Shattered Sword - Opinions?

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glenn239
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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#106

Post by glenn239 » 22 Jun 2015, 18:14

Rob Stuart wrote:
glenn239 wrote:
The order to include Akagi's D3A1's in the strike against the carriers was issued from HQ around 0830 - I posted it already from the Nagumo Report. Notice that this order does not tell Akagi to launch its D3A1's only after its B5N2's, it says to include them in the attack.
Glenn, presumably you're referring to the following order, logged at 0530 (Japan time):

Message from Comdr. Mobile Force to Mobile Force: "Carrier-based bombers will prepare for second attack. Equip yourselves with 250 kilogram bombs."

This is highly ambiguous in several ways:
It's ambigious to us, it was not unclear to the air staffs of Kido Butai. Difference between the real doctrinal experts (them) and the wanna bees (us).
3. If the 0530 order was meant to apply to the D3As which had attacked Midway, then why did it not say anything about the arming of the B5Ns which had attacked Midway?
2nd CAR DIV reported independently around 0910 that it would launch 18 B5N2's between 1030-1100.

In any case, the 0530 order was not addressed to Akagi alone, and it certainly does not explicitly say that Akagi's D3A1's were to be included in the first strike against the US carriers. This is purely an inference on your part.
Two IJN carrier dive bomber pilots confirm their aircraft were destroyed on the flight deck of the Akagi at 1025. On Kaga, Maeda independently confirms its D3A1's were being prepared as well.

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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#107

Post by glenn239 » 22 Jun 2015, 18:41

rob0274 wrote:Shattered Sword does not rely on other works to build its argument. It is a paraphrase of other works being sold without permission. A great portion of the book is nothing but piracy. The section on doctrine, which ironically enough follows a long diatribe about people's lack of interest in doctrine, is almost entirely the work of Evans & Peattie.
There's an online article called "Three Whoppers" by Jon Parshall in which he declares his intention to "bury" Fuchida at the outset. The first section of the piece relates to the question of a third wave, specifically that Jon Parshall knows what Fuchida was thinking, (or more accurately, was not thinking). In checking sources, it's all just a repeat of work done by Willmott in his book, "Pearl Harbor" back in 2001, nothing taken away, maybe a bit added. Willmott's "whoppers", such as his ridiculous assumption that the 100 shallow-running torpedoes loaded aboard Kaga were the only torpedoes in 1st Air Fleet for the mission, went uncorrected. (According to Willmott, Nagumo was apparently stupid enough he'd sail to a naval battle at Hawaii with 5th CAR DIV's torpedo magazines EMPTY!).
Example A.
"Unfortunately, for the past sixty years, almost every Western historian who has written on the Battle of Midway has made the assumption that Japanese carriers and naval aviation forces behaved pretty much like their Western counterparts.


Good point. Never thought of that particular claim. I certainly never thought that, but I'm not a historian either.
"As a result [of their doctrine of massing air power], Japanese carrier commanders tended to look for tactical solutions that allowed airpower to be deployed in an integrated, multidivisional fashion."

This is supported by Fn 31, which merely states:
"It should be noted that at the Battle of Coral Sea, Shkaku and Zuikaku in some cases apparently eschewed the usage of deckload strikes, instead spotting mixed strike packages. Their larger flight decks, particularly in comparison with the ships of CarDiv 2, apparently made this a more attractive option."
Another good point. You will find that Shattered Sword habitually calls Nagumo's staff's personal preferences "IJN doctrine". Insofar as 1st Air Fleet was creating its own doctrine, that is true. Insofar as Ozawa or Yamaguchi or Hara would do the same thing, that is not necessarily true; the lines between Nagumo's personal style and more ingrained habits shared by all IJN carrier admirals is blurred. For example, before Pearl Harbor was set Kusaka and Yamaguchi had a right good argument over scouting, with Kusaka prevailing, but Yamaguchi arguing strenuously for the advantages of search. This suggests that if Yamaguchi had been Kusaka's superior, searching would have gotten more attention that it did with Nagumo.
Claim A (Japanese carrier commanders favored deployment of integrated, multidivisional air power) is supported by...an irrelevant and undocumented statement, which itself is a combination of two half-claims that are only "apparent." Aside from not knowing that controversial statements have to be documented, P&T do not understand that the footnote is not something you arbitrarily add to produce the academic look, a common failing among undergraduates.
Well, I think it's true that 1st Air Fleet's staff favored multi-divisional formations. Combined Fleet and GHQ? That's more debatable.
This is unacceptable. You cannot present a counterfactual as "a simple statement of fact." At best it is a matter of varying degrees of plausibility, which demands explanation.
I think that if U.S. Navy did a Pearl Harbor in 1941 it would have looked like a scaled up version of the Solomon's carrier raid in 1942. It wouldn't have had the coherent attack formations, but all those SBD's still would have packed a hard punch. (Shattered Sword asserts the IJN was doctrinally inferior to the USN, but the trump card for Fletcher in all his battles were those oversized, magnificent, SBD wings).

This passage claims that one reason Nagumo did not change his plans after learning of Midway's alert-status and the discovery of his fleet by the Americans was overconfidence.
They guessed wrong on that one, IMO. Notice how their guess made Nagumo look stupider than necessary?
This is a pretty strong claim. One would think it demands elaboration. P&T, however, do not. They are able to look into the mindset of the "Japanese" and the Combined Fleet staff with the aid of two pieces of 'evidence.' These are:
I know the 1st and 2nd CAR DIV felt superior to IJN 5th CAR DIV. I know from Fuchida that they considered the US carriers their only worthy opponent, and that they were confident they could defeat them. There was certainly overconfidence at Midway, but whether this was related to the inferiority of US carrier air or the expectation that no US carriers were "supposed" to be nearby I do not know. You raise interesting questions.
It is one thing to state that a military culture of obedience existed and likely influenced Nagumo's decision, but what supports the idea that Nagumo acted as "the unquestioning tool of a supreme commander
The fact that Nagumo was ordered to go to Midway and fight, and obeyed those orders. He did not receive the reinforcements he requested, (Yamato for signal reception). In that sense he was a tool of Combined Fleet. But how Nagumo chose to fight at Midway - which is what Shattered Sword was really talking about - that was up to Nagumo. The one tactical restriction placed on Nagumo by Combined Fleet Nagumo just ignored anyways.
Supported by Fn 53, which merely states: "USF-74, the standard U.S. naval doctrine of the same period, is silent on the topic of two-phase searches." In other words, P&T believe that, because USF-74, a US navy manual, does not discuss two-phase searches, such a thing cannot have existed or, if existed, Japanese commanders could not have known it or have thought of it.
Yes, I listed the three possibilities that can explain the footnote. Shattered Sword cannot believe Nagumo was using USF-74, and cannot believe lack of dual phased searches in it implied anything about 1st Air Fleet. That leaves only the possibility that some other narrative purpose was being pursued.

BTW - I think Shattered Sword was wrong to state that phases search were "totally unknown" to Nagumo's command and had never been used before. At Pearl Harbor, a type of dual phased search was used where two E13A1's were sent before dawn to scout at Hawaii, then at dawn more seaplanes were launched, covering an arch to the south of the task force, but also the same area that the first two had passed through. It's not quite what Fuchida was talking about, but it meets the technical definition of the two-phased search, which is one where searchers move out before sunrise to be far from the TF at dawn, then the ground they covered is re-covered by other aircraft at dawn.


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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#108

Post by glenn239 » 22 Jun 2015, 19:01

rob0274 wrote:Taking advantage of a break in my schedule to add a few more examples of detestable scholarship in Shattered Sword--

Example A.

Chapter 7, Fn 42. The footnote does not cite to anything but sets forth independent conclusions, which is:

"Japanese doctrine of the time specified that capital ships (including heavy cruisers) could not be sunk by dive-bomber weapons, and that torpedoes were to be used (Tagaya, communication to Parshall, August 10, 2004). The torpedo aircraft were about to take off when word came back that the dive-bombers had, in fact, sunk the enemy cruisers. Given that torpedoes could not be brought back aboard the ship once their plane was launched, this timely message ended up saving CarDiv 5 from wasting thirty-six precious torpedoes. We are grateful to Michael Wenger for his insights on this matter."

P&T commonly use "communication" as acceptable evidence, and apparently never saw the point in asking after the source for the information and checking it themselves.
Also, they must not have realised (judging from the excerpt you post) that at Coral Sea on May 7th, 5th CAR DIV launched a large torpedo armed strike at Simms and Neosho on the 7th, then seeing these were not carriers, recovered the strike with torpedoes aboard rather than ditch them in the sea. SS assumes the Japanese would ditch the torpedoes, but in real life they decided to risk a recovery and it worked. (Are you sure they don't talk of the Coral Sea flight elsewhere, that would be a serious oversight, so I have to wonder).
Supported by Fn 6, which merely states:
"Research on Mobile Force Tactics, p. 15, a document issued by the Yokosuka Kokutai (which was the Imperial Japanese Navy’s think tank for aerial doctrine) in August 1943, featured carriers protected by a circle of destroyers."
I thought SS had demonstrated their AA doctrine stuff pretty good.
Once again, mere personal communication. The authors never bothered to track down the magazine themselves. At this point, this information is gossip.
I'd be willing to bet its true. They couldn't track down the original article and were careful to note that they had not seen it. Can't ask for more than that - I'd rather the information be presented the way it was than not be presented at all.

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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#109

Post by Rob Stuart » 22 Jun 2015, 19:46

glenn239 wrote:
Rob Stuart wrote:
glenn239 wrote:
The order to include Akagi's D3A1's in the strike against the carriers was issued from HQ around 0830 - I posted it already from the Nagumo Report. Notice that this order does not tell Akagi to launch its D3A1's only after its B5N2's, it says to include them in the attack.
Glenn, presumably you're referring to the following order, logged at 0530 (Japan time):

Message from Comdr. Mobile Force to Mobile Force: "Carrier-based bombers will prepare for second attack. Equip yourselves with 250 kilogram bombs."

This is highly ambiguous in several ways:
It's ambigious to us, it was not unclear to the air staffs of Kido Butai. Difference between the real doctrinal experts (them) and the wanna bees (us).
3. If the 0530 order was meant to apply to the D3As which had attacked Midway, then why did it not say anything about the arming of the B5Ns which had attacked Midway?
2nd CAR DIV reported independently around 0910 that it would launch 18 B5N2's between 1030-1100.

In any case, the 0530 order was not addressed to Akagi alone, and it certainly does not explicitly say that Akagi's D3A1's were to be included in the first strike against the US carriers. This is purely an inference on your part.
Two IJN carrier dive bomber pilots confirm their aircraft were destroyed on the flight deck of the Akagi at 1025. On Kaga, Maeda independently confirms its D3A1's were being prepared as well.
Mr. McMaster,

I will not be responding to any of your posts until you retract your accusation that I have lied.

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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#110

Post by glenn239 » 22 Jun 2015, 20:03

Rob Stuart wrote: If I had meant that Iizuka had lied, why would I not give my reasons rather than supposedly changing my tune?


Again - you ask, I answer. If you get tired of the process, then feel free to stop asking. I thought you'd originally used 'false' to mean 'lying' because you think Fuchida lied about this incident, and this pilot is saying the exact same thing as Fuchida. This is not the type of detail a pilot could confuse at a later date, even 50 or 60 years later, so, like Fuchida, he didn't misremember anything. My grandfather was on an airfield that was dive-bombed by a Stuka during the BoB. He was huddled in a shelter, not even near the impact point. It scared the living hell out of him, and he remembered the details of that attack for the rest of his 104 year life.
I'd also remind you of our long exchange in the same J-Aircraft thread about Kusoshima's claim, as related by Prange, that the NGS had on 2 June sent out a warning that KdB might be ambushed. I never once suggested that Kuroshima lied - because I did and do think that he did.
OK.
Even in the case of Fuchida, I don't believe that I've ever suggested that he lied. On the contrary, I have said that he would have no reason for lying about such things as the number of aircraft which attacked Colombo or the type of aircraft which attacked Trincomalee. I have ascribed such misstatements to a bad memory and a failure to do his homework. So why would I suddenly, out of the blue, suggest that Iizuka lied? What possible motive could I think he had for lying? What motive would I have?
You're telling me that you think Fuchida told the truth as he knew it about Akagi's situation when she was dive bombed at 1025 on June 4th, 1942?
Incidentally, in Reply #46 in the same thread, Tony described four statements made by yourself as "false", yet you apparently did not interpret that as an accusation that you were lying. Why the difference?
Can't even recall what that was about, certainly don't recall caring one way or the other.

I will not be responding to any of your posts until...<snip>
Sorry to hear that. I was interested to hear whether you thought Fuchida could be mistaken on his account of Akagi having a deck full of aircraft at 1025 rather than lying like SS said.

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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#111

Post by genie854 » 22 Jun 2015, 20:57

glenn239 wrote: Two IJN carrier dive bomber pilots confirm their aircraft were destroyed on the flight deck of the Akagi at 1025. On Kaga, Maeda independently confirms its D3A1's were being prepared as well.
Could you tell me who are those two dive bomber pilots?
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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#112

Post by David Thompson » 22 Jun 2015, 21:00

glenn239 -- You wrote:
Again - you ask, I answer. If you get tired of the process, then feel free to stop asking. I thought you'd originally used 'false' to mean 'lying' because you think Fuchida lied about this incident, and this pilot is saying the exact same thing as Fuchida.
We run this forum for our readers. This sort of dialogue has become tiresome and annoying. Make your point once, clearly and as best you can, and then move on. That way our readers won't have to work through a redundant and unproductive "process" like this one has become.

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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#113

Post by glenn239 » 22 Jun 2015, 22:21

genie854 wrote:
Could you tell me who are those two dive bomber pilots?
IIZUKA, Tokuji (link posted) and Kiyoto Furuta, (Akagi D3A1 squadron leader) are the two pilots.

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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#114

Post by genie854 » 22 Jun 2015, 23:37

glenn239 wrote:
genie854 wrote:
Could you tell me who are those two dive bomber pilots?
IIZUKA, Tokuji (link posted) and Kiyoto Furuta, (Akagi D3A1 squadron leader) are the two pilots.
As I mentioned in a post on page 6, Iizuka was not listed in the Midway Attack Force according to Akagi's kodochosho. You can check Shattered Sword's Appendix. How reliable are his following words?

Simultaneously with the loss of the Zero in the Aleutians, Japan lost four of her aircraft carriers at the Battle of Midway. I was then still a flight-crew member on board the Akagi and I joined in attacking Midway. After completing the first wave attack, we were busy loading land bombs for the second wave attack. Just at that time a report came that an enemy task force was sighted. So a quick change from land bombs to ship bombs had to be made. This took some time. Preparation for take-off was completed and the time came to line up the attack planes on deck so they could take off first. Just at the moment two Zeros took off; the enemy bombs began to fall on our deck. At the time, I was already in my plane ready for take-off and I could see the bombs coming toward me, one by one. The explosions touched off the bombs and machine gun ammunition, which had been loaded onto our planes. Next, the petrol tanks full of fuel began to catch on fire.

Furuta, at least in Beyond Pearl Harbor, doesn't say Vals were on the flight deck when Akagi was hit. By the way, he was not Akagi's squadron leader. Chihaya was the leader (as observer) and Furuta was Chihaya's pilot.
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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#115

Post by glenn239 » 23 Jun 2015, 00:38

As I mentioned in a post on page 6, Iizuka was not listed in the Midway Attack Force according to Akagi's kodochosho. You can check Shattered Sword's Appendix. How reliable are his following words?
Yes, you did mention that, and Paul responded to you with the information that the records contained errors because they were compiled later. Did you not see that response, your did you not like that response?

Contrary to your loaded assertion, both dive bomber pilots are listed on page 514 of Shattered Sword Akagi for the Midway attack.

Kiyoto Furuta is listed as “PO1c Yoshida Kiyoto”, piloting plane 1 of Chutai 1, (squadron leader).

Iizuka Tokuji is listed as “PO1c Kouno Takuji” (sic) pilot of plane 2 of the 2nd Chutai.

Kiyoto Furuta’s account is found in Beyond Pearl Harbor, Ron Werneth, published in 2008, three years after Shattered Sword. It runs,

“We went back to Akagi, Soryu and Hiryu. However, at that time B-17 bombers were attacking our carriers, so we were not able to land immediately. I flew away and waited until the attack was over. After the enemy aircrat left the area, I landed baack on our carrier. Luckily, every Akagi airplane returned safely, and the enemy fighters didn’t hit my formation. Our carrier wasn’t damaged from the high-level bombing attack; it turned into the wind so we could land and I landed first after receiving the order to land. After landing, I put my Type 99 into the hanger, and people brought food to us. While I was eating my lunch, American torpedo planes began to attack. I saw the airplanes and said, “They are coming”. Zero fighters were above our fleet doing combat air patrols, and other airplanes were ready to take off on the deck. They took off quickly and shot down the torpedo planes one after another. As far as I could see, the enemy planes were completely destroyed by our Zeros. Our fighter pilots were very skilled, and we didn’t suffer any damage from the enemy aircraft.

Vice Admiral Chuchi Nagumo and his staff thought that the planes must be coming from an enemy carrier, so he ordered us to prepare our airplanes for the next strike. Because I was senior officer, I told the younger airmen to go to the hanger and help ready the airplanes. They did this, and finished loading the bombs and torpedoes on the aircraft. The mechanics then poured fuel into the airplanes and took them to the deck. We were supposed to take off shortly after this, and when we were finished working on the airplanes, it was very hot. So, I told the other people to open up the hanger windows to get some air, and I let some others go outside. I also went outside to cool off.

Suddenly, I saw, probably 1,500-2,000 meters away from our ship, the carrier Kaga being attacked by dive bombers. I thought that this was a real emergency, and two or three bombs hit the ship, causing a big fire. I thought to myself, “Oh my god”. After seeing this attack, I thought it was best to urinate, because I probably would be flying another mission very shortly. While I was in the head, a bomb hit the deck of our carrier and there was a big explosion. I thought “We are Hit!”. Then, while I was still in the head, another bomb hit towards the rear side of the Akagi. I felt that this was a very bad situation, because at that time our airplanes were fuelled up and loaded with ammunition. The bombs created a big fire, and we couldn’t do anything about it. Inside our hanger bombs blew up one after another, so it because a blazing cauldron.”


The underlined portion is where Furuta states that the D3A1's were taken to the flight deck before the bombing. He is in the urinal because he expects to fly in minutes. Not in 30 minutes, in "minutes". That meant his D3A1 is spotted and ready to fly.

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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#116

Post by rob0274 » 23 Jun 2015, 01:06

glenn239 wrote:They couldn't track down the original article and were careful to note that they had not seen it. Can't ask for more than that - I'd rather the information be presented the way it was than not be presented at all.
It's hard to believe that an article from a popularly circulating magazine from the 70s could not be tracked down. I think rather P&T never tried, which is pretty pathetic and hypocritical for a book that is so aggressively polemical and outright disdainful of previous scholarship for not using Japanese sources.

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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#117

Post by genie854 » 23 Jun 2015, 02:14

glenn239 wrote: Yes, you did mention that, and Paul responded to you with the information that the records contained errors because they were compiled later. Did you not see that response, your did you not like that response?

Contrary to your loaded assertion, both dive bomber pilots are listed on page 514 of Shattered Sword Akagi for the Midway attack.

Kiyoto Furuta is listed as “PO1c Yoshida Kiyoto”, piloting plane 1 of Chutai 1, (squadron leader).
I never said Furuta didn't participate Midway. It is your mis-interpretation. The (B), which indicates buntaicho, is put along side Chihaya, not Furuta in Shattered Sword.
glenn239 wrote: Iizuka Tokuji is listed as “PO1c Kouno Takuji” (sic) pilot of plane 2 of the 2nd Chutai.
Are you serious? Kouno Takuji = 河野卓士 Iizuka Tokuji = 飯塚徳次 They are completely different. This is what they look like in kodochosho:
2.JPG
2.JPG (25.93 KiB) Viewed 1127 times
1.JPG
1.JPG (30.02 KiB) Viewed 1127 times
glenn239 wrote: “We went back to Akagi, Soryu and Hiryu. However, at that time B-17 bombers were attacking our carriers, so we were not able to land immediately. I flew away and waited until the attack was over. After the enemy aircrat left the area, I landed baack on our carrier. Luckily, every Akagi airplane returned safely, and the enemy fighters didn’t hit my formation. Our carrier wasn’t damaged from the high-level bombing attack; it turned into the wind so we could land and I landed first after receiving the order to land. After landing, I put my Type 99 into the hanger, and people brought food to us. While I was eating my lunch, American torpedo planes began to attack. I saw the airplanes and said, “They are coming”. Zero fighters were above our fleet doing combat air patrols, and other airplanes were ready to take off on the deck. They took off quickly and shot down the torpedo planes one after another. As far as I could see, the enemy planes were completely destroyed by our Zeros. Our fighter pilots were very skilled, and we didn’t suffer any damage from the enemy aircraft.

Vice Admiral Chuchi Nagumo and his staff thought that the planes must be coming from an enemy carrier, so he ordered us to prepare our airplanes for the next strike. Because I was senior officer, I told the younger airmen to go to the hanger and help ready the airplanes. They did this, and finished loading the bombs and torpedoes on the aircraft. The mechanics then poured fuel into the airplanes and took them to the deck. We were supposed to take off shortly after this, and when we were finished working on the airplanes, it was very hot. So, I told the other people to open up the hanger windows to get some air, and I let some others go outside. I also went outside to cool off.

Suddenly, I saw, probably 1,500-2,000 meters away from our ship, the carrier Kaga being attacked by dive bombers. I thought that this was a real emergency, and two or three bombs hit the ship, causing a big fire. I thought to myself, “Oh my god”. After seeing this attack, I thought it was best to urinate, because I probably would be flying another mission very shortly. While I was in the head, a bomb hit the deck of our carrier and there was a big explosion. I thought “We are Hit!”. Then, while I was still in the head, another bomb hit towards the rear side of the Akagi. I felt that this was a very bad situation, because at that time our airplanes were fuelled up and loaded with ammunition. The bombs created a big fire, and we couldn’t do anything about it. Inside our hanger bombs blew up one after another, so it because a blazing cauldron.”


The underlined portion is where Furuta states that the D3A1's were taken to the flight deck before the bombing. He is in the urinal because he expects to fly in minutes. Not in 30 minutes, in "minutes". That meant his D3A1 is spotted and ready to fly.
You added the word "flight", which was not in Furuta's account.
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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#118

Post by ChristopherPerrien » 23 Jun 2015, 17:14

genie854 wrote:
You added the word "flight", which was not in Furuta's account.
Yep.

However, I have noted a few times over the years even before SS, that both the Kaga, and the Akagi, before the war , had MULTIPLE, flight decks. And it is entirely possible in many of the accounts , the older carrier configuration, is used by aircrew, and includes planes on three decks, all called "flight decks".

Which is why I don't brook much of SS harping on "Fuchida's; "planes on the flight deck"" statement and its later effect in many books, which might just have been a misunderstanding/mis-translation, of what Fuchida and others, meant.

We did the same thing in the army, when stuff or equipment changed, we called things by their old name. For example, Before I got out , some soldiers were still calling MRE's , "C-rations", which were phased out many years before that.

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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#119

Post by genie854 » 23 Jun 2015, 17:42

ChristopherPerrien wrote:
genie854 wrote:
You added the word "flight", which was not in Furuta's account.
Yep.

However, I have noted a few times over the years even before SS, that both the Kaga, and the Akagi, before the war , had MULTIPLE, flight decks. And it is entirely possible in many of the accounts , the older carrier configuration, is used by aircrew, and includes planes on three decks, all called "flight decks".

Which is why I don't brook much of SS harping on "Fuchida's; "planes on the flight deck"" statement and its later effect in many books, which might just have been a misunderstanding/mis-translation, of what Fuchida and others, meant.

We did the same thing in the army, when stuff or equipment changed, we called things by their old name. For example, Before I got out , some soldiers were still calling MRE's , "C-rations", which were phased out many years before that.
If you read the original Japanese book by Fuchida and Okumiya, it is very clear that they mean the strike force (not CAP Zero) would have launched given five more minutes (at least on Akagi). This is also essentially repeated in Kusaka's book (Japanese).
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Re: Shattered Sword - Opinions?

#120

Post by glenn239 » 23 Jun 2015, 18:24

rob0274 wrote:
It's hard to believe that an article from a popularly circulating magazine from the 70s could not be tracked down. I think rather P&T never tried, which is pretty pathetic and hypocritical for a book that is so aggressively polemical and outright disdainful of previous scholarship for not using Japanese sources.
The amount of work that went into SS is staggering - I don't mind the way they did that.
Last edited by glenn239 on 23 Jun 2015, 18:50, edited 1 time in total.

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