Shattered Sword - Opinions?

[Rob Stuart]

Actually all six of them are relevant to IJN carrier tactics, since they all address the question of Fuchida's reliability as a source.

You've ruled out that conclusion apriori by stating that you do not believe Fuchida lied. As this is the case there is no reason to delve into the matter further. Since you nor I believe Fuchida was a pathological liar, there is no other link between the books, and God's Samurai therefore has nothing to say about the accuracy or inaccuracy of Midway. The way Fuchida wrote Midway was completely different than the way GS was written. Dissimilar methodology = no link.

Glenn, your response is one of the least logical statements I've ever read. How can you possibly argue that if Fuchida did not lie about X then his account must be accurate? This makes no sense whatsoever. There are other reasons why his accounts may be wrong. You've gave one of them yourself when you said the following:

It may be very possible that Fuchida made errors in Midway, for example, not remembering which commader led each and every attack in the first six months of a war that had occurred a decade earlier. is in fact very likely.

How can you possibly argue that there is no link between the two books? God's Samurai is based on Fuchida's accounts of what happened. Your dismissal of it as having no bearing on Fuchida's reliability as a source is not something a real historian would do.

[CharlesRollinsWare]

... snipped...
Your dismissal of it as having no bearing on Fuchida's reliability as a source is not something a real historian would do.

Rob;

You just answered your own question, my friend.

MArk

[glenn239]

How can you possibly argue that if Fuchida did not lie about X then his account must be accurate?

If Fuchida did lie about, for instance, the Missouri incident, then this may be relevant or irrelevant to his reliability about Midway depending on why he lied about Missouri. That is because, except for pathological liars, people tend to tell the truth and lie only when necessary. So, if (a) Fuchida is a pathological liar or (b) the reason Fuchida lied about Missouri (if he actually did) is similar to the reason he might lie in his book about Midway, then there might be a correlation. Otherwise there is probably no connection.

Your dismissal of it as having no bearing on Fuchida's reliability as a source is not something a real historian would do.

In God's Samurai Fuchida doesn't seem to care how close Nagumo was to launching his grand counterstrike, nor did he care to make claims about the exact status of the other carriers when disaster struck. If Shattered Sword's theories of Fuchida were correct, I'd expect to break open God's Samurai and see Fuchida going on and on for pages how close Nagumo was to winning the battle and how heroic Fuchida was when Akagi was hit. After all liars that lie for personal gain lie for personal gain, right? But Fuchida does not do this. Shattered Sword’s theory on Fuchida’s motives is therefore wrong.

[rob0274]

In the chapter they entitle 'the Fallacious Five Minutes,' P&T write,

"While such accounts [given by pilots reporting presence of aircraft aboard Japanese carriers] must be given due consideration, they must also be weighed against the authoritative written evidence that is available."

Parshall, Jonathan; Tully, Anthony (2005-11-30). Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (p. 231). Potomac Books. Kindle Edition.

They then go on to cite other accounts given by other pilots. Anyone care to guess as to what this "authoritative written evidence" might be? Aside from cherry-picked pilots reports, P&T cites only to Senshi Sosho and to Nagumo's AAR in the relevant section.

I am doubtful of the value of Senshi Sosho, or at least doubtful that it is "official history" as P&T refer to it as. Maybe in some literal sense it is, but in practical terms it appears to be an annals compilation kept by the Japanese military, thus more a contemporary source to investigate rather than representing current authoritative academic consensus.

I am also curious as to why P&T cut off their citation of Nagumo's report at Agaki's 10:10 recovery of the fighters. The very same document states that Akagi begin preparing torpedo planes for launch at 10:11. Perhaps the aircraft had not been completely spotted, but why should that preclude at least some aircraft being ready to launch? Yet P&T state that "in fact" spotting of strike aircraft "probably" did not even begin. A hilarious conjunction, if ever.

They refer also to: "the cold, hard data recorded in the individual Japanese carrier action reports[.]"

Parshall, Jonathan; Tully, Anthony (2005-11-30). Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (p. 231). Potomac Books. Kindle Edition.

No citation is provided for this cold, hard data; they don't even tell you what they are, or give any description or lead of any kind. P&T had such a wealth of cold, hard data and authoritative written evidence to support their argument with, yet the chapter Fallacious Five Minutes is almost entirely speculation based on CAP launch and recovery times. It is a curious thing that this book is taken seriously.

[CharlesRollinsWare]

...snipped...

I am also curious as to why P&T cut off their citation of Nagumo's report at Agaki's 10:10 recovery of the fighters. The very same document states that Akagi begin preparing torpedo planes for launch at 10:11. Perhaps the aircraft had not been completely spotted, but why should that preclude at least some aircraft being ready to launch? Yet P&T state that "in fact" spotting of strike aircraft "probably" did not even begin. A hilarious conjunction, if ever.
...snipped...

I can answer this - assuming you want an accurate answer. Because there were no other aircraft launches or recoveries from Akagi after 1010 until 1026 when 1 (of 3) A6Ms was launched immediately before the bomb (singular in the proper (i.e., IJN) translation viz USN translation) hit. Hiryu launched 3 A6Ms for CAP at 1013 and Soryu followed with 3 A6Ms at 1015. The Nagumo report of Air operations is copying the launch/recovery times of all flights and notes general times of action. It says NOTHING of readying. Carriers - US, RN, IJN, and French - logged takeoff and landing times. US carriers often logged number of aircraft - by type - in spots at the time the spot was completed. RN logged ranges the same. IJN records note spots only as part of the takeoff times as far as I have observed via translations (1941-42). This is also true of Zuikaku, Shokaku, Ryujo, Zuiho, and Shoho.

Mark

[glenn239]

Rob0274 - I am also curious as to why P&T cut off their citation of Nagumo's report at Agaki's 10:10 recovery of the fighters. The very same document states that Akagi begin preparing torpedo planes for launch at 10:11.

The NR says for 10:11

0711 Akagi swings around to place the starboard group of torpedo planes to her stern.

That’s referring to Yorktown's VT-3 inbound, not to Akagi’s own planes.

They then go on to cite other accounts given by other pilots. Anyone care to guess as to what this "authoritative written evidence" might be? Aside from cherry-picked pilots reports, P&T cites only to Senshi Sosho and to Nagumo's AAR in the relevant section.

The US pilots gave conflicting testimony as to what happened and like every other book on Midway, Shattered Sword had to prioritize between the differing versions because if you don’t you can’t even start with a reconstruction. SS favors Best over McClusky and VB-3. This is not an editorial bias, it’s an analytical tool to establish a working model. That being said, an example of a cherry-picked reference might be Lundstrom from BSCA, where in order to cite that VB-3's attack did not hit a carrier with a deck park, he referenced to an obscure TF-16 communications log for June 7th. But VB-3's official report from June 10th that says,

"....believed to be the Akagi. It's flight deck was covered with planes spotted aft".

Rob asked why bother with Fuchida. I can't tell when an eyewitnesses should and shouldn't be considered. All Fuchida did is cue me to look at old news with a fresh set of eyes. If Fuchida's version doesn't stand up after wracking my brains out to make it work, then I'll set it aside and consider some other guesses from 30 or 50 years later.

I am doubtful of the value of Senshi Sosho, or at least doubtful that it is "official history" as P&T refer to it as.

Again, analytical doctrine. Fuchida is one Japanese primary eyewitness source. The official history is another valid source and they are different. It is a valid technique to weigh one over the other. I veer the opposite way, weighing Fuchida with more value because he was there and the official historians were not. Why? The Morison vs. Fletcher debate – who in the end proved more accurate in the facts of that kerfuffle?

[Wellgunde]

I am doubtful of the value of Senshi Sosho, or at least doubtful that it is "official history" as P&T refer to it as. Maybe in some literal sense it is, but in practical terms it appears to be an annals compilation kept by the Japanese military, thus more a contemporary source to investigate rather than representing current authoritative academic consensus.

Senshi Sōsho is certainly an “official history” considering that it was written by the Japanese Defense Agency, the predecessor to the current Japanese Defense Ministry. It is not a contemporay “annals” as you refer to it but a legitimate historical record comparable in scope and content to the U.S. Army’s “Green Books.”

Writing began in the early fifties with the first volume published in 1958 and the last of the 102 released in 1980. It was written by academic historians and former officers of the Imperial Japanese forces who made use of interviews, diaries, and such written records and official documents as were available to them at the time. Like any historical work, it is a product of its time and place.

[glenn239]

Rob0274 am also curious as to why P&T cut off their citation of Nagumo's report at Agaki's 10:10 recovery of the fighters. The very same document states that Akagi begin preparing torpedo planes for launch at 10:11.

This doesn't pertain to Akagi, but here

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USS ... IJO-1.html

Then air officer Amagi was on the Kaga and was interrogated in October 1945. The preamble (which no doubt will have been taken from Amagi's background description) states in part,

Four direct hits were received by the Kaga from the dive bombers just prior to turning into the wind to launch the Kaga's air group (6 VF had been launched two hours before as CAP). The fires as a result of the attack ignited planes and ammunition which resulted in the sinking of the Kaga during the afternoon with the loss of 800, saving 1000 personnel.

Amagi also states,

Q. What was purpose of ALEUTIAN attack?
A. It was a feint.

Q. Were planes on board when ship was hit?
A. Yes, about 30 planes in hangar loaded and fueled, remainder on deck, six VF in air.

(27+18+18-30-6 = about 27 planes stated to be on the flight deck).
.

[CharlesRollinsWare]

Try reading the aircraft records from the ship (i.e., Kaga). She carried 21 of her own A6M2s and six from the 6th Ku. The 6th Ku pilots did not fly - thus, while the ship carried 27 fighters, no more than 21 could be used as only 21 pilots were available. One A6M2 and pilot were lost over Midway, leaving 20. At 1000 hours she made he last launch - six A6M2s. That put 15 in the air on CAP. with one having been lost, this left 5 pilots and 5 own planes on the ship (excluding the 6 carried as cargo). During the "Great CAP" 5 of the 15 Kaga A6Ms were shot down, leaving 10 in the air, all of which landed on Hiryu by 1130 hours.

Those in the air were:

4th Watch: launch @ 0830 6 VT, 6 VB
PO1c Yamamoto Akira nco24 recovered 1130, HIRYU
*PO1c Hirayama Iwao nco38 shot down, Great CAP, 1006-1040
Sea1c Nakaue Takahashi nco53 recovered 1130, HIRYU

5th Watch, 1st Shotai: launch @ 0920 15 VT, 5 VB
Lt. Iizuka Masao 34off recovered 1130, HIRYU
PO1c Suzuki Kiyonobu nco28 recovered 1130, HIRYU
PO1c Nagahama Yoshikazu ko2 recovered 1130, HIRYU

5th Watch, 2nd Shotai: launch @ 0920 4 VT, 1 VB
*PO2c Sawano Shigeto nco46 shot down, Great CAP, 1006-1040
Sea1c Egawa Yoshio nco53 recovered 1130, HIRYU
*Sea1c Takahashi Ei-ichi nco53 shot down, Great CAP, 1006-1040

5th Watch, 3rd Shotai: launch @ 1000 2 VT, 9 VB
PO1c Ogiwara Tsugio nco30 recovered 1130, HIRYU
PO2c Kaneko Ichiro otsu8 recovered 1130, HIRYU

5th Watch, 4th Shotai: launch @ 1000 several VT, 6 VB
*Ens. Yamaguchi Hiroyuku otsu1 shot down, Great CAP, 1006-1040
PO3c Bando Masahi nco48 recovered 1130, HIRYU

5th Watch, 5th Shotai: launch @ 1000 several VT, 3 VB
PO1c Toyoda Kazuyoshi ko1 bailout, Great CAP, 1006-1040
Sea1c Takaoka Matsutaro nco54 recovered 1130, HIRYU


So ... those last CAP fighters were launched at 1000. The ship was bombed at 1024 .... Now I will freely admit that the last recovery of any aircraft by the ship was during the period when the Midway Strike was recovered - this saw the CAP reshuffled as well. Thereafter the ship responded with the launches above. That said, the ship was under torpedo attack - and radically maneuvering - from 0935 to 1010. The fighters launched at 1000 were in direct response to the closeness of the TBDs of VT-6's 1st division ...

... how sure are you that the Japanese were ranging those fully armed strike planes during that attack ??? After all, it is customary to range fully armed and fueled aircraft in all navies in 1942 right ... WRONG

But heck, when facts conflict with the legend .. print the legend right?

[glenn239]

Sourcing for the statement that Kaga was about to launch a strike group when bombed is the summary report of the interrogation of Amagi, INTERROGATION NAV NO. 1 USSBS NO. 6, 6 October 1945 at link previously given.

OP may have otherwise been under an impression from Shattered Sword or other sources that none of the USSBS interviews with Midway survivors corroborated USN dive bomber accounts (McClusky, Klein in this instance) of strike aircraft spotted on deck.

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

Mr. Horan wrote : " That said, the ship was under torpedo attack - and radically maneuvering - from 0935 to 1010. The fighters launched at 1000 were in direct response to the closeness of the TBDs of VT-6's 1st division ..."

However, if you study the movements of the carriers of the Midway Strike Group while under air attack, it quickly becomes apparent that the IJN had two different tactics for dealing with air attacks: In the case of high altitude level bombing or dive bombing attacks, the response was to put the ships into tight circles. In the case of torpedo attacks, the carriers would place their sterns to the approaching torpedo bombers and race at full speed directly away from the attackers.

Thus, when VT3 was sighted, it was likely that both Kaga and Akagi turned away from the TBDs and made a straight line run, just as the Hiryu did. Then, when the McCluskey's and Best's SBDs were sighted, the helms were immediately put hard over and the ships went into tight circling turns.

Thus, there was a period where the Kaga and Akagi were NOT maneuvering radically, but were rather running in a course which, in the case of the Akagi, was approximately NNW.

The timing of Hiryu's launch indicates that she was spotting her aircraft during the attack.
Nagumo ordered the spotting of the strike as soon as the CAP Zeros were recovered, which was at 10:10. Fuchida, and many others describe Akagi's deck as having strike aircraft on deck. In fact, numerous sources, Japanese and American, describe decks loaded with aircraft.

"....believed to be the Akagi. It's flight deck was covered with planes spotted aft".


The sole evidence that no strike was on deck? The lack of a Akagi Kodochosho describing the spotting of the strike starting at 10:10 ! This is the cornerstone of Messrs. Parshall and Tully's assertion that Fuchida was a liar.

But this is easily explained by the simple fact that the SBD attack took place while the Strike Kodochosho was being prepared, and so the kodochosho was neither completed nor archived, and in fact, might even have been destroyed by the conflagration on the flight deck during the attack.


This is the essence of Messrs. Parshall and Tully's error: They have mistaken the ' Absence of Evidence ' for an ' Evidence of Absence '. It is a common mistake, I have seen it in industry a number of times.

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[Rob Stuart]

Q. What was purpose of ALEUTIAN attack?
A. It was a feint.

The whole idea that AL was a feint makes no sense. The purpose of a feint is to send the enemy in the wrong direction, or to keep him where he is instead of going to the right place, or do something else which will be to your advantage. The Japanese wanted the US fleet to go to Midway, so that it could be destroyed, but did not want it to arrive too soon, i.e., before Midway was taken. The results of a feint attack on Dutch Harbor the day before the attack on Midway would have been counterproductive, given the geography. If Nimitz had ordered his carriers to sail to Dutch Harbor as soon as news of the attack on it had been received, and they had been able to depart by nightfall, at dawn on 4 June they would have been no more than 200 miles north of Oahu. From 200 miles north of Oahu the distance to Midway is actually slight less than from Pearl Harbor, plus you're already at sea and can immediately head for Midway, instead of having to make whatever preparations would have been necessary before sailing. In other words, if AL were a feint and if it worked, then the US carriers would arrive off Midway earlier than otherwise, and not later. Why make a feint attack if it's likely to result in the enemy reacting more quickly than you want? To put it another way, if it had really been a feint it would have been made three or four days before the attack on Midway, to give the US carriers time to reach the Aleutians and be too far away to interfere in MI prematurely.

All in all, it's far more plausible that AL was simply a subsidiary operation, as suggested in Shattered Sword, than a feint.

[CharlesRollinsWare]

Hello All ;

Mr. Horan wrote : " That said, the ship was under torpedo attack - and radically maneuvering - from 0935 to 1010. The fighters launched at 1000 were in direct response to the closeness of the TBDs of VT-6's 1st division ..."

... snipped ...

In the case of torpedo attacks, the carriers would place their sterns to the approaching torpedo bombers and race at full speed directly away from the attackers.

Thus, when VT3 was sighted, it was likely that both Kaga and Akagi turned away from the TBDs and made a straight line run, just as the Hiryu did. Then, when the McCluskey's and Best's SBDs were sighted, the helms were immediately put hard over and the ships went into tight circling turns.

Thus, there was a period where the Kaga and Akagi were NOT maneuvering radically, but were rather running in a course which, in the case of the Akagi, was approximately NNW.

...snipped ...

Ahem ... What you "know" .... is worthless without applying it to the tactical situation on hand ... The attack on Kaga was executed far differently than VT-8's earlier attack. VT-6 deployed into two divisions which attempted to execute an anvil torpedo attack on Kaga. This was largely foiled by expert maneuvering by Kaga's captain. While he certainly attempted to show his stern to the closest attackers, by the very nature of the attack, he could not show the ships stern to both groups. Thus, he maneuvered "radically" over a widely spaced "question mark" course. That said, at least four of the surviving 5 pilots indicated they fired their fish on the ships beam or abaft her beam.

This attack ended at 1010, and saw Kaga much farther to the SW than any of the other three carriers. She then steamed to rejoin Akagi. I am not aware of any source that claims Kaga ever saw VT-3 [certainly VT-3 never saw her nor, for that matter, did the two surviving crews make any note of Akagi - their eyes were fixed on their designated target] - and why would she? she was miles to the SW of Akagi and closing and VT-3 was to the NE of Akagi flying a course towards Hiryu - which was far away from Akagi.

Further if Akagi and Kaga were steaming away from VT-3, why to the dive bomber crews place them on another course?

Whatever

Mark

[CharlesRollinsWare]

Q. What was purpose of ALEUTIAN attack?
A. It was a feint.

The whole idea that AL was a feint makes no sense.

...snipped

Considering that is what common sense (as you pointed out) says, is what the Japanese - and SS - have said for years ...

... the fact that many Japanese told US interviewers what they indicated (or what they thought) they wanted to hear being a known fact ...

... your statement above statement is true for any serious researcher ...

...those that want to rewrite history do not, however, fall into this group ...

Mark

[glenn239]

Mark

- This attack ended at 1010, and saw Kaga much farther to the SW than any of the other three carriers. She then steamed to rejoin Akagi. I am not aware of any source that claims Kaga ever saw VT-3 [certainly VT-3 never saw her nor, for that matter, did the two surviving crews make any note of Akagi - their eyes were fixed on their designated target] - and why would she? she was miles to the SW of Akagi and closing and VT-3 was to the NE of Akagi flying a course towards Hiryu - which was far away from Akagi.

0724 Noting that the two torpedo plane groups to starboard of the Akagi were preparing to launch their torpedoes, she goes into evasive action. Then, seeing that she was about to be dive bombed, she makes maximum reverse turn

Bolded part. Whose that close enough to Akagi to drop torpedoes?

NR -and Fuchida - imply that VT-3 was right on top of Akagi at 1024. Fuchida says that too, that Devastators which must have been VT-3 flew right down Akagi and attacked Hiryu right behind her. Shattered Sword breaks out the marching band each time Fuchida was said to lie, and does a podcast for those unable to attend the cerimony. But for this Fuchida “whopper”, that VT-3 flew right down the length of the Akagi (steaming into the wind) to attack Hiryu to her north, the narrative is silent. Curious.

On an unrelated note, if VT-3 flew right over the Akagi, then it must also be the case that VB-3 (flying nearby and above VT-3) overflew a 36,000 ton carrier and an 18,000 ton carrier to bomb a 16,000 ton carrier about 5-7 miles beyond, correct?