JASDF, continuity of personnel ?

[Matteus]

Hello all,

Germany had a lot of continuties from eg Wehrmacht to Bundeswehr or even NVA, now i do wonder if this was the case for Japanese officers as well?

are there lists or websites somewhere who made it to the postwar armed forces?

(very) quick search brought up Genda Minoru, now is there some kind of "Japanese Heusinger, Röttiger, Foertsch" ?


kind Regards,


Matteus

EDIT: sorry this not really "Japan at War 1895 - 1945" but i think heres the best place to ask

[Peter H]

Fujiwara Iwaichi,commanded 1st Division JSDF 1964
viewtopic.php?f=65&t=116019

Sugita Ichiji,Chief of Staff JSDF 1960s.He can also be seen interviewed in the BBCs The World at War
viewtopic.php?f=65&t=78703

[Sewer King]

Three Imperial Navy submariners who went on to Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force, retiring as Captains: Tamagawa Yasuhiro, Saga Satoru, and Ueda Kazuo, who were key in the tracing of US submarine Wahoo's loss near Japan.

-- Alan

[hisashi]

When National Police Reserve was created in 1950, they hired many reserve officers because Japan had mobilized most highly educated Japanese males. They excluded professional officers and NCO in IJA and IJN. From 1951 to 1952, JSDF hired 1095 professional officers. In general, continuity was outstanding in all three SDF.

For JASDF, this chart would be helpful.

JASDF C of S
1st 1954-1956 ex-chief of Tokko department in Tokyo metropolitan police (Uemura Kentaro)
2nd 1956-1959 IJN staff officer
3rd 1959-1962 IJN pilot/staff officer (Genda Minoru)
4th 1962-1964 IJA Engineer officer
5th 1964-1966 IJA pilot/staff officer
6th 1966-1967 IJA pilot
7th 1967-1969 IJA pilot
8th 1969-1971 IJA staff officer....

Uemura was appointed because ex-IJA and ex-IJN staff confronted to appoint the first chief from their group.
After Uemura, the first CofS who was not officer of IJA nor IJN was appointed in 1986 as 18th C of S.

[Sewer King]

Maeda Tetsuo's book The Hidden Army: the Untold Story of Japan's Military Forces, translated from the Japanese by Steven Karpa and edited by David J. Kenney (edition q, 1995) is a readable if general account written from the author's journalistic approach. It seems well-researched and footnoted, and is one of the few book-length English-language accounts of the history of today's Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

From pages 25-35:

[chapter 3] The Return of Imperial Officers

When Keizo Hayashi became commandant of the Police Reserve, he at first encountered extraordinary personnel problems. A fight continued between ex-military men and Ministry of Home Affairs police officials over the appointment of upper-level officers to posts that were still vacant. Groups of imperial officers tried to insinuate themselves into the nucleus of Japan's new military. Men from the old national police force linked with men from the old Ministry of Home Affairs, such as Police Reserve Director Keikichi Masuhara, strongly opposed the imperial officers. Additionally, the Second Section of [MacArthur's] GHQ's General Staff Office (G2), which was responsible for Police Reserve recruitment, supported the ex-military group, while the Civil Affairs Section (G8) supported the former Ministry of Home Affairs group ...

...The most difficult issues facing the Police Reserve concerned civilian control of the military, a concept ... completely unfamiliar to the Japanese, and the question of whether to commission purged former officers of the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy in the officer corps ... whatever approach the [Yoshida cabinet] selected, major political problems were sure to arise in its wake.

... After the Japanese completed their crash study of civilian control, they applied it to the new military organization without particular resistance. When it came time to appoint the military's executive staff, however, and in particular someone to command the military, it was not so easy to patch together consensus. Even after the fomer imperial officers had abandoned hope of setting military policy, they stood firm on the subject of giving military orders and directing troops in the field. Major General Charles Willoughby, the head of the information department of the G2 Section, who had participated in the recruitment operations for the Police Reserve, had joined the military personnel operations as a strong supporter of the ex-military men. An officers group represented by Colonel Takushiro Hattori, who had been the strategic operations chief of the Imperial Army general staff and secretary to Army Minister Hideki Tojo, worked frenetically to convince General Willoughby to inject the old military traditions into the new military.

Major General Willoughby was one of the Bataan Gang, who had been with MacArthur from Melbourne to Tokyo ... He had been charged by MacArthur with editing his war history as a sideline to his regular work as head of G2 in dismantling Japanese military institutions and demobilizing the troops. Colonel Hattori was Willoughby's Japanese counterpart in organizing Japanese war history materials ...

As Willoughby envisioned the Police Reserve, the general staff officers group led by Hattori would control the executive staff of the military heirs of the Japanese Imperial Army. Since GHQ had spared Colonel Hattori and other old soldiers from being purged by garaging them in the military history section of the Demobilization Bureau, their case was stronger. Willoughby ordered Hattori to select four hundred high-ranking officers from the old Imperial Army for the Police Reserve. The new chief-fo-staff, naturally, was to be none other than Takushiro Hattori.

To his astonishment, Masuhara had learned from Hattori himself that he was being undercut in his position as director. And so:

... he informed Prime Minister Yoshida of the plot being planned by Willoughby and the Hattori group. Yoshida had opposed the use of ex-imperial officers from the start. He had been incarcerated by the military police as a suspected member of an antimilitary movement during the Tojo administration; consequently, the idea of a man like Hattori, who had been a secretary to Prime Minister Tojo becoming a member of the executive staff of the Police Reserve probably seemed absurd. Domestic and international concern that a rearmament had begun under militarists from the past was sure to follow. Yoshida turned to the only person he knew who could control Major General Willoughby, and that was MacArthur himself. Through direct negotiation, a decision was reached to eliminate Hattori, and on August 9 [1950], the government specifically announced, under the name of Director Masuhara, that the former officers who were being supported by G2, including Hattori, would not be appointed. On the 18th, it was publicly announced that no purged officer would be appointed to the executive staff.

A Home Affairs official, Keizo Hayashi was named to the position of the Police Reserve's first commandant, in spite of his own reluctance as well as that of Willoughby. Yoshida and Masuhara encouraged him to take the post. In it he oversaw the transition from Police Reserve to Ground Self-Defense Force, later serving as its first chief-of-staff and Joint Staff Chairman.

Nevertheless,

Despite the strong effort to exclude former members of the imperial military and to break all ties to militarist tradition, that policy quickly failed. Whenever the former officers lost one battle, they began waiting for their next chance. They lobbied the Occupation army to depurge them. The former imperial officers moved step by step to establish themselves in the new military organization, advancing in tempo with the Police Reserve's move from carbine rifles and machine guns to bazookas and tanks.

The permanent exclusion of former imperial officers failed for two reasons. First, the war in Korea had become more intense. With the entry of communist China into the war, the importance placed by America on its bases in Japan and on Japanese rearmament grew. The Police Reserve became more military than ever. That made it more difficult to ignore the much-needed skills of former military men. GHQ began to change its attitude toward depurging ex-military men.

Second, though line and staff for the new military were clearly delineated by the use of former Ministry of Home Affairs and police officials, the defense bureaucracy adopted a strongly deferential attitude toward line officers in military affairs. The police knew nothing about operating tanks and attacking fortifications, and it would be some time before new officers could be trained. The Cold War was not slowing down; the Police Reserve needed fighting ability immediately. With GHQ softening its stance, the idea of commissioning former imperial officers resurfaced at the end of 1950 ... GHQ achieved an understanding with the former imperial officers [despite initial lack of respect between Police and military] ...

... the government abandoned its guiding plan to not commission former imperial regular officers for at least one year. Prime Minister Yoshida approved this opening of the door, but only with the proviso that every individual be subjected to a thorough investigation.

First the fifty-eighth class of the Military Academy and the seventy-fourth class of the Naval Academy, who held the rank of second lieutenant or ensign at the end of the war, were depurged in November 1950. Two hundred and forty-five of them, the first crop of officers, were commissioned as reserve officers on June 1, 1951. To reinforce the upper and middle classes of officers of the Police Reserve Headquarters, army colonels and majors and navy captains and commanders with exceptional experience in military affairs, tactics, and leadership began to be admitted in August 1951. Around this time, Director Masuhara and Personnel Bureau secretary [Eizo] Ishii made their appeal for cooperation to the Military Academy class secretaries. As a result seventeen hundred letters of invitation were issued; nine hundred officers replied. On October 1, a total of 408 qualifiers entered service.

The commissioning of former imperial officers into the officer corps continued thereafter. In 1952, the Police Reserve was opened to colonels, majors, captains, and commanders who had graduated from the Military Academy and the War College. Even some who had been decision makers in directing the war in the Military Affairs Office and General Staff Headquarters in the Army Ministry were accepted for military service upon a special recommendation. This prerogative did not extend as far as admitting men like Colonel Takushiro Hattori, but some members of the Hattori group were commissioned, including Colonel Susumu Nishiura, who [had been] secretary to Army Minister Tojo and chief war historian for the Defense Agency, and Colonel Iwaichi Fujiwara, who was head of the first division of the Self-Defense Forces. The defense bureaucracy also welcomed Colonel Ichiji Sugita, who was Seventeenth Area Army general staff and Fourth Ground SDF chief of staff, and Colonel Kumao Imoto, who [had also been] secretary to [Tojo] ...

In the end, more than five thousand regular officers who had graduated from the former imperial military schools entered the military in the Police Reserve and the early Self-Defense Force years. They continued to have a major impact on the military in Japan for the next thirty-six years, until the last member to come from the former Imperial Army, chairman of the joint staff council Shigehito Mori, retired in 1987. Mori graduated in the sixtieth, and last, class of the Imperial Military Academy, [and had] entered the Police Reserve in 1950 ...

The author goes on to cover the constitutional dispute over the development of new military forces, including that of the Maritime Patrol Force which became the Maritime SDF.

-- Alan

[Peter H]

I recall a japanese air ace flying for the JSDF in the late 1950s,dying in a crash?

Some photos of the National Police Reserve/"Japanese Army" 1951 can be seen here:
http://images.google.com/images?q=japan ... rce%3Alife

[Zaf1]

Were any wartime Japanese weapons or equipments still in use in post war by Japanese military?

[hisashi]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JDS_Wakaba_(DE-261)

Japanese wikipedia says JMSDF used 25 IJN Auxiliary subchasers (135 tons) .

http://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E7%AC%AC% ... 9%E8%89%87

[Peter H]

Were any wartime Japanese weapons or equipments still in use in post war by Japanese military?

http://www.drc-jpn.org/AR-5E/shigemura-e.htm

"...JSDF were equipped with US weapons from the start point..".

I assume they mean individual and crew served light weapons as well.

In 1957 they adopted the Type 64 Assault Rifle
http://world.guns.ru/assault/as88-e.htm

[Mostlyharmless]

Were any wartime Japanese weapons or equipments still in use in post war by Japanese military?

According to Nishida's site http://homepage2.nifty.com/nishidah/e/s_index.htm, several Ukuru class escorts (kaibokan) (displacement 940t standard, 1004t trial including Ukuru (renamed Satsuma), Ikuna (renamed Ojika), Shinnan (renamed Tsugaru), Chikubu (renamed Atsumi) and Shiga (renamed Kojima) remained in various types of Japanese government service such as weather ships until the sixties. The largest warship to return to service was the Tachibana class destroyer Nashi (displacement 1289t standard, 1555t trial), which was sunk in 1945 by air attack, refloated in 1954 and recommissioned in the JMSDF as Wakaba in 1956. However, a larger merchant type hull (a 2TM type standard design) was also recommissioned.

Another source for pilots is "Japanese naval aces and fighter units in World War II" by Ikuhiko Hata and Yasuho Izawa which mentions if the ace resumed service.

[Sewer King]

Were any wartime Japanese weapons or equipments still in use in post war by Japanese military?

The early JGSDF later standardized the M1 Garand rifle, as did the early West German Bundeswehr around the same time. I would have thought that the disarmament of Japan destroyed most stocks of wartime ammunition, so that the rifles for them would have been of almost no practical use. Only communist China kept up limited manufacture of Japanese ammunition in Manchuria, to supply those of her troops fighting in Korea armed with the matching rifles.

But, according to Smith and Smith's Small Arms of the World 9th edition (Stackpole Press, 1973), page 495 [bold my emphasis]:

The JGSDF [was] mainly equipped with U.S. caliber .30 M1 rifles and carbines. A limited number of 7.7mm Type 99 rifles were in service until recently...

Would these few Type 99s have been for parade and ceremonial use? For this same purpose the Bundeswehr kept Kar 98k rifles, the Americans some selected M1 Garands and M14s, the Soviets some SKS carbines. Such parade arms are often well-polished and decoratively chromed in part, or have white slings etc.

=============================

This photo of Police Reserve troops in ranks shows the nearest man with an M1 carbine slung, as told by the attachment band for an M4 bayonet at its muzzle. The pocketed cartridge belts worn here and in others of the LIFE series of photos look like domestic make rather than the American issue, which was meant mainly for rifle clips anyway.

Except for their weapons and cartridge belts these men seem little different from their IJA predecessors in winter field dress. Presumably they wore American M1 steel helmets from early times?

The M1 carbine had some mixed reception among its American users, but it was liked by many postwar Asian troops because of its lighter weight and lower recoil compared to the M1 Garand rifle. In his book as quoted above, Maeda Tetsuo made passing reference to Police Reserve use of carbines.

Here too we see that Police Reserve troops at least continued using the Imperial Army's mess kit, which I think continued well on into the modern JGSDF.

=============================

Two of the IJA officers mentioned by Maeda -- Colonel Hattori Tetsushiro and Lt. Colonel Imoto Kumao -- were part of the Hattori faction seeking the Police Reserve staff posts in postwar Japan. Both had been on the Imperial GHQ Army General Staff's Operations Section (also known as 2nd Section) on 8 December 1941.

(cited from Toshikazu Ohmae's "Personnel Study," in Goldstein and Dillon's The Pacific War Papers: Japanese Documents of World War II (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2004), page 102)

A Colonel Fujiwara Iwaichi was also named with the Hattori group. Was he part of the old Fujiwara family, which I understand carried some importance in Japan?

Maeda's full account of staffing the National Police Reserve and the early Self-Defense Forces is more factional than just what I quoted earlier. Since his is one of the few such English-language books on the subject, and a translation besides, I wonder if there are other Japanese sources that might differ

-- Alan

[Peter H]

It appears that Sherman tanks were used in the 1950s,replaced by the M41 in 1961.

From: http://www.arms-cool.net/forum/viewthread.php?tid=22074

M41s,note tankers with helmets similar to IJA days

[Sewer King]

From a capsule history of Japan's interim use of Sherman tanks and M24 Chaffees,, as shown above:

After World War II, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (A.K.A. GHQ in Japan) ceased all military manufacturing and development plants in Japan, making Japan lose the technology to build and manufacture tanks and armoured vehicles (even though the technology was not well developed.) However, due to the Korean War, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers ordered Japan to re-militarize, forming armed police forces (National police reserve, later called National security force, then finally Japan ground self defence force) and provided M4A3E8 Sherman and M24 Chaffee tanks. However, the average height of a Japanese person at the time was too small for the M4A3E8, and drivers had difficulty reaching the clutch pedal with their foot. In addition, the M4 was becoming obsolete. The M24, though it was popular amongst the Japanese crews, was inadequate when facing Soviet T-34/85s, as seen in Korea. Thus, as the tanks in JGSDF service at the time were obsolete/inadequate, the JGSDF was provided with the option of either purchasing the new American built M46 and M47 tanks or develop their own MBT in 1954. Due to the high cost of purhcasing american made tanks, and because the M47 did not meet their requirements, the JGSDF decided on developing their own main battle tank, resulting in the development of the Type 61.

The early JGSDF preference for the M24 light tank over the M4 Sherman medium sounds somewhat like that of the M1 carbine over the M1 rifle. It would be natural, since the ergonomics of tank driving can be more troublesome than that of firing a rifle.

As a matter for comparison the same problem has been mentioned for Western tankmen, but in reverse -- where tall German and American crews had trouble driving cramped, low-profile Soviet tanks. One wrote that "you don't really climb into the T-72 -- you more or less put it on, like steel coveralls ...” (Hans Halberstadt, Inside the Great Tanks [Windrow & Greene, 1997], page 114)

==============================

JGSDF tanker's coveralls and helmet do resemble the Imperial issue. The one-piece goggles and pistol belt are American-style. But the latter has bright-metal hardware that seems distinctive in JGSDF web equipment through at least the 1980s, to tell from contemporary photos.

==============================

The IJN had specialized air-sea rescue auxiliaries of 100-300 tons in service before the Pacific War. Up to sixteen of these survived to be transferred to the JMSDF as patrol ships, with three others transferred to the ROK Navy and some few remainders to civilian use. (A.J. Watts, Japanese Warships of World War II [Doubleday & Co, 1966], pages 357-359)

– Alan