#205
Post
by Eugen Pinak » 19 Sep 2014, 21:35
OK, guys - here is what I've noticed:
1. Bashing of Yamamoto and Japanese strategy looks solid until you've remember, that US did exactly what Japanese expected - they've attacked before they achieved superiority over Japan.
2. Attempt to distinguish between "Japanese" IJN with disregard of aircraft protection and "un-Japanese" IJA, which took care to protect its' aircraft. - In fact, both IJN and IJA walked in step regarding aircraft protection.
3. "By late 1941 the Japanese had four fleet carriers available, along with one escort and
two light carriers, with a total capacity of 378 operational aircraft.19 She had five fleet
carriers, two light carriers and two escort carriers either under construction or
conversion, or undergoing final workups, which meant an additional capacity of 406
aircraft."
No comments - just find any databook about IJN to find out the correct numbers.
4."GP Bombs v. Capital Ships
The Type 99 No. 25 model 1 Ordinary 250kg general purpose (GP) bomb carried by the D3A Val dive-bomber was designed to attack unarmored ships.
..."
Zimm has no idea, that "Ordinary" IJN bomb is equivalent to "Semi armor-piercing" US bomb and NOT "General purpose" bomb. As a result, all his conclusions and surprises on "why IJN hasn't developed small AP bombs" are simply incorrect.
Believe it or not, there is an drawing of this SAP bomb in his book with technical data, that includes armor penetration.
5. Number of planes on Kido Butai CVs are given wrong and does not reflect normal complement of the CVs (contrary to the author's statement).
6. IJN carrier doctrine - pure fantasy without a single source on topic.
7. "The Japanese fighters were considered offensive weapons, not defensive, in the sense that they were expected to range out and attack the enemy, not sit back in a defensive role as escorts or CAP."
Any good source on P-H operation will tell you, that this was not the case - fighters were used both as attackers, escorts and CAP.
8. "The standard was to have each multi-seat carrier aircraft carry an HF set and a radiotelephone, and each fighter carry a radiotelephone, by December 1941. All the aircraft of the Kido Butai may not yet have been fitted in time for the attack"
Bold statement without a single source.
9. Fuchida's attack on USS "Maryland". On one page Zimm claims, that Fuchida failed to hit this ship, on other pages he agrees with Fuchida's claim (which is correct, BTW).
10. "Level Bombers’ Attack
...
All ten formations lined up to pass over the targets one formation at a time. Even though they initiated their attack only minutes after the first torpedoes hit the water, they were surprised by a heavy volume of AA fire."
This statement contradicts with both Fuchida's statements (though he made a lot of different statements) and with reports from US ships.
11. "Level of Effort Against Nevada
...
Egusa’s decision to use dive-bombers to attack Nevada was an inappropriate weapon-target match. The 250kg GP bomb was not a battleship killer."
Indeed. But what if we don't have better bombs? - Shall we leave enemy battleship undamaged?
And the last, but not least, I can regularly attempts on "Monday morning quarterbacking" in his book. Indeed, now we can easily see Japanese mistakes - but how about than?
Of course, those mistakes doesn't mean, that the book, as a whole, is useless for P-H researcher.
First of all, Zimm's attempt to use modern methods of operation analysis in regard to P-H operation is praiseworthy and I really want to see similar analysis of other Pacific battles.
Second, his presentation of data is very "no-nonsense" and could be useful to every P-H researcher.
Third, he brings reader's attention to details, that weren't mentioned by previous writers.
