Nazi occupation policies for the USSR

[David Thompson]

Document 1206-PS, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression. Volume III: US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1947. pp. 841-844.

TOP SECRET

Rue (IV) Draft Berlin, 11 November 1941 6 Copies, 6th Copy

NOTES on outlines laid down by the Reichsmarschall in the meeting of 7 November 1941 in the Reich Ministry for Air (RLM)

SUBJECT: Employment of laborers in war industries.

The Fuehrer's point of view as to employment of prisoners of war in war industries has changed basically. So far a total of 5 million prisoners of war -- employed so far 2 million.

Directives for employment:

Frenchmen: Individual employment, transposition into armament industry [Rue-wirtschaft]

Serbs: Preferably agriculture

Poles: If feasible no individual employment achievement of Russian armament industry surpasses the German one. Assembly line-work, a great many mechanical devices with relatively few skilled workers.

Readiness of Russians in the operational area to work is strong. In the Ukraine and other areas discharged prisoners of war already work as free labor. In Krivoy Rog, large numbers of workers are available due to the destruction of the factories.

EMPLOYMENT OF RUSSIAN PWs

As a rule, employment in groups [geschlossener Arbeitseinsatz] no individual employment, not even in agriculture. Guard personnel, not only soldiers but also foremen, at least during the working time proper. As a rule soldiers in the camp.

Employment in:

1. Operational area

2. Reich Commissariats (occupied territories in the east)

3. General Government

4. Interior and Protectorate is to be differentiated.

For 1: In the operational area take preferable into consideration:

a. Railroads.

b. Highway construction.

Very important that in the Ukraine some roads be built with increased speed, not by German skilled labor but by Russian PWs.

c. Clearing work.

d. Agriculture.

The Ukraine being conquered, we now finally have to secure the feeding of the German people. If feasible, also Frenchmen and Belgians are to be used for directing the Russian farm-workers in the eastern area. If farm machinery is lacking, employ masses of workers. Transplantation of German farmers only where actual success can be expected.

e. Railroad-repair-factories, etc.

Best supervision: "Field kitchen." Quick evacuation from operational area are necessary. Losses during transport very heavy (escaping and joining with partisan and robber bands).

Barbed wire hard to get. (Discarding of barbed wire fences in East Prussia desirable)

Leave Asiatic people in operational area if possible.

From construction battalions 69000 workers have been transferred to the armament industry: replacement by prisoner of war battalions.

Again and again skilled workers are being found in the construction battalions (fraisiers etc). Investigation by army desirable. Express will of the Fuehrer, that every skilled worker is used in the proper place. If necessary, repeated checking should be instituted.

For 2: The same applies to employment in Reich Commissariats.

For 3: The above is also applicable to the Government General.

Attention is to be paid to avoiding of unnecessary transport of machinery, as thereby often the available manpower in the Gouvernement is not fully utilized, and, on the other hand, the machinery cannot be made use of for a long time in other places.

For 4: In the Interior and the Protectorate. It would be ideal if entire factories could be manned by Russian PWs except the employees necessary for direction. For employment in the Interior and the Protectorate the following are to have priority:

a. At the top coal mining industry.

Order by the Fuehrer to investigate all mines as to suitability for employment of Russians. At times manning the entire plant with Russian laborers.

b. Transportation (construction of locomotives and cars, repair-shops)

Railroad-repair and industry workers are to be sought out from the PWs. Railroad is most important means of transportation in the East.

c. Armament industries.

Preferably factories of armor and guns. Possibly also construction of parts for airplane engines. Suitable complete sections of factories to be manned exclusively by Russians. For the remainder employment in columns. Use in factories of tool machinery, production of farm tractors, generators, etc.

In emergency, erect in individual places barracks for occasional workers which are used as unloading details and similar purposes. (Reich Minister of the Interior through communal authorities).

OKW/AWA is competent for transporting Russian PWs, employment through "Planning Board for Employment of all PWs." If necessary, offices of Reich Commissariats.

No employment where danger to men or their supply exists, i.e. factories exposed to explosives, waterworks, powerworks, etc. No contact with German population, especially no "solidarity." German worker as a rule is foreman of Russians.

Food is a matter of Four Years' Plan. Supply their own food (cats, horses, etc.)

Clothes, billeting, messing somewhat better than at home where part of the people live in caverns.

Supply of shoes for Russians as a rule wooden shoes, if necessary Russian shoe repair shops.

Examination of physical fitness, in order to avoid importation of diseases.

Clearing of mines as a rule by Russians if possible by selected Russian engineers.

Employment offices for civilian workers to be kept separate from those for PWs. In this respect the wage-problem is to be considered. Furthermore families in Russia have to share the support. As a rule employment in closed groups [geschlossener Einsatz].

Some points as to general Arbeitseinsatz

Rather employ PWs than unsuitable foreign workers. Seize Poles, Dutchmen, etc., if necessary as PWs and employ them as such, if work through free contract cannot be obtained. Strong action.

General employment of all German women repudiated by the Fuehrer.

Where Russians can be employed, labor service is not to be used. Labor service to be used where greatest effect is produced, even if the principle of education through labor service is curtailed thereby. War situation to be taken into consideration.

As a matter of principle central interests precede local interests, therefore no resistance from Reich commissaries and other local authorities against Arbeitseinsatz in the homeland.

Savings in wages are to be made up by compensatory contributions of the business.

Express order by the Fuehrer. Under no circumstances may the wage level in the East be raised or assimilated to the wages in western Germany. Strong action is imperative against solicitors who offer high wages.

It is intended to issue a basically new regulation of wages for foreign workers.

Foreigners not to be treated like German workers, on the other hand do not provoke inferiority complex in foreigners by posters.

The welfare installations of the Labor Front [DAF] are under no circumstance to be used for PWs or Eastern workers.

All agencies are to promote maximum utilization of Russian manpower.

Employment of Russians not to be improvised, but first to be thoroughly organized in the operational area. Speed is necessary, as the mass of manpower is decreasing daily by losses (lack of food and billets).

Make provisions to decrease the excessive number of escaping prisoners. Especially in and around Berlin strictest guard necessary.

[illegible initials]

[David Thompson]

Document 3257-PS, in Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, Volume V, US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1946. pp. 994-997.

Vol. 226-3 Armament in the Ukraine Inspector

In the field, 2 December 1941 Secret

To General of the Infantry, Thomas, Chief of the Industrial Armament Department [Wi Rue Amt] Berlin W Kurfurstenstr. 63-67

1 enclosure

For the personal information of the Chief of the Industrial Armament Department [Wi Rue Amt] I am forwarding a total account of the present situation in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine in which the difficulties and tensions encountered so far and the problems which give rise to serious anxiety are stated with unmistakable clarity.

Intentionally I have desisted from submitting such a report through official channels or to make it known to other departments interested in it because I do not expect any results that way but, to the contrary, am apprehensive, that the difficulties and tensions and also the divergent opinions might only be increased due to the peculiarity of the situation.

Only the department authorized in the matter if it sees clearly can order a stoppage within the possibilities.

The report has been drafted by OKV Rat Prof. Seraphim and has no official but a definitely personal character.

I agree with his statements in all respects.

I wish to add, that the departments in question receive reports of the situation which state the existing material difficulties with complete frankness and that moreover nothing has remained untried by me to point out the existing difficulties and mistakes also to the gentlemen of the Reichskommisar Ukraine again and again in order to have them checked.

I would be obliged if the enclosed report were used only for the information of the Chief of the Industrial Armament Department [Wi Rue Amt] himself and his closest workers and if it were left exclusively to the decision of the Chief of the Industrial Armament Department to forward information on the essential facts which primarily might induce a change of the situation which gives rise to serious anxiety.

Jewish problem.

Regulation of the Jewish question in the Ukraine was a difficult problem because that the Jews constituted a large part of the urban population. We therefore have to deal -- just as in the General Government [GG.] -- with a mass problem of policy concerning the population. Many cities had a percentage of Jews exceeding 50%. Only the rich Jews had fled from the German troops. The majority of Jews remained under German administration. The latter found the problem more complicated through the fact that these Jews represented almost the entire trade and even a part of the manpower in small and medium industries besides the business which had in part become superfluous as a direct or indirect result of the war. The elimination therefore necessarily had far reaching economic consequences and even direct consequences for the
armament industry (production for supplying the troops).

The attitude of the Jewish population was anxious -- obliging from the beginning. They tried to avoid everything that might displease the German administration. That they hated the German administration and army inwardly goes without saying and cannot be surprising. However, there is no proof that Jewry as a whole or even to a greater part was implicated in acts of sabotage. Surely, there were some terrorists or saboteurs among them just as among the Ukrainians. But it cannot be said that the Jews as such represented a danger to the German armed forces. The output produced by Jews who, of course, were prompted by nothing but the feeling of fear, was satisfactory to the troops and the German administration.

The Jewish population remained temporarily unmolested shortly after the fighting. Only weeks, sometimes months later, specially detached formations of the police [Ordnungspolizei] executed a planned shooting of Jews. This action as a rule proceeded from east to west. It was done entirely in public with the use of the Ukrainian militia and unfortunately in many instances also with members of the armed forces taking part voluntarily. The way these actions which included men and old men, women and children of all ages were carried out as horrible.

The great masses executed make this action more gigantic than any similar measure taken so far in the Soviet Union. So far about 150000-200000 Jews may have been executed in the part of the Ukraine belonging to the Reichskommissariat [RK]; no consideration was given to the interests of economy.

Summarizing it can be said that the kind of solution of the Jewish problem applied in the Ukraine which obviously was based on the ideological theories as a matter of principle had the following results:

a. Elimination of a part of partly superfluous eaters in the cities.

b. Elimination of a part of the population which hated us undoubtedly.

c. Elimination of badly needed tradesmen who were in many instances indispensable even in the interests of the armed forces.

d. Consequences as to foreign policy -- propaganda which are obvious.

e. Bad effects on the troops which in any case get indirect contact with the executions.

f. Brutalizing effect on the formations which carry out the executions -- regular police (Ordnungspolizei).

Scooping of the agricultural surplus in the Ukraine for the purpose of feeding the Reich is therefore only feasible if traffic in the interior of the Ukraine is diminished to a minimum. The attempt will be made to achieve this

1. by annihilation of superfluous eaters (Jews, population of the Ukrainian big cities, which like Kiev do not receive any supplies at all);

2. by extreme reduction of the rations allocated to the Ukrainians in the remaining cities;

3. by decrease of the food of the farming population.

It must be realized that in the Ukraine eventually only the Ukrainians can produce economic values by labor. If we shoot the Jews, let the prisoners of war perish, condemn considerable parts of the urban population to death by starvation and also lose a part of the farming population by hunger during the next year, the question remains unanswered: Who in all the world is then supposed to produce economic values here? In view of the manpower bottleneck in the German Reich there is no doubt that the necessary number of Germans will not be available either now or in the near future. However, if the Ukrainian is supposed to work he has to be maintained physically not due to sentiments but due to very sober economic considerations. Part of these is also the creation of an orderly correlation between currency, prices of goods and wages.

(Summary) Population.

The attitude of the Ukrainian population is still obliging in spite of the deterioration of its economic situation during the last few months. A change of attitude is to be expected with continued deterioration which is certainly to be anticipated.

The Germans [Volksdeutsche] in the Ukraine do not constitute an element on which the administration and the economy of the country can lean.

A considerable proportion of the Jews who partly represented more than half of the population in the cities of the RK. has been executed. Thereby the majority of tradesmen has been eliminated thus hurting also interests of the armed forces (supplies for troops, billets).

Billeting, food, clothing and health of the prisoners of war is bad, mortality very high. The loss of tens of thousands even hundreds of thousands during this winter is to be expected. Among them is manpower which could have been utilized successfully for the Ukrainian economy, also skilled specialists and tradesmen.

[David Thompson]

Document NO-3028, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. p. 516-522.

Partial Translation of Document NO-3028, Prosecution Exhibit 2392.

[Stamp]
Personal Staff of Reich Leader SS
[Handwritten] 227
Berlin W 35
Kurfuerstenstr. 1134.
10 July 1943

The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories
Ministerial Dirigent, Dr. Braeutigam
I 1168/43 secret.

Secret!

SS Lieutenant General Berger [At this time defendant Berger was liaison officer of Himmler with the East Ministry.]
SS Main Office
Berlin-Wilmersdorf
Hohenzollerndamm 31.

Dear SS Lieutenant General!

Deputizing for Dr. Leibbrandt, who is presently away on leave, I am sending you four reports of the Commissioner General for White Ruthenia and one report of the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland for your information, leaving any suitable measures to your discretion and at the same time requesting speedy return of the documents.

Heil Hitler!
Sincerely yours,
Signed: Dr. Braeutigam.

*************************************

The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
Gauleiter/Wa
Journal No. 418/43
Secret.

[Stamp]
Personal Staff of Reich Leader SS,
[Handwritten] 227
Minsk
3 June 1943

Secret.

The Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, Berlin via the Reich Commissioner for the Ostland, Riga.

Enclosed I am sending you copy of a report by Director of Propaganda Lauch [Reproduced in part immediately below.] of the Propaganda Division of my Minsk office. Following my instructions Director of Propaganda Lauch participated in the large-scale operation of the SS and police under the command of SS Brigadier General v. Gottberg in the Borissow area. All details of this report dovetail with the reports submitted by my officials of the Agricultural Department and other civil administration offices.

This report also supplies the answer to the puzzle why, even after large-scale operations, the number of partisans not only does not decrease but actually increases, and why food supplies for the home front and the frontline from the embattled areas grow scantier instead of going up.

Furthermore, the report shows that any propaganda moves after the completion of such operations--which are terminated by mass shootings of the entire population--are completely useless.

I am not in a position to initiate and implement any changes in this matter, as the civil administration does not have any influence on the conduct of such operations.

The Commissioner General in Minsk,
Signed
Signature
Enclosure.

******************************************

[Handwritten] 227
[Stamp]
Personal Staff of Reich Leader SS.

Secret

Copy.

Report about the participation of the combat team of Lieutenant Colonel Klupsch in the large-scale operation.

16 May 1943, 1830 hours. Left Minsk by official train for Molodeczno, arrival in Molodeczno 0430 hours. Contacted transport.

24 May 1943, 0620 hours. Left for Paraffianov. Arrival in P. at 1100 hours.

24 May 1943: Trip from P. to Doschyze. Arrived at Nebyshino at 1300 hours, reported to combat post. Two barns at Nebyshino contained corpses of partisans and partisan suspects who had been shot. The barns were set afire; however, the corpses were not burned. In a barn in which six charred corpses were found, four pigs were eating those corpses. I complained to Colonel Klupsch about this, and I requested that they be buried, so that the wagon drivers and other indigenous personnel were spared this gruesome sight. Two days later Lieutenant Colonel K. gave orders to bury the corpses. I shall yet deal with further details of this incident.

25 May 1943: The loudspeaker truck was to accompany Lieutenant Colonel Klupsch on a frontline inspection trip. However, Lieutenant Colonel Klupsch decided later on to go alone and ran with his car on a mine, approximately 500 meters behind N; Lieutenant Colonel Klupsch was not badly wounded, though the other two occupants of the car were severely wounded, especially the driver. Lieutenant Colonel Kitzinger of the Wehrmacht then assumed command of the Combat Group Klupsch. On the same day the combat post was transferred to Novosselski. There, the first conference with the new commanding officer took place.

26 May 1943: 1300 hours arrival at Pjanyj Less. On that day propaganda meetings took place in Ossinovik and Vitinishi, which left a good impression with the population. Speeches by local propaganda agents can be called good.

27 May 1943: First Lieutenant Boehme calls me to the combat post and informs me that a so-called trap position [Auffangstellung] had been established in Babce, hence the combat post had been transferred on that day, and that we could expect to stay in this position for at least 1 week, possibly longer. This prolonged stay in B. in conjunction with the result of the talks I had with Lieutenant Colonel Kitzinger as well as the following combat operations, induced me to discontinue my activities, as the prevailing conditions were quite inimical to any further propaganda work. According to Lieutenant Colonel Kitzinger's statements the prisoner interrogations have shown that a large number of partisans have been issued with civilian clothes, and that they have been ordered to do agricultural work in the villages until further notice. Following this Lieutenant Colonel K. has decided to burn all villages and to shoot their inhabitants.

This kind of action has induced me not to continue my work. Apart from the described events, other incidents occurred during this particular operation which only boost the partisans' counter-propaganda drive, as they had asked the population to leave their villages before the Germans moved in and to take to the forests. They claimed that anyone not following this instruction would be murdered by the German barbarians. It has been established that the majority of the population actually followed their advice. As time passed some returned, and it was those people who saw the partly charred corpses of those shot in Nebyshino.

These events left a particularly strong impression and it is quite likely that they induced the greater part of the population not to return to the villages. An added bad impression was created by both Wehrmacht and police actions, in which the resident homes were quite senselessly gone over, and in the course of which the furniture, seed stocks, and other items were thrown into their fields and backyards. The whole is a sorry picture of senseless destruction and, of course, makes the worst impression imaginable on the population. Then, there was the labor allocation staff immediately starting its recruiting drive, which again caused a lot of anxiety. And then chickens were found lying about dead in the towns. Certainly, it is quite in order when the troops help themselves to those food supplies they need; but the senseless killing of livestock is highly objectionable and must be severely censured. Summing up it must be said that all those events prove irrevocably the uselessness of pushing a successful propaganda campaign, as we have no good points in our favor whatsoever to impart to the population.

Signed: Lauch.
Minsk, 2 June 1943.

*********************************************

[Stamp]
Personal Staff of Reich Leader SS
[Handwritten] 227.
The Commissioner General for White Ruthenia
Minsk
3 June 1943
Gauleiter/Ba.
Journal No. 419/43 secret.

Secret.

To the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories Berlin via the Reich Commissioner for the Eastland Riga.

Supplementing the report of Director of Propaganda Lauch, I enclose a copy of a report of the deputy department head for policy, Area Commissioner Langer [sic] [The name should be "Lange." Lange's report is reproduced immediately below.].

In addition, a further report of Party Member Langer based on an oral report of the political Referent in Borissow.

Both reports show that the statements [by] Director of Propaganda Lauch are not biased, but describe things as they are.

I propose that the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories be requested to submit the matter to Fuehrer headquarters. These things have great political significance. If the treatment of the indigenous population in the Occupied Eastern Territories is continued in the same manner which has been used up to now, not only by the police, but also by the Wehrmacht and the OT [Organisation Todt] then in the coming winter we may expect not partisans, but the revolt of the whole country, and then the forces of the police at our disposal would hardly suffice to carry out the duties assigned.

The Dirlewanger Regiment is particularly prominent in that type of operations. It is composed almost exclusively of previously convicted criminals from Germany.

The Commissioner General in Minsk,
Signed: signature.

Enclosures.

*****************************************

The Commissioner General in Minsk,
Department I Political,

To the Chief of Main Department X
in the building.

Minsk
31 May 1943
[Stamp]
Personal Staff of Reich Leader SS
[Handwritten] 227.

I am submitting the following private communication for your information. Dr. Walkewitsch, the acting head of WSW came to me.

He was informed by Mr. Sakowitsch, the former territory head [Gebietsvorsitzender] of the WSW Minsk--County that on 27 May 1943 at 1400 hours the SS and/or Ukrainians had driven the inhabitants of Krjvsk together into two houses and afterward set fire to the houses so that those inside burned to death.

The same thing happened to the village of Krashyn on 24 May 1943. Both villages are located in the district of Woloshin of the Vilijka territory.

By Order:
Signed: Lange:

*************************************

[Stamp]
Personal Staff of Reich Leader SS
[Handwritten] 227
13 July 1943.

Od SSHA/Bo/Ra./VS-Journal No. 4479/43 secret.
Office of the Adjutant
Journal No. 2204/43 secret.

[Stamp]
Secret.

Office of the Adjutant
Journal No. 2204/43 secret.
To Ministerial Dirigent Dr. Braeutigam.
Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories,
Berlin W 35, Kurfuerstenstrasse 134.

Dear Doctor!

Thank you for turning over the files to me for inspection. I deeply regret that reports of this sort are being relayed unchecked, that much confusion is being stirred up and above all things that the confidence in close cooperation is being destroyed. In the case at hand it is my opinion that it would have been the duty of Commissioner General Kube to ascertain the accuracy of the reports to his satisfaction on the spot and then to get in touch with the competent SS and Police Leader, SS Brigadier General v. Gottberg, or with the Chief in charge of fighting partisans, SS Lieutenant General von dem Bach. [SS Lieutenant General von dem Bach-Zelewski. See excerpts from the testimony of defendant Berger, reproduced later in this section.] We can alter nothing here in any case, for you cannot give orders to a troop without personally having exact insight into the situation. Moreover, perhaps Mr. Kube's attention can still be called to the fact that for the most part these "criminals" are former Party Members who were formerly punished for poaching or for some stupid action, are now taken out and allowed to prove themselves, and this they do with an incredible percentage of bloody losses.

Heil Hitler!
Signed: Berger,
SS Lieutenant General.

****************************************

[Stamp]
Personal Staff of Reich Leader SS
[Handwritten] 227.

Note for SS Lieutenant General Berger:

The Reich Leader SS has received a report of the Commissioner General for Volhynia and Podolia. He requests that the Reich Minister of the East be informed that the campaign against the partisans is going quite according to schedule and Volhynia and Podolia will be the next on the list.

[Initial] B [Brandt],
SS General.

16 July 1943,
[Handwritten] Anti-partisan operations.

[David Thompson]

Document NO-4317, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). District of Columbia: GPO, 1952. pp. 523-525.

Translation of Document NO-4317, Prosecution Exhibit 2373.

The Commander of the Security Police and the SD White Ruthenia,
Minsk,
20 July 1943

[Stamp],
Personal Staff of the Reich Leader SS
Central Archives
No. Secret 102/22 [This report was given to defendant Berger who discussed the matter with Alfred Rosenberg. See Berger's letter of 18 August 1943 to Brandt, Document NO-4315, Prosecution Exhibit 2375, reproduced immediately below, where the file reference "No. Secret 102/22" is the same as the file reference of this note.].

File Memorandum:

On Tuesday, 20 July 1943, pursuant to orders, I arrested and subjected to special treatment [Sonderbehandlung] 70 Jews employed by the Commissioner for White Ruthenia.

On the same day at 10 o'clock I received a telephone call from the office of the Commissioner General that the Gauleiter [At this instance Kube is being referred to as "Gauleiter" evidently because he was at one time the Gauleiter of Brandenburg.] would like to see me at once. I complied with this request.

Although the outward appearance of the Gauleiter seemed to be calm, his manner of speaking betrayed that he was in a state of extreme excitement. He asked me how I dared arrest the Jews employed with him, I declared that I had received a strict order to carry out this action. He asked me for a written order. I replied that I was satisfied with an oral order since I had to carry out such an order as exactly as a written one. Gauleiter Kube emphasized then that this constituted a serious violation of his jurisdiction; the Jewish workers were subordinated to him and it was not permissible that the Reich Leader SS or Lieutenant General von dem Bach interfere with his jurisdiction as Commissioner.

But even beyond that point, he considered this measure to be a chicanery directed against him personally. If the Jews were eliminated from his office only and not from all offices of the Wehrmacht and other offices, he must regard this as a personal insult. He said that Lieutenant General von dem Bach had been his guest until 3 o'clock in the morning during his last stay in Minsk. During his present stay, however, he had not contacted him at all. He would have to assume therefore that in this connection the action against the Jews was meant to be a special insult against him. Of course, he could not arm his men in order to prevent the SD from carrying out the arrest. He therefore had to yield to the use of force. However, he did not want to leave any doubt open as to the fact that in future he would decline to cooperate with the police, especially with the Security Police, and he would also no longer permit that members of the Security Police should enter his official building in the future.

But if we wanted a fight, he could also act in a different manner. He is reminding us of the case of SS Captain Stark who had mistreated three White Ruthenian women in a sadistic way and had taken a suitcase with jewels and valuables to Berlin. I replied that the so-called Stark case took place before the time of my service in White Ruthenia, that I had investigated it anyhow and that there was no reason to initiate proceedings against Stark. The valuables had been delivered by Stark at the Main Office Economics and Building in accordance with an order of the Reich Leader. The Gauleiter declared that even that was unlawful, since the valuables should have been delivered to him. The Reich Leader was not entitled to issue such orders. I replied that I was not entitled to examine the orders of my Reich Leader with regard to their correctness. If the Reich Leader gave me an order, it was certain for me that he had the right to do so.

Kube asked me then whether I had cared with the same diligence for the transports of livestock to SS Lieutenant General Berger as I had cared for his Jews. I replied that I did not know anything about such transports of livestock. Kube thought this strange since, after all, it was the duty of the police to prevent such illegal procedures.

I emphasized that I could not understand how German men could quarrel because of a few Jews. I was again and again faced with the fact that my men and I were reproached for barbarism and sadism, whereas I did nothing but fulfill my duty. Even the fact that expert physicians had removed, in a proper way, the gold fillings from the teeth of Jews who were designated for special treatment had been made the topic of conversations. Kube replied that this method of our procedure was unworthy of a German man and of the Germany of Kant and Goethe. It was our fault that the reputation of Germany was being ruined in the whole world. It was also true, he said, that my men literally satisfied their sexual lust during these executions. I protested energetically against that statement and emphasized that it was regrettable that we, in addition to having to perform this nasty job, were also made the target of mud-slinging. That was the end of the conversation.

[Signed] Strauch, [Eduard Strauch was a defendant in the Einsatzgruppen case, volume IV, this series.]
SS Lieutenant Colonel.

[David Thompson]

Document NO-4315, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 525-526.

Translation of Document NO-4315, Prosecution Exhibit 2375.

The Reich Leader SS
Chief of the SS Main Office
Cd SS HA/Be/Ra/VS-Journal No. 5249/43 g
Adjutant's Office Journal No. 2612/43 g.

When replying, please quote above reference and date,

Berlin-Wilmersdorf 1
Hohenzollerndamm 31, Post Office Box 58
18 August 1943

[Stamp]
Personal Staff Reich Leader SS Archives
Files Ref. No. Secret/102/22

Secret.

To Reich Leader SS
Personal Staff, SS Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Brandt
Berlin SW 11
Prinz-Albrecht-Str.

Dear Doctor:

1. The file note returned after perusal and report to Reich Leader Rosenberg. [The file memorandum returned is indicated by the file reference "No. Secret 102/22." See the identical file reference on Strauch's report of 20 July 1943 on his conference with Kube. Document NO-4317, Prosecution Exhibit 2373, reproduced immediately above.] During the next few days Reich Leader Rosenberg will send Gauleiter Meyer to Minsk to give Kube a serious warning.

[Marginal handwritten note to 2] Filed under troop training ground.

2. Troop training ground Dondangen definitely approved by Rosenberg; also the proposition made by the Reich Leader SS that the Latvians to be settled there are to be accommodated en bloc in Latgalia [Latgalia or Latgale, is a province in eastern Latvia.] on well-sized plots of land and that the former inhabitants must evacuate Latgalia. I notified SS Brigadier General Dr. Kammler.

I request most urgently the return of the files which belong to the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories.

Heil Hitler!
Yours,
[Signed] G. Berger
SS Lieutenant General.

[Stamp] Personal Staff Reich Leader SS / Enclosures.
In on: 19 August 1943.
Journal No.: 36/207/43 g.
To: RF. 1
File note.
[Handwritten] Encl.

[David Thompson]

Document No-621, in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10. Vol. 13: United States of America v. Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. (Case 11: 'Ministries Case'). US Government Printing Office, District of Columbia: 1952. pp. 530-531.

Translation of Document No-621 [Photographic reproduction of this document appears in Appendix A, Volume XIV.], Prosecution Exhibit 2394.

The Reich Leader SS
Chief of the SS Main Office.
Berlin-Wilmersdorf 1
Hohenzollerndamm 31, Post Office Box 58.

Chief of the SS Main Office
Cd SSHA/Be/We.
Now: Berlin-Grunewald
Douglas Street 7/11.
19.10.43

Please quote the above reference and date in your reply.

Secret
Register No. 1026/43
Top Secret.
Adjutant's Office
Diary No. 566/43 Top Secret
3 copies 1st copy.

Subject: Staff Leader Schickedanz.
[Stamp] Top Secret.
[Initials] H. H. [Heinrich Himmler]

To the Reich Leader SS and Reich Minister of the Interior, Berlin SW 11 8, Prinz-Albrecht Street.

Reich Leader!

Staff Leader Schickedanz was once earmarked as Reich Resident [Reichsresident] for the Caucasus. In view of the continued withdrawal of the front, he now himself recognizes that his dream of becoming king of the Caucasian peoples is over.

Probably urged on by the unqualified conduct [unqualifiziertes Verhalten] of his wife, which has not yet been quite clarified, he now wishes to obtain an appointment at all costs and has applied for Minsk. Reich Leader Rosenberg is not averse to this and today stated that Reich Minister Dr. Lammers was in agreement with this suggestion and that in fact, if I heard correctly, the proposal would come from Lammers himself. This change of opinion is probably due to the unqualified conduct of my Special Kommando [meines Sonderkommandos] Dr. Dirlewanger, which--so far as I could ascertain--has behaved in a most unsatisfactory fashion in every respect [das sich jedenfalls-soweit ich feststellen konnte--in jeder Beziehung vorbei benommen hat].

Reich Leader Rosenberg, however, does not wish to submit this proposal to the Fuehrer until he is certain that Schickedanz is actually acceptable to the Fuehrer.

I should be particularly grateful if Reich Leader SS would inquire from Dr. Lammers, as to the latter's actual attitude toward the proposal.

I myself consider Schickedanz' appointment to Minsk unsuitable.

[Signed] G. Berger
SS Lieutenant General

[MilHist BT]

Does anyone know if the formal title of the "Braun Mappe" was Allgemeine Instruktion für alle Reichskommissar in der besetzten Ostgebieten, and if so did it apply in all three Reichskommissariate (Ostland, Ukraine, Kaukasus) or only in RK Ostland?

[MilHist BT]

Having difficulty learning about SS Nordhau Foundation. It was the Algemeines SS entity which owned and operated the home in Grossen-Wannsee where the 20Jan41 Wannsee Conference took place.

Was apparently spelled Nordhau and had no association with either Kzl Nordhausen or WVHA.

[Jonathan Harrison]

I would like to add three forms of documentation to this discussion that help to understand how the policy unfolded and escalated, using Galicia as an example. Firstly, we have the murder of the Lvov professors on 4 July 1942, as documented by Zygmunt Albert: http://www.lwow.home.pl/lwow_profs.html

Secondly, we have the diaries of Felix Landau, which are extracted in Omer Bartov (ed), "The Holocaust: Origins, Implementation, Aftermath", pp. 185-203. These describe numerous shootings of Jews during the Summer of 1941, in connection with the Forced Labour Program. Landau was given a life sentence by a Stuttgart court in 1962 for:

Shooting of 20 Jews, captured at random in the office of the Jewish council, as a reprisal for the escape of 17 Jewish forced laborers from a labor commando. Shooting of a Jewish forced laborer, whom the defendant noticed as he - the victim - interrupted his work

Court decision: http://www1.jur.uva.nl/junsv/brd/brdeng ... eng531.htm

Thirdly, the interrogation of Hans Krueger in Berlin in 1962 elicited this testimony:

“When the heads of the various branch offices were installed by the new commander in Lvov, Sturmbannfuehrer Tanzmann, specific areas were assigned, and then the guidelines for work were set down...Jews not suitable for deployment as laborers were to be shot. Since they realized that such shootings could not be organized overnight, the plan was that the residential area set aside for the Jews should be progressively reduced. The result was that a certain number of Jews had to be shot on a regular basis, because space was no longer available.”

Cited by Dieter Pohl in this study: http://yad-vashem.org.il/odot_pdf/Micro ... 202292.pdf

Krueger's evidence is crucial because it suggests that this infamous passage in the Wannsee Protocol, which was to be applied to labour deported from the General Government to the East, had already been implemented for Soviet Jews in mid-1941:

Able-bodied Jews, separated according to sex, will be taken in large work columns to these areas for work on roads, in the course of which action doubtless a large portion will be eliminated by natural causes.

The possible final remnant will, since it will undoubtedly consist of the most resistant portion, have to be treated accordingly, because it is the product of natural selection and would, if released, act as a the seed of a new Jewish revival (see the experience of history.)

http://remember.org/wannsee.html

These three forms of evidence suggest that, whilst the decision to kill all Soviet Jews may not have been taken until after July 1941, some key features of genocidal policy (liquidation of intellectuals, attrition through forced labour, gradual killing of those unfit or 'unwilling' to work) were already in place.

[michael mills]

Krueger's evidence is crucial because it suggests that this infamous passage in the Wannsee Protocol, which was to be applied to labour deported from the General Government to the East, had already been implemented for Soviet Jews in mid-1941:

The situation in Galicia cannot really be used as a model for assessing the development of German Government policy in relation to the Jewish population in conquered Soviet territory, since Galicia was transferred to the Generalgouvernement in August 1941, and thereafter the policy towards the Jewish minority in that territory followed the model of the policy developed toward Polish Jews rather than that towards Soviet Jews.

The German Government policy toward Soviet Jews which emerged in the summer of 1941 showed certain differences toward the policy toward Polish Jews which began to be implemented from early 1942 onward.

In conquered Soviet territory, the German policy was to physically destroy Jews regarded as dangerous, rather than Jews regarded as unfit for labour. At first the exterminatory policy applied to Jews holding positions in the governmental apparatus of the Soviet Union, but was soon extended to encompass all males of military age. Thus, the section of the Jewish population targeted for elimination was precisely that one which would have been most usable for labour, ie young, physically fit men.

That policy had a detrimental effect on the German requirment for labour services, as is shown by the December 1941 report of Dr Seraphim, quoted in preceding posts on this thread.

In the Generalgouvernment, the policy was the reverse. The group targeted for elimination was not defined by a putative security threat it posed, but by the degree of its "usefulness". From early in 1942, the German Government had decided to kill off the part of the Jewish population considered unusable for labour, estimated to be 60% of the total. The remaining 40% scheduled to be preserved for labour would consist of the younger, fitter elements, those that by definition would be more capable of posing a security threat to the German occupiers.

The result of the application of an exterminatory policy based on "usefulness" was revealed in the ghetto and camp uprisings in 1943, which were carried out by the Jewish population preserved for labour, ie the young, fit men and women, the unfit parts of the population having been killed in the extermination camps.

That was the opposite of the situation in occupied Soviet territory, where the part of the Jewish population most capable of resistance was killed off first.

The quoted evidence of Krueger applies to Galicia, which although conquered as part of Barbarossa was treated under the policy applied in the Generalgouvernment, and hence it cannot be seen as a model for the treatment of the Jewish population in occupied Soviet territory. The quoted policy did not apply to Soviet Jews but to Polish Jews, the Jews of Galicia being treated as the latter rather than as the former.

[Jonathan Harrison]

In the Generalgouvernment, the policy was the reverse. The group targeted for elimination was not defined by a putative security threat it posed, but by the degree of its "usefulness".

But a policy of killing "useless eaters" was also applied in Lithuania, as was revealed in the Ulm Tilsit trial verdict. The policy was instigated by the SS, which over-rode the wishes of the civilian authorities: http://p102.ezboard.com/frodohforumfrm1 ... =293.topic

There are also two secondary commentaries by experts on Nazi policy in Lithuania:

Christoph Dieckmann in "National Socialist Extermination Policies" (ed. Ulrich Herbbert), p.261: Hans Gewecke, the Regional Kommissar of Siauliai, ordered that Jewish women and children were to be shot by "Lithuanian police, overseen by Germans".

Helmut Langerbein, "Hitler's Death Squads: The Logic of Mass Murder", p.87, states that there was a battle for control of policy between the SS and civilian authorities in the region and that Boehme's order to kill "useless eaters" in August 1941 was imposed in order to prevent the civilian authorities taking over jurisdiction of the remaining Jews.

[Penn44]

The German Government policy toward Soviet Jews which emerged in the summer of 1941 showed certain differences toward the policy toward Polish Jews which began to be implemented from early 1942 onward.

In conquered Soviet territory, the German policy was to physically destroy Jews regarded as dangerous, rather than Jews regarded as unfit for labour. At first the exterminatory policy applied to Jews holding positions in the governmental apparatus of the Soviet Union, but was soon extended to encompass all males of military age. Thus, the section of the Jewish population targeted for elimination was precisely that one which would have been most usable for labour, ie young, physically fit men.

If the Germans killed Soviet Jews who were considered a security threat, Mills will you explain why they also killed women, children, and the elderly?

In the Generalgouvernment, the policy was the reverse. The group targeted for elimination was not defined by a putative security threat it posed, but by the degree of its "usefulness". From early in 1942, the German Government had decided to kill off the part of the Jewish population considered unusable for labour, estimated to be 60% of the total. The remaining 40% scheduled to be preserved for labour would consist of the younger, fitter elements, those that by definition would be more capable of posing a security threat to the German occupiers.

The temporary respite from destruction of a portion of Polish Jewry was merely a "triage" measure based on a near-term need for their labor. Those Polish Jews temporarily saved for labor were slated for eventual destruction as soon as they could be replaced by suitable Polish labor. The long-term goal was the physical destruction of all Polish Jews for racial "security" reasons, all in accordance with Nazi racial ideology.

That was the opposite of the situation in occupied Soviet territory, where the part of the Jewish population most capable of resistance was killed off first.

In the occupied Soviet east, some ghettos were created in which military age Jewish males were not eliminated for quite some time.

Penn44

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[David Thompson]

A post from Penn44 containing a personal remark about another poster was deleted by the moderator pursuant to many previous warnings -- DT.