rob0274 wrote:Shattered Sword does not rely on other works to build its argument. It is a paraphrase of other works being sold without permission. A great portion of the book is nothing but piracy. The section on doctrine, which ironically enough follows a long diatribe about people's lack of interest in doctrine, is almost entirely the work of Evans & Peattie.
There's an online article called "Three Whoppers" by Jon Parshall in which he declares his intention to "bury" Fuchida at the outset. The first section of the piece relates to the question of a third wave, specifically that Jon Parshall knows what Fuchida was thinking, (or more accurately, was not thinking). In checking sources, it's all just a repeat of work done by Willmott in his book, "Pearl Harbor" back in 2001, nothing taken away, maybe a bit added. Willmott's "whoppers", such as his ridiculous assumption that the 100 shallow-running torpedoes loaded aboard Kaga were the only torpedoes in 1st Air Fleet for the mission, went uncorrected. (According to Willmott, Nagumo was apparently stupid enough he'd sail to a naval battle at Hawaii with 5th CAR DIV's torpedo magazines EMPTY!).
Example A.
"Unfortunately, for the past sixty years, almost every Western historian who has written on the Battle of Midway has made the assumption that Japanese carriers and naval aviation forces behaved pretty much like their Western counterparts.
Good point. Never thought of that particular claim. I certainly never thought that, but I'm not a historian either.
"As a result [of their doctrine of massing air power], Japanese carrier commanders tended to look for tactical solutions that allowed airpower to be deployed in an integrated, multidivisional fashion."
This is supported by Fn 31, which merely states:
"It should be noted that at the Battle of Coral Sea, Shkaku and Zuikaku in some cases apparently eschewed the usage of deckload strikes, instead spotting mixed strike packages. Their larger flight decks, particularly in comparison with the ships of CarDiv 2, apparently made this a more attractive option."
Another good point. You will find that Shattered Sword habitually calls Nagumo's staff's personal preferences "IJN doctrine". Insofar as 1st Air Fleet was creating its own doctrine, that is true. Insofar as Ozawa or Yamaguchi or Hara would do the same thing, that is not necessarily true; the lines between Nagumo's personal style and more ingrained habits shared by all IJN carrier admirals is blurred. For example, before Pearl Harbor was set Kusaka and Yamaguchi had a right good argument over scouting, with Kusaka prevailing, but Yamaguchi arguing strenuously for the advantages of search. This suggests that if Yamaguchi had been Kusaka's superior, searching would have gotten more attention that it did with Nagumo.
Claim A (Japanese carrier commanders favored deployment of integrated, multidivisional air power) is supported by...an irrelevant and undocumented statement, which itself is a combination of two half-claims that are only "apparent." Aside from not knowing that controversial statements have to be documented, P&T do not understand that the footnote is not something you arbitrarily add to produce the academic look, a common failing among undergraduates.
Well, I think it's true that 1st Air Fleet's staff favored multi-divisional formations. Combined Fleet and GHQ? That's more debatable.
This is unacceptable. You cannot present a counterfactual as "a simple statement of fact." At best it is a matter of varying degrees of plausibility, which demands explanation.
I think that if U.S. Navy did a Pearl Harbor in 1941 it would have looked like a scaled up version of the Solomon's carrier raid in 1942. It wouldn't have had the coherent attack formations, but all those SBD's still would have packed a hard punch. (Shattered Sword asserts the IJN was doctrinally inferior to the USN, but the trump card for Fletcher in all his battles were those oversized, magnificent, SBD wings).
This passage claims that one reason Nagumo did not change his plans after learning of Midway's alert-status and the discovery of his fleet by the Americans was overconfidence.
They guessed wrong on that one, IMO. Notice how their guess made Nagumo look stupider than necessary?
This is a pretty strong claim. One would think it demands elaboration. P&T, however, do not. They are able to look into the mindset of the "Japanese" and the Combined Fleet staff with the aid of two pieces of 'evidence.' These are:
I know the 1st and 2nd CAR DIV felt superior to IJN 5th CAR DIV. I know from Fuchida that they considered the US carriers their only worthy opponent, and that they were confident they could defeat them. There was certainly overconfidence at Midway, but whether this was related to the inferiority of US carrier air or the expectation that no US carriers were "supposed" to be nearby I do not know. You raise interesting questions.
It is one thing to state that a military culture of obedience existed and likely influenced Nagumo's decision, but what supports the idea that Nagumo acted as "the unquestioning tool of a supreme commander
The fact that Nagumo was ordered to go to Midway and fight, and obeyed those orders. He did not receive the reinforcements he requested, (Yamato for signal reception). In that sense he was a tool of Combined Fleet. But
how Nagumo chose to fight at Midway - which is what Shattered Sword was really talking about - that was up to Nagumo. The one tactical restriction placed on Nagumo by Combined Fleet Nagumo just ignored anyways.
Supported by Fn 53, which merely states: "USF-74, the standard U.S. naval doctrine of the same period, is silent on the topic of two-phase searches." In other words, P&T believe that, because USF-74, a US navy manual, does not discuss two-phase searches, such a thing cannot have existed or, if existed, Japanese commanders could not have known it or have thought of it.
Yes, I listed the three possibilities that can explain the footnote. Shattered Sword cannot believe Nagumo was using USF-74, and cannot believe lack of dual phased searches in it implied anything about 1st Air Fleet. That leaves only the possibility that some other narrative purpose was being pursued.
BTW - I think Shattered Sword was wrong to state that phases search were "totally unknown" to Nagumo's command and had never been used before. At Pearl Harbor, a type of dual phased search was used where two E13A1's were sent before dawn to scout at Hawaii, then at dawn more seaplanes were launched, covering an arch to the south of the task force, but also the same area that the first two had passed through. It's not quite what Fuchida was talking about, but it meets the technical definition of the two-phased search, which is one where searchers move out before sunrise to be far from the TF at dawn, then the ground they covered is re-covered by other aircraft at dawn.