1937. Lessons not learned.

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Dave Bender
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Dare not ignore foreign battleships

#16

Post by Dave Bender » 06 Jan 2011, 19:30

Land based naval airpower similiar to IJN 11th Air Fleet serves multiple purposes.
- Recon.
- Attack enemy surface warships.
- Attack enemy merchant shipping.
- ASW.

That's the smart way to deal with enemy battleships.

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phylo_roadking
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#17

Post by phylo_roadking » 06 Jan 2011, 19:55

Land based naval airpower similiar to IJN 11th Air Fleet serves multiple purposes.
- Recon.
- Attack enemy surface warships.
- Attack enemy merchant shipping.
This wasn't proved by 1937....and in fact, wasn't proved for much of 1939 or early 1940 either! The lesson from Norway was that while land based bombers could OCCASIONALLY hit waships...warships could manouver to avoid fall-of-ordnance. Look at the numbers of RN/french/Polish vessels NOT sunk off Norway by air attack, for instance - despite some instances of VERY heavy and repeated attack.
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Ironmachine
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#18

Post by Ironmachine » 06 Jan 2011, 20:48

In fact, most of the ships sunk by the Italians aircraft in 1937 (and during the whole SCW) were sunk while in port, so if a lesson was to be learned it was that a stronger anti-aircraft defense on land was needed, not that aircraft was a suitable weapon to attack enemy merchant shipping on open seas. :wink:

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This wasn't proved by 1937

#19

Post by Dave Bender » 06 Jan 2011, 23:05

Observations from a foreign war (i.e. Spanish Civil War) would be tested by realistic training exercises. If exercises substantiate observations then it gets written into military operational doctrine. That's how professional armed forces conduct business. The pre-WWI German Army raised this to a science. For example, observations from both the Boer War and the Russo-Japanese War were tested and then added to the 1906 Exerzier Reglement fur die Infanterie. The U.S. Army has operated in a similiar manner since the 1980s. Tactics refined at the National Training Center (in California) and other places are used to update army operational doctrine.

Why didn't naval officers take similiar action after observing commerce interdiction operations during 1937?

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mescal
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#20

Post by mescal » 06 Jan 2011, 23:55

Well, it seems actually that the Admiralty did learn from the Spanish civil war w/r to ASW work.

At least, that's what I infer from this quote from D.K. Brown (Atlantic Escorts, p11)
The bending of Asdic beams by layers of water of different density was known [...] though the full effect was probably not appreciated until the Spanish Civil War and Neutralit Patrols
Olivier

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phylo_roadking
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#21

Post by phylo_roadking » 07 Jan 2011, 00:07

Why didn't naval officers take similiar action after observing commerce interdiction operations during 1937?
In the RN and probably the French Navy's case....might this possibly be because the vast majority of senior officers had fought a REAL anti-submarine war as junior officers and midshipmen/cadets in the Great War? As noted above by Olivier - what had changed was the technology....not the importance of submarine interdiction of sea traffic as the Allies had learned it in 1914-18...

Oh - and they had conducted commerce interdiction too! Both by very successful submarine campaigns AND maritime blockade of Germany...
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Ironmachine
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#22

Post by Ironmachine » 07 Jan 2011, 00:28

Dave Bender wrote:Why didn't naval officers take similiar action after observing commerce interdiction operations during 1937?
Most commerce interdiction operations during 1937 and during the whole SCW were made by surface ships. The blockade of the national fleet was far more successful than any submarine campaign. That surely explains why there was no lesson to be learned regarding submarines.

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phylo_roadking
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#23

Post by phylo_roadking » 07 Jan 2011, 00:57

Quite correct; if anything - it would reinforce the opinion in the Royal Navy that they could simply reconstitute a WWI-style blockade of surface traffic into Europe...
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Dave Bender
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#24

Post by Dave Bender » 07 Jan 2011, 17:31

reinforce the opinion in the Royal Navy that they could simply reconstitute a WWI-style blockade of surface traffic into Europe
There's nothing wrong with that conclusion and in fact it proved correct. But what about the effectiveness of submarines and land based maritime attack aircraft?

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LWD
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#25

Post by LWD » 07 Jan 2011, 18:31

What about them? The data presented doesn't support much in the way of new conclusions from what I see.

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phylo_roadking
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#26

Post by phylo_roadking » 07 Jan 2011, 19:27

But what about the effectiveness of submarines
What was there left to to learn, as of 1937? 8O

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Batt ... e_Atlantic

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HMS_E11
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crolick
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#27

Post by crolick » 17 Jan 2011, 21:39

kgvm wrote:Which ships were sunk by the Italians?
I have the following:
09.02.37 "Navarra", Spain, cargo, 1.688 GRT, torpedoed off Tarragona by the submarine "Ferraris", beached, later scrapped
12.08.37 "Campeador", Spain, tanker, 7.932 GRT, torpedoed and sunk off Cape Bon by the destroyer "Saetta"
13.08.37 "Conde de Abasolo", Spain, cargo, 3.121 GRT, torpedoed and sunk off Sicily by the destroyer "Ostro"
15.08.37 "Geo. W. McKnight", Panama, tanker, 12.442 GRT, torpedoed off Sicily by the destroyer "Freccia", beached, later salved and repaired
15.08.37 "Ciudad de Cadiz", Spain, passenger, 3.946 GRT, torpedoed and sunk in the Aegean by the submarine "Ferraris"
18.08.37 "Armuru", Spain, cargo, 2.762 GRT, torpedoed and sunk in the Aegean by the submarine "Ferraris"
31.08.37 "Timiryazev", USSR, cargo, 2.151 GRT, torpedoed and sunk off Algeria by the destroyer "Turbine"
01.09.37 "Woodford", Great Britain, tanker, 6.987 GRT, torpedoed and sunk off Benicarlo (Spain) by the submarine "Diaspro"
03.09.37 "Blagoev", URSS, cargo, 3.100 GRT, torpedoed and sunk in the Aegean by the submarine "Settembrini"
If we include the "Navarra" sunk in February we have 9 ships (44.129 GRT) sunk by Italian naval units, but of which 4 (25.646GRT) were victims of destroyers!
How do you conclude by this numbers submarines are the most dangerous weapon??
Is there any list of sunk or damaged merchant vessels during Spanish Civil War? In my notes I have British STANCLIFFE damaged in March 1938 by torpedo from unknown submarine. I'm looking for any additional information on this attack.

kgvm
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#28

Post by kgvm » 17 Jan 2011, 22:50

There is a complete listing of all vessels captured or lost in R. González Echegaray, la marina mercante y el tráfico marítimo en la guerra civil. Damaged ships are not mentioned :-(

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Winston Churchill. Sep 1, 1938

#29

Post by Dave Bender » 20 Jan 2011, 17:07

This is per Patrick Buchanan. I assume he is quoting a WSC speach.
Aircraft will not be a mortal danger to properly equipped modern war fleets, whether at sea or lying in harbour under the protection of their own very powerful anti-aircraft batteries reinforced by those on shore....

This, added to the undoubted obsolescence of the submarine as a decisive war weapon, should give a feeling of confidence and security, so far as the seas and oceans are concerned, to the Western democracies.

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Mischa
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Re: 1937. Lessons not learned.

#30

Post by Mischa » 20 Jan 2011, 17:29

Hell,
my first post in the German Forum-Marinearchiv: 19 Oktober 2007, 17:38:08

sorry but in German, but it will not too difficult to translate it in English.

http://forum-marinearchiv.de/smf/index. ... l#msg70325

"Canarias“

Almirante Ferrandiz / Zerstörer / versenkt am 29. September 1936
San Antonio / Fischerboot / versenkt am 12. Oktober1936
Ioake / Frachter / Prise am 17 Oktober 1936
Marinero Cante / Wachboot / versenkt am 30. Oktober 1936
Manuel / Frachter / versenkt am 11. November 1936
Ciudadela / Passagier - und Frachtschiff. / Prise am 12. November 1936
Sac 4° / Frachter / versenkt am 17. November 1936
Czubar(Tschubar) / Kohlenschiff / Ladung beschlagnahmt am 26. November 1936
Komsomol / Frachter / versenkt am 14. Dezember 1936
Campuzcano / Tanker / Prise am 8. Januar 1937
Aya-Mendi / Frachter / gestrandet (? Könnte auch sein, daß dieser Frachter „gezwungen“ wurde, sich auf Strand zu setzen) am 11. Januar 1937
Joven Amalia / Fischerboot / versenkt am 4. Februar 1937
Joven Antonia / Fischerboot / versenkt am 4. Februar 1937
Galdames / Frachter / Prise am 5. März 1937
Nabarra / Begleitschiff / versenkt am 5. März 1937
Name unbekannt / Fischerboot / versenkt am 5. März 1937
Iyxas-Gain / Fischerboot / versenkt am 7. März 1937
Zerupe / Fischerboot / Prise am 7. März 1937
Miguel Parales / Fischerboot / Prise am 7. März 1937
Mar Cantabrico / Passagier – und Frachtschiff / Prise am 8. März 1937
Juan Jose / Fischerboot / Prise, Frühling 1937
La Primera / Fischerboot / Prise, Frühling 1937
Pedro / Schoner / versenkt am 22. Juli 1937
Siete Hermanos / Schoner / versenkt am 22. Juli 1937
Gloria / Fischerboot / versenkt am 22. Juli 1937
Rey Jaime II / Frachter / Prise am 17. September 1937
J.J. Sister / Frachter / Prise am 17. September 1937
Teide no. I / Fischerboot / versenkt am 10. Dezember 1937
Maria Soledad / Fischerboot / 22. Dezember 1937 – keine näheren Angaben
Dolores / Fischerboot / 22. Dezember 1937 – keine näheren Angaben
Ellinico Vouno / Frachter / Prise am 19. Mai 1938
Skworcow Stiepanow / Frachter / Prise am 26. Mai 1938
Czernow (Tschernow) / Tanker/ Prise am 3. Juli 1938
Adela / Wachboot / Prise am 29. Januar 1939.

Regards
Micha

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