Gen. Halder and the German-Polish Crisis

[David Thompson]

This is the first part of a collection of extracts from Generaloberst Franz Halder's notebook, dealing with the German-Polish crisis of 14 Aug-3 Sept 1939 and the start of WWII. They are taken from Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, vol. 7 - August 9 - September 3 1939, pp. 551-72.

Appendix I

EXTRACTS FROM THE NOTEBOOK OF COLONEL GENERAL HALDER[1] AUGUST 14-SEPTEMBER 3, 1939

The whole notebook, which covers the period 14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942, was lodged as an exhibit in the case against von Leeb et. al. Short extracts were subsequently published in Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, U.S. Government Printing Office (Washington, 1951), vols. X and XI.

The notebook, which consists of shorthand notes made personally by Haider in connection with his daily tasks as Chief of the General Staff of the Army, should not be confused with the official War Diaries kept by the High Command of the Army. The transcript of the notes, which were written in the Gabelsberger system of shorthand, was prepared by the staff of the Office of the U.S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (OMGUS).

All those entries which deal primarily with matters of purely military interest have been omitted. All omissions are indicated by a series of dots. The translation has been revised to tally more exactly with the somewhat telegraphic style of the original. Some of the explanatory information supplied in the footnotes provided by the American editors at Nuremberg, who worked over the shorthand text with General Halder, has been used; these footnotes are marked with an asterisk. Alt the footnotes have been numbered in daily series.
______________________________________
[1] Nuremberg document NOKW 3140; Case 12, Prosecution Exhibit 1359.
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. . . . .

14 AUGUST 1939 (Obersalzberg)[1]

First of all the fact must be recognized that any political or military success involves taking risks: In the political field, because there is opposition to overcome, in the military, because sober assessment of all factors often reveals the possibility of failure.

Clear appraisal of the conditions !—Historical facts.

England's position must be viewed in the light of internal politics. Decision in 1914.

England would not have stepped in if she had foreseen the consequences. No nation wants a long war as such.

England only stands to lose.

Changes since the World War:

Recognition that a wealthy nation has little to gain, but a great deal to lose: Every nation must pay with blood:

Even when a war is won the victor emerges with diminished strength. This is the key to an understanding of the actions of men of less than heroic cast.—England overburdened with commitments in all parts of the world.

Fight Germany Yes
Fight for Allies ?
Fight for others No
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1 The following are notes of an address by the Führer which form the basis of the summary to be found on pp. 554 ff.

552 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

In view of their experiences in the World War, there is little chance that opponents will deliberately run the risk of a major war. They know that it is a different Germany they would have to tackle today. 1914: Socialists, Church.

The factors involved:

Political:

Opponents:

Poland (primary).
England (active), France.

Russia is not in the least disposed to pull chestnuts out of the fire. Nothing to gain, but much to fear. War at the periphery a possibility, perhaps even welcome. Not so in centre. A war lost as much a threat as a victorious army. Interested in disruption of the Western States, access to Baltic.

Neutrals:

Norway, Sweden, Denmark. Will be genuinely neutral, from inner convictions. Britain's overtures to Russia have caused intense irritation.—Switzerland, Belgium, Holland:

Switzerland will certainly remain neutral.

Holland: neutral on principle; danger to Far East possessions.

Belgium will endeavour to remain neutral. Belgium would be battlefield. Could only stand to lose. A section of the population, with French or Jewish family ties, might wish to pull in opposite direction as long as the guns do not speak.

Hungary requires no mention.

Friends:

Italy is not interested in a major conflict, but would welcome certain adjustments. A victory of the democratic nations would be the end of Italy.—A Man! Spain will look with disfavour upon any victory of the Western Democracies.

Democracies would introduce a monarchy and dependence on Western Powers. England and France will have to shoulder the burden alone. Nor will the Balkan States be of any help to them.

Military:

Scale of British armaments: Supplementary armament programme passed (Navy, Air, Ground Forces). Not yet effective. Naval armament: programme not yet started. There will be no increase in battleship strength before 1941, no increase in cruisers and destroyers before 1940. Additional programme, just passed, is still in the misty future.

Ground Forces: One class of conscripts called up. It will be months before they are shaped into fighting units. Forces primarily needed for anti-aircraft. Months will pass before they could be available in any number.

Air: Progress has been made in bomber and fighter strength; improvement in ground organizations. No fundamental changes in ratio of bombers fighters. No major improvement in anti-aircraft (10 to 12 pieces a month). Three years will be needed to build up an adequate anti-aircraft force. Armament programme is being pushed in too many directions, with resulting mutual interference. On the whole, in the development stage (similar to our situation in 1934).

France: Resembles a weak man trying to carry machine guns, heavy guns, etc., on his back. Age classes of conscripts are small, and for a long time only one

APPENDIX I 553

year's service. Armament, too, is not in best shape. Potential of army on the whole limited. Colonial troops tied down.

If Führer were in the place of opponents, he would not accept the responsibility for a war. 125 million lined up against 80.

What can the English and French do?

Offensive: Between Basle and Saarbrücken hopeless. Local successes possible. Do-or-die attack improbable. A violation of neutrality of Luxembourg, Belgium and Holland: a quick success, likely to relieve pressure on the Eastern Front, is completely out of question. British could give support with a few Divs.—Blockade (counter measures) is therefore a long-term affair.

No immediate relief could be afforded by any Anglo-French action.

There is nothing to force them into a war.

The men of Munich will not take the risk. Risk of world-wide repercussions. Nobody has got ready cash for armaments. No more credit to be had.

The only clear-headed people left are the English Imperial General Staff and
the French General Staff.

In the political field some English spokesmen are beginning to back down (Duff Cooper)[2] The Press!

Utmost possibilities: Recall of ambassadors. Embargo on commerce with Germany, promotion of trade with Poland. League of Nations.

Line of retreat: Russia. Poland has not lived up to her promises.—Neutral States oppose passage through their territories. Treaties not ratified; formula: "All support in their power."[3]

Not really sincere: Were England resolved to help, she would have given money to the Poles. But the English will not put any more money into a bankrupt business.—Politicians take cover behind Ironside Report.[4] Polish mentality: If England had made any positive commitments, the Poles would be much more cocky. Tapped telephone conversations! Führer is concerned lest England hamper showdown by last-minute offers.

Summing up: In last weeks, conviction of [Poland's] isolation strengthened from day to day.

A necessary condition: That we obtain results within measurable time. In a week or a fortnight the impression [must prevail] that Poland will collapse. Winding up the operation can take longer.

Further necessity: Resolution to fight every corner. In the West build-up must be carried out completely.

Relations with Russia: Loose contacts. Started from negotiations for trade agreement. Under consideration whether a negotiator should go to Moscow, and whether or not this should be a prominent figure. [Russia] not thinking of obligations towards the West. Russians understand destruction of Poland. But what about Ukr[aine]? Promise of delimitation of spheres of interest.—Baltic States? Issue, Lithuania (not Baltic States). Russians want to discuss subject more closely. Distrust. No common frontier.—Führer inclined to meet half-way.

[Führer] has hinted to England that he will approach her with a new offer after disposal of the overriding Polish question. Has registered in London. Paris, too, is informed about his determination. So the great drama is now approaching its climax.—The British commotion happened because of some
_______________________________________________
[2] Alfred Duff Cooper, British Conservative M.P.; Secretary of State for War, 19351937; First Lord of the Admiralty, May, 1937–October, 1938.
[3] A reference to Mr. Chamberlain's statement in the House of Commons on Mar. 31, 1939. See Parl. Deb., H. of C., vol. 345, col. 2415.
[4] See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 752.

554 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

careless German boast that the Führer's calculations had always proved correct.

The other nations must be given proof that there will be a shooting war no matter what. (Poland will be polished off in six to eight weeks.) Even if England should step in.

AFTERNOON SESSION

If opinion changes, possible that cheap success taken. [Decision] reserved until 48 hours beforehand.

a) Central problem is Poland. Must be carried through at all costs.

b) Situation if western front is under pressure : all-out drive against German fortified zone unlikely. Attack possible with violation Belgian-Dutch neutrality.—No need for a change in our attitude before the proper time arrives. Attack to gain an advantageous front line because of lack of forces not necessary. It would thus be a question of: a) ensuring protection of our frontier with least delay ; b) investigating the possibilities of creating new reserves or moving up existing ones; c) [no entry made] ; d) occupation of the islands and the northern tip.

c) East: How can we seize the Dirschau Bridge? Graudenz.—Führer has ordered study on what could be done about Dirschau Bridge.

Dirschau: (Himmler) Armoured train, coup-de-main.

Graudenz: Possibly raiding force in civilian clothes.[5] Dive-bombers practically out of question.

Slovakia has signed protection treaty.[6]

Disposition of forces has been reviewed. Nothing will be taken away from troops earmarked for East.

Danzig will be left to its own resources. [Danzig selbst.]

Navy: Planned: 1 cruiser and 11 submarines will put to sea for exercises on 18th.

Air attack: Gdynia: 8 dive-bomber groups—80 aircraft. Mixed bombs.

Party Rally: Decision [Nachricht] 15 August.

Deployment in West advanced to 15 August.

SUMMARY

Morning Session: Review of political situation

Success, political or military, cannot be had without taking risks. The Fiihrer regards the foreign policy risks involved in a German attack on Poland in the light of the risks which he had to take in all his decisions to date, and which, to his mind, were great at first and then steadily decreased.

As opponents, only a matter of England—apart from Poland herself—with France towed in her wake.

England, unlike in 1914, will not allow herself to blunder into a war lasting for years.

Talk of England wanting a long war discounted. No Government will make a long war their primary aim. England, knowing war, is well aware that she stands to lose in a war, and that even a victorious war would not make up for the cost of such a war. Such is the fate of rich countries. England is overburdened with responsibilities because of the excessive size of her empire.
__________________________________
[5] A special task force organized by OKW—Abwehr (Adm. Canaris) to seize the strategic Vistula bridge.
[6] See Editors' Note, p. 50.

APPENDIX I 555

She has no leaders of real calibre. ("The men I got to know in Munich are, not the kind that start a new World War.") Moreover, the other side is well aware that it has to deal with a different Germany from 1914 (Socialism, Church). (What should England fight for? You don't get yourself killed for an ally.) Not even England has the money nowadays to fight a world war. She can get nothing on credit.

France is not directly interested in waging a war.

Russia has no intention of pulling England's chestnuts out of the fire and will keep out of war. A lost war is as dangerous for Stalin as a victorious army. His interests at most extend to the Baltic States.

Norway, Sweden, Denmark are neutral from innermost conviction. Deeply perturbed over Britain's wooing of Russia.

Switzerland, Belgium, Holland: Switzerland certainly neutral, Holland the same. Belgium will endeavour to remain neutral. As a battlefield she only stands to lose. Possibly there are still some forces pulling in favour of participation at the side of France, but they will be silent once the guns begin to speak. In sum, England and France will have to shoulder the burden alone. Nor will the Balkan States be of any help to them.

Appraisal of military potential of opponents:

England has not gained in naval power over last year. On land, it will be months before stepped-up intake of recruits can take effect in the form of efficient fighting units.

Progress has been scored in the air: bombers, fighters, ground organization improved. Anti-aircraft defences, no real improvement yet.—On the whole, everything is still in the development stage, similar to ours in 1934.

France's potential is curtailed by the limitations of her manpower. Colonial troops are tied down. Equipment not ideal.

If the Führer were in the shoes of the Franco-English statesmen, he would not assume responsibility for a world conflict. One hundred and twenty-five million are lined up against eighty.

What military measures can France and England undertake? Drive against West Wall unlikely. A northward swing through Belgium and Holland will not bring speedy victory. None of this would help the Poles. Blockade works slowly and provokes dangerous counter measures.

All these factors argue against England and France entering the war, particularly since they are not under any compulsion. Treaties are not yet ratified. Formula: "Support with all our power" is not genuinely meant. Proof: England does not give Poland money to buy arms in other countries. Politicians are beginning to back down, taking cover behind Ironside Report.

English and French General Staffs take a very sober view of the prospects of an armed conflict and advise against it.

Further evidence that no determined action is to be expected on the part of England may above all be inferred from Poland's attitude. Poland would be even more cocky if she knew she could depend on England. England has strongly remonstrated with Poland over the latest Polish Notes[7] and is continuously putting on the brakes. Tapped telephone conversations in Poland! Even now England is putting out feelers to find out how the Führer envisages developments after Poland has been disposed of.

All this supports the conviction that while England may talk big, even recall her ambassador, perhaps put a complete embargo on trade, she is sure not to resort to armed intervention in the conflict.
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[7] See document No. 10, and vol. VI of this Series, document No. 774.

556 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

The requisite conditions are:

(1) That we obtain results in Poland within measurable time. "Within a week or two the world must be convinced that Poland is at the point of collapse. The operations themselves may well continue past that date." (Six to eight weeks.)

(2) Determination to fight every comer.

(3) Build-up on the Western front must be completed.

Separate issue: Russia. -. Questions concerning the Army:

a) Call-up for West (required 250,000 men, i.e., 12 Divs.)? Decision 15 Aug. Decision on movement into Holland including northern part still pending!

b) Cancellation of Party Rally? Decision on 15 Aug. (Yes!)

c) Advance notice to railroads? Decision on 15 Aug. (Yes!)

Things should go according to our timetable.

d) Dirschau: Coup-de-main. Himmler! Armoured train? Report and pertinent information to be submitted. Graudenz: Paratroops on evening of first day.

e) Gdynia. K 58 [gun] to be used. Report to be submitted.

OB. f) Mobilization in East as prearranged, also for East Prussia. Consult with Bock.

OR.Weserübung

g) Treaty with Slovakia signed.

14 Aug. Evening: v. Stülpnagel[10] (through v. Weizsäcker) : Ri[bbentrop]--Ciano:[11] [three words illegible]:[12] Ciano exceedingly surprised. M[ussolini) wants to have peace for some more years. Germany's encirclement complete. Italy exhausted; no raw materials; deficiencies in armaments; no coastal fortifications. —Nothing can be undertaken from Libya.

General Staff estimates fighting strength Italy-France at 1:5.

Albania was a disappointment. Operations in Balkans not feasible in near future.

R[ibbentrop]: We don't need you.—C[iano]: The future will show.

15 Aug. 0840 hrs. Talk with State Secretary Weizsäcker: He confirms the picture of the situation presented yesterday. Chamb[erlain] and Hal[ifax] in particular wish to avoid bloodshed. U.S. observes marked reserve. Concurs in estimate of developments in the next ten days.
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[9] A 28 cm. railway gun.
[10] According to Haider this was the designation of an annual Engineer Corps field exercise; usually named after. the river where it was held.
[11] See entry for Aug. 31, footnote 7.
[12] See Editors' Note, p. 35.
[13] According to Halder they might be: "Mu[ssolini] West neutral".

APPENDIX I 557

17 AUGUST 1939
. . . . .
Canaris [Checked with] Section 1 [Operations] Hi[mrnler] Hei [?Heydrich] Obersalzberg: 150 Polish uniforms with accessories (Dr. Trumler) for Upper Silesia[1] . . .
____________________________________________
[1] See Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. XXVI, document 795-PS, Exhibit GB-54,
p. 337, for a record of a conversation held by Keitel on Aug. 17 about Hitler's orders that Heydrich should be supplied with Polish uniforms. The oral evidence of Keitel (ibid., vol. X, p. 515) confirmed that this conversation was with Canaris. See also the oral evidence of Colonel Erwin Lahousen, head of Section II of the Abwehr (ibid., vol. II, pp. 449-451 and vol. III, p. 10) and the affidavit by Alfred Naujocks (ibid., vol. XXXI, document 2751-PS, exhibit USA-482) describing the use to which such uniforms were put, and in particular the faking of a Polish raid, reported by DNB on Aug. 31, on the Gleiwitz radio station.
. . . . .

21 AUGUST 1939

Canaris:

a) First: guarantee pact does not meet Russian wishes.[1] Then programme:
Ri[bbentrop] could go [to Moscow] eight days after signing and publication of trade agreement (20 Aug.)[2] Would have to take with him draft of guarantee pact. Must cover all points of joint interest to Germany and Russia.

Russian draft[3] provides for no use of force against others. No support for the aggressor. In event of disagreements, arbitration. Duration for five years from date of rat[ification].

b) Attol[ico] at Fuschl:[4] Expressed misgivings very clearly. Italy won't go along. Result: considerable annoyance. Att[o[ico] returned to Rome.

c) Belgium: (Bülow-Schwante) . . .
_________________________________________________
[1] See document No. 132.
[2] Document No. 131.
[3] See document No. 133
[4] See document No. 126, footnote 4.

[David Thompson]

Part 2:

22 AUGUST 1939
. . . . .
Führer Conference (Obersalzberg, 1200)[1]
Present: The Army Group and Army Commanders of the three Armed Forces.

I. Exposition of the situation, and decision (Morning)

1) Development of the decision to settle Eastern question: theoretically desirable to settle with West first, but as it has become increasingly clear that Poland would fall on us from behind in any difficult situation the Eastern question must be disposed of before the problems in the West are tackled.

2) Germany's present position favourable for settlement of Eastern question. A number of factors are in our favour now which would not exist a few years hence.

(a) Personal considerations:

On our side: the personality of the Führer.—The personality of Mussolini as the sole champion of the imperial idea. Proved his strength in Abyssinian
____________________________________________
[1] See also documents Nos. 192 and 193.

558 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

conflict. The personality of Franco, the champion of unified progressive leadership and of friendship for Germany in Spain.

On the enemy's side: there are no men of the necessary calibre to carry through, firmly and heroically, the very difficult decisions which must be taken, especially on the English side. The enemy has much to lose [whereas we] only stand to gain.

(b) Political advantages:

England is contained: in the Mediterranean, by tension with Italy; in the Far East, by tension with Japan; in Near East, by tension with the Mohammedan peoples.

England did not win in the last war. In entering a new war the Empire must reckon with changes in its structure.

France's position has also deteriorated. Decline in birth-rate.

Balance of forces in Balkans since Albania, Yugoslavia tied down. Rumania vulnerable and dependent on the tension between the other Powers. Turkey has no leadership.

"A showdown, which it would not be safe to put off for four to five years, had better take place now.

"Use of military weapons necessary, before final great showdown with West; testing the [military] machine.

"A general settlement of accounts is not desirable, but rather disposing of specific issues; this is not only politically but also militarily the right way."

(c) Poland:

Polish-German relations unbearable. Proposals concerning Danzig and communications through Corridor (Currency question) were turned down at England's instigation. Settlement of Polish tension must not be left to solution by third powers. Time for solution now ripe, therefore strike! Political risk involved cannot be avoided. No great decision without risk.

3) Reasons leading to [this] decision

Only two States (England and France) can feel any obligation to assist Poland, England primarily, France towed in England's wake.

England's rearmament has not yet altered the situation substantially in England's favour. Improvement of Navy will not be noticeable until 41/42; on land it will also take considerable time for effects to be felt; only air force improved. Today England's vulnerability in the air is still great. Therefore England desires armed conflict only in three to four years' time.

France's armaments partially outdated, but not bad. Population dwindling. France cannot afford long war.

In the West there remain only two possibilities:

Blockade: Unpromising, as we can utilize Danube basin. Attack in West:

(a) Attack on West Wall psychologically impossible, also militarily very difficult.

(b) Violation of neutral States. These countries really wish to remain neutral. Besides, England also needs their neutrality.

Therefore we expect that England and France will not violate neutrality. Military intervention therefore without prospects. "Long war" not attractive. Germany can be expected to do better in a long war now than in 1914.

Russia will never be so senseless as to fight for France and England.

APPENDIX I 559

Developments: Dismissal of Litvinov[2] sign of ending of policy of intervention; commercial treaty.[3] Even before that, conversations, on Russia's initiative, on non-aggression pact,[4] intervention in Russo-Japanese conflict, Baltic States.

Russians have informed [us] that they are prepared to conclude pact. Personal contact Stalin-Führer. "With this I have knocked the weapons out of the hands of these gentry [Herrschaften]. Poland has been manoeuvred into the position that we need for military success."

Ultimate effect cannot yet be foreseen: new course ! Stalin writes[5] that he expects a great deal for both sides. Tremendous revolution in the whole European political situation.

II. The Führer's demands on his military chiefs

1) Ruthless determination: Anglo-French counter moves will come. We must stand fast. Build-up in West will go forward [W-Aufmarsch wird gefahren]. "Iron steadfastness of all in authority."

2) Aim: Annihilation of Poland—elimination of its vital forces. It is not a matter of gaining a specific line or a new frontier, but rather of the annihilation of an enemy, which must be constantly attempted by new ways.

3) Solution: Means immaterial. The victor is never called upon to vindicate his actions. We are not concerned with having justice on our side, but solely with victory.

4) Execution: Harsh and remorseless. Be steeled against all signs of compassion!

Speed: Faith in the German soldier, even if reverses occur!

Of paramount importance are the wedges [which must be driven] from the south-east to the Vistula, and from the north to the Narev and Vistula. Promptness in meeting new situations; new means must be devised to deal with them quickly.

5) New frontiers: New Reich territory? Outlying protectorate territory. Military operations must not be affected by regard for future frontiers.

III. Details

1) Probable start: Saturday morning.

2) Slovakia (List)[6] Instruct Barckhausen to strengthen Slovak frontier defence. Elements of 7th Air Force Division to Zipser-Neudorf. Slovak airmen to be grounded. We guarantee Slovakia against Hungarians taking action[7]

3) Dirschau: Attack at dawn on Y-day by dive-bomber groups on western end of bridge and town (barracks, power plant, etc.). Simultaneously freight train [Bahnzug] from Marienburg, followed by armoured train and remainder of [group] Medem.

4) Gdynia: Air attack simultaneously with Dirschau; simultaneous blockade of harbour.

5) Operation of Army Reichenau:[8] No comment.

6) Review of position of enemy in sector of Army Group North.
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[2] See vol. VI of this Series, document No. 825.
[3] See document No. 131.
[4] See document No. 50.
[5] See document No. 159.
[6] Colonel General Siegmund Wilhelm List, C-in-C Fourteenth Army, in Army Group South (Slovakia).
[7] See document No. 214.
[8] Tenth Army, in Army Group South (Upper Silesia).

560 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

23 AUGUST 1939

OKW Conference (Section Chiefs):

1) Safeguarding Slovakia: OKH assume immediate control of Slovak army (Slovak protest) (Instructions to Barekhausen).[1] Safeguarding Zipser-Neudorf. Intelligence [Abwehr] Sec. II. (Instructions given by OKH to OQu IV.)

2) Dirschau-Gdynia: No indications beforehand ! The Führer thinks that Engineers are too valuable [to expend on this operation].

3) Luxembourg: In the event of violation of neutrality: reconnaissance and covering parties will be sent out to establish contact. Fight back? Air Force is to protect ground force movements. (Clear with OQu I, Sec. 1, and OQu IV.)

4) Leaflets: Führer reserves decision.

5) Railroad movements to East Prussia (12,000 to 15,000 men).

6) For the time being, no conversion to war economy or setting in operation of war industry. (Thomas[2] to check with State Secretaries daily at 1100).

Quartermaster-General: (Crüwell!) [3]

Press Conference at Goebbel's Office at 1100 (Section 6). (Wedel[4] to see Goebbels at 1030).

7) Y-Day[5] definitely set for the 26th (Saturday). No further orders.

8) X-Hour: 0430??-0415?? . . .
____________________________________________
[1] See document No. 214.
[2] Major General Georg Thomas, Chief of the War Economy Staff of the OKW.
[3] Colonel Ludwig Crüwell, Chief of Section 6 (Supply) of the OKH.
[4] Lieutenant Colonel Hasso von Wedel, Head of the Wehrmacht Propaganda Department in the OKW.
[5] See document No. 100, footnote 3.

25 AUGUST 1939[1]
. . . . .

1200. Call from OKW: Postponement of decision. What is latest deadline? Reply: 1500.

1330. Call from OKW: Last deadline will have to be used. (Henderson.)[2]

1545. ObdH: Luxembourg—Führer ruling—OKW, Sec. 1, has been notified.
Evacuation of Red Zone in XII Corps area[3] starts tomorrow in accordance with instructions of Army Group. (Crüwell has already been notified.)

Cheval[lerie]:[4] General Staff on war-time footing.—Press?—Printing of situation maps.

1930. ObdH:

a) Treaty between Poland and England ratified .[5]

b) No opening of hostilities. All troop movements to be stopped, even near frontier if not otherwise possible.

c) Mobilization continues.

d) Build-up West and East continues.

e) Evacuation of Red Zone, Corps Command area XII, cancelled.
______________________________________________________
[1] See also entries for 1715 on August 26 and for 1215 (f) on August 28.
[2] See document No. 265.
[3] i.e., the Saarbrücken industrial area of Military District XII.
[4] Major General Kurt von der Chevallerie, Chief of the Central Department of the OKH.
[5] See Editors' Note, p. 303.

APPENDIX I 561

2035. Keitel confirms.

Canaris: Telephone restrictions lifted on England and France. Confirms development of events.

2100. Bock:[6] Enquires whether possibility [of action] tomorrow must be allowed for.

2130. v. Boeckmann: Proclamation on Executive Power[7] to be stopped. All political as well as military measures connected with [Aug.) 26 must be called off.

2150. Talk with Wagner[8] on withholding proclamations on Executive Power.
________________________________________________
[6] Colonel General Fedor v. Bock, Commander Army Group North.
[7] See Editors' Note, p. 302.
[8] Colonel Eduard Wagner, Chief of Staff to the Generalquartiermeister of the OKH.

[David Thompson]

Part 3:

26 AUGUST 1939: [Mobilization Day]
. . . . .

1610. Canaris: Helldorf![1] (through OQu I). The Army is said to have been blamed for shrinking back. Hi[mmler] is being talked of as Minister of the Interior.

1600. Siewert:[2]

a) Conference at Reich Chancellery has just ended.

b) Situation unchanged. Decision not yet taken on main problem (not before late tonight).

c) Feelers have been put out but no results so far.

1715. Engels[2] (through OQu IV): Letter to Duce yesterday.[3] Action must be taken. History of the Russian Pact. Japan's attitude. Italy must come in. Will benefit Axis.—Att[olico] transmitted letter to Ci[ano]. Att[olico] : first a statement by Italy. The Italians and their General Staff have doubts. England sure to intervene. Italy is not in a position to conduct even a defensive war.—Renewed request, to try to influence Duce, which caused delay from 1400 to 1500 on 25th. Then decision of Führer to give the order at 1502, without [Mussolini's] reply. 1745: Italian reply.[5] Italy must stick to her statement. Participation is out of the question without guarantee, and actual delivery, of large quantities of war and raw materials.

Führer considerably shaken [ziemlich zusammengebrochen].

Ciano has communicated his Salzburg impressions to the English.

Neurath: He can thank the Italians for that.—Roatta.[6] Cancellation of attack order passed on at 2230 [sic].[7] Subsequent developments: A faint hope that England might still, by negotiation, be brought to accept the demands rejected by Poland. Danzig Corridor. (Henderson: offer on solution of Corridor and Danzig questions [8] now in London.)

Italy to be strengthened? ObdH no! Göring no ? Demands[9] said to be
___________________________________________
[1] Police Commissioner of Berlin.
[2] Lt. Colonel Curt Siewert, Adjutant of von Brauchitsch. Time probably 1630 or 1700.
[3] One of Hitler's aides-de-camp.
[4] See document No. 266.
[5] See document No. 271.
[6] General Mario Roatta, Italian Military Attache in Berlin.
[7] cf. entries for 1930 and 2035 on Aug. 25 and for 1215 (f) on Aug. 28.
[8] See document No. 265.
[9] See document No. 301.

562 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

so exorbitant that we cannot accept: fuel, steel, 600 barrels for heavy anti-aircraft guns, etc.

Führer intends to press the Italians again.

Secret clause with Russians:[10] Ukraine and Baltic States, exclusive of Lithuania, sacrificed to the Russians .. .

[Enquiry at OKW]: No change. When can we start: 6th or 7th [Mob.] Day.[11] Concentrate air power! (Jeschonnek.)[12]

Interpretation of Polish Treaty: more jumping-off facilities! Objectives of forcible means farther [Ziele der Gewalt weiter]:[13] decision on regrouping of build-up tomorrow [Entscheidung über Verwerfen des Aufmarsches morgen].

Reconsideration scheduled for about 6th Mob. Day. Order follows.

Gö[ring]—Compr[omise][14]

Belgium-Holland-Luxembourg: We shall respect independence[15]

Gamelin-Lipski.

Foerster [sic].

Preparations to continue. Make preparations on assumption that attack be launched on 6th [Mob. Day] (at earliest). Orders follow . . .
________________________________
[10] See document No. 229.
[11] i.e., August 31 or September 1.
[12] Major General Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe.
[13] The shorthand notes are fairly clear and suggest no other rendering. General Halder can no longer interpret this entry, which he believes he made hurriedly at the telephone.
[14] See also document No. 312.
[15] i.e., "We shall respect neutrality." [See document No. 272.]

27 AUGUST 1939: 2nd Mob. Day
. . . . .
OQu IV:

1) Coulondre has been to see Führer[1] Daladier's urgent appeal to leave the sword in the sheath. (Letter for [my] information; reply ;[2] not yet [seen].) Telephone conversation Coul[ondre]-Dal[adier]; Coul[ondre] said to be negative; will Germany strike? If so, I put my confidence in the strength of the nation.

2) Navy: Destroyer sunk in collision.

3) Henderson is expected back at 1700.

4) Japan deeply displeased. Oshima has sought to lodge protest with Weizsäcker.[3] "Relations seriously endangered." Weizs[äcker] sees no grounds for accepting this protest and for yielding to his insistence.Gen[eral] Ott: Very bad impression in Japan, especially among Army.—A declaration of sympathy [Sympathiekundgebung] by German Army[4]

France: Frontier build-up now proceeding; only against Germany. Corps commanders still at their peacetime posts. Fourth degree of readiness confirmed. General mobilization not confirmed. No change in disposition of troops on frontier. Transport of "A" Echelons [A Staffeln] from Central Corps Areas apparently only partially started.

England: Mobilization started 23 August. First contingent: (regular army) two to three Divs. and two Armd. Divs. were ready on 25 August, morning. No evidence of transports (embarkation).
____________________________________________
[1] See document No. 324 and footnote 1 thereto.
[2] See document No. 854.
[3] See document No. 829.
[4] See documents Nos. 246 and 400.

APPENDIX I 563

Belgium: First phase of preliminary mobilization. Frontier troops identified only east of Liege. Belgium will defend integrity of the country under all circumstances.

Holland: Anything that can fight is already on the frontiers.

1130. Groscurth:[5] Situation report.

[Word received that] Henderson will not return before tomorrow afternoon . . .

OBf/OQu IV: West:

England no general mobilization. First wave: 2 [Inf.] Divs. and 1 Armd. Div. First wave not yet on the move. Territorial Army not yet alerted. Anti-aircraft defence in top gear.
Belgium: First phase of mobilization, i.e., regular army: 9 Divs., i.e., 6 Inf. Divs., 2 mot. Divs., 1 Ardennes Chasseur Div., have been mobilized (began at earliest on 25 Aug.). Movement to frontier not yet started. Special Powers for King. First phase [of mobilization] has not yet been passed.

France: No change. Clothing depots in Corps Areas in South shifted to North. Rumour: Chasseurs Alpins north from Italian border. Hesitant! General mobilization apparently not yet announced. "A" Echelons from Central Corps Areas only partly to frontier?

Poland: No news of consequence.
____________________________________________
[5] Major Helmuth Groscurth, Chief of the liaison section of the Foreign/Intelligence Department [AuslandlAbwehr] of the OKW.

28 AUGUST 1939: 3rd Mob. Day

0800. Conference with ObdH on proposals of Army Groups re attack on 6th Mob. Day.

Conference with ObdH: Stick it out.[1] . . .

1215. Oster:[2] Finance Minister Popitz: Those who want to stab me in the back again had better watch out.[3]

a) Conference at Reich Chancellery at 1730:[4] Reichstag and several Party notables, Führer accompanied by Himmler, Heydrich, Wolff,[5] Goebbels and Bormann.

Situation very grave. Determined to solve Eastern question one way or another.

Minimum demands: return of Danzig, settling of Corridor question.

Maximum demands: "Depending on military situation." If minimum demands not satisfied, then war: Brutal!

He will himself be in the front line.

The Duce's attitude serves our best interests.

War very difficult, perhaps hopeless; "As long as I am alive there will be no talk of capitulation."—Soviet Pact widely misunderstood by Party. A pact with Satan to cast out the Devil.

Economic situation.

"Applause on proper cues, but thin."
____________________________________________
[1] According to Haider this meant: "Don't let anyone change your plans!" After opening of hostilities was called off on Aug. 25, all commanders wanted changes in their orders.
[2] Colonel Hans Oster, Chief of Staff of the Intelligence Department [Abwehr] of the OKW.
[3] Presumably citing Hitler.
[4] Presumably on Aug. 27. See Editors' Note, p. 367.
[5] SS-Gruppenführer Karl Wolff, Chief of the Personal Staff of the Reichsführer-SS.

564 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Personal impression [of Führer] : exhausted, haggard, croaking voice, preoccupied. "Keeps himself completely surrounded now by his SS advisers."

b) Conversation between Coulondre and Forbes:[6] Opponents know about target date (26 August) and its postponement. England and France of opinion that it would be impossible to give way as long as troops are on the frontier.

Henderson working to gain time. Chamberlain indignant at personal insults.

c) Ribb[entrop] has received Chinese Minister.[7]—Chiang [Kai-shek].

Trade agreement. Discussion has been held.

Japan: civilian faction has won, is urging conclusion of alliance with France and England.

d) Italian press has changed course? English pressure in Mediterranean [will increase] after cessation of pressure in [sic] Japan.

e) English broadcasts: Mobilization in Germany. No signs in Italy.

f) Sequence of events:

23 August

1400. Chamb[erlain's] letter[8] to Führer at Berghof: "We stand by our commitments."

1800. Reply:[9] Rejection of interference.

24 August

0200. Russian Pact[10] signed.

1500. Chamberlain] makes statement[11]- on determination to aid Poland.

1900. Ri[bbentrop] back from Moscow.

25 August

0100. Ri[bbentrop]-Ciano.[12] Changed situation. "Intervention by Western Powers impossible."

1200. Scheduled telephone conversation postponed.[13]

1330. Henderson sees Führer. Memorandum presented.[14] Henderson: No basis for negotiations. Führer would not take it amiss if England were to wage a sham war.

1400. Attolico sees Ri[bbentrop],[15] is informed of letter to Duce. Russian Pact has altered situation. Rumania powerless. Turkey must change course. Duce stands by Führer.

1500. Ciano to Attolico.[16] "Expected improvement is not taking place."

1630. Anglo-Polish Pact announced.

1700. Coulondre:[17] appeal to Daladier not to interfere, "eternal frontiers".
__________________________________________________
[6] Sir George Ogilvie-Forbes, British Counsellor of Embassy.
[7] Chen Chieh: no record of this interview has been found; see, however, document No. 327.
[8] See document No. 200, enclosure.
[9] See document No. 201.
[10] See documents Nos. 228 and 229.
[11] See document the British Blue Book, Cmd. 6106, No. 64.
[12] See document No. 263.
[13] See D.D.I., Eighth Series, vol. XIII, No. 234.
[14] See document No. 265.
[15] No German record of this conversation has been found; see D.D.I., Eighth Series, vol. xn-, Nos. 258 and 259.
[16] No record has been found.
[17] See Editors' Note, p. 284.

APPENDIX I 565

1800. Duce's reply[18] through Attol[ico] : Concurs with Russian Pact. However, if Western Powers should attack Italy, she would not be able to resist without raw materials and war material.

2000. March order cancelled.

2115. Duce message[19] that list [of requirements] is coming tomorrow.

26 August

0730. Letter Hend[erson]-Ri[bbentrop] [20] Will transmit message to Cabinet. I will hurry and not play for time.

1330. Duce's list [21] of requirements. Offers his services as mediator. 150 anti-aircraft batteries with personnel wanted at once.

1600. Reply[22] to Duce, with statement on what deliveries are possible. Question of transport merely touched upon. Not afraid to enter conflict alone.

1835. Duce.[23] "Since Germany is unable to furnish the necessary raw materials, I am unable to take an active part." A political settlement on favourable and honourable basis still possible.

1900. Daladier's reply[24] to Führer's appeal. Offers of mediation. But France will have to come to the aid of the Poles.

2300. Führer's letter[25] to Duce. Appreciates that Italy is not able to attack. Impression that Italy would come in should, however, be maintained until outbreak of hostilities, in order to tie up enemy forces!

I could then settle the Eastern question and in the winter appear on the Western front with forces equalling those of the English and French. Blockade rendered ineffective by autarky. [Italian] support with industrial manpower.

Von Br[auchitsch]:[26] If I am pushed to it, I shall even wage a two-front war. Rumanian Minister:[27] Hend[erson] has brought little with him. War inevitable unless miracle happens. Rumania will be neutral if Hungary does nothing foolish.

Request by Weizs[äcker][28]

1522. ObdH: Get everything ready for morning of 7th Mob. Day (by telephone from Reich Chancellery) . . .

ObdH:

1) Attack starts September 1.

2) Führer will let us know at once if we are not to strike.

3) Führer will let us know at once if further postponement is necessary.

4) It is intended to force Poland into an unfavourable position for negotiations and so achieve maximum objective [grosse Lösung]. (Hend[erson].)

Führer very calm and clear.

Appraisal of military situation same as Br[auchitsch's].

Rumour has it that England is disposed to consider comprehensive proposal [grosses Angebot]. Details when Hend[erson] returns. According to another rumour England stresses that she herself must declare
_______________________________________________
[18] See document No. 271.
[19] Not found, but see document No. 282.
[20] See document No. 296.
[21] See document No. 301.
[22] See document No. 307.
[23] See document No. 317.
[24] See document No. 324.
[25] See document No. 341.
[26] Presumably citing Hitler.
[27] Radu Crutzescu.
[28] Probably request to see Halder. See entry at 2200.

566 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

that Poland's] vital interests are threatened. In France more and more representations to the Government against war.

Italy is said to have agreed to [the proposal in] the Führer's letter that she should cooperate (in tying up [forces]). Will play the unknown quantity.

Plan: we demand Danzig, corridor through Corridor, and plebiscite on the same basis as Saar. England will perhaps accept, Poland probably not. Wedge between them!

Line to be followed: try to agree with Britain on comprehensive solution [Grosslösung] : Danzig, corridor through Corridor, several corridors. Selection of date: according to political considerations.

Japan uncertain.

Bearing of Army praised.

2200. At Weizsäcker's. No news. There is a proposal to get Russia into the conversations.

[David Thompson]

Part 4 (final):

29 AUGUST 1939: 4th Mob. Day

OQu IV:

a) Belgium's neutrality is sure to be respected by France and England (von Pappenheim),[1]

b) Something went wrong at Bratislava[2]

Stapf:[3]

a) Apart from the scheduled 5 [bomber] groups [Gruppen] from the West, 6 more groups [Gruppen] will be got ready.


b) Does date of attack depend on air support?

v. Bock:

a) Lithuania?

b) 206th [Div.] will be brought up; their place will be taken by some reserve units sent to frontier for training.

c) Enemy in Kluge's[4] sector will hold ground (has three lines, one behind the other).

d) Air support important.

0930. Set out for Neisse .[5]

Neisse:

1200 to 1400: [Conference with] Cs-in-C and Cs of Staff, Army Group South, and Fourteenth, Tenth and Eighth Armies. ObdH conveys Führer's tribute. Reviews overall situation. Discusses operational plans of Tenth Army (tanks in the lead) and Fourteenth Army (Second Armd. Div. will not be sent off with Fourth Light, but must hold back; instead send Third Mtn. with Fourth Light against Jablunka).

This leaves Second and First Mtn. Divs. with XV'III Corps HQ at Deutschendorf.

OQu I:

X-Hour on 7th Mob. Day, as before, 0430.
____________________________________________
[1] Lt. Colonel F. Rabe v. Pappenheim, Military Attaché at Brussels and The Hague.
[2] Probably diplomatic friction possibly about transit of Fourth Light Division through Slovakia. [See also document No. 468.]
[3] Major General Otto Stapf, Oberquartiermeister III of the OKH—Senior Staff Officer: Organization, etc.
[4] General Günther v. Kluge, C-in-C 4th Army, concentrated in Pomerania.
[5] HQ of Colonel General Gerd v. Rundstedt, Commander Army Group South.

APPENDIX I 567

OQu IV:

Question of closure of Slovak frontier (automobile traffic Jablunka Pass).

1620. OQu IV:

Contents of letter:[6] Germany knows that England has commitments towards Poland. On the other hand, it is noted with satisfaction that [Germany] is desirous of relieving the tension with England. The English Government share this attitude.

There are two problems: the German-Polish, and the German-English.

The former must first be settled before the latter can be dealt with. It is imperative to settle the former by peaceful means. To this end it is necessary for Germany and Poland to consider the issue jointly and to have the settlement backed by international guarantees. England has commitments towards Poland.

Any solution which jeopardizes Poland's interests is unacceptable to England. England is ready to participate in working out a solution by which, as the Führer has always declared, Poland's interests would be safeguarded.

Conversation with He[nderson]:[7] He[nderson] does not deny to Führer that Danzig is no problem at all, and that Autobahn is also no problem. Corridor: More tortuously expressed, but yet hinted at, is the possibility of resettling minorities in Corridor. (Führer: Not a bad idea at all.) Germany entirely free also in timing her reply. England does not wish to set any deadline for a reply.

The present state of affairs cannot continue. It is anticipated that situation will be clearer by 3 or 4 September.

Führer says: I will do this: from now on I shall act only on an international basis. Bring in international troops, including Russians. Führer has hopes of driving wedge between British, French and Poles. Today: Poles directed by English to go to Berlin, as required by Germans.

Führer wants them to come tomorrow.

Basic principles: Raise a barrage of demographic and democratic demands. Plebiscite within six months, under international supervision. Those opting for Germany must remain German citizens; the same holds good for the Poles. Poles will not want Germans in their territory.

30.8. Poles in Berlin.

31.8. Blow up. [Zerplatzen]

1.9. Use of force.

Foreign Ministry: The Foreign Ministry believes that no conclusions of a military nature can be drawn??

Lithuania: Official feelers not from Lithuanian side. Lit[huania] has not stirred politically. We have given declaration of [respect for her] neutrality.[8] Reference to Vilna.

Holland: piqued that no one is paying any attention to her.

Russia: Ri[bbentrop] has suggested that [she] do something on [her] western frontiers.[9]
_______________________________________
[6] Evidently the memorandum brought by Henderson is meant; see document No. 384, enclosure.
[7] See document No. 384.
[8] See documents Nos. 410, 419 and 429.
[9] See documents Nos. 887 and 388.

568 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

England: Transports to Continent have begun?

Bulgaria: Bruckmann :[10] 40 ammunition trucks and trucks with machine guns for Bulg[aria] alleged to have been stopped by Yug[oslavia].[11]

Polish airmen: reported to have landed in sector of Group Wartenberg (Eighth Army) . . .

Jodl 1800. (ObdH has been informed);

Chamb[erlain]'s letter conciliatory. Endeavour to find a modus vivendi. (Opinion-in Cabinet divided.) Dignified tone: It is clear that we cannot refrain from rendering assistance. Concept of vital interests and integrity elastic. England to participate in definition. Face must be saved.

England gives assurance that Poland will come to conference.

Führer intends to answer letter today:[12] Danzig no longer a problem, small corridor no problem, question of large corridor still open.

Führer will pull all the stops of democratic States (proposal for plebiscite; exchange of populations). (International observers to investigate atrocities.) Through England: demand that Polish plenipotentiaries be here by midday tomorrow; deadline for reply evening of 31st. General impression: England "soft" on the issue of a major war.

Probable directive:[13] In the West, the other side must fire first shot.

Neutrality to be respected.

Air attack on Warsaw called off . . .
_____________________________________________
[10] Military Attaché at Sofia.
[11] See document No. 314.
[12] See document No. 421.
[13] See document No. 493.

30 AUGUST 1939: 5th Mob. Day

1840. Siewert: Make all preparations so that attack can begin at 0430 on Sept. 1. Should negotiations in London necessitate postponement, then postponement to Sept. 2. In that case we shall be notified before 1500 tomorrow. Army Group North has already been instructed.

After the 2nd we will not attack.

(Göring has objected to 0430) Inform Jesch[onnek].

Poland: Notice too short. Going to Berlin = submission. Führer insists on demand that a Polish negotiator be sent immediately. Führer drafts letter[1] to England, listing in detail demands on Poland.

OQu I:

Clear with Air about 0430. Reinforcement of bomber squadrons [Geschwader]: only 2!
Warsaw: No terror attack (only military targets!) —Order for West: deployment of forces. Positions.-22nd Div. will be available from evening of 9th Mob. Day . . .

OQu IV: . . .

New letter by Führer[1] to England, detailing our demands.

France: No general mobilization yet; everything else unchanged. British troops in Upper Alsace?

Lithuania: Preparing 3 Divs.
_______________________________________
[1] Presumably document No. 458.

APPENDIX I 569

ObdH:

Führer's proposal to Poland: Danzig, plebiscite (via Gö[ring] telephone)[2] Poles have not yet arrived; England has become party [to negotiations]. Fuhrer: either 1 or 2 [Sept.]; all off after 2 [Sept.].

2000. Greiffeenberg:[3] Instructions to deputy at OKW conference on Aug. 31 re time of jump-off.
_________________________________________________
[2] The reference is uncertain, but see Birger Dahlerus : The Last Attempt (London, 1947).
[3] Colonel Hans v. Greiffenberg, Chief of Section 1 (Operations) of the OKH.

31 AUGUST 1939: 6th Mob. Day

0630. Hauser brings word from Reich Chancellery that jump-off order has been given for Sept. 1 . . .

1130. Take-off from Frankfort-on-Main. On arrival, von Stülpnagel[1] (1350) reports on fixing of time of attack for 0445; intervention of West said to be unavoidable: in spite of this, Führer has decided to attack. ObdH goes to Berlin. Polish Navy has sailed for England. Naval operation against Gdynia therefore cancelled.

Greiffenberg—OQu I: Preparation of orders.

1600. OKW order for attack.

On receiving word from Canaris that Lipski is seeking to reach Führer, another call put through to ObdH, to find out whether attack is still on.

Gercke:[2] reports on progress of railway security [sic].[3] In the main satisfactory, although effort required is very great.

1620. ObdH: Orders to go out. (Fuhrer refuses to receive Lipski.) . . .

1800. ObdH: Führer calm, has slept well. Letter was not transmitted because it was conditional on Poles coming to him. Letter read to He[nderson].[4]

Reported it to London.

Poles are delaying, tapped telephone conversation .[5]

Decision against evacuation shows that he expects France and England will not take action.

Reichstag tomorrow; demands will be put before it (Danzig, Corridor, plebiscite). Greatest impression on the German people and on the world.

Italy is putting up a comparatively big show. Hopes that Mu[ssolini]'s influence will contribute to the avoidance of big conflict. Restraining influence on France.

Some movements in Russia (alarm !).[6] By no means impossible that the Russians will move, once we have had our first successes. Belgium. No agreements on cooperation. No agreement yet. Lithuania. Nothing new from the North.

"I cannot carry on much longer in this situation; a decision is imperative."

Gö[ring]: Stülp[nagel][7] relieved of his post; Fromm has taken over
________________________________________
[1] Presumably Heinrich v. Stülpnagel; see also footnote 7 below.
[2] Colonel Rudolf Gercke, Chief of Section 5 (Transport) of the OKH.
[3] Presumably "movements" was intended.
[4] See document No. 461.
[5] See also Dablerus, The Last Attempt.
[6] See also documents Nos. 360, 383, 387, 388, 413, 414, 424 and 446.
[7] According to Halder, General Joachim v. Stülpnagel, who had only just been recalled from retirement as Chief of the Replacement Army, had worked against Göring in the cases involving the retirement in February 1838 of the C-in-C of the Army, Colonel General Werner v. Fritsch, and of the War Minister, Field Marshal Werner v. Blomberg. He was not related to General Heinrich v. Stülpnagel, the Oberquartiermeister I at the OKH nor to General Otto v. Stülpnagel, recalled from retirement as replacement Commander of a Military District. General Friedrich Fromm now combined Stülpnagel's post with that of Chief of Army Equipment.

570 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

(acting) Fritsch-Blomberg. Situation: Is furious about Ri[bbentrop]. Impression: England wants to keep out. Receive Poles! Attol[ico]: Duce has got in touch with London,[8] pressure on Poland . . .

Wagner: Danzig only through Reich law.[9]

2100. Special announcement on radio: Führer's offer to Poland.[10] . . .
2250. ObdH: Führer has telephoned: Ratification of German-Russian Treaty; Molotov's speech.[1]
__________________________
[8] See document No 467.
[9] This reference presumably foreshadows the action taken on Sept. 1, when Gauleiter Forster, as Head of the State of the Free City of Danzig [see document No. 224] signed a law proclaiming Danzig as part of Reich territory, and the Reichstag passed a law confirming this (see Reichsgesetzblatt, 1939, Pt. I, pp. 1547-1548).
[10] See document No. 482.
[11] See document No. 480.

1 SEPTEMBER 1939: 7th Mob. Day

0630. Frontier crossed everywhere: Dirschau; planes have started; Westerplatte. Landing Company.

Führer's proclamation to Armed Forces. . . .

0840. ObdH: Order of the Day.—Conference with Staff (Schaefer). Several possibilities of getting to East Prussia by sea and by air. No reports to Führer that are not cleared with ObdH.
0850. OQu IV: West: nothing new. No indications of general mobilization.—Time for assembly of troops extended by 48 hours.—Frontier not closed. Intelligence work more difficult. (Numbers [of the units) concealed; large units have mobilization number.)

England, Switzerland, Holland, nothing new.

Belgium: Second stage of mobilization completed (peace-time Army mobilized).

1.9. Three Drafts ordered; this means activation of 7-12 Reserve Divisions. Will be completed by 3 Sept. Ardennes frontier with France occupied by weak forces. West of the Meuse (Fifth Inf. Div.) stronger forces.

Italy: Frontier guard against France mobilized. Reinforced by Alpini Ens.; behind them eighteen divisions in reinforced peace-time strength. First to Fourth Armies.

Hungary is being pressed by France to join the Yugoslav-Rumanian bloc. Turkey favourably disposed. Bulgaria neutral.

Yugoslavia]: Conference Italy—Western Powers in London? (Grandi there.)[1] Italy sends another division to Africa (East).—Air Force increased.

1000. Fuhrer's speech to the Reichstag. (ObdH in Reichstag.) . . .

1300. General mobilization in France; state of emergency. . . .

1430. London: General mobilization ordered . . .

West: French Cabinet in session; Chamber of Deputies will not meet until tomorrow.

No closing of the frontier, no evacuation, no military measures; radio announcement: no reaction.

London: Cabinet 1130 evening. Both Houses of Parliament . . .
__________________________________________________
[1]1 Italian Minister of Justice; he had been Italian Ambassador in London until July 1939. In memorandum St.S. No. 669 of Aug. 31 (52/35369) Weizsäcker noted that Mackensen had telephoned in answer to an enquiry made in telegram No. 423 of Aug. 30 (not printed, 52/35337) to say that Grandi's alleged visit to London had not in fact taken place.

APPENDIX I 571

1615. At 1800 Cabinet meeting: Want report before meeting. Reported: Our troops have everywhere crossed the frontier and are sweeping on towards their objectives of the day, checked only slightly by the Polish forces thrown against them. . .

2 SEPTEMBER 1939: 8th Mob. Day
. . . . .

1015. OQu IV: Führer wants to receive the Ambassadors of France and England; we must not commit ourselves; links must not be broken.

Eight Polish submarines in the Baltic.

English want to have their entire merchant fleet in safe ports by September 3. Protection by Naval forces on both sides of the Channel. Strong patrols in the northern North Sea. No blockade line yet.

1200. Führer:

a) Review of the situation: Question is examined whether it would be desirable to move troops from the Corridor to East Prussia or whether it would be better to cross the Vistula and attack the Mlava Group from the south. After Army has presented its views, the idea is dropped. Report on the situation and appraisal of the situation.

b) Westerplatte: Will be dealt with today, Army in charge.

1) Schleswig-Holstein[1] moves out so that she may use her guns to full effect.

2) Counter battery fire by Navy, Army and anti-aircraft, which will be at the disposal of the Army for this purpose.

3) Air attack (50 kg. bombs).

4) Inf. attack. Eberhard.[2]

c) Evacuation authorized. XII [Mil. District] Red Zone.

d) (With Keitel.) Allocation of raw materials must give consideration to demands of Army . . .

OQu IV:

Rome—Paris—Berlin: What do we demand for the cessation of hostilities? Duce mediator. Führer enquires: is the Note in the nature of an ultimatum?

Reply: No .[3]

English Ambassador in Rome[4]: No.

Latest suggestion from Paris (via Rome): Conference[5] as soon as possible, meanwhile truce. . . .
________________________________________________________
[1] See documents Nos. 197, 225, 338 and 457.
[2] Major General (Police) Eberhard, Danzig Chief of Police, who commanded a Brigade in this operation.
[3] See documents Nos. 539 and 541.
[4] Sir Percy Loraine.
[5] See document No. 535.

3 SEPTEMBER 1939: 9th Mob. Day
. . . . .
1015. Report of French-English ultimatum.[1] OB summoned to Führer . . .

1230. OQu I: . . . Declaration of war, England 1130. France 1700. Changeover to war economy ordered.
_________________________________________________
[1] See documents Nos. 560 and 563.

572 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Keitel (OKW): English Admiralty has announced opening of hostilities.

Führer: Tasks for Navy: war against enemy commerce and naval forces. Air Force authorized to attack naval forces, not the homeland.

[State of war with] French since 1700 hrs.: Do not open hostilities, but return fire.[2] . . .
____________________________________
[2] See document No. 576.

[michael mills]

From Halder diary:

30 AUGUST 1939: 5th Mob. Day

1840. Siewert: Make all preparations so that attack can begin at 0430 on Sept. 1. Should negotiations in London necessitate postponement, then postponement to Sept. 2. In that case we shall be notified before 1500 tomorrow. Army Group North has already been instructed.

After the 2nd we will not attack.

The above suggests that the German Government was considering cancelling the planned attack on Poland if the latter country agreed to negotiate over the German proposals for Danzig and the Corridor.

If negotiations began, the attack planned for 1 September would be postponed until 2nd September. If negotiations failed on 1 September, the attack would go ahead on 2 September. If however they did not fail, then the attack would be called off altogether.

The reason why Hitler finally (on the afternoon of 31 August) gave the go ahead for the attack to proceed on the following day, 1 September, was that Goering's phone-tapping operation, the Forschungsamt, had picked up a message from Warsaw to Polish Ambassador Lipski in Berlin at around midday on 31 August, ordering him not to enter into any negotiations when he met with German officials. That showed that the publicly expressed Polish agreement to the British request for Poland to respond to the German request for negotiations on the Marienwerder Proposals was phoney, that the Polish Government had no intention of negotiating seriously and was simply playing for time, its strategy being to draw out any talks until the campaigning season had ended.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote:

The reason why Hitler finally (on the afternoon of 31 August) gave the go ahead for the attack to proceed on the following day, 1 September, was that Goering's phone-tapping operation, the Forschungsamt, had picked up a message from Warsaw to Polish Ambassador Lipski in Berlin at around midday on 31 August, ordering him not to enter into any negotiations when he met with German officials.

Source(s) please. The wiretap allegation sounds like a lurid spin of this exchange, taken from Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-45, Series D, vol. 7 - August 9 - September 3 1939, pp. 462-63:

No. 475
132/328829
Memorandum by the State Secretary
St.S. No. 673 BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

On the afternoon of August 31, on instructions from the Foreign Minister, I spoke to the Polish Ambassador as follows:

I had now been in touch with the Foreign Minister, and had the following further question to ask regarding Lipski's request to be received :[1] Did Lipski come as envoy from the Polish Government with the necessary full powers?

Lipski replied that he came as Ambassador, in order to make a communication to the Government of the Reich from his Government.

I thereupon reported to the Foreign Minister accordingly.

WEIZSÄCKER

____________________________________________________
[1] No German record of this request has been found, but see the Polish While Book, Nos. 110 and 111. See also Appendix I to this volume, entry for 1600 hours on Aug. 31.

AUGUST, 1939 463

No. 476
F14/348-48

Memorandum by an Official of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat

RM 42 BERLIN, September 1, 1939.

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE POLISH AMBASSADOR, LIPSKI, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON AUGUST 31, 1939, AT 6:30 P.M.

Ambassador Lipski read out the following instructions from his Government:

August 31, 1939.

During the past night the Polish Government were informed by the Government of Great Britain of the exchange of views with the German Government regarding the possibility of direct conversations between the Reich Government and the Polish Government.

The Polish Government are favourably considering the suggestions of the Government of Great Britain and will make them a formal reply on the subject within the next few hours.

Ambassador Lipski replied in the negative to the question repeatedly put to him[1] by the Foreign Minister as to whether he was empowered to negotiate. He only had instructions to remit to the Foreign Minister the instructions already read out, which he thereupon handed to him in writing.[2]

The Reich Foreign Minister then briefly outlined the exchange of views between the German and British Governments, and Germany's proposal that in the course of August 30 a Polish representative should come to Berlin. The Führer had waited throughout the whole day, but only in the evening had he received a somewhat non-committal statement from the British Government.

In reply to a further question by the Foreign Minister as to the possibility of Lipski being empowered to negotiate, the latter again stated that he had no plenary powers for any negotiations.

Submitted to the Foreign Minister in accordance with instructions.

DR. SCHMIDT
Minister

_____________________________________
[1] See also document No. 475.
[2] The written communication (52f35385) is identical with the text cited above; see also the Polish White Book, Nos. 110 and 112, and British Documents, Third Series, vol. VII, No. 630.

and this follow-up, from pp. 468-70:

[Enclosure][3]

BERLIN, August 31, 1939.

His Britannic Majesty's Government informed the German Government, in a Note dated August 28, 1939,[4] of their readiness to offer their mediation towards direct negotiations between Germany and Poland over the problems in dispute. In so doing they made it abundantly clear that they, too, were aware of the urgency of the matter in view of the continuous incidents and the general European tension. In a reply dated August 29, 1939,[5] the German Government, in spite of being sceptical as to the desire of the Polish Government to come to an understanding, declared themselves ready in the interests of peace to accept the British mediation or suggestion. After considering all the circumstances prevailing at the time, they
________________________________________________________
[3] The text of the enclosure and of the "Proposals" (see footnote 2 above) was broadcast by the German radio at 9 p.m. on Aug. 31.
[4] See document No. 884, enclosure.
[5] See document No. 421.

AUGUST, I939 469

thought it necessary in their Note to point out that, if the danger of a catastrophe was to be avoided, then action must be taken promptly and without delay. In this sense they declared themselves ready to receive a personage appointed by the Polish Government up to the evening of August 30, with the proviso that he was, in fact, empowered not only to discuss but to conduct and conclude negotiations.

Further, the German Government pointed out that they felt they could make the basic points regarding the offer of an understanding available to the British Government by the time the Polish negotiator arrived in Berlin.

Instead of a statement regarding the arrival of an authorized Polish personage, the first answer the Government of the Reich received to their readiness for an understanding was the news of the Polish mobilization, and only towards 12 o'clock on the night of August 30, 1939,[6] did they receive a somewhat general assurance of British readiness to help towards the commencement of negotiations.

Although the non-arrival of the Polish negotiator expected by the Government of the Reich removed the necessary condition for informing His Majesty's Government of the views of the German Government as regards possible bases of negotiation, since His Majesty's Government themselves had pleaded for direct negotiations between Germany and Poland, the German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Ribbentrop, gave the British Ambassador, on the occasion of the presentation of the last British Note, precise information as to the text of the German proposals which would be regarded as a basis for negotiations in the event of the arrival of the Polish plenipotentiary.

The Government of the German Reich considered themselves entitled to claim that in these circumstances a Polish personage should, at least belatedly, be nominated forthwith. For the Reich Government cannot be expected for their part not only to emphasize continually their willingness to start negotiations, but actually to be ready to do so, while being, from the Polish side, merely put off with empty subterfuges and meaningless declarations.

It has once more been made clear, as a result of a démarche which has meanwhile been made by the Polish Ambassador,[7] that the latter himself has no plenary powers either to enter into any discussion, or even to negotiate.

The Führer and the German Government have thus waited two days in vain for the arrival of a Polish negotiator with plenary powers.

In these circumstances the German Government regard their proposals as having, this time too, been to all intents and purposes rejected, although they consider that these proposals, in the form in
_________________________________
[6] See document No. 481.
[7] See document No. 478.

470 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

which they were made known to the British Government also, were more than loyal, fair and practicable.

The Reich Government consider it advisable to inform the public of the bases for negotiation which were communicated to the British Ambassador by the Reich Foreign Minister, Herr von Ribbentrop.

followed by this tidbit, at p. 491:

No. 512
52/35447
Circular of the State Secretary[1]
Telegram
BERLIN, September 1, 1939—[8:35 p.m.][2]
Pol. I M 856.

For guidance on language to be held:

In defence against Polish attacks, German troops moved into action against Poland at dawn today. This action is for the present not to be described as war, but merely as engagements which have been brought about by Polish attacks.

WEIZSÄCKER
____________________________________________________________
[1] Addressees were diplomatic Missions, the Consulates General at Ottawa, Sydney, Danzig and Calcutta, and the Consulate at Geneva. The list of the diplomatic Missions to which the telegram was sent has not been found.
[2] The hour of despatch is taken from the Rome copy (7987/E575407).

The British accounts of the exchange can be seen in the following sections of the British Blue Book (1939) online at:

http://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-169.html
http://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-199.html
http://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-230.html

[michael mills]

Source(s) please. The wiretap allegation sounds like a lurid spin of this exchange,

The source is the book "The Last Attempt" by Birger Dahlerus, in which Dahlerus describes his activity as an unofficial emissary for Göring to the British Government.

Dahlerus describes how on 31 August 1939, Göring showed him a message from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Lipski that had been intercepted by the Forschungsamt.

The message contained an instruction to Lipski to meet with Ribbentrop to discuss the Marienwerder proposals, as had been requested by the British Government, but not to enter into any negotiations on those proposals.

The collection of doucments published by the Polish Government-in-Exile after the beginning of the war contained the text of the instruction to Lipski, but omitted the section ordering Lipski not to enter into negotiations.

It is obvious that the Polish Government-in-Exile considered that revelation of the order to Lipski not to enter into negotiations would harm its claim that in the days leading up to the German attack it had done everything in its power to negotiate in good faith on the German proposals, and that those proposals had not been genuine but simply a cover for a German attack that was wanton and entirely unprovoked.

The crucial fact is that Halder's diary notes show that on 30 August Hitler was specifically keeping open the option of cancelling the planned attack on Poland altogether if negotiations on the German proposals had begun by 1 September and were still proceeding satisfactorily by 2 September.

That indicates that the German request for negotiations was not simply a cover for an attack on Poland that was planned to proceed regardless of any Polish agreement to that request.

[David Thompson]

No doubt Göring was indulging in a little undeserved self-praise at the expense of Dahlerus. The British government informed first Hitler, and then the German Foreign Ministry, prior to the date of the supposed 31 Aug 1939 wiretap, that negotiations under the circumstances proposed by Germany could be classed somewhere between highly unlikely to improbable. See The British Blue Book (1939):

No. 78.

Reply of the German Chancellor to the communication of August 28, 1939, from His Majesty's Government.* This reply was handed to Sir N. Henderson by Herr Hitler during the evening of August 29, 1939.

(Translation.)

THE British Ambassador in Berlin has submitted to the British Government suggestions which I felt bound to make in order-

(1) to give expression once more to the will of the Reich Government for sincere Anglo-German understanding, co-operation and friendship;

(2) to leave no room for doubt as to fact that such an understanding could not be bought at the price of a renunciation of vital German interests, let alone the abandonment of demands which are based as much upon common human justice as upon the national dignity and honour of our people.

The German Government have noted with satisfaction from the reply of the British Government and from the oral explanations given by the British Ambassador that the British Government for their part are also prepared to improve the relationship between Germany and England and to develop and extend it in the sense of the German suggestion.

In this connexion, the British Government are similarly convinced that the removal of the German-Polish tension, which has become unbearable, is the pre-requisite for the realisation of this hope.

Since the autumn of the past year, and on the last occasion in March, 1939, there were submitted to the Polish Government proposals, both oral and written, which, having regard to the friendship then existing between Germany and Poland, offered
________________________________________________
* No. 74

176 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

the possibility of a solution of the questions in dispute acceptable to both parties. The British Government are aware that the Polish Government saw fit, in March last, finally to reject these proposals. At the same time, they used this rejection as a pretext or an occasion for taking military measures which have since been continuously intensified. Already in the middle of last month Poland was in effect in a state of mobilisation. This was accompanied by numerous encroachments in the Free City of Danzig due to the instigation of the Polish authorities; threatening demands in the nature of ultimata, varying only in degree, were addressed to that City. A closing of the frontiers, at first in the form of a measure of customs policy but extended later in a military sense affecting also traffic and communications, was imposed with the object of bringing about the political exhaustion and economic destruction of this German community.

To this were added barbaric actions of maltreatment which cry to Heaven, and other kinds of persecution of the large German national group in Poland which extended even to the killing of many resident Germans or to their forcible removal under the most cruel conditions. This state of affairs is unbearable for a Great Power. It has now forced Germany, after remaining a passive onlooker for many months, in her turn to take the necessary steps for the safeguarding of justified German interests. And indeed the German Government can but assure the British Government in the most solemn manner that a condition of affairs has now been reached which can no longer be accepted or observed with indifference.

The demands of the German Government are in conformity with the revision of the Versailles Treaty in regard to this territory which has always been recognised as being necessary: viz., return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, the safeguarding of the existence of the German national group in the territories remaining to Poland.

The German Government note with satisfaction that the British Government also are in principle convinced that some solution must be found for the new situation which has arisen.

They further feel justified in assuming that the British Government too can have no doubt that it is a question now of conditions, for the elimination of which there no longer remain days,

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 177

still less weeks, but perhaps only hours. For in the disorganised state of affairs obtaining in Poland, the possibility of incidents intervening, which it might be impossible for Germany to tolerate, must at any moment be reckoned with.

While the British Government may still believe that these grave differences can be resolved by way of direct negotiations, the German Government unfortunately can no longer share this view as a matter of course. For they have made the attempt to embark on such peaceful negotiations, but, instead of receiving any support from the Polish Government, they were rebuffed by the sudden introduction of measures of a military character in favour of the development alluded to above.

The British Government attach importance to two considerations: (1) that the existing danger of an imminent explosion should be eliminated as quickly as possible by direct negotiation, and (2) that the existence of the Polish State, in the form in which it would then continue to exist, should be adequately safeguarded in the economic and political sphere by means of international guarantees.

On this subject the German Government makes the following declaration:-

Though sceptical as to the prospects of a successful outcome, they are nevertheless prepared to accept the English proposal and to enter into direct discussions. They do so, as has already been emphasised, solely as the result of the impression made upon them by the written statement received from the British Government that they too desire a pact of friendship in accordance with the general lines indicated to the British Ambassador.

The German Government desire in this way to give the British Government and the British nation a proof of the sincerity of Germany's intentions to enter into a lasting friendship with Great Britain.

The Government of the Reich felt, however, bound to point out to the British Government that in the event of a territorial rearrangement in Poland they would no longer be able to bind themselves to give guarantees or to participate in guarantees without the U.S.S.R. being associated therewith.

For the rest, in making these proposals the German Government have never had any intention of touching Poland's vital

178 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

interests or questioning the existence of an independent Polish State. The German Government, accordingly, in these circumstances agree to accept the British Government's offer of their good offices in securing the despatch to Berlin of a Polish Emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this Emissary on Wednesday, the 30th August, 1939.

The German Government will immediately draw up proposals for a solution acceptable to themselves and will, if possible, place these at the disposal of the British Government before the arrival of the Polish negotiator.

No. 79.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 9:15 p. m.).

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 29, 1939.

HERR HITLER handed me German reply at 7.15 this evening. Translation of full text will follow as soon as possible.

2. In reply to two British proposals, namely, for direct German-Polish negotiations and international guarantee of any settlement, German Government declares:-

(1) That, in spite of its scepticism as to the prospect of their success, it accepts direct negotiation solely out of desire to ensure lasting friendship with Britain, and

(2) In the case of any modifications of territory German Government cannot undertake or participate in any guarantees without consulting the U.S.S.R.

3. Note observes that German proposals have never had for their object any diminution of Polish vital interests, and declares that German Government accepts mediation of Great Britain with a view to visit to Berlin of some Polish plenipotentiary. German Government, note adds, counts on arrival of such plenipotentiary to-morrow, Wednesday, 30th August.

4. I remarked that this phrase sounded like an ultimatum, but after some heated remarks both Herr Hitler and Herr von Ribbentrop assured me that it was only intended to stress urgency of the moment when the two fully mobilised armies were standing face to face.

5. I said that I would transmit this suggestion immediately

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 179

to His Majesty's Government, and asked whether, if such Polish plenipotentiary did come, we could assume that he would be well received and that discussions would be conducted on footing of complete equality. Herr Hitler's reply was "of course."

6. German demands are declared to be revision of Versailles Treaty; namely, return of Danzig and the Corridor to Germany, security for lives of German national minorities in the rest of Poland; note concludes with statement that the German Government will immediately elaborate proposals for an acceptable solution, and inform British Government, if possible, before arrival of Polish plentipotentiary.

No. 80.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 10:25 p. m.).

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 29, 1939.

INTERVIEW this evening was of a stormy character and Herr Hitler far less reasonable than yesterday. Press announcement this evening that five more Germans had been killed in Poland and news of Polish mobilisation had obviously excited him.

2. He kept saying that he wanted British friendship more than anything in the world, but he could not sacrifice Germany's vital interests therefor, and that for His Majesty's Government to make a bargain over such a matter was an unendurable proposition. All my attempts to correct this complete misrepresentation of the case did not seem to impress him.

3. In reply to his reiterated statement that direct negotiations with Poland, though accepted by him, would be bound to fail, I told his Excellency that their success or failure depended on his goodwill or the reverse, and that the choice lay with him. It was, however, my bounden duty to leave him in no doubt that an attempt to impose his will on Poland by force would inevitably bring him into direct conflict with us.

4. It would have been useless to talk of a truce, since that can only depend on whether M. Beck or some other Polish representative came to Berlin or not.

180 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

No. 81.

Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 30, 1939, 2 a. m.

WE shall give careful consideration to German Government's reply,* but it is, of course, unreasonable to expect that we can produce a Polish representative in Berlin to-day, and German Government must not expect this.

It might be well for you at once to let this be known in proper quarters through appropriate channels. We hope you may receive our reply this afternoon.

No. 82.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 1 p. m.).

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 30, 1939.

YOUR message** was conveyed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at 4 a. m. this morning. I had made similar observation to Herr Hitler yesterday evening, his reply being that one could fly from Warsaw to Berlin in one and a half hours.

2. I repeated the message this morning by telephone to State Secretary, who said that it had already been conveyed to Herr Hitler. He added that something must be done as soon as possible.

3. While I still recommend that the Polish Government should swallow this eleventh-hour effort to establish direct contact with Herr Hitler, even if it be only to convince the world that they were prepared to make their own sacrifice for preservation of peace, one can only conclude from the German reply that Herr Hitler is determined to achieve his ends by so-called peaceful fair means if he can, but by force if he cannot. Much, of course, may also depend on detailed plan referred to in the last paragraph of the German reply.

4. Nevertheless, if Herr Hitler is allowed to continue to have the initiative, it seems to me that result can only be either war or once again victory for him by a display of force and encourage-
______________________________________
*No. 78.
**No. 81.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 181

ment thereby to pursue the same course again next year or the year after.

No. 83.

Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).
(Telegraphic) Foreign Office, August 30, 1939, 2:45 p. m.

WE are considering German note * with all urgency and shall send official reply later in afternoon.

We are representing at Warsaw how vital it is to reinforce all instructions for avoidance of frontier incidents, and I would beg you to confirm similar instructions on German side.

I welcome the evidence in the exchanges of views, which are taking place, of that desire for Anglo-German understanding of which I spoke yesterday in Parliament.

No. 84.

Sir H. Kennard to Viscount Halifax (received 10 a. m.).
(Telegraphic.) Warsaw, August 30, 1939.

I FEEL sure that it would be impossible to induce the Polish Government to send M. Beck or any other representative immediately to Berlin to discuss a settlement on basis proposed by Herr Hitler. They would certainly sooner fight and perish rather than submit to such humiliation, especially after examples of Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania and Austria.

2. I would suggest that if negotiations are to be between equals it is essential that they should take place in some neutral country or even possibly Italy, and that the basis for any negotiations should be some compromise between the clearly defined limits of March proposals on the German side and status quo on the Polish side.

3. Considering that the Polish Government, standing alone and when they were largely unprepared for war, refused the March terms it would surely be impossible for them to agree to proposals which appear to go beyond the March terms now that
_________________________________________
* No. 78.

182 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

they have Great Britain as their ally, France has confirmed her support and world public opinion is clearly in favour of direct negotiations on equal terms and is behind Poland's resistance to a dictated settlement.

4. I am, of course, expressing no views to the Polish Government, nor am I communicating to them Herr Hitler's reply * till I receive instructions which I trust will be without delay.

* * * * *

No. 88.

Viscount Halifax to Sir N. Henderson (Berlin).

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 30, 1939, 6:50 p. m.

WE understand that German Government are insisting that a Polish representative with full powers must come to Berlin to receive German proposals.

2. We cannot advise Polish Government to comply with this procedure, which is wholly unreasonable.

3. Could you not suggest to German Government that they adopt the normal procedure, when their proposals are ready, of inviting Polish Ambassador to call and handing proposals to him for transmission to Warsaw and inviting suggestions as to conduct of negotiations.

4. German Government have been good enough to promise they will communicate proposals also to His Majesty's Govern-

184 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

ment. If latter think they offer reasonable basis they can be counted on to do their best in Warsaw to facilitate negotiations.

No. 90.

Viscount Halifax to Sir H. Kennard (Warsaw).
(Sent to Sir H. Kennard on August 30 and acted on in the early morning of August 31.)

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, August 30, 1939.

MY telegram to Berlin gives the text of the reply of His Majesty's Government * to the German communication ** which has been repeated to you.

2. Please communicate it to M. Beck. In doing so, you should
__________________________________
*No. 89
**No. 78.

186 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

point out that, whilst the first part of the German Government's reply consists of an indefensible and misleading presentation of the German case, the really important part of the reply consists of Germany's acceptance of the proposal for direct discussion, of the suggestion of the proposed international guarantee, and Germany's assertion that she intends to respect Poland's vital interests.

3. It is perhaps unnecessary to take exception at this stage to much that finds place in the German reply, of which His Majesty's Government would be as critical as, they have no doubt, would be the Polish Government, but His Majesty's Government have made an express reservation in regard to statement of the particular demands put forward in the German note. The point that seemed to call for immediate comment was the German demand that a Polish representative should present himself at Berlin to-day. M. Beck will see the line we took last night on this (see my telegram to Berlin *) and the further reference we have made to point in our reply to German Government's latest communication. German Government are now drawing up proposals for a solution, and it will be in the light of these, and of other developments, that the decision as to future procedure, including place and conditions of discussion, will have to be taken.

4. M. Beck will see from the reply of His Majesty's Government that the proposal has been made for a military standstill during discussions, to which His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the Polish Government will have no objection.

5. His Majesty's Government would be glad to have the views of the Polish Government urgently. In view of the fact that the Polish Government have authorised His Majesty's Government to say that they are prepared to enter into direct discussions with the German Government, His Majesty's Government hope that, provided method and general arrangement for discussions can be satisfactorily agreed, Polish Government will be prepared to do so without delay. We regard it as most important from the point of view of the internal situation in Germany and of world opinion that, so long as the German Government profess themselves ready to negotiate, no opportunity should be given them for placing the blame for a conflict on Poland.
___________________________________
*No. 81.

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 187

6. You should, of course, emphasise that His Majesty's Government have made it quite clear to Herr Hitler that they are irrevocably determined to implement their obligations without reserve. On this point there is no misunderstanding in Berlin. The position of the Polish Government is very different from that which they occupied last March, since it is now supported both by direct British guarantee and promise of British participation in guarantee of any settlement reached on bases we have indicated, and the conversations would be carried on against this background.

No. 91.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 2 45 a. m. August 31).

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 30, 1939.

I INFORMED Herr von Ribbentrop to-night of the advice given to the Polish Government in your telegram of 30th August to Warsaw.*

2. Practically his only comment was that all provocation came from the side of Poland. I observed that His Majesty's Government had constantly warned the Polish Government that all provocative action should be vigorously discouraged and that I had reason to believe that the German press accounts were greatly exaggerated. Herr von Ribbentrop replied that His Majesty's Government's advice had had cursed ("verflucht") little effect. I mildly retorted that I was surprised to hear such language from a Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 92.

Sir N. Henderson to Viscount Halifax (received 9:30 a. m. August 31).

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, August 30, 1939.

I TOLD Herr von Ribbentrop this evening that His Majesty's Government found it difficult to advise Polish Government to accept procedure adumbrated in German reply, and suggested
______________________________
*No. 85.

188 THE BRITISH WAR BLUE BOOK

that he should adopt normal contact, i.e., that when German proposals were ready to invite Polish Ambassador to call and to hand him proposals for transmission to his Government with a view to immediate opening of negotiations. I added that if basis afforded prospect of settlement His Majesty's Government could be counted upon to do their best in Warsaw to temporize negotiations.

2. Herr von Ribbentrop's reply was to produce a lengthy document which he read out in German aloud at top speed. Imagining that he would eventually hand it to me I did not attempt to follow too closely the sixteen or more articles which it contained. Though I cannot therefore guarantee accuracy the main points were: restoration of Danzig to Germany; southern boundary of Corridor to be line Marienwerder, Graudenz, Bromberg, Schönlanke; plebiscite to be held in the Corridor on basis of population on 1st January, 1919, absolute majority to decide; international commission of British, French, Italian and Russian members to police the Corridor and guarantee reciprocal communications with Danzig and Gdynia pending result of the plebiscite; Gydnia to be reserved to Poland; Danzig to be purely commercial city and demilitarised.

3. When I asked Herr von Ribbentrop for text of these proposals in accordance with undertaking in the German reply of yesterday, he asserted that it was now too late as Polish representative had not arrived in Berlin by midnight.

4. I observed that to treat matter in this way meant that request for Polish representative to arrive in Berlin on 30th August constituted, in fact, an ultimatum in spite of what he and Herr Hitler had assured me yesterday. This he denied, saying that idea of an ultimatum was figment of my imagination. Why then I asked could he not adopt normal procedure and give me copy of proposals and ask Polish Ambassador to call on him, just as Herr Hitler had summoned me a few days ago, and hand them to him for communication to Polish Government? In the most violent terms Herr von Ribbentrop said that he would never ask the Ambassador to visit him. He hinted that if Polish Ambassador asked him for interview it might be different. I said that I would naturally inform my Government so at once. Whereupon he said while those were his personal views he would

DEVELOPMENTS LEADING TO HOSTILITIES 189

bring all that I had said to Herr Hitler's notice. It was for Chancellor to decide.

5. We parted on that note, but I must tell you that Herr von Ribbentrop's whole demeanour during an unpleasant interview was aping Herr Hitler at his worst. He inveighed incidentally against Polish mobilisation, but I retorted that it was hardly surprising since Germany had also mobilised as Herr Hitler himself had admitted to me yesterday.

http://ibiblio.org/pha/bb/bb-199.html#78

The whole arrangement, from the German side, was just a piece of play-acting.

[michael mills]

The whole arrangement, from the German side, was just a piece of play-acting.

That is your opinion.

But the notes recorded in Halder's diary, consisting of directions and advice given to the German military commanders, indicate that the planned invasion of Poland on 1 September might be postponed for one day or cancelled altogether, if negotiations proceeded satisfactorily.

It is hardly likely that advice of a possible cancellation of the invasion would have been given to the German military leaders if Hitler had been determined to go ahead with it, and his discussions with Henderson from 29 August onward were merely "play-acting".

The German response of 29 August 1939, contained in Blue Book Document 78, is the diplomatic initiative which A J P Taylor said should have been launched one day earlier. It was Taylor's opinion that the war broke out because Hitler launched on 29 August a diplomatic initiative that he should have launched on the previous day.

What Taylor meant was that if the German request for the sending of a Polish plenipotentiary had been made on 28 August, it would have given more time for such a plenipotentiaty to arrive and meaningful negotiations to begin.

However, the German agreement to enter into negotiations with a Polish plenipotentiary was in response to a British request for such agreement, which was not received until very late on August 28, just before midnight if my memory serves me correctly. Accordingly, it would have been impossible for Hitler to have "launched the diplomatic offensive" one day earlier, as suggested by Taylor, because until receipt of the British request he had no idea whether Britain would support any negotiations between Germany and Poland over the German proposals which had been made back in October 1938 and repeated since then, and would encourage Poland to negotiate seriously rather than simply go on rejecting the German proposals.

[David Thompson]

Michael -- You wrote, quoting me:

The whole arrangement, from the German side, was just a piece of play-acting.

That is your opinion.

It was apparently Hitler's as well. See Halder's notes for 29 Aug 1939 (at viewtopic.php?f=6&t=190795&p=1716054#p1716054):

Führer says: I will do this: from now on I shall act only on an international basis. Bring in international troops, including Russians. Führer has hopes of driving wedge between British, French and Poles. Today: Poles directed by English to go to Berlin, as required by Germans.

Führer wants them to come tomorrow.

Basic principles: Raise a barrage of demographic and democratic demands. Plebiscite within six months, under international supervision. Those opting for Germany must remain German citizens; the same holds good for the Poles. Poles will not want Germans in their territory.

30.8. Poles in Berlin.

31.8. Blow up. [Zerplatzen]

1.9. Use of force

That's pretty much how it played out, too. See the British version in my post at viewtopic.php?p=1716243#p1716243

[michael mills]

That's pretty much how it played out, too.

Because the Polish side refused to negotiate on the Marienwerder proposals.

As Hitler advised the military comanders, if the Poles would not negotiate seriously within the time-frame laid down (30-31 August). Germany would resort to force on 1 September. The series of events recorded by Halder represented what Germany planned to do if the Polish side refused to negotiate (which Hitler thought the most likely outcome).

The option of postponing the use of force until 2 September, or cancelling it altogether, was left open, in the event of the Polish side negotiating seriously (which Hitler thought less likely, but nevertheless considered a possibility). Here again is the note in the Halder diary recording that option:

30 AUGUST 1939: 5th Mob. Day

1840. Siewert: Make all preparations so that attack can begin at 0430 on Sept. 1. Should negotiations in London necessitate postponement, then postponement to Sept. 2. In that case we shall be notified before 1500 tomorrow. Army Group North has already been instructed.

After the 2nd we will not attack.

Note that this option, of cancelling the attack, was recorded one day after Halder recorded the schedule of events that were planned to take place in the event of Polish refusal to negotiate.

Accordingly, the series of planned events recorded by Halder on 29 August was not inevitable. Whether they occurred depended on what the Polish side did.

They did in fact occur as recorded by Halder, since, as Hitler expected, the Polish side refused to negotiate.