Shattered Sword - Opinions?

[David Thompson]

glenn239 -- You wrote:

Do you propose you to go to IIzuka Tokuji's next of kin and explain to them that he needs to be lying in order for your pet theory on the state of Akagi at 1025 to be seen as correct

I think everyone who has participated in this thread is heartily tired of this kind of "reasoning" from you. I don't plan to warn you again. This is an offensively personal comment and the forum has rules against it. Shape up or ship out.

[jparshall]

Does Jim really confirm "that the pilot account is correct, IIzuka Tokuji was on Akagi during the Battle of Midway"? I don't see any evidence except Iizuka's narrative from recollection. And that contradicts primary source.

At this point we've done all we can. Both historians have chimed in. Jim Lansdale confirms the vetting on the IIzuka Tokuji account is 'impeccable' and, indicates that it take primacy over reconstructed records replacing lost originals. Jon Parshall confirms that the squadron rosters they went with was the best information they had at the time, and he does not say that information takes precedent over the pilot's account. So we have our answer; the pilot account takes primacy.

This is a perfect example of your sophistry, Glenn. With respect to which records take precedence, I said precisely nothing, and yet you twist my non-answer to become an endorsement of your position. In point of fact, I would take exactly the opposite stance in this instance.

Likewise, Jim Lansdale's stance, per the thread on j-aircraft which I know you are monitoring, is actually "In the event, we no longer need to debate what IIZUKA-San wrote since we may now totally dismiss all of the IIZUKA-San material because it seems absolutely clear he was not even on board the AKAGI since his name does not appear on any roster at that time."

These argumentative games that you so delight in simply detract from honest people actually trying to move the ball forward on this topic.

Jon Parshall

[glenn239]

jparshall
This is a perfect example of your sophistry, Glenn. With respect to which records take precedence, I said precisely nothing, and yet you twist my non-answer to become an endorsement of your position. In point of fact, I would take exactly the opposite stance in this instance.

I apologise for the misinterpretation.

Likewise, Jim Lansdale's stance, per the thread on j-aircraft which I know you are monitoring, is actually "In the event, we no longer need to debate what IIZUKA-San wrote since we may now totally dismiss all of the IIZUKA-San material because it seems absolutely clear he was not even on board the AKAGI since his name does not appear on any roster at that time."

I see that now. The original title of the thread was, IIZUKA, Tokuji Was Aboard The AKAGI At BoM!!!.

"In his reply 17 of June 25th Jim had said,


What would IIZUKA gain by telling a "whopper" about his being on the AKAGI during the BoM?
He certainly participated in enough other campaigns to have gained sufficient glory without further aggrandizement.
I choose to accept what he wrote as factual according to his memory ... others may choose to think otherwise.

But I see earlier today Jim says what you excerpt,

" In the event, we no longer need to debate what IIZUKA-San wrote since we may now totally dismiss all of the IIZUKA-San material because it seems absolutely clear he was not even on board the AKAGI since his name does not appear on any roster at that time. Equally obvious is the fact that IIZUKA-San is guilty of telling even a greater whopper than FUCHIDA!

This changes the dynamic completely from where I understood the matter to be. When both historians conclude that the squadron records take precedent over IIzuka, Tokuji's account, then his testimony has to be dismissed.

[glenn239]

It's not my pet theory.

There are direct eyewitness accounts on Akagi that say otherwise - Kusaka, Genda, (who says 15 minutes to launch), Fuchida, Kiyoto Furuta, IIzuka-san. So yes, that Akagi had no aircraft on deck when bombed is a theory, because there is eyewitness testimony that she did have aircraft on deck, (add Dick Best who counted 6 'fighters' on the fantail, which must have been Kates because Zeros were not parked on the fantail, the Kate and the Zero look very similar from above. Not sure if Dick Best had seen either type from above before).

When closing the book on the IIzuka-san account this morning, Jim Landsdale indicated that IIzuka-san told a bigger 'whopper' than Fuchida. I agree totally with that yes-or-no type conclusion, having to catagorize all these similar type accounts of the participants as either truthful or as lies. I don't think it's possible for them to be mistaken in the same way, or to have all misremembered about something like this. Either they all told the truth as they remembered it, or they all lied.

[CharlesRollinsWare]

Wow - another Midway / Shattered Sword volume of discussion started by a seemingly new figure who starts a similar discussion to several others posed elsewhere with the the same lack of subject knowledge that was immediately joined by a career dissenter from many forums and another who became infamous on the combined fleet board ... what a surprise. Same folks, same arguments, same facts or lack thereof - gotta love the big lie approach - repeat it enough and something will stick ...

... after wading through most of this tonight I am way to tired to even begin to express my disgust - yet again - by another unnamed "expert" with no credentials spouting off repeatedly his lack of expertise as he hammers Jon and Tony - and all the contributors that they used for sources and as sounding boards for their though processes ... whatever ... la de da

I can - and will - comment on one thing. The repeated reference, here and elsewhere, to Japanese aviation personnel claiming "aircraft ready on deck" in English translations of Japanese writings.

Americans, well acquainted with USN parlance via famous/infamous authors and USN terminology ALWAYS assume the phrase "READY" - in regards to carrier aircraft - they assume this means the plane was ON THE FLIGHT DECK and ready to go because that "is" what it meant in WWII to anyone in the USN. Well - that is at least partially right. However, that is decidedly NOT the case in other carrier using navies.

In the USN of 1940-1942 (the period of my interest), aircraft were made ready, ARMED, and engine checks performed, on the hangar deck, and then spotted on the flight deck, and READIED for launch there. In fact, while the enlisted aircrew would be with the aircraft on the hangar deck, the pilot seldom arrived at the plane before the plane it was spotted for takeoff and the engines were ready to be started for a final run up. The gist of the language is that in USN usage, aircraft were not ready for launch until the engines were warmed up and the engine check passed, and the plane's fuel tanks had again been topped off ON the flight deck. Only then was it READY for launch

This is decidedly different from RN and IJN usage. The IJN drew its heritage, and much of its founding "doctrine" and "usage" from extent RN "doctrine" and "usage" because THAT is where they started from with their modern navy. In the RN - and the IJN - aircraft were made ready ON THE HANGAR DECK. In the RN parlance, aircraft were READIED on the hangar deck and brought up by the planes maintenance crew. Interestingly, this did not necessarily mean that the planes were, as yet, armed [ordnance might still be on trolley's to be fitted on deck], and they certainly had NOT had any engine run up at all! Effectively, while the airplane was deemed "to be READY", it was, as yet, not ranged, might not be armed, and thus certainly was not, yet, READY to be LAUNCHED.

Now, I had personal opportunity for discussions with a few Fleet Air Arm aircrew and three Japanese aviators that were at Midway. In direct questioning of them it became clear that in neither case did my "USN" language have the same meaning to either group, and THEIR language did not have the same meaning to me. What I did have going for me was that I am a pilot - I asked specific questions using a pilots terminology and if I was not getting proper terminology back, I asked more questions.

How a Japanese/English linguist might translate spoken statements is directly related to words they compare in each language without any SUBJECT MATER expertise as to what specific words mean in the military sense. In ENGLISH conversations with RN aircrew it became readily clear that READY meant different things to each of us. It was easy, however, to work out what was going on. With the Japanese, it became clear that we were not on the same page at all - but the solution was harder than hell to figure because the translation process was - at best - iffy.

So, when a translation says that a IJN aviator's plane was READY on the FLIGHT DECK I instantly question every part of that because it makes NO SENSE. A Japanese aviator or mechanic would say the plane was ready prior to it ever moving to the flight deck - the same as an RN aviator would. BUT, did the person involved ever ACTUALLY SAY THAT - I surely do not know and I am not sure ANYONE knows - or ever will. The Japanese aviator /mechanic would state the plane was ready the instant it WAS READY to be moved to the flight deck. Did he say "ready" of did the translator come up with that word from something else. Did he was it was READY and the translator assumed that meant ON THE FLIGHT DECK - again I don't know - but NEITHER does anyone else here. What I do know is that the words READY and FLIGHT DECK cannot be remotely inferred from each other in any but USN terminology and even then it DOE NOT MEAN ready to GO. And in RN and IJN terminology, it does not even imply that much!

What I do know for a fact is that in the conversation I had with one Japanese pilot I talked to it was initially implied in translation that his plane was ready on the flight deck while subsequent conversation made it clear that was NOT the case at all.

....

Next, the comment directly above by glenn239 @ 26 Jun 2015 15:41 states, and I quote "There are direct eyewitness accounts on Akagi that say otherwise - Kusaka, Genda, (who says 15 minutes to launch), Fuchida, Kiyoto Furuta, IIzuka-san. So yes, that Akagi had no aircraft on deck when bombed is a theory, because there is eyewitness testimony that she did have aircraft on deck, (add Dick Best who counted 6 'fighters' on the fantail, which must have been Kates because Zeros were not parked on the fantail, the Kate and the Zero look very similar from above. Not sure if Dick Best had seen either type from above before)."

As I have told Glen and others BEFORE, Dick Best NEVER said that. The report quoted was written by Joe Penland, the squadron Flight Officer, in the absence of the Squadron XO (absent on USS Hornet) and the Squadron CO, Best, absent from duty in Sick Bay, and was NEVER shown to Best by Penland - in fact it was not seen by Best during WWII. Best dove on Akagi. Penland dove on Kaga. Thus he never saw Akagi. Of the three pilots that did, Weber was shot down (and KiA) over Hiryu, Best was in Sick Bay, and although okay on Enterprise, Kroeger never spoke to Penland. What Penland wrote was HIS INTERPRETATION of notes made during by the Personal Officer during Best's quick debrief after his return from the first strike. I had extensive conversations with Best about this and he was ABSOLUTELY clear that the aircraft he saw - estimated to be six - were ranged aft of the center line but NOWHERE NEAR the fantail and, in HIS ESTIMATE, they were fighters because - and I quote - "bombers would have been ranged all the way aft".

Thus, as Rob claimed earlier on this thread, Glen continues to quote what he WANTS to quote even though he has been told previously that what he is quoting it is not correct.

....

My last comment is directed to the original poster on this thread, Rob whatever. You take issue with Jon's (and Tony's) footnotes as being "unacceptable" - HOGWASH. First, footnotes are entirely secondary to SOURCES - the bibliography and contributors. Have you looked at the sources? Have you noted what is there? What is there that was NEVER used before The money it cost to get access to it? Do you have a clue what that source list represents? Virtually ALL the MOST NOTED Midway scholars then living in the world were involved in some way or another, as were the research notes of those other noted scholars that were deceased. Their book has more primary sources than ANY prior book on the subject - and more noted experts as contributors than any prior - or subsequent - book on the subject. What footnotes/sources does Morison have? What footnotes/sources does Lord have? What footnotes/sources does Tuleja have? What footnotes/sources does "A Glorious Page in Our History" have? And more IMPORTANTLY - WHY? Because PUBLISHERS are in the business to MAKE MONEY, and they don't MAKE MONEY by printing MORE pages - especially pages of sources - they make money by printing less.

I happen to have been lucky enough to see the original draft before it's page count was "condensed" I got to see the same for John Lundtrom's second two books. Guess what - the publishers don't buy off on all the author "wants" or even "needs" - especially when you are a nobody writing your first book - and it isn't a book, it is a treatise. Heck, the publishers would not let John Lundstrom have what he wanted on his fourth book.

Unusually, both of the authors, like John, are MORE than open to answering queries and questions from polite and scholarly folks - hell, Jon even commented to you, and you are neither.

I am not sure what it is that that prompts arrogant fools with no clue as to what scholarship is (hint it is YEARS of PASSIONATE work for nowhere near enough money), to spend hours on-line reaming authors like Jon and Tony, when they themselves are nothing more than pompous asses with big mouths and an anonymous username".

By the way, in case you haven't figured it out, I am the ONE person here that calls a spade a spade because I never learned to be polite to fools - and that you are ...

Mark E. Horan

And to avoid a repeat of the last idiot with an opinion I dealt with, the above is my name - my REAL name - CharlesRolinsWare is my forum ID. He was a pilot who went missing in action at Midway trying his best to get the rookie pilots in the back of Scouting Squadron Six back home safely. He flew the mission with two others, and acquired three more fighting his way clear of Kido Butai. Only one of those planes made it. My interest in Midway was generated by one line in Walter Lord's book that mentioned him. it took 10 years and a ton of research to find out what happened to him and all the other aircrew we lost. And the final piece came from Lord graciously giving me access to his interview notes when I told him what I was trying to do.

Lord had passion. I had passion. John, Jon, Tony, and a bunch of others that have commented here have an educated passion. None of us ever claimed to be all knowing or 100% right. What else none of us ever even thought of doing was to anonymously go on line and expound what an ignorant ass a passionate author was because you, an unknown idiot that has never put the time in to do anything remotely useful, didn't agree with them.

To quote a famous line "Don't go way mad - just go away"

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

I think we can safely ignore the previous poster. He does nothing but make ad hominem attacks, using insult and invective, and claims as irrefuteable knowledge unverifiable conversations with un-named and mysterious persons.

It appears that there are several individuals, of whom the previous poster is one, who were involved in the production of Shattered Sword, and that they are taking a very personal interest in preventing any crtitical examination of the facts quoted or the conclusions drawn by Messrs. Parshall and Tully.

I think that anyone with an open mind should be willing to look at any facts that are presented. So far, I have seen not one single quote from a person who was either on the flight deck or the bridge of the Akagi that states that the strike aircraft were NOT being spotted when the Akagi was bombed.

On the other hand, numerous individuals who WERE on the flight deck or the bridge have stated that there were strike aircraft being spotted for take-off.

As to which USN officer stated that there were appx. six aircraft at the stern of the Akagi, I have no doubt that Lt. Best was debriefed in the sick bay by a Personnel officer, and that his comments were incorporated into the official report. As to Bombers being spotted all the way aft, it would depend on whether they had been brought up by the midships or stern elevator. As the section of the hanger that was occupied by the B5Ns on the Akagi was between the midships and stern elevators, fueled and armed B5Ns could have been brought up on either elevator, or on both.

I conclude with this note: Passion is an interesting thing. It can create great art, new inventions, and religious jihads. A good historian is open minded, dispassionate, and, in my opinion, polite when dealing with others in discussions in which there may be disagreements.

Respectfully ;

Paui R. Ward

[CharlesRollinsWare]

Hello All ;
...snipped ...
As to which USN officer stated that there were appx. six aircraft at the stern of the Akagi, I have no doubt that Lt. Best was debriefed in the sick bay by a Personnel officer, and that his comments were incorporated into the official report.
... snipped...
Paui R. Ward
...snipped...

And you would be WRONG. Lt. Best was not interviewed by anyone in sick bay on 5 June or at any point after that date - neither on USS Enterprise (CV-6), not at the US Naval Hospital at Pearl Harbor, nor at the same in San Diego ... Why? Because he was critically ill. The source for this was Lt.Cdr. Best himself.

That said, I find in utterly astonishing that you would consider yourself more of an authority on the facts of Mr. Best's life than he himself ... and all the more so since this is the SECOND tie I have informed you of this fact.

[glenn239]

Hello All ;

I think we can safely ignore the previous poster. He does nothing but make ad hominem attacks, using insult and invective, and claims as irrefuteable knowledge unverifiable conversations with un-named and mysterious persons.

That's just Mark's way of saying hi. He's a very knowledgable poster. I hope Rob0274 continues with his observations and pays careful attention to Mark's constructive comments.

I saw yours and Mark Horan's discussion on radial engine warm up times over on Tully's Port. I can't recall if Mark was or was not in the discussions on Combined Fleet, but suffice it to say that Mark is not the only pilot in the world, and the one I talked to - my brother with five thousand hours and a degree in physics, he runs a nuclear accelerator for a living and is aiming to fly P-51's amongst others - said that he thinks you can punch a radial engine to full throttle when its cold - it's more a maintenance issue than a "blowing engine jugs all over the deck" issue. The oil seal might fail within a few minutes, but you'll probably get away with it. Since radial engines are, to put it mildly, a tad on the expensive side, no one ever does it. OTOH, when Kaga just blew up and is burning stem to stern a short distance away with explosions everywhere, the standard 15-minutes for warm up time on Akagi during routine operations might not be an adequate measure of what is actually going to occur.

It appears that there are several individuals, of whom the previous poster is one, who were involved in the production of Shattered Sword, and that they are taking a very personal interest in preventing any crtitical examination of the facts quoted or the conclusions drawn by Messrs. Parshall and Tully.

The more the merrier!

I think that anyone with an open mind should be willing to look at any facts that are presented. So far, I have seen not one single quote from a person who was either on the flight deck or the bridge of the Akagi that states that the strike aircraft were NOT being spotted when the Akagi was bombed.

More accounts from Beyond Pearl Harbor. In Furuta’s account (dive bomber pilot, Akagi) he uses the term “hanger deck” zero times, the term “hanger” five times, the term “deck” three times to describe the flight deck, and the term “flight deck” twice”. Genie theorized that he couldn’t mean the dive bombers were taken to the “flight deck” but yes, he appears to have meant exactly that - the flight deck. He does not use the word 'deck' to describe the hanger deck. I can take a scan and post the original if desired. There are a couple more accounts from Akagi. This one here, the torpedo bomber mechanic has a description (not posted) of frantically rearming the torpedo bombers, then this -

Maintainance P01C Haname Shimoyama

I heard that the American dive bombers attacked while we were trying to take off which was very bad. They must have known when it was a good time. At that time I was in the torpedo adjustment room near the walkway, (below the flight deck). I did…not see the dive bombers….our bombs and torpedoes were exploding one after another in the hanger…inside the hanger fuelled and armed aircraft began to explode, one after another.

So, the rearmament must be complete because he’s now elsewhere. Some bomber aircraft are still in the hanger, but when he heard they were caught at takeoff, he doesn’t appear surprised by that.

Mainenance ieutenant Hiroshi Suzuki – In his account, he states that he was busy that morning spotting both bombers and CAP fighters. When Akagi was bombed by dive bombers, he was on at the operations center getting new orders,

“The first bomb was a near miss, but I was knocked down by the force of the blast. I stood up and checked my body for any wounds….then there was a direct hit on our carrier that caused a big explosion. This bomb landed squarely on the Zero fighters sitting on the flight deck.”

This account is very interesting because the direct hit on the rear corner of the central elevator “squarely” on top of Zero fighters is not the Zero fighters spotted by the bridge. Those particular fighters only started to cook off 17 minutes later, at 0743 according to the Nagumo Report -

0743 Fighter aboard the Akagi to starboard of the bridge catches fire and spreads to bridge.

In Fuchida’s original 1951 edition, not repeated in the 1955 English edition, he describes a moment after the mid-ship hit where the elevator is drooping in its shaft and planes around it are blown into disarray, standing on their props, then all hell breaks loose with fires and explosions. This happens more quickly than 17 minutes. Similar to what Suzuki is saying.

Ensign Taiksu Maruyama – This account is from Hiryu, and he could see the dive bomb attack on Kaga and Akagi. It runs,

“…on board Kaga I could see aircraft exploding, it soon became an inferno. Also, in the middle that, bombs exploding in a chain reaction. Akagi was in the same situation when two bombs hit the ship. Nevertheless the engine itself was still running. However, Akagi’s rudder was damaged and it was circiling at high speed.”

The account of aircraft exploding on Kaga’s deck could be him seeing this on Akagi and remembering it as the Kaga. Every account in Beyond Pearl Harbor (maybe 5 or 6?) does not mention bomber aircraft on Kaga’s deck. Some of them specifically state the bombers were still in the hanger.
Mark Horan mentions a conversation we had about Dick Best, and I’d long forgotten it. The information about Dick Best I was referring to is here,

http://www.goldengatewing.org/proptalk/ ... .cfm?ID=65

“Then he was startled to see Group commander McClusky on the first carrier. Best had to pull back up to 14,000 feet and start his dive again." At 35 hundred feet I pulled up to put my gun telescope on the deck...and there were six or seven Zeros on the fantail."
The carrier was the Akagi, flagship of the fleet, and it was launching fighters at that very moment, while the rest of the strike group was below deck.
"My bomb hit near the forward elevator...the next bomb hit right on the next Zero to be launched, on the fantail. Either the second or third bomb hit was the one that did the most damage, because it was well aft. One of them jammed the rudder and the Akagi circled helplessly while she was still afloat.”

Here a bomb hits the forward elevator – but this was actually a near miss, not a hit. The next bomb hits “right on” the next Zero to be launched on the fantail. This again is not any of the CAP Zeros by the bridge, these were maybe 80-100 feet further forward from that hit. It seems to be referring to a Zero fighter sitting right on the aft edge of the central elevator that had the 1,000lbs bomb land right on it, which is what Suzuki and Fuchida also say.

[paulrward]

Hello All ;

And 'Hi' to Mr. Horan.

First, I am very surprised that, at no time did the USN commanders on the Enterprise send someone down to the sick bay to get a quick statement from Lt. Best. But, then again, they probably had more important things to do. And, I can sympathize with Lt. Best, as I have spent the better portion of my life fighting off a persistent lung infection.

I find it interesting that Best states that the next day he was approached by a " gunnery specialist who said there was a 16-inch armor-piercing shell which could be slung under Best's SBD..." This implies that Best was NOT in sick bay, but was rather on duty on June 5th. So perhaps the reoccurrence of his TB was not an acute onset, but was more likely a gradual process. ( And, I should note, in the 1920s and 1930s, USN warships were hotbeds of TB. A number of promising young officers and enlisted men were invalided out for having a positive Tuberculin test )

That said, if we go to the GoldenGate Wing website noted above, it has a number of interesting facts that directly contradict Parshall and Tully. In Shattered Sword, a great deal is made that the Akagi was struck by only ONE bomb. However, numerous IJN witnesses on board the Akagi, and Lt. Best himself, state that Best's flight of three scored not one, but TWO direct hits, one at the stern, and one amidships. This contradicts Shattered Sword, but is squarely in accord with most previous historians.

And, if we accept that there were two bombhits, then it is certainly possible that each exploded among parked aircraft, the midships bombhit among the A6M's, being readied both for CAP and Strike Escort, and a stern bomb hit that exploded among B5N's parked out by the stern elevator.

But, then that would confirm Fuchida's story, wouldn't it ?

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward


Post Scriptum: I only have a bit over 1800 flying hours, and only about 20-30 of that is in round engine aircraft, but the accounts of the operational requirements for radial engines described in Shattered Sword were just some of the more, shall we say, questionable aspects of the book. And, when I began to see these, I was forced to go back and make a more critical evaluation of Shattered Sword.

[ChristopherPerrien]

I find it interesting that Best states that the next day he was approached by a " gunnery specialist who said there was a 16-inch armor-piercing shell which could be slung under Best's SBD..." This implies that Best was NOT in sick bay, but was rather on duty on June 5th.

No, all it implies is he was still on the carrier and able to walk and talk. He never returned to full duties.

In Shattered Sword, a great deal is made that the Akagi was struck by only ONE bomb. However, numerous IJN witnesses on board the Akagi, and Lt. Best himself, state that Best's flight of three scored not one, but TWO direct hits, one at the stern, and one amidships.

Hair-splitting by you and SS. The bomb that exploded right next to the stern , after passing through the edge of the flight deck(IIRC), hit so close that the concussion and the explosion, which caused damage, and jammed the rudders would have seemed to many there on the ship or in the air that she had been "directly" hit by that bomb. It is also , within the bounds that Shattered Sword can say she was only "hit " by one bomb, as only one bomb exploded in the Akagi. Technically , since the other was a severely damaging near miss, and did hit the target, I'd give the pilot credit for a "near-hit", and a hit as far as the navy is concerned. .


As to all this "warm-up" business. Yes, 15 minutes might be longer than some Japanese aircraft types or specific aircraft needed, but I gather this reflects the longest warm up period of one of the three (Zero VAL , Kate). However I don't think it is possible , to just start a radial and take-off. AIUI, They simply will not develop full power until they warm-up: Which is a little important when trying to take-off fully loaded from an aircraft carrier. I just ran across an article, yesterday, talking of F4U Corsairs, they needed 20 minutes to "warm-up".

But, then that would confirm Fuchida's story, wouldn't it ?

I believe Mr Horan has adequately explained how "Fuchida's- Planes on deck" statement can be construed and the "readied planes" issue.

[glenn239]

That said, if we go to the GoldenGate Wing website noted above, it has a number of interesting facts that directly contradict Parshall and Tully. In Shattered Sword, a great deal is made that the Akagi was struck by only ONE bomb. However, numerous IJN witnesses on board the Akagi, and Lt. Best himself, state that Best's flight of three scored not one, but TWO direct hits, one at the stern, and one amidships. This contradicts Shattered Sword, but is squarely in accord with most previous historians.

The GoldenGate account, (is this a speech by Dick Best in 1999? That's what I assumed it was.). For the third hit it's not clear from the brief account exactly where it landed - it could be consistent with the Shattered Sword version of a close near miss near the rudder, since the account says the first bomb was a hit and the first bomb certainly missed close to port. Where its not compatible with Shattered Sword is when the bomb lands right on top of the Zeroes. This bomb is the second to fall, so has to be the midship elevator hit, and the Zeros can't be the Zeros spotted further forward by the bridge - these only cooked off at 0743. When the account says a hit 'on the fantail', it looks to me that it doesn't mean on the rear of the deck at the back of the ship, 'fantail' means the center elevator hit.

Post Scriptum: I only have a bit over 1800 flying hours, and only about 20-30 of that is in round engine aircraft, but the accounts of the operational requirements for radial engines described in Shattered Sword were just some of the more, shall we say, questionable aspects of the book. And, when I began to see these, I was forced to go back and make a more critical evaluation of Shattered Sword.

When Genda said 15 minutes to launch and Fuchida said 5, the difference might in part be in their assumptions on warm up times - the margin of error is less than the warm-up time. Fuchida doesn't say how long the warm up was, he just says it was 'completed'. Did he mean 15 minutes, or some truncated rush job?

With my brother's comments, while he said that while a radial engine can be put to full throttle cold and you'll almost certainly get away with it, he didn't say you should do that, or that doing so would be anything but against all standard routines, where as Mark indicates, warm up time is never to be trifled with. It's entirely possible that even in an emergency situation the routine would be adhered to. You really need experts with the engine types in question, the type of grognards aboard Akagi whose knowledge has long since passed, to chime in. The question is, what happens on Akagi when Kaga blows up? Before that moment, there's no question in my mind the launch might be rushed, but it's not launching cold. After Kaga blows up, we really enter the realm of not possible to say. It's feasible there was no change on Akagi. It's feasible it was decided to launch immediately irrespective of any safety standard. Literally, even the officers that made the decision might have had no idea how they would react before it happened.

[glenn239]

No, all it implies is he was still on the carrier and able to walk and talk. He never returned to full duties.

Did Best come down sick on June 4th after bombing Hiryu, or only on the 5th? That is to say, was he feeling fine up until bed time June 4th?

Hair-splitting by you and SS. The bomb that exploded right next to the stern , after passing through the edge of the flight deck(IIRC), hit so close that the concussion and the explosion, which caused damage, and jammed the rudders would have seemed to many there on the ship or in the air that she had been "directly" hit by that bomb. It is also , within the bounds that Shattered Sword can say she was only "hit " by one bomb, as only one bomb exploded in the Akagi. Technically , since the other was a severely damaging near miss, and did hit the target, I'd give the pilot credit for a "near-hit", and a hit as far as the navy is concerned. .

Maybe, but where in the picture here is the hit drawn?

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/I ... le3.html#1

As to all this "warm-up" business. Yes, 15 minutes might be longer than some Japanese aircraft types or specific aircraft needed, but I gather this reflects the longest warm up period of one of the three (Zero VAL , Kate). However I don't think it is possible , to just start a radial and take-off.

This is the main part of what my brother wrote,

Warm up times on aircraft recip engines vary. Usually the manufacturer would give provisions based on cylinder head temps and oil temps. For the most part a recip would be considered "warmed up" if the oil temp is in the green, the green arc on the oil temp gage. If the outside air temp is cold, it could take a while as opposed to starting up a recip on a warm day. This could be anywhere from 10 - 20 minutes depending on OAT and the type of engine we're talking about.

For the most part there will be no issues if a pilot throttles up prior to reaching normal operating temps, but this continued practice can cause damage to bearings and other components as the oil hasn't reached a temperature to ensure proper flow and lubrication throughout the engine. In extreme cases when the oil is real cold, there will be no lubrication to portions of the engine and ultimately you will see the same internal failures as if the engine was ran without oil.

Ok, bear in mind my time behind round engines is only around 5 hours but
this, combined with having watched a bunch of pilots flying radials, leads
me to believe they are not that different then "normal" reciprocating aero
engines.

Also remember there are other possible variables including details of the
engine design that might make it more susceptible to blowing seals or
turning bearings. Also in WWII Japenese oil may have sucked requiring
more warm up then I would consider normal. But this was June 42 so they
were sitting pretty well still, no need to be using junk in the pride of
the fleet right?

So, after all that, what would I do if I was sitting in an A6M2 on Akagi's
flight deck watching the SBDs role in?

Start and go. No warm up, no hold, as soon as I had the engine running
I'd put in as much power as I had to and go. Back it off as much as
possible once airborne to give it a bit of warm up but I'd bet 99.9% of
the impact of immediate takeoff would be long term engine wear vs
immediate catastrophic failure. They could send me the bill later.
Biggest immediate danger would be blowing a front seal with the high oil
pressure, big leak then, engine would seize in minutes. Still would be
worth the risk.

The real question is though: what would Lt. Japanese navy pilot do?
It would take serious stones to go against 2 years of procedure and training,
especially if your crew chief was yelling at you. If it was an American
carrier, sure, I can see some officer yelling at the guy to go. Japanese,
not so sure, they were pretty rigid guys.

[CharlesRollinsWare]

Did Best come down sick on June 4th after bombing Hiryu, or only on the 5th? That is to say, was he feeling fine up until bed time June 4th?
[/i]

I had considerable discussions with Best about these "bombs" in the early/mid 80s and more in person about 10 tears later.

Enroute home from the attack on Hiryu, Best flew towards the remaining burning carriers of Kido Butai and observed the three blazing wrecks. He then set course back to CV-6. He was already feeling ill. He was the last SBD recovered and the carrier had to turn back into the wind to take him aboard. He was seriously ill by this point and could not exit the plane. Murray and his plane crew had to extract him from the cockpit and he was taken below by stretcher. It did not leave sick bay until the ship arrived in Pearl.

He was asked about the 1,600 pound "bombs" (modified 16" shells) on the afternoon of 6 June. There were enough for the entire Bombing Squadron to fly one mission (21?) on the ship. They had been taken aboard late 1941 - prior to the sortie to Wake in November/December for the Bombing Squadron to evaluate the possibility of using them against battleship targets. Best, then the Squadron XO, was given the job of evaluating the SBDs ability to carry it. The planes maximum ordnance load was 1,000 pounds. Thus, they had to drop 600 pounds to carry one. First flight was done with an SBD without self-sealing tanks and armor. A "doctrine was written wherein the planes would carry less than half their normal fuel load, all oxygen canister's, and some of the emergency equipment. The planes would climb no higher than 10,000 feet and the maximum range would be 50 miles.

Consideration was given to using these bombs on 6 June to sink the Japanese "battleship" that had been bombed and damaged. No one on the ship had flown with one but Best. He was approached in sick bay on the afternoon of 6 June (!) as to the possibility of the SBDs carrying them in another attack. He explained weight saving necessities, no oxygen, a climb to no higher than 10,000 feet, and the need to close the range to 50 nautical miles. He spoke from his bed and it is the only time he spoke to anyone after 4 June and the arrival at Pearl.

Mark

[CharlesRollinsWare]

As to all this "warm-up" business. Yes, 15 minutes might be longer than some Japanese aircraft types or specific aircraft needed, but I gather this reflects the longest warm up period of one of the three (Zero VAL , Kate). However I don't think it is possible , to just start a radial and take-off.

This is the main part of what my brother wrote,

Warm up times on aircraft recip engines vary. Usually the manufacturer would give provisions based on cylinder head temps and oil temps. For the most part a recip would be considered "warmed up" if the oil temp is in the green, the green arc on the oil temp gage. If the outside air temp is cold, it could take a while as opposed to starting up a recip on a warm day. This could be anywhere from 10 - 20 minutes depending on OAT and the type of engine we're talking about.

For the most part there will be no issues if a pilot throttles up prior to reaching normal operating temps, but this continued practice can cause damage to bearings and other components as the oil hasn't reached a temperature to ensure proper flow and lubrication throughout the engine. In extreme cases when the oil is real cold, there will be no lubrication to portions of the engine and ultimately you will see the same internal failures as if the engine was ran without oil.

Ok, bear in mind my time behind round engines is only around 5 hours but
this, combined with having watched a bunch of pilots flying radials, leads
me to believe they are not that different then "normal" reciprocating aero
engines.

Also remember there are other possible variables including details of the
engine design that might make it more susceptible to blowing seals or
turning bearings. Also in WWII Japenese oil may have sucked requiring
more warm up then I would consider normal. But this was June 42 so they
were sitting pretty well still, no need to be using junk in the pride of
the fleet right?

So, after all that, what would I do if I was sitting in an A6M2 on Akagi's
flight deck watching the SBDs role in?

Start and go. No warm up, no hold, as soon as I had the engine running
I'd put in as much power as I had to and go. Back it off as much as
possible once airborne to give it a bit of warm up but I'd bet 99.9% of
the impact of immediate takeoff would be long term engine wear vs
immediate catastrophic failure. They could send me the bill later.
Biggest immediate danger would be blowing a front seal with the high oil
pressure, big leak then, engine would seize in minutes. Still would be
worth the risk.

The real question is though: what would Lt. Japanese navy pilot do?
It would take serious stones to go against 2 years of procedure and training,
especially if your crew chief was yelling at you. If it was an American
carrier, sure, I can see some officer yelling at the guy to go. Japanese,
not so sure, they were pretty rigid guys.

Simple answer to this - the person that wrote it is an imbecile - and certainly NEVER did it in real life from a carrier over water - because if he had he'd be dead - period, end of discussion.

Show this to Rich Leonard and see how quick he laughs you off whatever forum you are on ...

[glenn239]

But, then that would confirm Fuchida's story, wouldn't it ?

Paul, I'm interested to know what do you make of this. It's the 1943 US Navy account of the attack on Kido Butai, and its the origin of the Five Minutes account as well. This is 1943, so I'm pretty sure Fuchida isn't advising the US Navy yet, :^)

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/USN ... way-7.html

The attacks on Kaga and Akagi,

northwest. This ship (probably the Kaga) lay on the left as our planes approached from the south. At least eight direct hits were observed. The planes of the first division of VB-6, each armed with one 1,000-pound bomb, took the carrier to the right, which they believed was the Akagi, and scored at least three hits. Both carriers burst into flame. The second division, which had temporarily withheld its attack, now dove on the carrier to the left. Several hits with 1,000-pound bombs produced violent explosions. The third division attacked both carriers, scoring further hits.

The attack on Soryu,

the same moment that the Enterprise squadron was attacking the two enemy carriers to the west, the one to the east was under attack by Yorktown planes. This squadron (VB-3) consisted of 17 scout bombers, each with one 1,000-pound bomb. It had proceeded with the rest of the Yorktown attack group and had sighted the enemy at about 1000. At 1020 it had lost contact with the torpedo squadron, which was then attacking. At 1025 VB-3 was ordered to attack. From about 14,500 feet the bombers opened their dive on a carrier which pilots believed was of the Akagi class. The carrier was turning southward into the wind in an attempt to launch her planes. As the first Japanese plane started to take off our first bomb exploded in the midst of the planes assembled on deck, turning the after part of the flight deck into a mass of flames. Five direct hits and three near hits followed as our planes dove from the south on the ships' fore-and-aft line. Four planes of the squadron, seeing the carrier so badly damaged, transferred their attack to a cruiser and a battleship nearby, scoring a hit on the stern and a near hit on each.