Japanese Early War Superiority? Evans & Peattie's Kaigun

[rob0274]

While reading about the Japanese navy in WWII, I've noticed that many authors consider the Japanese navy to have been markedly superior in areas involving carrier operations. While some such claims are substantiated with specific arguments (e.g. Parshall and Tully show that the Japanese were better at coordinating launches from multiple carriers), many more such claims are made as if they go without saying. I am wondering why this is the case. Why do we take Japanese superiority for granted, while the notion that the German army possessed superior fighting ability continues to be attacked, despite them having had notable success unlike the Japanese navy?

Some more specific points raised during my brief exposure to this history:

In Kaigun, Evans and Peattie state that

"y 1941, in training and experience, Japan's naval aviators, [sic] were undoubtedly the best among the world's three carrier forces." 325.

Now, they substantiate this claim by describing Japan's training regimen, which does indeed sound impressive and thorough...but how exactly is that supposed to confirm that Japan's naval aviators were "undoubtedly" the best? First of all, how much training did American and British pilots receive? Second, how effective was Japanese training compared to American and British training? Third, how valuable was the combat experience the Japanese navy pilots received in China as land-based pilots compared to that received by the British pilots as carrier pilots in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic?

Evans and Peattie then follow that up by:

"For the first six months of the Pacific War Japanese naval pilots fought and flew supremely, jinking about the skies over Southeast Asia and the western Pacific and using their Zeros like rapiers against less experienced Allied airmen flying inferior aircraft."

What exactly did the Japanese naval pilots do, especially the fighter pilots, to show their superiority over "Allied airmen flying inferior aircraft"? If I understand correctly, the only naval battle in that time period involving carriers was the Battle at Coral Sea, and there both sides got through the others' CAP and landed blows on enemy carriers--with the Zuikaku surviving intact thanks to cloud cover rather than any use of Zeros like rapiers by its pilots.

I've noticed the same thing from Parshall and Tully. Here is a passage from their website, Combinedfleet.com.

"For the first six months of the war, [Kidou Butai] would roam the Pacific with near impunity, destroying their opponents almost at will."

I'm not sure how this adds up. They did not encounter the British fleet and they did not emerge victorious against the US forces at Coral Sea. I do not know of any other opponents they destroyed almost at will. They made some raids against Allied ports, but then so did the US navy, also "with near impunity," striking even at Tokyo.

The basic question is, why is the superiority of the Japanese carrier forces unquestioned? I have listed some particular instances of this unquestioning, with my impressions, as uninformed as they may be. I can think of three reasons myself why this supposed superiority is unquestioned: 1. It is so obvious that it simply goes without saying--I don't know if evidence exists for this explanation; 2. the claim is usually made as a throwaway comment to the more substantial project of the author, hence they do not bother to examine their assertion; 3. the notion comes from war-time propaganda/ psychological reaction and has survived intact without revision. I would appreciate your replies and comments.

[paulrward]

Hello Mr. Rob0274

I have held off on this thread, waiting for someone else to pick it up, but here goes:

The IJN superiority in the first six months of the war was in three segments:

1. Superiority in terms of numbers of ships over the local forces of Japan's opponents

2. Superior training of its naval forces

3. Air superiority due to the presence of the A6M over the second rate fighters fielded, for the most part, by Japan's opponents, and the superior training of the IJN pilots.


Discussion:

1. Superiority in terms of numbers of ships over the local forces of Japan's opponents

At the outbreak of the Pacific War, the IJN was pitted against France, Holland, the British Empire, the United States, and China. France and Holland had been occupied by the Nazis, and their far eastern navies, always at the end of the supply line, were now cut off. Lacking spares, refitting capability, and secure bases, they were quickly overwhelmed. The British were fighting in Europe, and even though Singapore was the Gibralter of the Pacific, after the Repulse and PoW were gone, it went also. The USN was out of the fight until the Pearl Harbor could be pumped out of the hulls of the USN's old battle line and the new battle line came into service. As for China, no fleet, no problems.

This situation existed until the USN got back on it's feet starting in June of 1942.

As for your comments re the British and USN: The IJN did encunter the British Fleet. They sank the Repulse and PoW, sank the Hermes, the Cornwall, the Dorsetshire, and the Exeter. Their losses: A few aircraft.
The IJN whacked the USN at Pearl and the Philippines, kicked us out of Manilla and the Dutch Indies while essentially wiping out the Asiatic Fleet, and calling the Coral Sea a USN victory, where the IJN lost the Shoho and the USN lost the Lexington, is only true in retrospect. At the time, the USN considered the Coral Sea a setback. Yes, Doolittle and the transmontaine raids were victories, but they were not war winners. And, in the Doolittle raid, all 16 bombers were lost...

And, for the USN, just in terms of carriers, the USN had 5 large fleet carriers and two small fleet carriers. The IJN had 6 large fleet carriers, and 3 small ones. The British couldn't afford to lose any flight decks in the Pacific, and the Dutch and French didn't have any. So, the odds were in the IJN's favor. As Joseph Visarionovich Dugashvili said, " Quantity has a Quality all it's own..."


2. Superior training of its naval forces

Little here needs to be said. A quick reading of 'Japanese Destroyer Captain' by Tameichi Hara will give you all the insight you need on this point. Add in their very good torpedoes with their very expensively gained torpedo doctrine, and you have the makings of a really nasty attack force whose



3. Air superiority due to the presence of the A6M over the second rate fighters fielded, for the most part, by Japan's opponents, and the superior training of the IJN pilots.

Here we have a big part of the IJN success story. Everywhere they went, they established air superiority by first destroying the Allied fighters, and then having their fighter ravage enemy bombers while their bombers bombed with impunity the Allied targets. At Manilla, they put the P40s and P35s out of service, in the Indies, they wiped out the Hawk 75s, over Malaya, they wiped out the Hurricanes and Buffaloes, and over Indochina, they dominated the Morane 406s. In each case, they used superior numbers of superior fighter aircraft, better maintained aircraft with better trained and more experienced ( higher flying hours ) pilots, many led by combat veterans of China.

The A6M was VASTLY superior to any Allied fighter in 1942, except possibly the P40, which, when flown in a limited type of engagement scenarios, could attack and survive combats with the A6M, and the P38, which was greatly superior to the A6M but was in very limited numbers in the first half of 1942 in the Pacific.

Here is an example: An average fighter aircraft of the period, such as an F4F, when performing a loop, would lose between 200 and 400 feet of altitude, in other words, at the end of the maneuver, it would be at a lower altitude than at the start. The A6M, on the other hand, could GAIN 200 to 400 feet in the same manuever. Thus, if an F4F got on the tail of a Zeke, the IJN pilot simply 'popped' a loop, and if the F4F followed him, at the end of the process, found himself below the IJN fighter, and was thus an easy prey.

The same held for most other maneuvers. The A6M simply could outclimb, out turn, and out loop any Allied fighter. Most of the Allied Pilots in the Pacific were 1930's era pilots who had no combat experience, and would engage the IJN fighters in their first dogfight, attempt to use what they had been taught by veterans of WW1, and die in that first encounter. The fact that they would be starting the dogfights outnumbered, in often obsolete or poorly supported aircraft didn't help their cause at all. The IJN A6M pilots were the equivalent of Canadians wandering around an ice flow with lead pipes, and the Allied pilots played the role of baby harp seals.....


As the IJN hit target after target, wiping out the air defense, then wiping out the enemy air forces and enemy infrastructure, they developed a momentum, and the effect on the Allied air crew can only be imagined. Put yourself in the shoes of a Marine flghter pilot at Midway: " We are going into combat against IJN pilots with better training, years of combat experience, and better fighter aircraft, who have wiped out every opponent they have fought. We have inferior training, no experience, and poor aircraft. We're going to die......"

And, at Midway, that's exactly what happened. The Marine's died.




Respectfully ;

Paul R Ward

[hisashi]

USSBS Report 62 Japanese Air Power was once translated into Japanese. I remember it pointed out that under limited resource, IJN chose to allow so long, intense flight hours for so little number of flight crews. It made difficult to rebuild air power once first stock was gone.

Against broadly shared belief, not so many IJN pilots were lost at Midway. Slow and steady loss, anyway, deteriorated the expertice of IJN pilots.

[Joan Pinyol]

Dear friends,
So impressive were these first months of war at Western eyes, that Intelligence staffs of both British and American armies were compelled to invest many efforts convincing their troops that Japanese soldier was not some kind of superman or a being of the Outer World. There are intelligence documents discussing why Japanese must be considered Human and not Outer World Beings.

[hysteric]

Hello Paul,

Thank you for an enjoyable post.

I think Vichy France was at least a nominal ally of Japan's. Between September and October 1940 the Vichy French and the Japanese Government negotiated the peaceful Japanese Army occupation of northern French Indo-China (although force would have been used if necessary), Hanoi coming under Imperial control on October 7th 1940.

hysteric

[rob0274]

Having lost my point by point reply, I will settle for a generalized one.

Your response, like the books and websites I am reading, seems to equate Japanese achievements and successes to Japanese superiority without scrutiny. That is simply wrong. The fact that Japanese were able to train its pilots does not mean that its training was superior, and the fact that their pilots completed training does not mean that they were superior pilots. Likewise, the fact that the Japanese navy was able to sink isolated ships or surprise a harbor of a neutral nation or establish air superiority over colonial outposts cannot mean that its aviators and aircraft were superior. These successes must have been a combination of several factors, of which training, skill (of individual pilots and of naval aviation as a whole), and aircraft quality are only parts. Yet you (nor the authors I have mentioned earlier) make neither any effort to isolate this supposed superiority nor even to establish it via comparison. You state it as if it simply goes without saying.

This is especially puzzling, considering these same vastly superior pilots flying vastly superior aircraft were curiously ineffective in 1942 when facing the main parts of the US navy. At Coral Sea, both sides scored hits on the other sides' carriers. Only the Zuikaku survived in- tact, but that had nothing to do with the vastly superior skill of the Japanese pilots--unless they were able to summon clouds into being. The Lexington was sunk and the Shoukaku was not, but then again, I wonder if you would be willing to avouch that the Japanese pilots, being so skilled, were able to cause a gas leak and explosion, whereas the US pilots were not. At Midway, the Japanese lost four carriers, despite them being literally full of superiority. Then over the course of 1942, these vastly superior pilots in their vastly superior aircraft lost the battle of attrition against vastly inferior pilots in their vastly inferior aircraft. This is surely strange and calls for some scrutiny into this vast superiority of Japanese pilots and aircraft.

Here is a hypothetical to illustrate my point. Let's say that in January 1939, Germany had placed the major elements of its army next to France and left 100 men guarding the Polish border. Poland then invades and destroys this 100 men garrison. In February Germany returns its army and destroys Poland. Applying the same logic that circulates in the thinking about the Pacific War, this would prove that , in January 1939, Poland had the stronger army and the most skilled and experienced soldiers.

[rob0274]

Against broadly shared belief, not so many IJN pilots were lost at Midway. Slow and steady loss, anyway, deteriorated the expertice of IJN pilots.

It should be noted that IJN's "slow and steady loss" was heavier in proportion to the USN's loss over the same period. Again, these were the same otherworldly pilots who apparently were so talented early in the war as to appear superhuman. They were flying what has been described as vastly superior aircraft, and, by mid-1942, with the benefit of even more flight hours and combat experience, they should by all rights have been close to invincible. Yet they suffer heavier losses than the hapless US navy aviators. Why?

[paulrward]

Hello Mr. Rob0274 ;

Here are two points: First, the IJN was losing pilots, but in return, they had wiped out the airforces in Malaya, the Dutch Indies, the Philippines, Guam, Wake, Indochina, and at Ceylon. To compare the losses of the IJN with the losses of the USN is misleading. Instead, compare the losses of the IJN with the entire Allied " ABDA " force losses. This gives you a better picture of the ability of the IJN pilots.

The training of IJN pilots is worthy of study. The IJN started with the BEST men they could get, and then put them through a highly competitive, highly selective training process. At the end of this, they sent them to China for 'finishing school' Opposed to them were Dutch, French, British, and U.S. pilots who had no combat experience, and in many cases, had spent 5 or 10 years 'flying around the flagpole' as peacetime pilots, who were judged more on how safely they could fly and land their aircraft than on their air to air combat prowess.

Finally, up to the battle of Coral Sea, everywhere the IJN went, they simply kicked ass, and defeated the Allies. There were no refugee pilots from Malaya or the Indies or the Philippines, the pilots there either died or were taken prisoner. The experience they gained was lost. With each successive battle, the veteran IJN pilots would and and again encounter a new set of 'green' pilots who were no match for them. This was a major reason for their victories.

If you study the Red Baron Study undertaken by the USAF after VietNam, they determined that some 80 to 90 % of all fighter pilots die in their first 10 missions. After that, their increased level of experience and awareness might not make them aces, but it at least allows them to stay alive. In effect, the IJN pilots had their first 10 missions in China, against the inneffective Chinese Air Force. The Allied pilots had their first 10 missions fighting the IJN. And, for the most part, they died.

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[Rob Stuart]

... the IJN was losing pilots, but in return, they had wiped out the airforces in Malaya, the Dutch Indies, the Philippines, Guam, Wake, Indochina, and at Ceylon.

There are some problems with this list:

-there were no air forces on Guam
-Indochina was occupied before 7 December and there was no air combat with the Vichy air forces
-the air forces at Ceylon sustained heavy casualties but were not "wiped out"

[rob0274]

Hello Mr. Rob0274 ;

Here are two points: First, the IJN was losing pilots, but in return, they had wiped out the airforces in Malaya, the Dutch Indies, the Philippines, Guam, Wake, Indochina, and at Ceylon. To compare the losses of the IJN with the losses of the USN is misleading. Instead, compare the losses of the IJN with the entire Allied " ABDA " force losses. This gives you a better picture of the ability of the IJN pilots.

One would also have to compare the context in which the Japanese wiped out the air forces in those places and the great numerical strength they enjoyed. There were 4 F4F Wildcats on Wake, against which the IJN brought two aircraft carriers. I wonder if you can attribute their success against those 4 Wildcats entirely to superior skill and experience of the Japanese pilots, or to the superior aviation tactics they employed, without being misleading.

The training of IJN pilots is worthy of study. The IJN started with the BEST men they could get, and then put them through a highly competitive, highly selective training process. At the end of this, they sent them to China for 'finishing school'

One should not make the mistake of assuming that selectivity and length simply equals effectiveness in training, and by extension that the more selective training is therefore more effective. Top Chinese universities today are immensely more selective than Yale and Harvard, yet no one would even entertain the notion that they must therefore be better at training hedgefund managers or engineers or future scholars. There are factors other than selectivity and length involved in training and, if I am not wrong, they seem to predominate. In assuming that selectivity and length are the only meaningful criteria, you are assuming that other factors were equal. This is frankly hard to believe.

Opposed to them were Dutch, French, British, and U.S. pilots who had no combat experience, and in many cases, had spent 5 or 10 years 'flying around the flagpole' as peacetime pilots, who were judged more on how safely they could fly and land their aircraft than on their air to air combat prowess.

I am puzzled by this notion. Yes, the Japanese faced pilots who had no combat experience and who were moreover outnumbered and flying obsolete aircraft. But they were also not the only pilots possessed by these nations, a fact you seem to ignore. The British, for instance, had been fighting a war for two years, during which time their navy pilots achieved some remarkable feats, as well as many more routine ones. On the other hand--if the USSBS summary report is correct--about 10% of Japanese navy pilots had seen combat at the outbreak of the Pacific War.

Finally, up to the battle of Coral Sea, everywhere the IJN went, they simply kicked ass, and defeated the Allies.

And these same pilots could not replicate their successes, everywhere they went. Why?

With each successive battle, the veteran IJN pilots would and and again encounter a new set of 'green' pilots who were no match for them. This was a major reason for their victories.

I wonder if the immense numerical, tactical, and strategic advantages they enjoyed might have played a role. And it is also worth asking what was the major reason for their failure to emerge victorious against the USN in carrier battles or (as in Santa Cruz Islands) 'win' only at the cost of mindboggling human capital losses.

If you study the Red Baron Study undertaken by the USAF after VietNam, they determined that some 80 to 90 % of all fighter pilots die in their first 10 missions. After that, their increased level of experience and awareness might not make them aces, but it at least allows them to stay alive. In effect, the IJN pilots had their first 10 missions in China, against the inneffective Chinese Air Force. The Allied pilots had their first 10 missions fighting the IJN. And, for the most part, they died.

I wonder where you derive this notion that the IJN pilots were good at staying alive. I think it is fairly well established that it was the entire IJN pilot corps that effectively died out in 1942. Reading the accounts of Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons, and Santa Cruz Island, one encounters over and over again the IJN pilots suffering horrific attrition.

[paulrward]

Hello Mr. Rob0274

As for the notion that the IJN pilots were good at staying alive, in fact, prior to Midway, their losses had been relatively light. After that, it was a war of attrition against a steadily increasing number of USN/USMC/USAAF pilots. Very simply, when the odds were even or in the favor of the IJN, they did VERY well. When the odds were against them, it was a war of attrition, and, with their long training cycles, small replacement cadres, and no improvement in the quality of their equipment in the face of greatly and rapidly improving Allied aircraft, the IJN pilots were on a treadmill to extinction.

Mr. Rob0274, try this: Look at the Pacific War only up to May 1, 1942. Compare loss rates, kill to loss ratios, and the results of the battles. If you do, it will give you some idea of why, on May 1, 1942, the IJN aviators had gained the reputation of being the best.

Respectfully ;

Paul R. Ward

[Mil-tech Bard]

There were other aspects to the Japanese superiority over Allied ground forces that has been only slightly touched upon in the Pacific War histories.

The Imperial Japanese Army infantry units were far more heavily equipped with machine guns and light mortars than the Chinese Army and the colonial infantry -- British, Dutch and US-Filipino -- it faced.

See the following post by Richard Anderson --

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 5&start=60

Re: Philippine Army 1941-42
Post Number:#64 by RichTO90 on 15 Mar 2011, 15:21

nebelwerferXXX wrote:
The 100,000 Filipino soldiers were integrated to the USAFFE. The Philippine Scouts (division-sized) were a part of the US Army. The Philippine Scouts' Officers and NCOs were Americans, one regiment of which were an all American regiment. Fully equipped with 105mm howitzers, machine guns, SMGs, rifles, pistols, motorized transport, armored cars and horses...

Not quite ...the PS were not actually a separate division, but were part of the U.S. Army, comprising two infantry, one cavalry, and two artillery regiments (each single-battalion equivalents), making up about two-thirds of the Philippine Division, as well as Coast Artillery and support elements. The American contingent of USAFFE included a single two-battalion infantry regiment, two artillery regiments (one two- and one single-battalion), two strong provisional SPM artillery battalions (24 pieces in each plus two reserve), and a two-battalion provisional tank group (106 M3 Light Tanks), plus Coast Artillery and other.

The Philippine Army proper consisted of a regular division that had been stripped of cadre pre Pearl Harbor to use, along with 400 U.S. and PS officers and 200 U.S. NCOs in mobilizing the ten reserve divisions. The 1st Regular Division was not reactivated until late December with mobilizing men, so had exactly the same lack of training and experience as the reserve divisions; its artillery component was never activated. The regiments and divisional units of the reserve divisions were mobilized sequentially starting in August 1941 from a pool of men that had received five months of basic training in the ten bi-yearly classes inducted since reserve conscription was enacted in 1937. However, the divisions had never been mobilized and their regiments and battalions had never been organized prior to the mobilization beginning in August 1941. The result was that the first regiments had about 13 weeks of unit training as a regiment (some less since the initial call-ups also had to do the construction to build the mobilization camps), the second 5, and the third none. The artillery was not actually mobilized until 8-12 December and that intended for the Mindanao forces never arrived since its transport was sunk en route from Luzon where the guns had been stored. In theory the ten classes mobilized as of August 1941 comprised a pool of around 200,000 trained men, but all indications are that about 125,000 eventually were mobilized (based upon numbers surrendered and later pension claims). Of those, perhaps 7,000-8,000 cadred from the 1st Regular division, plus the 600 USA and PS officers and men seconded as advisors, had any real training and experience...call it three-quarters of a percent and you will be exaggerating...

In no sense were any of the units "fully equipped"...especially the Philippine Army ones. USA Field Artillery comprised 24 M1916 75mm and possibly 12 M1897 75mm, Philippine and PS field artillery comprised 24 155mm M1917 "GPF" guns shipped without sighting equipment, 124 M1916 and M1917 75mm Guns, 52 ex-Indian Army 2,95" mountain guns, and 36 "3-inch" weapons that otherwise remain unidentified, but which may have been M1902, M1905, or M1906 Guns. The nominal requirement for the USAFFE and PA artillery (41 battalions) was 492 pieces...so 55.3% equipped (altthough the 50 75mm SPM made up for it a bit). Their were no, none, zero, zilch 105mm M2 Howitzers inthe Philippines and none overseas at the time...fewer than 500 existed and only about 300 had been issued in CONUS. The first that went overseas did so with the 1st, 29th, and 34th Divisions and the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions, along with the ones sent to Eighth Army in September 1942.

In terms of machineguns the U.S. and PS had their normal peacetime allotment, which was about two-thirds the mobilized one, while the Philippine units had was that there was "one Browning automatic rifle for each infantry company and eight .30-caliber Browning water-cooled machine guns for each machine gun company. Each infantry regiment had two .50-caliber machine guns and six 3-inch trench mortars, 70 percent of the ammunition for which proved to be duds", Fall of the Philippines page 29.

As a comparison, the then contemporary US Army divisional TO&E included 375 BAR, the Filipino organization 27, there would have been 179 .30 caliber MG, the Filipinos had 72, there would have been 113 .50 caliber MG, the Filipinos had six, there would have been 36 81mm and 81 60mm mortars, the Filipinos had 18 3-inch mortars...so the mobilized Philippine regiment had roughly the firepower of a wartime US battalion and the whole division that of about a regiment. The P17 rifles equipping most of the infantry units were also problematic, but the PS did receive Garands; 6,536 M1 rifles, 22,612 M1903 Springfields, and 238,725 M1917 Enfield-types were in the Philippine inventory on 3 November. The 31st, 45th (PS), and 57th (PS) Infantry and 26th Cavalry (PS) all had Garands, the 4th Marines Springfields, and most of the rest of the US and PS were issued Springfields while the PA were mostly equipped with the P17, many of which had rusted extractors that tore the base off the cartridge or jammed after firing, so they were issued with rods to clear them after firing.

One extempore supplement was taken from the port of Luzon where the transport carrying much of the equipment for the Canadian contingent in Hong Kong put in after Pearl Harbor. The Carriers, Bren guns, and reportedly some 3" mortars were used by the Provisional Tank Group.

Cheers!

Richard Anderson
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall: the 1st Assault Brigade Royal Engineers on D-Day
Stackpole Books, 2009.

Compare that with Japanese Infantry machine gun firepower, via this post from Fontessa --


http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... 0#p1761003

Re: Some questions about infantry platoon organization
Post Number:#4 by fontessa on 07 Jan 2013, 15:40

Good morning Eugen Pinak:

Eugen Pinak wrote:
I know, that 1936 TO&E specified for war time 4 15-men squads (3 rifle, 1 grenade discharger) in platoon + 2-men HQ.
,why squad size was reduced?

Unfortunately I can't see the organization table in 1936. Because I can't confirm them, I can't answer the question. If I dared to have guessed, the Army reduced the number of riflemen, in order to increase the number of divisions.
.
Eugen Pinak wrote:
Do you know - is this organization remained the same until the end of the war?

By Army Regulation "A"s which were issued in early 1945, many divisions and independent mixed brigades were organized or re-organized for the preparations of "???? Battle of Japan Mainland". Some divisions had the same organization as that of 1941. Others had somewhat different organizations as follows. Command sections were omitted in the below.
? Type I for ?????? Mobile Striking Divisions
- 1st ~ 3rd squads: 13 men with a light machinegun and 11 rifles
- 4th squad: 13 men with 3 heavy grenade dischargers and 10 rifles
? Type II for ?????? Coast Deployment Divisions
- 1st and 2nd squads: 6 men with 2 heavy machineguns
- 3rd ~ 5th squads: 8 men with a light machineguns and 7 rifles
- 6th squad: 10 men with 3 heavy grenade dischargers and 7 rifles
The source is Senshi Sosho "?????? The Preparations for Battle of Japan Mainland".

Eugen Pinak wrote:
I've seen mention, that in 1945 grenade dischargers squads were disbanded and its' soldiers (and grenade dischargers) were included in 3 "line" squads

All divisions and independent mixed brigades were to have "grenade discharger squads" on the equipment tables. But I guess that some of them were not organized because of the shortage of heavy grenade dischargers.

fontessa

An IJA infantry Platoon of 1941-late 1942 was facing colonial infantry it had three times the machine gun fire power at platoon level and with its organic 50mm grenade dischargers they had an organic indirect fire capability to destroy the proportionately fewer Allied Machine guns in short order.

Add to that the fact that most Japanese Army units were blooded in the 1937-1941 China war, were hitting green colonial infantry with faulty weapons, and the few places they faced enemy infantry with equivalent machine gun firepower (See Malaya and early Burma fighting)
the Japanese had either or both tanks and air superiority, the early Japanese Air-Sea-Land blitzkrieg makes a great deal more sense.

In all three of he IJA's early repulses, the Kakoda Trail, Milne Bay and Guadalcanal, it faced equivalently machine gun armed infantry (Australians and US Marines) as well as enemy air superiority.

[Mil-tech Bard]

One more minor Japanese infantry advantage that turned up in Malaya, New Guinea and the Solomons --

The Japanese Ariska rifle in 6.5mm was over long due to the spear kata the IJA adopted in lieu of European bayonet fighting techniques. Japanese spear kata was for dealing with riders on horse back among other things, so the Ariska rifle was given a barrel length that could do that. This gave the IJA a bolt action rifle with neither flash nor smoke in the Malaya, Solomons islands and New Guinea jungle fighting because their barrel was so long.

The longer Ariska rifle barrel allowed a more complete burn of Japanese 6.5mm cartridge propellant that larger caliber Allied rifles.

This positively unnerved British, US and Australian ground troops in early jungle fighting and there were a whole series of US Army Ordnance Corps and US Navy Bureau of Ordnance reports explaining this facet of Japanese small arms performance in late 1942-early 1943.

Imperial Japanese Army procurement never noticed any of this and was in the process of replacing the 6.5mm cartridge with 7.7 mm cartridge as the war was ending.

[Wellgunde]

Getting back on track, the original question was about the IJN’s aviation forces. This supposed IJN aviation superiority seems to be the accepted conventional wisdom among many, many authors. I don’t think it is possible to identify the source(s) of this evaluation without doing a considerable amount of research.

Qualitative analysis. I think to either prove or disprove the premise it would be necessary to examine 1. Pre-war U.S. naval attaché reports 2. CINCPAC-CINCPOA analytical reports on Japanese naval aviation. 3. The records of the Congressional and military boards and hearings which investigated the Pearl Harbor attack. 4. Post war interviews and interrogations of Japanese naval aviators 5. A statistical analysis of IJN, USN, and RN combat sorties vs. loss ratios. 6. A statistical analysis of IJN, USN, and RN operational aircraft vs. total aircraft. 7. A detailed comparison of IJN, USN, and RN naval aviation training curricula. In particular, how many flying hours were required before a pilot trainee was considered fit for combat operations and numbers of trainees in the pipeline at any given time. 8. An analysis of IJN naval aviation logistics and maintenance policies and procedures. 9. Combat flying hour experience of IJN, USN, and RN naval aviators at particular stages of the war. 10. Mental and physical backgrounds and requirements for aviation pilot trainees accepted by the IJN, USN, and RN. 11. Training failure rates and accidents. 12. Comparison of performance characteristics between IJN, USN, and RN naval aircraft 13. Weapons effectiveness. This is just off the top of my head, I’m sure we can think of other criteria which might contribute to answering the question.

Subjective analysis. I am inclined to believe that the supposed early superiority of IJN naval aviation has been based largely on emotional responses following the attack on Pearl Harbor up until the Battle of Midway. 1. Contemporary press and radio reporting was often alarmist and sometimes defeatist. 2. Statements by some senior government and military personnel in both the United States and Britain extolled the superiority of the Japanese fighting man. Sometimes it is easier to cover up or paper over government and military incompetence and unpreparedness by exaggerating enemy capabilities. 3. Postwar revelations of the intensive planning and training undertaken by the Kido Butai prior to the Pearl Harbor operation has perhaps been wrongly extrapolated to include all aspects of Japanese naval aviation in the early war period.

What do Morrison, Prange, Willmott, Spector, Costello, Lord and Toland have to say on the topic?

[rob0274]

Getting back on track, the original question was about the IJN’s aviation forces. This supposed IJN aviation superiority seems to be the accepted conventional wisdom among many, many authors. I don’t think it is possible to identify the source(s) of this evaluation without doing a considerable amount of research.

This, and the questions you identified later, would indeed be essential. I find it most interesting that reputable authors like Evans & Peattie repeat the unexamined evaluation without even considering that it may demand further research. This is doubly so, because their own narrative of the IJN paints a picture of a dysfunctional organization obsessed with and generally bungling their war preparations because of the notion of superiority, both in technological and in human resources.

What do Morrison, Prange, Willmott, Spector, Costello, Lord and Toland have to say on the topic?

I am merely beginning to read into the subject (WW2 in the Pacific); this interest being merely a hobby, I've unfortunately not read very deeply into it. Thank you all the same for providing a reading list.