compelled the others to be cautious. The most uncertain
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factor was Rumania, next came Yugoslavia and then Greece. The Rumanians had a guilty conscience where we were concerned. Their character lacked a strong foundation. They were, however, also afraid of documenting their opposition to us too obviously.
Count Csáky said that he knew Rumania very well. A distinction must be made between the Rumanians of Transylvania, who had proved trustworthy even under Hungarian leadership and the Old Rumanians,[5] particularly the Rumanian intelligentsia, who had been educated in Paris. On the defensive, the Rumanians were not bad soldiers. The Officers' Corps was bad. The Rumanians probably would not attack Hungary on their own initiative but would await a suitable opportunity, such as they considered to have arisen after the battle of Luck in 1916.[6]
The Führer agreed with this.
Count Csáky went on to say that even now the Rumanians had mobilized 150,000 men. Hungary was not doing so in order to save money, with which the Führer agreed. Count Csáky added that the Rumanians were at present constructing a line of defence some 650 km. in length from Yugoslavia to the Carpathians, with underground shelters and revolving armoured turrets, as well as a second line near Cluj and a third in the Carpathians. On the other hand they were completely neglecting the line of the Pruth and Dniester facing Russia. The Dobruja frontier, however, was being fortified with feverish haste.
The Führer also thought that should any occasion arise the Rumanians would at first take no action of their own accord.
Count Csáky expressed the opinion that Rumania would remain neutral as long as possible and that Yugoslavia would only intervene against us if things were going really badly for us.
The Führer said that calm prevailed in the Protectorate. Only two insignificant incidents had taken place. We were satisfied with the Czech workers and they were sending back enthusiastic reports to their homes. The Czechs were not united among themselves. A German-Polish conflict with its serious consequences for Poland would be the strongest vindication for Czech politicians such as Hácha.
Count Csáky remarked that in. the event of a revival of Russian nationalism, Czechia, as an exponent of Panslavism, might become dangerous, and the Führer agreed with this.
Count Csäky went on to relate that patriotic radio talks in Russian from Moscow were said to be finding a strong response among the youth of Yugoslavia.
The Führer remarked that although no member of the Romanov
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[5] i.e., from the Regat, the Old (pre-1919) Kingdom.
[6] In June 1916, the first Brusilov offensive opened against Lutsk- In August Rumania declared war on Austria-Hungary and invaded Transylvania.
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family would find himself at the head of a new Russia it was quite possible that Bolshevism might put on a nationalist helmet. He then spoke of impressions gained from showings of Russian news-reels. It must be remembered that the younger generation in Russia knew only Bolshevism.
Count Csáky asked if the Führer thought it possible that, after the defeat of Bulgaria, a Turkish army might in certain circumstances advance against Hungary through Rumania. The Führer considered this out of the question, as the Turks had shown themselves to be lazy and had always required a lead from someone else. It was of course possible that they were fortifying the Chatalcha line and the Straits. With regard to the latter, incredibly little had been done in the years since the Montreux Convention.[7]
Count Csáky said that Atatürk [8] had told him in 1927 that if the Serbs and Bulgarians united in any way, that meant war for Turkey. Moreover, the latter would never wage war against Hungary. The new President of Turkey had recently confirmed this statement.
The Führer again emphasized that he thought it was out of the question that the Turks could be used in the West outside the frontiers of their own country. Moreover they would have to reckon with a devastating Italian air attack on Constantinople, good bases for which had been gained in Albania. By their new attitude the Turks were hoping to amass a great deal of gold but they would not want to bleed to death for Britain. He had ordered that our deliveries of arms to Turkey, to Rumania and, to some extent also, to Yugoslavia should be stopped and that these countries should receive from us only such war material as they could otherwise also buy elsewhere. It was nonsense to say that the French would not attack our West Wall but would fight in North Africa or throw themselves upon the Italians, for thanks to our own and the Italian submarines and their excellent bases, the enemy would not be able to operate in the Mediterranean. Besides, he would certainly not look on inactively if Italy were attacked by France.
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After this conversation, which lasted one hour and forty minutes, a further conversation of almost one and a half hours took place during tea, in which the Führer dealt in detail, among other things, with German-British relations, making reference to historical events, and said that had Chamberlain already been at the helm in 1935, the British Government might perhaps have accepted his generous offer, whereby the whole world situation would have been changed. It had merely been his wish to secure the necessary German Lebensraum including the Colonies, in return for which he would have supported Britain in every
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[7] Of July 20, 1936 ; for the text see B.F.S.P., vol. 140, pp. 288-300.
[8] Kemal Atatürk, President of Turkey 1923-1938.
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way, including the protection of her interests in East Asia. A European war would probably result in Britain losing Hong Kong, Singapore and India, but German colonies in East Asia and New Guinea were untenable without British rear cover against the advance of the yellow race which was to be expected owing to Britain's fault. If Britain were defeated we would never struggle for India. Chaos and war by all against all would start there. The Führer dwelt in detail on the different values and special peculiarities of the Czech and the Polish armies and stressed the megalomania of the latter.
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The Reich Foreign Minister told me that Count Csáky, in a conversation which he had with him in private today, had promised to withdraw the two letters from the Hungarian Prime Minister to the Führer and Mussolini as, unfortunately, they had apparently been misunderstood. He accepted responsibility for this in the name of his Government.
Count Csáky told me on the return journey that he would notify us officially of this through the Hungarian Minister, Sztöjay. A corresponding communication would be sent to Rome. In the very improbable event of the Hungarian Government disapproving of his action, he would resign.[9]
VON ERDMANNSDORFF
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[9] In a minute of Aug. 9 (73/51973) to Weizsäcker, Hewel wrote: "At his visit to the Obersalzberg yesterday the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Csáky, told the Führer that he was authorized by his Government to request the German Government to regard the two letters in question signed by Imrédy [sic ? Teleki] as not having been written. He would also have this communication made officially to the respective Governments by the Legations in Berlin and Rome." According to a memorandum by Woermann dated Aug. 10 (not printed, 73/51974-75) a communication in this sense was handed to him by the Hungarian Minister on that date.
by ljadw on 22 Aug 2012 19:18 
Thankfully Amazon's free preview reinforced my failing memory by including the portion that of book that pertained to his Berlin visit. 
